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A  Phenomenological  Study  of  Mania  and  Depression  
Hannah  Mary  Bowden  
Abstract  
In   this   thesis   I   develop   a   cohesive   phenomenological   account   of   mania   and  
depression.  Whilst  phenomenological   insights  have  been  applied   to  a  number  
of  psychiatric  disorders  –  most  notably  schizophrenia  –  mania,  depression,  and  
bipolar  disorder  have  been  neglected.  In  developing  my  account  I  challenge  the  
common   understanding   of   mania   and   depression   as   opposed.   Through   an  
examination   of   bodily   and   temporal   experiences   in   mania   and   depression   I  
unearth   deeper   structural   commonalities.   This   allows   for   greater   insight   into  
the   relationship   between   the   two   states   and   casts   light   on   ‘mixed   episodes’,  
where  features  of  mania  and  depression  co-­‐‑occur.   In  my  exploration  of  bodily  
experience   I   argue   for   an   understanding   of   the   depressed   body   as  
‘corporealized’.   I   show  how  this  helps  us   to  understand  common  descriptions  
of   the   body   and   the   world   found   in   first   person   accounts.   I   challenge   the  
intuitive   distinction   between   the   body   as   active   and   invisible   and   inactive   and  
conspicuous  by  showing   that   the  manic  body   is  both  conspicuous  and  active.   I  
argue  that  we  can  enhance  our  understanding  of  this  bodily  experience  through  
an  appreciation  of   the  associated   temporal  experience.  Turning   to   the   topic  of  
time,   I   reveal   the   inadequacies   of   accounts   that   suggest   that   alterations   in  
experiences   of   time   in   mania   and   depression   are   restricted   to   changes   in  
temporal  velocity.  Using  the  Husserlian  concepts  of  ‘retention’  and  ‘protention’  
I   develop   a   new   model   of   temporal   experience   in   mania   and   depression,  
arguing  that  in  addition  to  changes  in  temporal  velocity  we  also  find  changes  in  
temporal  structure.  This  account  allows  us  to  understand  common  experiences  
in  mania,   including   feelings  of  grandiosity,   a   loss  of   reflection,   and   the  active  
yet   conspicuous   body.   Likewise,   it   casts   light   on   experiences   common   in  
depression,  including  guilt,  a  perception  of  recovery  as  impossible,  and  feelings  
of  separation  from  others.  
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Introduction  
The   aim   of   this   thesis   is   to   provide   a   cohesive   phenomenological   account   of  
mania  and  depression.  Whilst  there  is  a  long  and  productive  history  of  dialogue  
between   phenomenology   and   psychiatry,   mania,   depression,   and   bipolar  
disorder  have  been  largely  neglected.1  This  stands   in  stark  contrast   to   the  rich  
vein   of   work   undertaken   on   schizophrenia   (e.g.   Sass,   2001;   Sass   and   Parnas,  
2007;   Gallagher,   2006).   Recent   interest   in   depression   has   gone   some   way  
towards  rectifying  the  situation  (e.g.  Fuchs,  2005a;  Ratcliffe,  2010;  Wyllie,  2005).  
However,   mania   remains   relatively   overlooked   and   few   phenomenological  
accounts   seek   to   place   both   states   within   the   same   framework.   A   unified  
account  allows  us  to  unearth  otherwise  overlooked  continuities  and  disparities  
in  the  structures  which  underlie  both  states.    
In  developing  this  account  I  focus  on  two  central  areas:  Experiences  of  the  body  
and  experiences  of  time.  Each  of  these  plays  a  central  role  in  the  structuring  of  
experience  and  descriptions  of  alterations  in  experiences  of  the  body  and  time  
are   a   striking   feature   of   first   person   accounts   of   mania   and   depression.  
Furthermore,   an   analysis   of   these   alterations   provides   us   with   the   means   to  
understand   experiences   of   the   world   and   experiences   of   other   people,   thus  
paving   the   way   for   a   comprehensive   philosophical   account   of   mania   and  
depression.  
I  aim  to  challenge  the  simple  opposition  between  mania  and  depression  that  is  
frequently  found  in  everyday  discourse.  I  offer  a  new  model  that  reveals  deeper  
commonalities  between  these  two  states,  thus  casting  light  on  their  relationship.  
                                                                                                 
1  For  more  on  the  relationship  between  phenomenology  and  psychiatry,  see  Broome  et  al.  
(2012).    
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In   the   process   I   make   explicit   various   assumptions   made   by   philosophers,  
challenging  and  refining  existing  accounts  of  bodily  and  temporal  experience.  
Drawing   on   work   by   Thomas   Fuchs   (2003;   2005a),   I   argue   that   in   cases   of  
depression   there   is  a   ‘corporealization’  of   the   lived  body.  By   this,   I  mean   that  
the   body   loses   its   everyday   transparency   and   is   experienced   as   distressingly  
object-­‐‑like.   This   account   of   the   body   in   depression   allows   us   to   understand  
common  descriptions   found   in   first  person  narratives  of   the  body  as   “heavy”  
and   “tired”,   as   well   as   evaluative   descriptions   of   the   body   as   “useless”   and  
“disgusting”.  Throughout   this   thesis   I  make  use  of  such   first  person  narrative  
accounts.  However,  I  take  care  to  reflect  on  my  use  of  them,  remaining  alert  to  
potentially   problematic   features   of   narratives,   including   issues   of   motivation  
and  cultural  influence.  Despite  these  concerns,  I  suggest  that  the  context,  focus,  
and  structure  of  such  accounts  can  help  to  provide  us  with  access  to  features  of  
experiences  of  mania  and  depression  that  may  not  be  easily  accessible  through  
other  means.   Used   judiciously   and   in   conjunction  with   other   resources   these  
first  person  narrative  accounts  can  be  productively  used   in  phenomenological  
studies.    
When  studying  these  narrative  accounts  we  find  frequent  reference  to  increased  
activity   in   mania.   Whilst   philosophers   have   largely   ignored   the   topic   of   the  
body   in  mania,   Fuchs  provides   a   relevant  distinction  between   the   conspicuous  
and   inactive   body   and   the   invisible   and   active   body   (e.g.   2003).   Given   this  
understanding   of   bodily   experience,   we   might   assume   that   the   manic   body  
would  fade  out  of  the  person’s  awareness  –  it  would  be  invisible  to  the  person.  
However,   I   argue   that   this   account   of   the   manic   body   is   incorrect.   Instead,  
drawing   on   first   person   accounts   of  mania,   I   suggest   that   the  manic   body   is  
conspicuous   and   active.   This   challenges   Fuchs’s   distinction   and   highlights   a  
need   for   a   more   nuanced   understanding   of   bodily   experience   in   mania   and  
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depression.  I  argue  that  this  understanding  can  be  developed  partly  through  an  
appreciation  of  the  alterations  to  temporal  experience  that  occur  in  these  states.  
Accounts   of   temporal   experience   in  mania   and  depression   frequently   suggest  
that  time  is  experienced  as  slowing  down  in  cases  of  depression  and  speeding  up  
in   cases   of   mania   (e.g.   Fuchs,   2013a).   Taking   these   accounts   as   my   starting  
point,  I  explore  how  a  decrease  of  ‘conation’  (a  basic  forward-­‐‑directed  drive  or  
momentum)   may   bring   about   common   features   of   depressed   experience,  
including  feelings  of  isolation  from  others.  Similarly,  I  show  how  an  increase  of  
conation  may   feature   as   part   of   the  manic   experience.  However,   I   argue   that  
experiences   of   time   in  mania   and   depression   cannot   be   explained  merely   by  
reference   to   temporal   velocity;   we   must   also   take   into   account   alterations   to  
temporal  structure.  
Husserl   proposes   a   tripartite   structure   of   temporal   consciousness   (e.g.   1991).2  
Within   the   ‘now’   phase  we   find   our   awareness   of   the   immediate   present,   as  
well   as   our   ‘retention’   of   the   immediate   past   and   our   ‘protention’   of   the  
immediate   future.   Drawing   on   work   by  Matthew   Ratcliffe   (2012a),   I   suggest  
that  in  cases  of  depression  there  is  not  only  a  diminishment  of  conation,  there  is  
also  an  impoverishment  of  protention  –  the  anticipation  of  the  immediate  future.  
I   explore   the   links   between   protention   and   retention,   arguing   that   an  
impoverishment   of   protention   entails   an   impoverishment   of   retention.   An  
appreciation   of   the   alterations   in   temporal   structure   that   occur   in   depression  
enriches  our  understanding  of  the  state,  casting  light  on  common  experiences  of  
mild  fragmentation.  
Similarly,   I   show   that   mania   cannot   be   understood   as   merely   an   increase   of  
conation.   I   argue   that   in   manic   states   the   person’s   retentional   capacity,   his  
awareness  of  the  immediate  past,  is  weakened.  I  demonstrate  how,  in  contrast  
                                                                                                 
2  The  original  publication  dates  for  the  texts  used  in  this  thesis  can  be  found  in  the  reference  list.      
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to   accounts   that   focus   merely   on   temporal   velocity,   my   account   of   temporal  
experience   in   mania   provides   us   with   the   means   of   understanding   the  
experiences  of   fragmentation  and   loss  of   reflection   that  are   common   in  manic  
states.  Furthermore,  my  account  of  mania  helps  us  to  make  sense  of  the  manic  
experience  of  the  body.  I  argue  that  the  weakening  of  retention  that  we  see  in  
mania  causes  the  person  to  experience  an  excess  of  possibilities  in  the  world  –  
the  world  drawing  him  in  to  constant  action.  Thus,  the  body  is  active.  However,  
the   weakening   of   retention   also   prevents   meaningful   engagement.   I   suggest  
that  without  this  meaningful  engagement  the  body  fails  to  fade  out  of  conscious  
awareness.  Thus,  the  body  is  conspicuous.  The  account  of  mania  that  I  develop  
in   this   thesis   therefore  grants  us  greater   insight   into   the  seemingly  difficult   to  
understand   experience   of   mania,   as   well   as   highlighting   the   intimate  
relationship   between   experiences   of   time   and   experiences   of   the   body.  
Throughout   my   discussion   of   temporal   experience   I   focus   on   developing   an  
accurate  account  of  experiences  of  time  in  mania  and  depression,  as  well  aiming  
to   refine   descriptions   of   temporal   experience   more   generally   –   including  
revealing  the  relationship  between  shorter  and  longer-­‐‑term  temporal  structures,  
and   the   connections   between   experiences   of   time,   the   body,   the   world,   and  
other  people.    
Superficially,  mania   and   depression   appear   to   be   polar   opposites   –   one   state  
characterised  by  elation,  the  other  by  extreme  sadness.  Given  this,  it  is  difficult  
to   understand   the   existence   of   ‘mixed   episodes’   or   ‘states’,  where   features   of  
mania  and  depression  occur  simultaneously.  Seeking  to  address  this  challenge  
of  mixed  states,  I  provide  accounts  of  mania  and  depression  that  accommodate  
the   possibility   of   this   co-­‐‑occurrence,   as   well   as   exploring   the   relationship  
between  the  two  states.    In  doing  this  I  challenge  the  conception  of  mania  and  
depression   as   two   ‘pure’   states   that   directly   oppose   each   other,   instead  
developing  accounts  that  provide  insight  into  a  variety  of  different  experiences  
in  bipolar  disorder.  
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Thesis  Outline  
This  is  a  phenomenological  study  of  mania  and  depression.  As  such,  we  must  
first  be  clear  on  what  phenomenology  is  and  on  its  relationship  with  psychiatry.  
I   therefore   begin   chapter   one   by   describing   phenomenology   and   the  
phenomenological  method.  Using  the  work  of  Husserl  (e.g.  1983),  I  discuss  the  
need  to  move  beyond  what  he  calls  the  ‘natural  attitude’  in  order  to  reveal  that  
which  is  taken  for  granted  in  our  everyday  experiences.  This  includes  the  way  
in  which  we  are  practically  embedded  in  the  world  –  a  sense  of  belonging  to  the  
world.   I   highlight   how   these   features   of   experience   may   alter   in   cases   of  
psychiatric  disorders  and  so  how  the  phenomenological  method  may  contribute  
to  our  understanding  of  these  disorders,  helping  us  to  make  sense  of  seemingly  
incomprehensible  experiences.  I  draw  on  work  by  Parnas  and  Zahavi  (2002)  to  
suggest  that  we  can  use  phenomenology  in  order  to  influence  the  classification  
of  psychiatric  disorders   and,   following  Minkowski   (1970),   I  draw  attention   to  
how  phenomenology  can  help  us   to  move  beyond  superficial  presentations  of  
psychiatric   disorders.   Beyond   classification,   I   argue   that   phenomenology   can  
play  a  distinctive  role  in  helping  those  with  psychiatric  disorders  to  understand  
and  articulate   their  experiences,  potentially  alleviating  some  of   the   feelings  of  
isolation   that   are   commonly   reported.   I   argue   that   the   relationship   between  
phenomenology   and   psychiatry   is   a   reciprocal   one,   and   review   some   of   the  
ways  in  which  the  study  of  psychiatric  disorders  may  aid  us  in  improving  our  
phenomenological  accounts.    
With   this   account   of   phenomenology   in   place,   and   having   explored   the  
mutually   beneficial   relationship   between   phenomenology   and   psychiatry,   I  
turn   in   chapter   two   to   questions   concerning   the   nature   of  mania,   depression,  
and   bipolar   disorder,   and   ask  whether   there   is   a   need   for   phenomenological  
studies   in   this   area.   I   begin   by  providing   an   overview  of   the   history   of   these  
categories,   highlighting   how   the   individual   categories   and   the   relationship  
between  them  has  changed.   In  doing  so,   I  demonstrate   the   instability  of   these  
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categories.   I   then   move   on   to   discuss   contemporary   classifications   of   mania,  
depression,  and  bipolar  disorder,   focussing  on   the   criteria  given   in   the   fourth  
and   fifth   editions   of   the   American   Psychiatric   Association’s   Diagnostic   and  
Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  (APA,  2000;  2013).  I  note  the  continued  
instability  in  even  these  contemporary  classifications,  and  discuss  a  number  of  
debates   that   have   arisen   from   the   2013   publication   of   the   fifth   edition   of   the  
Diagnostic   and   Statistical  Manual   of  Mental   Disorders   (DSM-­‐‑5)   (APA,   2013).  
These  include  the  challenge  of    ‘Mixed  Episodes’,  where  features  of  mania  and  
depression   co-­‐‑occur,   as   well   as   the   difficulties   involved   in   distinguishing  
between   mania,   depression,   and   everyday   distress.   Such   debates,   I   suggest,  
highlight   the   need   for   greater   understanding   of   these   states.   I   then   consider  
how  we  can  begin   to   study   these  experiences,   clarifying  my  use  of   the   fourth  
edition  of  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  (DSM-­‐‑IV)  
(APA,   2000)   and   outlining   how   we   can   develop   an   account   of   mania   and  
depression   that   moves   beyond   the   complexities   of   individual   experiences  
without  abandoning  the  aim  of  describing  experiences  of  these  states.  
Having   established   why   we   might   want   to   develop   a   phenomenological  
account   of  mania   and  depression,   and  having  outlined  how  we   can  go   about  
developing  such  an  account,  we  must  next  explore  what  resources  we  can  draw  
on  to  gain  access  to  reliable  descriptions  of  these  experiences.  In  chapter  three  I  
therefore  focus  on  narratives  of  mania  and  depression,  assessing  the  value  and  
reliability  of  such  accounts.  I  argue  that  first  person  narrative  accounts  can  be  a  
useful  resource  for  phenomenologists,  noting  the  value  of  the  context  provided  
in   these   accounts,   the   insight   narratives   offer   into   the   relationship   the  person  
has  with  his  or  her  disorder,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  structure  of  a  narrative  
can   be   revealing   of   the   described   experience.   I   go   on   to   outline   some   of   the  
potential  problems  with  narrative  accounts.  These   include  the  extent   to  which  
the  person  may  compromise  the  accuracy  of  the  account  in  order  to  adapt  it  to  
established  narrative   structures,   the   role  of   social  and  cultural   influences,  and  
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the   existence  of  potentially  distorting  personal  or   editorial  motivations.   I   take  
care   to   note   the   ways   in   which   narratives   of   mania   and   depression   may   be  
particularly  vulnerable  to  certain  distortions.  Following  this,  I  explain  how  we  
can   corroborate   the   descriptions   found   in   first   person   narratives   through   the  
use   of   additional   resources,   including   questionnaire   studies.   I   introduce   the  
Durham   Depression   Questionnaire,   a   web-­‐‑based   questionnaire   on   the  
experience   of   depression   that   I   developed   with   colleagues   in   the   project  
“Emotional  Experience   in  Depression:  A  Philosophical  Study”.   I  conclude   this  
chapter  by  outlining  the  role  that  narratives  of  depression  and  mania  can  play  
in   phenomenological   study,   including   how   we   can   remain   mindful   of   the  
limitations  of  such  resources.  
First  person  narratives  of  mania  and  depression  frequently  describe  alterations  
in  experiences  of  the  body.  In  chapter  four  I  therefore  turn  to  bodily  experience,  
seeking   to   understand   these   changes   and   how   they   impact   on   the   person’s  
wider  experiences,  including  experiences  of  the  world.  I  begin  by  outlining  the  
everyday   experience   of   the   body,   as   discussed   in   the  work   of  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  
(e.g.   2002)   and   Sartre   (e.g.   2003).   I   particularly   note   the   body’s   role   in  
structuring  our  experience  of  the  world,  and  how  it  typically  takes  on  a  degree  
of  transparency  when  a  person  is  active  in  the  world.  Turning  to  experiences  of  
the   body   in  depression,   I   draw  on   the  work   of   Fuchs   (e.g.   2005a)   in   order   to  
argue   for   an   understanding   of   the   depressed   body   as   ‘corporealized’.   I   note  
how   this   account   of   the   depressed   body   helps   us   to   understand   common  
descriptions   of   experience   in   depression.   This   includes   the   body   feeling  
“leaden”   or   “heavy”,   evaluative   claims  made   about   the   body   and   the   self   as  
“useless”  or  “disgusting”,  as  well  as  accounting  for  some  of  the  difficulties  the  
depressed   person   experiences   when   attempting   to   act   in   the   world.   Having  
established   this   account  of  bodily   experience   in  depression,   I   turn  next   to   the  
topic  of  mania.  I  begin  by  highlighting  Fuchs’s  implied  distinction  between  the  
inactive   and   conspicuous   body   and   the   active   and   transparent   body   (e.g.   2003).  
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Given  the  increased  activity  in  states  of  mania,  I  suggest  that  we  might  initially  
assume   that   bodily   experience   in  mania  would   be   characterised   by   increased  
transparency.   I   discuss   what   an   account   of   this   type   might   look   like   and  
consider  what  some  of  the  advantages  of  adopting  it  might  be.  However,   I  go  
on   to   show   that  we  must   ultimately   reject   accounts   of   this   type.  Drawing   on  
first   person   descriptions   of   mania   I   show   that   far   from   the   body   becoming  
increasing  transparent,  it  in  fact  becomes  conspicuous  during  manic  states.  The  
active   and   conspicuous   body   of   mania   thus   directly   challenges   Fuchs’s  
distinction.  However,  it  also  leaves  us  with  questions  regarding  how  we  should  
understand   the   bodily   experiences   of   mania   and   depression.   How   can   the  
manic   body   be   both   active   in   the   world   and   yet   not   fade   from   explicit  
awareness?   I   suggest   that   one   possible   answer   lies   in   the   ways   that   time   is  
experienced  in  both  mania  and  depression.  
In   chapter   five   I   therefore   turn   to   the   topic   of   time,   exploring   how   temporal  
experience   is   altered   in   cases  of  mania   and  depression.  Using   the   concepts  of  
‘objective’  and  ‘subjective’  time,  I  put  forward  a  basic  account  of  how  time  may  
subjectively  appear  to  slow  down  in  cases  of  depression  and  speed  up  in  cases  
of  mania.  I  make  use  of  psychological  studies  (e.g.  Bschor  et  al,  2004)  and  first  
person  accounts  in  order  to  assess  the  accuracy  of  such  an  account.  Whilst  I  note  
that   this   basic   account   does   go   some  way   towards   helping   us   to   understand  
temporal   experiences   of   mania   and   depression,   I   argue   that   it   does   not  
adequately   capture   the   full   complexities   of   such   experiences.   Continuing   the  
chapter,  I   therefore  return  to  the  concept  of  subjective  time.  Drawing  on  work  
by  Fuchs  (2013a)  and  Ratcliffe  (2012a)  I  outline  the  roles  played  by  ‘conation’  (a  
basic   forward  directed  drive)  and   ‘temporal  synthesis’   (the  continuity   that  we  
experience  through  time).  I  provide  a  Husserlian  account  of  temporal  synthesis,  
explaining   how   our   ‘retention’   of   the   immediate   past   and   ‘protention’   of   the  
immediate   future   allows   for   a   unification   of   temporal   experience.   With   this  
account  of  subjective  time  in  place,  I  go  on  to  discuss  how  experiences  of  time  
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alter   in   cases   of   depression.   In   line   with   Fuchs   (2013a)   and   Wyllie   (2005),   I  
suggest   that   an   appreciation   of   intersubjective   time   can   enhance   our  
understanding   of   the   temporal   experience   of   depression.   I   further   draw   on  
work  by  Fuchs  (2013a),  Ratcliffe  (2012a),  and  Wyllie  (2005)  to  argue  that  there  is  
a  loss  of  conation  in  cases  of  depression,  with  a  resultant  desynchronization  of  
intersubjective  time.  I  note  how  this  account  of  temporal  experience  can  help  us  
to  understand  common  features  of  depression,  including  increased  experiences  
of  guilt,  and  a  perception  of  depression  as  eternal  and  recovery  as  impossible.    
Turning  to  cases  of  mania,  I  argue  that  the  manic  experience  of  time  cannot  be  
adequately   understood   simply   through   appeal   to   alterations   in   temporal  
velocity.   Instead,   I  propose   that   the  manic  person  experiences  a  weakening  of  
retention   –   the   perception   and   appreciation   of   the   just-­‐‑past.   I   show   how   this  
disruption   accounts   for   a   number   of   common   features   of   manic   states,  
including   reports   of   the   fragmentation   of   time,   a   loss   of   reflection,   a   loss   of  
engagement,   and   a   diminished   sense   of   ownership   of   action.   I   conclude   the  
chapter   by   addressing   some   initial   concerns   that  might   be   raised   against   this  
account  of  temporal  experience  in  mania.  
A   full   understanding   of   the   experience   of   time   in   mania   and   depression  
requires  an  appreciation  of  alterations  in  both  shorter  and  longer-­‐‑term  temporal  
structures.  I  therefore  begin  chapter  six  with  a  discussion  of  the  ways  in  which  
we   are   situated   in   time   due   to   our   projects,   commitments,   and  
self-­‐‑interpretations.  Drawing  on  work  by  Matthew  Ratcliffe  (2012a),   I  examine  
the   relationship   between   projects,   possibilities   that   appear   as   ‘relevant’,   and  
possibilities  that  appear  as  ‘enticing’.  I  explore  the  ways  in  which  these  related  
features  can  be  affected  in  cases  of  depression,  and  show  how  the  alteration  or  
loss  of   them  can  account   for  experiences   that  are  commonly  described   in   first  
person   accounts.   These   include   experiences   of   time   as   cyclical,   feelings   of  
separation   from   the   world,   and   an   experience   of   the   world   as   having   lost  
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meaning.    Following  this,  I  examine  the  relationship  between  these  longer-­‐‑term  
temporal  structures,  and   the  shorter-­‐‑term  structures  of  conation  and   temporal  
synthesis  that  I   introduced  in  chapter  five.   I  outline  Ratcliffe’s  (2012a)  account  
of   how   protention   –   the   anticipation   of   the   immediate   future   –   may   be  
impoverished   in   cases   of   depression.   Building   on   this,   I   argue   that   an  
impoverishment   of   protention   necessarily   entails   an   impoverishment   of  
retention,  and  use  first  person  descriptions  of  depression  to  illustrate  how  this  
impoverishment   may   be   experienced.   In   this   first   section   of   chapter   six   I  
therefore  aim  to  enrich  my  account  of  temporal  experience  in  depression  as  well  
as  reveal  the  relationships  between  shorter  and  longer-­‐‑term  structures  of  time.  
Next,   I   return   to   the   topic   of   temporal   experience   in  mania.   I   argue   that   the  
weakening   of   retention   that   occurs   in  manic   states   prevents   the  development  
and   maintenance   of   projects.   I   suggest   that   the   loss   of   projects   leads   to   a  
decontextualisation  of  possibilities,  resulting  in  an  excess  of  relevant  and  enticing  
possibilities.  This  more  detailed  account  of  temporal  experience  in  mania  helps  
to   develop   our   understanding   of   common   features   of   manic   states,   such   as  
grandiosity,  creativity,  and  a  constant  re-­‐‑interpretation  of  the  self  and  values.  I  
particularly   note   how   these   alterations   impact   on   the   manic   person’s  
relationship   with   other   people.   Following   this,   I   return   to   the   questions  
regarding  bodily  experience  that  I  raised  in  chapter  four.  I  note  that  the  excess  
of   possibility   experienced   by   the   manic   person   results   in   increased   activity.  
However,   I  argue   that   the  manic  body  remains  conspicuous  due   to   the  manic  
person’s  inability  to  meaningfully  engage  in  tasks  and  projects.  Thus,  the  manic  
body   is  both  active  and  conspicuous  –   just  as  we  find  reported   in   first  person  
accounts.  Through  this  account  I  examine  the  relationship  between  experiences  
of  time  and  experiences  of  the  body,  revealing  the  intimate  connection  between  
the  two.  
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Earlier,   I  noted  the  superficial  opposition  between  mania  and  depression,  and  
the   challenge   posed   by   episodes   in   which   features   of   both   states   co-­‐‑occur   –  
so-­‐‑called   “mixed   episodes”   or   “mixed   states”   (APA,   2000,   p365).   Through   an  
examination   of   two   forms   of   mixed   state   –   ‘dysphoric   mania’   and   ‘agitated  
depression’  –  I  demonstrate  how  my  accounts  of  mania  and  depression  are  able  
to   accommodate   these   theoretically   challenging   experiences.   I   then   use   these  
accounts   of   mania,   depression,   and   mixed   states   to   explore   potential   links  
between  features  of  these  experiences  and  suicidality.    
What   emerges   from   this   thesis   is   a   cohesive   phenomenological   account   of  
mania   and   depression.   Throughout,   I   refine   descriptions   of   temporal  
experiences,   challenge   traditional   accounts   of   bodily   experience,   and   reveal  
relationships   between   experiences   of   the   body,   time,   the   world,   and   other  
people.   In   my   concluding   chapter   I   discuss   the   philosophical   and   clinical  
implications   of   this   account.   I   outline   how   it   may   be   used   to   provide   a  
principled  distinction  between  bipolar  disorder  and  schizophrenia  and  suggest  
fruitful  directions  for  future  research.  
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Chapter  1:  Phenomenology  and  Psychopathology  
Introduction  
This  thesis  is  a  phenomenological  study  of  mania  and  depression.  Before  we  go  
any   further   it   is   therefore   necessary   to   consider   what   is   meant   by  
‘phenomenology’  and  to  assess  what  kind  of  contribution  phenomenology  can  
make  to  the  study  of  psychiatric  disorders.  This  chapter  thus  has  two  primary  
aims:   Firstly,   to   provide   a   description   of   phenomenology   and   the  
‘phenomenological   stance’;  and,   secondly,   to  explore   the   relationship  between  
phenomenology  and  psychiatry.  Through  this  discussion  I  will  make  clear  the  
distinctive   role   that   phenomenology   can   play   in   a   study   of   psychiatric  
disorders.  
What  is  Phenomenology?  
Phenomenology  may  broadly  be  understood  as  a  field  of  study  concerned  with  
exploring   and   describing   lived   experience   in   all   its   richness   and   complexity.  
Central  areas  of  interest  therefore  include  the  ways  in  which  we  experience  the  
world,  time,  our  bodies,  other  people,  and  so  on.  At  this  point  we  might  be  led  
to   think   that   there   is   nothing   particularly   distinctive   about   phenomenology.  
After  all,  the  question  of  how  we  understand  and  interact  with  other  people  is  
also   of   interest   to   other   philosophers.   Similarly,   it  might   be   suggested   that   a  
psychologist  could  carry  out  explorations  into  how  we  perceive  the  world.  We  
must   therefore   ask   what   it   is   that   is   distinctive   about   phenomenological  
enquiry.   Is   there  anything   that  unites  phenomenological  approaches  and  how  
do  such  approaches  differ  from  the  methodologies  found  in  other  traditions?  In  
the  next  section  I  begin  to  explore  these  issues,  describing  what  is  meant  by  the  
phenomenological  method.    
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Husserl  and  the  Phenomenological  Method  
Philosophers   working   in   the   phenomenological   tradition   include   Husserl,  
Heidegger,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  and  Sartre.  Although  I  draw  on  insights  from  each  
of  these  philosophers,  I  will  begin  by  focussing  on  the  work  of  Husserl  in  order  
to  introduce  the  phenomenological  method.  As  we  shall  see,  this  method  is  not  
unique   to  Husserl   and  we   can   find   relevant   similarities   in   the  work   of   other  
phenomenologists.   However,   let   us   start   by   focussing   on   Husserl   and   his  
account  of  the  phenomenological  method.  
Husserl  argues  that  in  our  ordinary,  everyday,  experiences  we  take  for  granted  
the  reality  of  the  world  and  all  that  it  contains.  As  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  put  it,  
we  assume  that  reality  is  “out  there,  waiting  to  be  discovered  and  investigated”  
(2008,  p22).  This  belief  in  the  world  does  not  take  what  we  might  think  of  as  the  
typical   form   of   a   belief,   demonstrated   in   statements   such   as   “I   believe   that  
London  is  in  England”  or  “I  believe  that  apples  are  a  type  of  fruit”.  The  belief  
that  London  is  in  England  or  that  apples  are  a  type  of  fruit  already  presupposes  
the   reality  of   the  world  –   it   takes   for  granted   this  acceptance.  Our  beliefs  and  
doubts   operate  within   the  world;   they   are   built   upon   this   naïve   acceptance   –  
what   Husserl   refers   to   as   the   “natural   attitude”   (1983,   p51).   The   difference  
between   this   belief   and   beliefs   of   a  more   typical   structure   becomes   apparent  
when   we   consider   Husserl’s   description   of   this   attitude   –   our   ordinary  
acceptance  of  the  world:  
I   am   conscious   of   a   world   endlessly   spread   out   in   space,   endlessly  
becoming  and  having  endlessly  become  in   time.   I  am  conscious  of   it:  
that   signifies,   above   all,   that   intuitively   I   find   it   immediately,   that   I  
experience  it.  By  my  seeing,  touching,  hearing,  and  so  forth,  and  in  the  
different   modes   of   sensuous   perception,   corporeal   physical   things  
with   some   spatial   distribution   or   other   are   simply   there   for   me,   “on  
hand”   in   the   literal   or   the   figurative   sense,   whether   or   not   I   am  
particularly  heedful  of  them  and  busied  with  them  in  my  considering,  
thinking,   feeling,  or  willing.  Animate  beings   too  –  human  beings,   let  
us  say  –  are  immediately  there  for  me…  (1983,  p51)  
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This  is  not  simply  a  belief   in  the  existence  of  the  world,  held  in  the  same  way  
that  we  may  believe  London  is  in  England,  but  rather  it  is  a  way  of  belonging  or  
being  in  the  world.  This  attitude  is  taken  for  granted  by  people  as  they  go  about  
their  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  lives,  and  it  is  within  this  attitude  that  they  explore  individual  
beliefs   and   doubts.   Crucially,   we   find   that   it   is   presupposed   even   by   our  
scientific  methods  and  endeavours.  It  is  presupposed  at  every  moment,  and  as  
such  we  find  that  our  usual  enquires  into  the  world,  self,  and  experience  rest  on  
unexamined   foundations.  As  Husserl  writes,   “No  doubt   about   or   rejection   of  
data   belonging   to   the   natural   world   alters   in   any   respect   the   general   positing  
which   characterizes   the  natural   attitude”   (1983,  p57).  An  accurate  and   systematic  
study   of   world-­‐‑experience   thus   requires   a   radical   method   in   order   to   move  
beyond  the  natural  attitude.  For  Husserl,   this   is   found  in  the   ‘epoché’  and  the  
‘phenomenological  reduction’.    
The  epoché  is  a  process  through  which  the  natural  attitude  is  set  aside  or  ‘put  
out   of   action’   in   order   to   allow   for   a  more   radical   and   thus   far   reaching   and  
thorough   study   of   experience.   This   is   sometimes   referred   to   as   a   process   of  
‘bracketing’   the   natural   attitude.  We  must  make   clear   here   that   this   is   not   to  
advocate  a  process  of  denying  what  is  found  in  the  natural  attitude,  nor  even  of  
doubting   it.  We  do  not   affirm  or  deny   it,   instead  we   suspend,   bracket,   or   set  
aside  our  naïve  attitude  towards  the  world  in  order  to,  as  Dan  Zahavi  puts   it,  
“focus  more  narrowly  and  directly  on  reality  just  as  it  is  given”  (2007,  p30).  By  
analogy,  I  might  affirm  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  sentence  “the  red  mug  is  
next  to  the  blue  teapot”.  Alternatively,  I  can  set  aside  questions  of  the  sentence’s  
truth  value  and  bracket  it  –  (the  red  mug  is  next  to  the  blue  teapot)  –  in  order  to  
study   the   structure   of   the   sentence.   The   aim   is   therefore   not   to   dismiss   the  
world-­‐‑experience  we   find   in   the   natural   attitude,   but   rather   to   set   it   aside   in  
order   to   allow   these   presupposed   features   of   experience   to   be   studied.   As  
Husserl  puts  it:  
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[It]  is  not  a  transmutation  of  positing  into  counter  positing,  of  position  
into  negation…Rather   it   is   something  wholly  peculiar.  We  do  not  give  up  
the   positing   we   effected,   we   do   not   in   any   respect   alter   our  
conviction…Nevertheless  the  positing  undergoes  a  modification:  while  
it   in   itself   remains  what   it   is,  we,   so   to   speak,   “put   it   out   of   action,”  we  
”exclude  it,”  we  “parenthesize  it”.  (1983,  p59)1    
It  must  be  stressed  that  the  suggestion  is  not  that  we  perform  the  epoché  once  
and   then   are   able   to   simply   return   to   the   natural   attitude   as   we   carry   out  
phenomenological   enquires.   Instead,   Husserl   suggests   that   the   epoché   is   the  
gateway   to   the   ‘phenomenological   reduction’   –   a   sustained   stance   that   allows  
us  to  turn  our  attention  towards  the  bracketed  world-­‐‑experience,  exploring  and  
reflecting   on   the   structure   of   our   experiences.   With   the   natural   attitude   set  
aside,  we   are   now   able   to   focus  more   clearly   and   fully   on   the  world   as   it   is  
given  to  us  –  on  the  ‘phenomena’.  Phenomenological  enquiry  thus  allows  for  an  
exploration   of   the   ways   in   which   we   experience   the   world,   including   the  
conditions  for  the  possibility  of  the  appearance  of  objects.  Through  the  epoché  
and   the   reduction,   phenomenologists   are   able   to   explore   the   contribution  
consciousness  makes  in  constituting  the  objects  of  our  experience  –  in  allowing  
them  to  appear  and  giving  them  meaning  –  rather  than  exploring  the  objects  as  
separate   from   how   they   are   given.   I   could,   for   example,   perceive   a   table,  
remember  a  table,  imagine  a  table,  or  hallucinate  a  table.  The  phenomenologist  
focuses   on  describing   the   structures   of   these  different   experiences,   examining  
how  it   is   that   the  object  may  be  given  to  us   in  these  ways,  rather  than  merely  
describing  the  physical  features  of  the  table  itself  (the  weight  of  it,  for  example,  
or  the  colour),  or  describing  the  structures  of  my  eye  that  cause  or  allow  me  to  
see  the  table.  As  David  Cerbone  puts  it:    
When   I   perform   the   reduction,   I   no   longer   attend   to   the   worldly  
objects   of   my   experience,   nor   do   I   wonder   about   the   causal  
                                                                                                 
1  “We  “parenthesize  it””  (Husserl,  1983,  p59)  is  often  translated  as  we  “bracket  it”  (e.g.  Husserl,  
1931,  p108)  
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underpinnings  of  that  experience;  instead,  I  focus  my  attention  on  the  
experience  of  those  worldly  objects.  (2006,  p23)  
In   performing   the   phenomenological   reduction   we   therefore   allow   for   the  
possibility   of   exploring   the   rich   complexities   of   the   structures   of   our  
experiences,  focussing  on  that  which  is  taken  for  granted  in  the  natural  attitude.  
Zahavi   sums   up   the   aim   of   the   epoché   and   the   phenomenological   reduction,  
explaining   that   the  purpose   is   “to   liberate  us   from  a  natural(istic)  dogmatism  
and   to   make   us   aware   of   our   own   constitutive   (that   is,   cognitive,  
meaning-­‐‑giving)  contribution”  (2003,  p46).  
However,   this   process   does   not   entail   cutting-­‐‑off   or   turning   away   from   the  
world.  Indeed,  what  is  revealed,  amongst  other  things,  is  the  way  in  which  we  
find  ourselves  practically  immersed  in  a  world  that  has  meaning  for  us.  In  other  
words,  we   are   not  merely   detached   observers   of   an   inaccessible   and   external  
world.   Instead,  we   immediately   find   that  we  have   a   sense   of   belonging   to   the  
world.  Husserl  writes,  “this  world  is  there  for  me  not  only  as  a  world  of  mere  
things,  but  also  with  the  same  immediacy  as  a  world  of  objects  with  values,  a  world  
of   goods,   a   practical   world”   (1983,   p53).   Prior   to   our   beliefs,   doubts,   and  
perceptions   of   particular   objects   in   the   world   we   find   our   implicit  
understanding  that  the  world  is  there  for  us  and  for  others.  We  are  immersed  in  
it,  we  can  act  within  it,  and  it  holds  meaning  and  significance  for  us  in  various  
ways.    
We   can   therefore   see   that   the   epoché   and   reduction  do  not   lead   to   the  world  
being  excluded  or  ignored,  nor  can  phenomenology  be  understood  to  be  a  form  
of  introspection.2  As  Zahavi  explains,  phenomenology  allows  for  “an  expansion  
of  our  field  of  research”  (2003,  p46),  rather  than  a  turn  inwards,  away  from  the  
world.   Indeed,   phenomenologists   such   as   Husserl   reject   the   very   distinction  
                                                                                                 
2  See  Cerbone  (2006)  and  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  (2008)  for  further  discussion  of  the  differences  
between  phenomenology  and  introspection.  
   24  
between   ‘inner’   and   ‘outer’   that   introspection   is   reliant  upon.3     Gallagher  and  
Zahavi  write  that  to  “speak  of  introspection  is  to  (tacitly)  endorse  the  idea  that  
consciousness   is   inside   the   head   and   the   world   is   outside”   (2008,   p21).  
Introspection   thus   operates   within   the   natural   attitude,   presupposing   the  
distinction  between  internal  and  external  and  then  turning  inwards  to  examine  
and   describe   merely   the   internal.   In   contrast,   phenomenologists   reject   this  
distinction,   retaining   the   world   as   part   of   their   field   of   enquiry.   To   offer   a  
description   of   an   internal  mental   state,   even   an   incredibly   rich   description   of  
such  a   state,   thus   fails   to  move  beyond  our  natural   attitude  and  so   cannot  be  
described  as  phenomenological.  
At  this  point  we  may  be  concerned  that  such  a  radical  project  must  be  seen  as  
impossible.  It  seems  implausible  that  we  could  adopt  such  an  extreme  position  
–  disconnecting  ourselves  from  our  intuitive  and  everyday  ways  of  perceiving  
the  world.4   If  we   cannot   successfully   ‘bracket’   our   natural   attitude,   does   this  
mean   that   the   entire   phenomenological   project  must   be   rejected?   I   think   not.  
Whilst  we  may  doubt  whether  we  can  adopt  such  an  extreme  position,  we  can  
aim  to  turn  our  attention  towards  the  usually  taken-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted  or  presupposed  
features  of  experience,  commit  to  uncovering  such  features,  and  work  towards  
analysing  them.  We  need  not  think  that  the  epoché  and  reduction  must  be  fully  
completed  in  order  to  be  valuable.  We  can  adopt  a  ‘phenomenological  stance’,  
without   committing   ourselves   to   the   possibility   of   completing   such   a   radical  
turn.  
Whilst   what   I   have   outlined   here   is   a   Husserlian   account   of   the  
phenomenological  method  and   the  world   experience   that   is   revealed   through  
that  method,  we  can  find  relevantly  similar  commitments  and  aims  within  the  
work  of  other  phenomenologists.  For  example,  Heidegger’s   (1962)  description  
                                                                                                 
3  See  Zahavi  (2007)  for  further  discussion  of  this  point.  
4  Indeed,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  writes  that  “The  most  important  lesson  which  the  reduction  teaches  us  
is  the  impossibility  of  a  complete  reduction”  (2002,  pxv).  
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of   being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world   similarly   stresses   the  ways   in  which  we   are   practically  
immersed  in  a  meaningful  world  –  the  world  experience  that  Husserl  maintains  
is  overlooked  in  the  natural  attitude.  Indeed,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  suggests  that  Being  
and   Time   “amounts   to   no   more   than   an   explicit   account   of   the   ‘natürlicher  
Weltbegriff’  or  the  ‘Lebenswelt’  which  Husserl…identified  as  the  central  theme  
of   phenomenology”   (2002,   pviii).   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   himself   describes   the  
importance  of  “reawakening  the  basic  experience  of  the  world”  (2002,  pix).  This  
turn   towards   the   taken-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted   world   experience   thus   runs   through   the  
work  of  each  of  these  different  philosophers.  Whilst  significant  differences  can  
be  found  in  their  broader  work,   it   is   in  the  common  acknowledgement  of  that  
which   is  presupposed   in   the  natural  attitude  and   in   the  aim  of   studying  such  
structures   of   experience   that   we   find   both   what   is   distinctive   about  
phenomenology  and  what  unifies  different  phenomenological  accounts.    
In   this   study   I  will   be   drawing   on   the   collective   phenomenological   tradition,  
rather   than   relying   on   or   seeking   to   defend   any   single   philosopher’s   work.  
Thus,   this   thesis   ought  not   be  understood   to   be   a  purely  Husserlian   study  of  
mania   and  depression   (or   a   Sartrean   study,   or  Heideggerian,   and   so   on),   but  
rather   a   phenomenological   study   of   the   topic.   I   therefore   employ   a  
phenomenological  method  while   seeking   to   apply   insights   from  philosophers  
working  within  the  phenomenological  tradition.  In  doing  this,  I  aim  to  explore  
and  clarify  experiences  of  mania  and  depression.    
The  question  that  arises  at  this  point  is  of  the  relevance  of  phenomenology  for  
the  study  of  mania  and  depression,  and  of  psychiatric  disorders   in  general.   In  
the  next   section   I   therefore  examine   the   relationship  between  phenomenology  
and  psychiatry,   exploring  how  phenomenology   can   aid  our  understanding  of  
psychiatric  disorders.    
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Phenomenology  and  Psychiatry  
Some   features   of   psychiatric   disorders   are   externally   observable   to   a   third  
person.  For  example,  extremely  low  weight  in  cases  of  anorexia  nervosa  (APA,  
2000,  p589)  or  insomnia/hypersomnia  in  cases  of  depression  (APA,  2000,  p356).5  
Such  features,  we  might  think,  can  be  both  described  and  understood  even  by  
those   who   do   not   have   first   person   experience   of   those   features.6   However,  
psychiatric  disorders  also  include  features  that  involve  alterations  in  subjective  
experience.  For  example,  the  “excessive  anxiety”  found  in  Generalised  Anxiety  
Disorder  (APA,  2000,  p476)  or  the  racing  thoughts  found  in  mania  (APA,  2000,  
p362).   These   features   are   often   very   distressing   for   the   person   experiencing  
them   and,   as   Nassir   Ghaemi   points   out,   “If   we   say   nothing   or   little   about  
subjective   states,   psychiatry   as   a   field   would   seem   to   lose   a   great   deal   of  
relevance   to   what   patients   experience   and   for   which   they   want   assistance”  
(2009).  We  may   be   able   to   observe   some   of   the   effects   of   such   experiences   –  
perhaps  a  person  may  pace  or  hyperventilate  when  anxious,  for  example  –  but  
we  cannot  directly  observe   the  experience   itself.   Similarly,  we  may  be  able   to  
study  the  neurobiological  processes   that  may  be   thought   to  be  responsible   for  
or   correlates   of   the   experience.   However,   we   must   first   have   some  
understanding  of  what  the  experience  is  before  we  can  explore  the  correlates  of  
that   experience   or   the   processes   responsible   for   it.   Otherwise,   as   Matthew  
Ratcliffe  succinctly  puts   it,  “our  enquiry  would  have  no  subject  matter”  (2009,  
p238).  Thus,  whilst   subjective   features  of  psychiatric  disorders  may  be  able   to  
be   described,   to   do   so   accurately   requires   a   developed   understanding   of   the  
person’s   experience.   In   order   to   fully   understand   a   psychiatric   disorder,  
                                                                                                 
5  The  examples  in  this  chapter  are  taken  from  the  American  Psychiatric  Association’s  Diagnostic  
and  Statistical  Manual,  fourth  edition,  text  revision  (APA,  2000).  However,  similar  features  can  
be  found  in  other  editions  of  the  DSM.  
6  This  is  not  to  say  that  we  can  easily  provide  a  causal  explanation  of  such  features  –  merely  that  
we  can  observe  and  describe  them.  
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including   these   features,   we   must   therefore   understand   the   subjective  
experience  of  that  disorder.    
However,  when  we  attempt  to  describe  experiences  of  a  number  of  psychiatric  
disorders  we  immediately  run  into  problems:  Many  features  of  the  experiences  
appear   to  be  difficult,   if  not   impossible,   to  understand.  For  example,  how  are  
we   to   understand   someone  who   says   that   she   feels   like   she   has   been   cut   off  
from  the  world  by  a  glass  wall?  What  does  a  person  mean  when  he  says   that  
time   has   stopped?7   Furthermore,   we   find   that   psychiatric   disorders   do   not  
simply  involve  alterations  in  the  content  of  experience  –  what  the  experience  is  
about   –   they  also   frequently   involve  alterations   in   the   structures  of   experience.  
First  person  accounts  report  profound  changes  in  the  structures  of  temporality,  
embodiment,   self-­‐‑awareness,   interpersonal   relations,  world-­‐‑experience,  and  so  
on.   Consider,   for   example,   the   following   descriptions,   the   first   taken   from   a  
memoir  of  depression,  the  second  taken  from  an  interview,8  and  the  third  taken  
from  a  memoir  of  schizophrenia:  
I  had,  too,  a  pronounced  sense  of  unreality…It  was  all  so  normal,  yet  
everything  was  different.  It  looked,  to  me,  like  a  scene  from  a  play  that  
I  was  witnessing.  (Brampton,  2009,  p66)  
There  were   often   a   lot   of   confused  moments   and   I  would   stand   still  
and  try  to  understand  how  to  inhabit  the  world.  Try  to  find  any  way  at  
all   to   breathe,   to   gesture,   to   reach,   to   speak,   to   do   any   action   in   the  
world  that  could  be  me…The  world  had  lost  its  welcoming  quality.  It  
wasn’t   a   habitable   earth   any   longer.   It   didn’t   bear   the   meanings   of  
human   life   anymore.   It   wasn’t   a   place   where   human   beings   could  
dwell.   It  became   impossible   to  know  how  to  relate   to   it…You’ve   lost  
the  invitation  to  live  that  the  universe  extends  to  us  at  every  moment.  
                                                                                                 
7  As  both  men  and  women  experience  mania  and  depression,  I  use  both  male  and  female  
pronouns  throughout  this  thesis.  
8  It  is  not  clear  from  the  interview  what  James  Melton’s  precise  diagnosis  is  –  though  we  are  told  
he  was  in  a  catatonic  state  at  one  stage  (Hornstein,  2009,  p209).  However,  his  descriptions,  
whilst  more  extreme  than  many,  are  otherwise  similar  to  accounts  of  severe  depression.  Even  if  
we  take  his  experience  to  be  different  from  most  experiences  of  depression  he  still  appears  to  be  
hinting  at  alterations  in  features  of  experience  that  are  frequently  involved  in  a  variety  of  
different  psychiatric  disorders,  including  depression.  
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You’ve  lost  something  that  people  don’t  even  know  is.  That’s  why  it’s  
so  hard  to  explain.  (Hornstein,  pp210-­‐‑213)  
Everything   was   exact,   smooth,   artificial,   extremely   tense;   the   chairs  
and  tables  seemed  models  placed  here  and  there.  Pupils  and  teachers  
were  puppets  revolving  without  cause,  without  objective.  I  recognized  
nothing,   nobody.   It   was   as   though   reality,   attenuated,   had   slipped  
away  from  all  these  things  and  these  people.  (Sechehaye,  1994,  p26)  
These  extracts  do  not  appear   to  be  describing  changes   in   individual  beliefs  or  
attitudes,  but  rather  a  profound  change  in  world-­‐‑experience  –  a  change  in  how  
the   person   dwells   or   is   embedded   in   the   world.   As   the   second   quotation  
highlights,  these  are  features  of  experience  of  which  most  people  are  oblivious.  
These   structures   of   experience   are   rarely   acknowledged   or   reflected   on,   they  
instead   form   the   presupposed   backdrop   to   our   beliefs,   doubts,   and   attitudes.  
Understanding   these   experiences   is   central   to   understanding   psychiatric  
disorders,  but  we   cannot   set   about   studying   these   changes   in   the   structure  of  
experience  if  we  continue  to  maintain  the  assumptions  about  world-­‐‑experience  
that   we   hold   in   the   natural   attitude.   Put   simply,   we   cannot   seek   to   contrast  
these   experiences   with   everyday   experiences   if   we   already   assume   these  
structures  are  the  same.  
We  must,  it  seems,  pull  away  from  these  taken-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted  features  so  that  we  
can   explore   the  ways   in  which   they  may   be   altered   or   lost.   This   is   precisely  
what   phenomenology   can   contribute   to   the   study   of   psychiatric   disorders.  
Adopting   a   phenomenological   stance   grants   access   to   the   taken-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted  
structures  of  experience  that  are  frequently  altered  in  psychiatric  disorders.  The  
phenomenological  tradition  focuses  on  these  structures  of  experience  and  thus  
provides   a   rich   set   of   resources   that   we   can   draw   on   in   order   to   help   us   to  
understand  and  describe  these  alterations.    
The  clarity   that  phenomenological  studies  can  provide  helps   to  make  sense  of  
hard   to   understand   experiences   that   may   occur   in   the   context   of   psychiatric  
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disorders.  Writing   on   schizophrenia,  Giovanni   Stanghellini   suggests   “there   is  
something   incomprehensible   and   almost   inhuman   in   these   experiences,  
something  that  makes  me  feel  radically  different  from  the  person  I  am  listening  
to”   (2007,   p129).   He   uses   a   phenomenological   approach   to   enhance   our  
understanding   of   the   experience   of   schizophrenia,   suggesting   that   we   can  
interpret  the  experience  as  a  “crisis  of  commonsense”,  where  “commonsense”  is  
understood   to   be   “the   set   of   interpretative   procedures   or   ‘account   practices’  
shared   in  a   tacit  and  undiscussed  manner  by  everyone  belonging   to   the  same  
cultural  context”  (2004,  p12).  It  is  through  phenomenological  reflection  that  he  
suggests   we   are   able   to   make   the   ‘incomprehensible’   experience   of  
schizophrenia   comprehensible:   “When   I   listen   to  my   schizophrenic   partner,   I  
may  have  the  opportunity  to  see  in  front  of  me  what  I  cannot  be  aware  of  when  
I  am  turned  to  the  life-­‐‑world  in  the  so-­‐‑called  ‘natural’  attitude”  (2007,  p130).  
Shaun   Gallagher   (2006)   similarly   employs   a   phenomenological   approach   in  
order   to   enhance   our   understanding   of   the   experience   of   schizophrenia.   He  
describes  how  alterations  in  temporal  experience  may  help  to  make  sense  of  the  
experience   of   ‘thought   insertion’   –  where   a   person   believes   that   thoughts   are  
being   inserted   into   his   head   from   an   external   source.9      Louis   Sass   and   Josef  
Parnas   provide   further   analysis   of   the   experience   of   schizophrenia,   exploring  
how   disturbances   to   the   person’s   sense   of   self   (‘Ipseity’)   may   account   for   a  
number   of   common   features   found   in   schizophrenia,   including   a   sense   of  
alienation   from   thoughts,   the  world,   and   the   body   (e.g.   2007).10   They   suggest  
that   a   phenomenological   approach   helps   to   “make   sense   out   of   seemingly  
bizarre   actions   or   beliefs   that   might   otherwise   seem   completely  
incomprehensible”  (2007,  p65).    
                                                                                                 
9  See  Gallagher  (2006,  chapter  eight)  for  a  discussion  of  this  topic.  
10  They  particularly  highlight  the  role  that  ‘hyper  reflexivity’  may  play  in  schizophrenic  
experience.  Hyper-­‐‑reflexivity  may  be  understood  to  be“a  kind  of  exaggerated  
self-­‐‑consciousness”  (Sass  and  Parnas,  2007,  p68).  
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What  these  accounts  hold  in  common  is  the  claim  that  phenomenology  can  help  
enhance  our  understanding  of  the  experience  of  schizophrenia.  They  each  offer  
detailed  phenomenological  analyses  that  provide  accounts  of  an  experience  that  
might   otherwise   escape  our  understanding.   It   should  be   clear   that  we  do  not  
need   to  accept   the  details  of   each  of   these  accounts   in  order   to  appreciate   the  
more  general  point   that  phenomenology  offers  a  potential  means  of  clarifying  
experiences   of   psychiatric   disorders.   What   these   accounts   of   schizophrenia  
demonstrate   to   us   is   the   ways   in   which   phenomenology   opens   up   the  
possibility  of  making  sense  of  experiences   that  might  otherwise  be   labelled  as  
‘incomprehensible’.  
In  addition  to  helping  us  to  understand  the  experiences  of  psychiatric  disorders,  
phenomenology  may  also  be  able  to  contribute  to  neuroscientific  understanding  
of   those   disorders   through   a   process   of   what   Gallagher   calls   “front-­‐‑loaded  
phenomenology”  (e.g.  2003).  This  is  a  process  by  which  phenomenology  can  be  
used   to   help   inform   the   set-­‐‑up   and   interpretation   of   scientific   experiments.  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi  explain:  
The  idea  is  to  front-­‐‑load  phenomenological  insights  into  the  design  of  
experiments,   that   is,   to   allow   the   insights   developed   in  
phenomenological  analyses  to  inform  the  way  experiments  are  set  up  
(2008,  p38).  
For  example,  Gallagher  and  Brøsted  Sørensen  describe  how  phenomenological  
insights   that   reveal   a   distinction   between   a   sense   of   agency   as   an   immediate  
first-­‐‑order   experience   and   as   a   second-­‐‑order   cognitive   attribution   have   been  
used  to  inform  fMRI  studies  seeking  to  explore  the  neurological  processes  that  
underlie   experiences   of   agency   (2006,   pp125-­‐‑6).  As  disturbances   in   a   sense   of  
agency  occur  in  psychiatric  disorders  such  as  schizophrenia,  such  research  has  
the   potential   to   contribute   to   our   neuroscientific   understanding   of   those  
experiences.   Gallagher   and   Brøsted   Sørensen   (2006)   also   report   on   how  
experiments   that  have  been  phenomenologically   front-­‐‑loaded  have  been  used  
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to   explore   senses   of   agency   and   ownership   in   bulimia   nervosa.11   We   can  
therefore   see   how   phenomenological   distinctions,   and   phenomenological  
insights   more   generally,   may   be   able   to   inform   experimental   studies   into  
psychiatric  disorders.  In  this  way  phenomenology  may  aid  our  understanding  
of   the   neuroscience   of   psychiatric   disorders,   as   well   as   providing   accurate  
descriptions  of  the  experiences  of  those  disorders.  
The   recognition   that   phenomenology   can   contribute   to   our   understanding   of  
psychiatric  disorders  is  not  new.  We  can  find  phenomenological  approaches  in  
the  work  of  Karl   Jaspers,  Ludwig  Binswanger,  Eugene  Minkowski,  and  Erwin  
Straus,  amongst  others.  Writing  in  1946,  Binswanger  suggested  that:    
[I]n   mental   diseases   we   face   modifications   of   the   fundamental   or  
essential  structure  and  of  the  structural  links  of  being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world  as  
transcendence.   It   is   one   of   the   tasks   of   psychiatry   to   investigate   and  
establish  these  variations  in  a  scientifically  exact  way.  (2012,  p119)    
Binswanger   employed   a   phenomenological   approach   in   exploring   these  
structures.12   Jaspers   similarly  explains  how  he  made  use  of  phenomenological  
research:  
As   a   method   I   adopted   and   retained   Husserl’s   phenomenology…It  
turned  out  to  be  possible  and  fruitful  to  describe  the  inner  experiences  
of   the   sick   as   phenomena   of   consciousness.   By   the   patient’s   own  
self-­‐‑description,   not   only   hallucinations   but   delusive   experiences,  
modes   of   ego-­‐‑consciousness   and   types   of   emotion   could   be   defined  
well   enough   for   positive   recognition   in   other   cases.   Phenomenology  
became  a  research  method.  (Quoted  in  Broome  et  al.  2012,  p87)  
Both   the   historical   and   the   contemporary   work   in   this   area   highlight   the  
immediate   benefit   of   a   phenomenological   approach   as   a   means   to   “further  
enrich   our   knowledge   of   what   the   psychiatric   patient   really   experiences”  
                                                                                                 
11  See  Brøsted  Sørensen  (2005)  for  a  full  discussion  of  this  experimental  work.  
12  Binswanger  was  particularly  influenced  by  the  work  of  Heidegger.  See  Binswanger  (2012)  for  
a  detailed  description  of  his  approach.  
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(Jaspers,   2012,   p100).   However,   this   phenomenologically   informed  
understanding  of  psychiatric  disorders  can  also  be  seen  to  have  further  benefits.  
One   such   area   that   has   attracted   particular   attention   is   the   ability   for  
phenomenological   research   to   aid   the   development   of   accurate   diagnostic  
categories.  
Phenomenology  and  Classification  
We  have  already  seen   that  many  psychiatric  disorders   involve  changes   in   the  
structures   of   experience.  Unsurprisingly,   changes   in   subjective   experience   are  
frequently   referenced   in   the   diagnostic   criteria   for   a   number   of   psychiatric  
disorders.  For  example,  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  anorexia  nervosa  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  
refer  to  an  alteration  in  the  person’s  relationship  with  her  body:  “Disturbance  in  
the   way   in   which   one’s   body   weight   or   shape   is   experienced”   (APA,   2000,  
p589).  The  criteria   for  a  major  depressive  episode  similarly   include  alterations  
in  subjective  experience  -­‐‑  one  criterion  is  a  subjective  experience  of  diminished  
interest  in  activities,13  another  mentions  a  reduced  ability  to  think  or  concentrate  
(APA,  2000,  p356).  It   is  notable  that  recent  editions  of  the  DSM  aim  to  classify  
psychiatric   disorders   on   the   basis   of   description   rather   than   by   using   causal  
accounts   –   the   American   Psychiatric   Association   has   adopted   “a   descriptive  
approach   that   attempt[s]   to   be   neutral   with   respect   to   theories   of   etiology”  
(APA,   2000,   xxvi).   If   descriptions   of   experience   comprise   at   least   part   of   the  
classification  of  psychiatric  disorders,  as  they  do  in  contemporary  classification  
manuals  such  as  the  DSM,  it  is  essential  that  such  descriptions  are  as  accurate  as  
possible.  In  order  to  maintain  accurate  classification  of  psychiatric  disorders  we  
can,   therefore,   use   phenomenological   insights   in   order   to   explore,   challenge,  
and  correct  these  features.    
                                                                                                 
13  “markedly  diminished  interest  or  pleasure  in  all,  or  almost  all,  activites  most  of  the  day,  
nearly  every  day  (as  indicated  by  either  subjective  account  or  observation  made  by  others)”  
(APA,  2000,  p356).  
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However,  we  can  go  further  than  this.  Parnas  and  Zahavi  argue  that  whilst  the  
DSM   may   claim   to   be   atheoretical,   a   number   of   terms   (such   as   ‘delusion’,  
‘dysfunction’,   or   ‘incorrect   inference’)   “are   either   loaded   with   metaphysical  
assumptions…or   tainted   by   references   to   hypothetical   extra-­‐‑clinical,  
sub-­‐‑personal   processes”   (2002,   p140).   They   also   suggest   that   there   is   an  
underemphasis   of   subjective   experience   and   an   overemphasis   of   behavioural  
signs  and  symptoms  due  to  a  “lack  of  a  suitable  theoretical  psychopathological  
framework   to   address   human   experience”   (2002,   p140).   Phenomenology,   they  
argue,   can  provide   this   framework,   allowing   for   the  development   of   accurate  
descriptions   of   the   subjective   experience   of   psychiatric   disorders   whilst  
avoiding  unwanted  metaphysical  commitments  or  assumptions.  Thus  the  claim  
is   not   simply   that   phenomenology   may   inform   classification   by   helping   to  
correct   individual   criteria   within   a   category,   but   rather   that   phenomenology  
may  act  as  a  conceptual  framework  through  which  to  develop  a  more  accurate  
classification.  
One   advantage   of   a   phenomenologically   informed   classification   is   the   focus  
given  not  simply  to  observable  signs  and  symptoms,  but  also  to  the  profound  
structural   changes   that   we   have   seen   occur   in   psychiatric   disorders.   As  
Minkowski   points   out,   superficially   similar   signs   or   symptoms   may   belie  
significant  differences  in  experiential  structures  (1970,  p224).    He  illustrates  this  
by   contrasting   the   “hypochrondrial   preoccupations   of   a   neurotic”   with   the  
“hypochondrial   preoccupations”   seen   in   schizophrenia   (1970,   p224).   Whilst  
there   may   be   similarities   in   an   initial   description,   he   suggests   that   further  
examination  reveals  relevant  differences  between  the  two  cases.  That  there  can  
be   “similarity   in   the   expression   of   entirely   different   disorders”   (1970,   p224)  
highlights  the  importance  of  moving  beyond  these  superficial  presentations.  A  
close  examination  of  the  structural  changes  in  psychiatric  disorders  thus  allows  
us  to  distinguish  between  those  that  merely  appear  similar  due  to  similarity  of  
expression   and   those   that   maintain   similarities   in   experiential   structures.   An  
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acknowledgement   of   the   potential   for   difference   between   the   superficial  
presentation   and   the   experiential   structures   also   allows   for   the   possibility   of  
bringing   together   seemingly   distinct   experiences.   The   phenomenological  
emphasis   on   the   need   to   “delve   below   superficial   levels   of   behavioural  
description”   (Sass,   Parnas,   and   Zahavi,   2011,   p3)   allows   us   to   explore   the  
possibility   of   disorders   that   are   relevantly   similar   at   a   structural   level,   but  
manifest   in   different   ways.   Examinations   of   alterations   in   the   structures   of  
experience  thus  allow  for  more  accurate  classification  of  psychiatric  disorders.  
This  focus  on  alterations  in  the  structures  of  experience  can  also  help  to  direct  
and   inform   the   development   of   effective   treatments   for   psychiatric   disorders.  
As   Martin  Wyllie   writes,   “Within   the   constitution   of   meaningful   experience,  
one   can,   on   analysis,   identify   the   critical   points   where   the   constitution   of   a  
meaningful  mode  of  being  in  the  world  is  exposed  and  open  to  distortions  that  
become   discernible   as   psychiatric   conditions”   (2005,   p174).   Identifying   such  
critical   points   provides   us   with   a   plausible   focus   for   the   development   of  
treatments   which   focus   on   the   central   features   of   the   disorder,   rather   than  
dealing   with   ‘symptoms’   that   result   from   these   crucial   alterations.   This   may  
particularly   be   seen   to   be   the   case   when   we   find   distinctions   that   are   not  
apparent  at  a  more  superficial   level.  Significant  differences   in  experience  may  
suggest   a   need   for   a   difference   in   treatment   or   support.14   Alternatively,   the  
discovery  that  two  seemingly  distinct  experiences  share  relevant  alterations  in  
structural   features  may  suggest   that  exploring  similar   treatments  would  be  of  
value.   Such   phenomenological   discoveries   may,   therefore,   contribute   to  
research  into  effective  treatments.    
We   can   therefore   see   that   phenomenological   approaches   to   understanding  
psychiatric   disorders   may   plausibly   contribute   to   contemporary   discussions  
                                                                                                 
14  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  one  treatment  may  not  be  effective  for  multiple  disorders.  
However,  understanding  differences  between  experiences  may  still  be  seen  to  allow  for  more  
focused  research  into  possible  treatments.    
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regarding  classification  and  treatment.    However,  we  undersell  the  importance  
of   interaction   between   phenomenology   and   psychiatry   if   we   restrict   our  
discussion  to  the  ways  in  which  phenomenology  can  inform  classification  and  
treatment.   In   the   next   section   I   therefore   continue   to   explore   this   area,  
demonstrating  how  interaction  between  phenomenology  and  psychiatry  allows  
for  significant  benefits  in  both  disciplines.    
Beyond  Classification  
Those  with  psychiatric  disorders  often  speak  of  the  difficulties  they  have  trying  
to  describe  their  experiences.  Fiona  Shaw,  for  example,  writes  in  her  memoir  of  
postnatal  depression,  “If  Hugh  asked  me  how  I  was,  I  wept  and  had  no  words”  
(1997,  p25).  Many  use  metaphors  in  the  place  of  description  or  simply  suggest  
that   the   experience   is   impossible   for   others   to   understand.   Andrew   Solomon  
explains   this   use   of  metaphor   in   his  memoir   of   depression:   “Depression   is   a  
condition   that   is   almost   unimaginable   to   anyone   who   has   not   known   it.   A  
sequence  of  metaphors  –  vines,  trees,  cliffs,  etc.  –  is  the  only  way  to  talk  about  
the  experience”  (2002,  p29).  This  difficulty  in  accurately  communicating  distress  
may   exacerbate   already  present   feelings   of   loneliness,   isolation,   irritability,   or  
frustration.   William   Styron   discusses   the   difficulties   with   the   ‘indescribable’  
nature  of  depression  in  his  memoir  of  the  disorder:  
That   the  word  “indescribably”   should  present   itself   is  not   fortuitous,  
since  it  has  to  be  emphasized  that  if  the  pain  were  readily  describable  
most  of  the  countless  sufferers  from  this  ancient  affliction  would  have  
been  able   to   confidently  depict   for   their   friends  and   loved  ones   (and  
even  their  physicians)  some  of  the  actual  dimensions  of  their  torment,  
and  perhaps  elicit  a  comprehension  that  has  been  generally  lacking.  
(2004,  p14)  
As   Styron   highlights,   the   inability   to   accurately   describe   the   experience   of   a  
psychiatric   disorder   can   increase   feelings   of   isolation   from   others   and   may  
prevent  other  people,   including  health  care  professionals,   from  developing  an  
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empathetic   response   to   those   with   the   disorder.   Binswanger   stresses   that  
difficulties   in   communication   often   come   about   due   to   “the   fact   that   the  
mentally   ill   live   in   “worlds”   different   from   ours”   (2012,   p129).  
Phenomenological   studies  of  psychiatric  disorders  can  prove  beneficial   in   this  
regard:   By   describing   these   ‘worlds’,   these   altered   structures   of   experience,  
phenomenological   research   can   provide   those   affected   with   the   descriptions  
needed   to   accurately   communicate   their   experiences   to   others.      In   this   way,  
phenomenology   can,   as  Binswanger  puts   it,   “bridge”   these   two  worlds   (2012,  
p129).   This   ability   to   articulate   their   distress   may   prove   to   be   beneficial   in  
alleviating   some   of   the   feelings   of   isolation   and   alienation   common   in  
experiences  of  psychiatric  disorders.  Improved  communication  may  also  aid  the  
building   of   support   networks   and   facilitate   more   productive   conversation  
between  those  who  have  experienced  the  disorder  and  those  who  have  not.15  If  
the  person  is  able  to  accurately  articulate  his  experience,  he  may  more  easily  be  
able  to  highlight  to  others  areas  in  which  support  may  be  beneficial.  
Finally,   phenomenology  may   provide   the   means   by   which   a   person   can   not  
only  articulate  her  experiences,  but  also  understand  her  experiences.  Experiences  
of   psychiatric   disorders   are   often   distressing,   and   this   distress   may   be  
compounded  by  a  lack  of  self-­‐‑understanding.  J.P.  Whetsell  explains  this  need  to  
understand  her   own  experiences   in  her   account  of   bipolar  disorder:   “Because  
my   identity   is   so   bound   to   my   experiences   with   bipolar   disorder…it   is  
important   for  me   to  understand  my  diagnoses   in   order   to  understand  myself  
and   the   story   of   my   life”   (2010,   p55).   Whilst   some   people   may   come   to  
understand   their   experiences   through   diagnosis,   phenomenology   offers   a  
means   by   which   a   person   may   gain   understanding   even   if   she   does   not  
                                                                                                 
15  Matthew  Ratcliffe  suggests  that  we  can  take  this  one  step  further  and  explains  that  the  
adoption  of  a  phenomenological  stance  can  aid  what  he  calls  “radical  empathy”.  A  recognition  
of  the  taken-­‐‑for-­‐‑granted  structures  of  experience,  and  the  ways  in  which  these  structures  can  
alter  in  cases  of  psychiatric  disorder  can  help  to  develop  “a  way  of  engaging  with  others’  
experiences  that  involves  suspending  the  usual  assumption  that  both  parties  share  the  same  
modal  space”  (2012b,  p483).    
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interpret  her  experiences  as  resulting  from  or  being  part  of  a  disease  or  illness.  
Furthermore,   it   allows   the  person   to  move  beyond   the   behavioural   signs   and  
symptoms   found   in   diagnostic   classifications   and   develop   a   richer  
understanding  of  her  experiences.    
However,  it  is  not  only  our  understanding  of  psychiatric  disorders  that  stands  
to   gain   from   phenomenological   studies   of   psychiatric   disorders.   The  
relationship   between   phenomenology   and   psychiatry   can   be   seen   to   be   a  
mutually   informative   one.   Whilst   phenomenology   can   help   to   clarify   our  
understanding   of   experiences   of   psychiatric   disorders,   in   turn   aiding  
classification,   directing   treatment   and   improving   communication,   these   same  
studies   can   help   to   improve   our   broader   phenomenological   accounts.   This   is  
possible  in  at  least  two  ways:  
Firstly,   through   studying   alterations   in   experience   or   by   exploring   atypical  
experiences,  we  may  have  our  attention  drawn  to  particular  features  that  would  
otherwise   have   been   overlooked.  An   alteration   from   the   everyday   can   reveal  
the  function  or  role  that  a  feature  typically  plays  in  wider  experience.  As  such,  
we  might  discover  both  the  role  it  occupies  in  the  atypical  experience,  as  well  as  
the  role  it  may  more  generally  occupy  in  everyday  experiences.  As  Minkowski  
explains,  “Psychopathological  research  has  more  than  once  helped  to  revise  the  
phenomenological  givens,  to  complete  them  in  calling  attention  to  points  which  
up  until  then  had  been  disregarded”  (1970,  p171-­‐‑2).  Through  an  exploration  of  
psychiatric   disorder   we   may   find   that   it   becomes   apparent   how   particular  
features  allow  for  or  contribute  to  our  everyday  experiences.  An  exploration  of  
selfhood   in   schizophrenia,   bodily   experience   in   anorexia   nervosa,   or  
world-­‐‑experience   in   depression   may,   therefore,   help   to   refine   our  
phenomenological  accounts  of  everyday  experiences  of  selfhood,  the  body,  and  
the  world.    
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Secondly,   it   is   important   that   our   phenomenology   is   not   restricted   to  merely  
one  group  or  type  of  person.  For  example,  we  find  that  our  phenomenology  is  
enhanced  when  there  is  an  appreciation  of  the  ways  in  which  female  experience  
may   differ   from   male   experience,   recognising   as   we   do   the   importance   of  
accounting   for   both.16   Reflecting   on   these   different   experiences   gives   us   the  
opportunity  to  identify  which  features  may  alter  in  different  situations  or  cases  
and  which  may   be   thought   to   underlie   or   unite   all   experience.   The   study   of  
psychiatric   disorders   can   contribute   to   this   process,   clarifying   and   correcting  
our   phenomenological   accounts,   making   sure   that   they   are   accurate   for   a  
variety   of   different   experiences   rather   than   remaining   merely   abstract  
theoretical  models.17  Through  this  dialogue  our  phenomenological  accounts  can  
remain  grounded  in  the  reality  of  experience,  improving  our  understanding  of  
the  structures  of  experience  rather  than  particular  instances  of  experience.    
The  use  of  medical  insights  to  enhance  and  correct  phenomenological  accounts  
is  well  documented.  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   for  example,  uses   cases  of  phantom   limb  
syndrome   to   inform   his   investigation   of   bodily   experience   (2002,   pp84-­‐‑102).  
Later,  he  makes  use  of   the  case  of  “Schneider”,  explaining  that   the  analysis  of  
this   “example   of   morbid   mobility…clearly   shows   the   fundamental   relations  
between  body   and   space”   (2002,   p117).  A   contemporary   example   of   a   similar  
methodology  can  be  seen   in   the  work  of  Shaun  Gallagher.  Gallagher   refers   to  
phantom   limb   syndrome   in  order   to  develop  and   refine  his  understanding  of  
body  schema  (2006,  pp86-­‐‑106).  The  use  of  the  pathological  or  non-­‐‑everyday  can  
                                                                                                 
16  For  example,  see  Iris  Young  (1980)  for  an  account  of  female  embodiment.  
17  Psychiatric  disorders  ought  not  be  seen  as  rare  occurrences.    A  2007  survey  conducted  by  the  
National  Centre  for  Social  Research  and  the  University  of  Leicester  found  that  just  under  a  
quarter  of  adults  in  England  met  the  criteria  for  at  least  one  psychiatric  disorder  (McManus  et  
al.,  2009).  To  neglect  such  experiences  in  our  phenomenology  would  therefore  be  to  neglect  the  
experiences  of  a  significant  percentage  of  the  population.  If  our  phenomenology  does  not  have  
the  potential  to  account  for  the  experiences  of  a  quarter  of  the  population,  we  might  wonder  in  
what  sense  it  can  be  said  to  be  accurate.  
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be  an   important  method  of   clarifying  not  only   those  experiences,  but  also   the  
related  non-­‐‑pathological  or  everyday  experience.    
The   relationship   between   phenomenology   and   psychiatry   ought   then   to   be  
understood   as   a   process   of   constant   clarification,   correction,   and  
re-­‐‑interpretation.  The  application  of  phenomenology  to  psychiatry  is  not  a  one  
off  information  exchange  but  rather  a  process  of  dynamic  interaction  in  which  
advances   in   each   field   can   provide   further   challenges   and   enhanced  
understanding  in  the  other  field.  
Phenomenology  and  the  Study  of  Psychiatric  Disorders  
What  contribution  can  we  then  say  that  phenomenology  can  make  towards  the  
understanding   of   psychiatric   disorders?   We   have   seen   that   psychiatric  
disorders   often   involve   alterations   in   aspects   of   experience   that   are   taken   for  
granted   in   the   everyday   or   ‘natural   attitude’.   Adopting   a   phenomenological  
stance   reveals   such   features,   allowing  us   to   explore   and  describe   the  ways   in  
which   they   may   be   altered.   This   allows   us   greater   and   more   accurate  
understanding   of   the   lived   experience   of   psychiatric   disorders.   Such  
understanding,   we   have   seen,   can   feed   directly   into   discussions   regarding  
classification   as   well   as   helping   to   direct   research   into   treatment.  
Phenomenology  may  even  be  able  to  inform  research  into  the  neurobiology  of  
psychiatric   disorders   through   a   process   of   ‘front-­‐‑loading’   phenomenology.  
Beyond  classification  and  treatment,  phenomenologically  informed  descriptions  
may   aid   those   with   psychiatric   disorders   in   understanding   and   articulating  
their  experiences,  helping  to  reduce  some  of  the  common  feelings  of  isolation.  
Phenomenological   research   has   already   been   carried   out   into   a   number   of  
psychiatric  disorders.  We  have,  for  example,  already  seen  some  of  the  insightful  
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phenomenological   accounts   of   schizophrenia   that   have   been   developed.18  We  
can  also  find  phenomenological  accounts  of  experience  of  psychiatric  disorders  
as   varied   as   the   Capgras   delusion   (e.g.   Ratcliffe,   2008,   pp143-­‐‑163),   Obsessive  
Compulsive  Disorder   (e.g.  Straus,  2012),   and  Anorexia  Nervosa   (e.g.  Bowden,  
2012).   In  recent  years  phenomenological  research  into  depression  has  received  
increasing   attention.19   However,   phenomenologists   have   remained   curiously  
silent  on  the  topics  of  mania  and  bipolar  disorder.20  Where  these  experiences  are  
discussed   it   is   often   only   to   emphasise   differences   between,   for   example,  
bipolar  disorder  and  schizophrenia,  rather  than  with  the  purpose  of  developing  
a  phenomenological  account  of  either  bipolar  disorder  or  mania.21  
At  this  point  we  might  wonder  whether  the  lack  of  work  in  this  area  is  actually  
indicative  of  a  lack  of  a  need  for  work  in  this  area.  Are  experiences  of  mania  and  
depression  already  sufficiently  understood?  Does  the  long  history  of  mania  and  
depression   suggest   that   we   can   already   sufficiently   describe   these   states?   Is  
there  thus  no  need  for  a  phenomenological  analysis  of  these  experiences?  In  the  
next   chapter   I   turn  my   attention   to  mania,   depression,   and   bipolar   disorder,  
highlighting   the   instability  of   these  categories,  examining   the  need   for  greater  
understanding,  and  exploring  how  best   to  begin  a  phenomenological  study  of  
these  experiences.  
  
                                                                                                 
18  For  further  discussion  of  phenomenological  accounts  of  schizophrenia  see  Sass,  2001;  Sass  and  
Parnas,  2003;  2007;  Stanghellini,  2007.  
19  See,  for  example,  the  special  issue  of  the  Journal  of  Consciousness  Studies  20  (7-­‐‑8)  on  depression.  
See Tellenbach (1980) for one earlier account of melancholy.   
20  For  one  exception  see  Binswanger  (1964).  
21  For  example,  see  Sass  and  Pienkos’s  papers  that  seek  to  compare  schizophrenia,  mania,  and  
depression  (2013a;  2013b).    
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Chapter  2:  Changing  Conceptions  of  Mania,  
Depression,  and  Bipolar  Disorder  
Introduction  
Frederick  Goodwin  and  Kay  Redfield   Jamison  claim   that  bipolar  disorder  has  
been  described  with  “unvarying   language”,  writing   that,  “From  ancient   times  
to  the  present,  an  extraordinary  consistency  characterizes  descriptions  of  these  
conditions”  (2007,  p3).  This  long  history  may  be  thought  to  indicate  a  degree  of  
stability   when   it   comes   to   the   categories   of   mania,   depression,   and   bipolar  
disorder.   We   might   assume   that   the   descriptions   offered   in   contemporary  
diagnostic  manuals  such  as  DSM-­‐‑IV  and  DSM-­‐‑5  (APA,  2000;  APA,  2013)  would  
therefore  be  relevantly  similar  to  those  that  we  find  in  Graeco-­‐‑Roman  texts  or  in  
the  work  of  nineteenth  century  psychiatrists.  Furthermore,  we  might  think  that  
such  consistency  indicates  a  developed  understanding  of  the  disorder,  that  we  
are   able   to   accurately   describe   experiences   of   these   states   even   if   we   do   not  
always  know  what   causes   these  experiences  or  how  best   to   treat   them.  Given  
this,  we  might  wonder  what  work  remains  to  be  done  by  the  phenomenologist.  
Is  there  a  need  for  a  phenomenological  study  of  mania  and  depression?  
It  is  this  question  that  I  address  in  this  chapter.  I  do  this  through  an  exploration  
of   the   categories   of   mania,   depression,   and   bipolar   disorder,   examining   the  
extent  to  which  these  categories  can  be  seen  to  be  stable  and  demonstrating  the  
need  for  greater  understanding  of  experiences  of  mania  and  depression.  I  begin  
by   looking   at   the   history   of   bipolar   disorder,   exploring   how   mania   and  
depression   came   together   in   the   category   of   ‘bipolar   disorder’.   Through   this  
discussion  I  highlight  the  instability  of  these  categories,  instabilities  that  caution  
us   against   assuming   that   we   can   take   them   to   be   fixed   and   easily   defined  
entities.   I   then   turn   to   contemporary   classifications,   introducing   the   DSM-­‐‑IV  
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categories   of   mania,   depression,   and   bipolar   disorder.   I   explore   the   recent  
changes  to  these  categories  and  discuss  a  number  of  current  debates  regarding  
them.   Through   this   discussion   I   highlight   the   continued   instability   of   the  
categories   of   mania   and   depression   and   demonstrate   the   importance   of  
understanding  the  experience  of  these  states.  I  draw  these  discussions  together  
in   order   to   clarify   the   need   for   phenomenological   studies   of   mania   and  
depression.   In   the   final   section   I   discuss   how   we   can   develop   a  
phenomenological   account   of   these   states.   I   explore  how  we   can  make  use  of  
the  DSM  categories,  explain  why  I  am  focussing  on  experiences  of  mania  and  
depression  rather  than  the  narrower  category  of  bipolar  disorder,  and  identify  
how  ‘ideal  types’  can  help  to  direct  our  research.  
How  Mania  and  Depression  became  “Bipolar  Disorder”  
Graeco-­‐‑Roman  Concepts  of  Mania  and  Melancholia  
The  origins  of  bipolar  disorder  are  often  traced  back  to  Graeco-­‐‑Roman  writings  
on  mania  and  melancholia.  Angst  and  Marenos,  for  example,  write,  “The  origin  
of  bipolar  disorders  has  its  roots  in  the  work  and  views  of  the  Greek  physicians  
of   the   classical  period”   (2001,  p3).  David  Healy  notes   that   it  was  Hippocrates  
(c.  460   –   c.   370   BC)  who  was   the   “first   to   put  mania   and  melancholia   on   our  
cultural   radar”   (2008,   p3),   distinguishing   between   mania,   melancholia,   and  
paranoia.1      The   Hippocratic   writers   understood   mania   and   melancholia   as  
humoral   imbalances   –   melancholia   indicating   an   excess   of   ‘black   bile’,   and  
mania   indicating   an   excess   of   ‘yellow  bile’   (Goodwin   and   Jamison,   2007,   p3).  
Whilst  it  is  tempting  to  draw  parallels  between  our  modern  concepts  of  mania  
and  depression  and  these  classical  accounts,  we  must  be  alert  to  the  significant  
                                                                                                 
1  See  Angst  and  Marenos  (2001,  pp3-­‐‑5)  for  discussion  of  mania  and  melancholia  in  the  classical  
period.  
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differences   that   exist.2   Angst   and  Marenos   identify   four   distinct  meanings   of  
“mania”  used  during  the  classical  period3:  
1. A   reaction   to   an   event   with   the   meaning   of   rage,   anger   or  
excitation.  
2. A  biologically  defined  disease.  
3. A  divine  state.  
4. A  kind  of  temperament,  especially  in  its  mild  form.  
(2001,  p5)  
These   four   categories   clearly   give   us   an   understanding   of   mania   that   is   far  
broader   than   our   current   classifications,   highlighting   the   range   of   different  
ways   the   term   was   understood.   However,   even   if   we   take   only   the   narrow  
definition  of  “a  biologically  defined  disease”,  we  can  still  find  evidence  that  this  
category   was   quite   different   from   the   ones   we   have   today.   Healy   notes   that  
Hippocrates’s   description   of   manic   states   included   a   number   of   physical  
symptoms   including   sweating   and   fever   (2008,   pp3-­‐‑4).   Cases   of  mania   in   the  
classical   period,   he   writes,   “invariably   involved   fever   and   often   resulted   in  
death”  (2008,  p4).  As  such,  at  least  some  of  the  cases  of  mania  that  Hippocrates  
was  discussing  may  have  actually  been  cases  of  infection.4  At  the  very  least,  we  
can  therefore  conclude  that  the  mania  of  the  classical  period  encompassed  a  far  
broader  range  of  experiences  than  our  contemporary  cases  of  mania  do.  
Discussion  of  the  relationship  between  states  of  mania  and  melancholia  can  be  
seen  as  far  back  as  the  first  and  second  centuries  AD.5  Aretaeus  of  Cappadocia,  
writing  in  the  first  century  AD,  linked  the  two  states  together,  suggesting  that  
                                                                                                 
2  As  we  shall  see,  even  our  contemporary  categories  of  mania  and  depression  are  not  static.  
3  In  some  cases,  thinkers  would  use  the  same  term  to  refer  to  distinct  meanings.  For  example,  
Hippocrates  used  mania  to  refer  to  both  a  biologically  defined  disease  as  well  as  a  kind  of  
temperament  (Angst  and  Marenos,  2001,  p5).  
4  See  Healy  (2008,  p8)  for  a  discussion  of  ‘postpartum  mania’  and  postpartum  infection.  
5  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  p6)  for  a  timeline  of  quotations  linking  mania  and  
depression.  
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mania  was  a  worsening  of   the   state  of  melancholia.   In   ‘On   the  Aetiology  and  
Symptomatology  of  Chronic  Diseases’  he  writes:  
I   think   that  melancholia   is   the   beginning   and   a   part   of  mania…The  
development   of   a   mania   is   really   a   worsening   of   the   disease  
(melancholia)   rather   than   a   change   into   another   disease…In  most   of  
them  (melancholics)  the  sadness  became  better  after  various  lengths  of  
time   and   changed   into   happiness;   the   patients   then   developed   a  
mania.  
(Quoted  in  Angst  and  Marneros,  2001,  p6)  
However,  Erwin  Ackerknecht   cautions  us   that   this  view  can  “only  with   some  
qualifications   be   regarded   as   foreshadowing   manic-­‐‑depressive   psychosis”  
(1968,  p15).  Aretaeus  included  in  his  understanding  of  mania  and  melancholia  
concepts   that  we  might  now  associate  with   forms  of   schizophrenia  or  organic  
disease  (Angst  and  Marenos,  2001,  p6;  Goodwin  and  Jamison,  1990,  p57).    
This  view  of  mania  as  being  on  a  continuum  with  melancholia,  rather  than  an  
opposite  pole,  may  have  been  widespread  amongst  Greek  and  Roman  writers.  
Healy  suggests  that,  “The  usual  connection  was  in  terms  of  melancholia  being  
an  earlier   stage  or  mild   form  of  madness  with  mania  being   the   term  used   for  
later  and  more  severe  stages”  (2008,  p11).  However,  opinion  was  not  uniform  in  
this   period.   Soranus   (fl.   100AD),   for   example,   characterised   melancholia   and  
mania   as   two   separate   diseases.6   He   suggested   that   whilst   the   two   shared  
similar  symptoms  (Goodwin  and  Jamison,  2007,  p4),  mania  “is  a  disease  of  the  
head,  while  melancholia   is   a   disease   of   the   oesophagus”   (Ackerknecht,   1968,  
p15).    
Hence,   whilst   descriptions   of   mania   and   melancholia   can   be   seen   in  
Graeco-­‐‑Roman  writings,  the  definitions  of  these  terms  were  not  stable  and  may  
                                                                                                 
6  It  is  worth  noting  that  Soranus  excluded  cases  in  which  fever  is  present  from  his  classification  
of  mania  (Ackerknecht,  1968,  p13).  We  can,  therefore,  already  see  difference  in  classification  and  
understanding  of  mania  from  the  understanding  of  Hippocrates.    
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seem   to   bear   little   resemblance   to   our   modern   concepts   of   mania   and  
depression.   Healy  writes   that   “while   the   terms  mania,   melancholia,   insanity,  
dysphoria,   dysthymia,   paranoia,   frenzy   and   lunacy   all   go   back   to   the  Greeks  
and  the  Romans,  manic  depressive  disease  does  not”  (2008,  p1).  In  this  respect  
he   appears   to   be   correct   –   the   categories   used   were   far   broader   than   our  
contemporary  concepts  of  mania  and  depression,  and  the  relationship  between  
the   two  was   not   of   the   two   poles   of   bipolar   disorder,   but   rather  mania   was  
understood  to  be  a  more  severe  form  of  melancholia  or  part  of  a  distinct  disease  
quite  separate  from  melancholia.  
The  Nineteenth  Century:  Falret  and  Baillarger  
Whilst   hints   of   mania   and   depression   can   therefore   be   seen   in   Greek   and  
Roman  writings,  it  was  not  until  the  mid-­‐‑nineteenth  century  that  the  connection  
between   the   two   states   was   formally   identified   and   ‘manic   depression’   was  
conceptualised  as  a  distinct  entity.  First   in  a   lecture  in  1850,  then  published  in  
the  Gazette  des  Hopitaux  in  1851,  Falret  devoted  a  mere  twelve  lines  to  the  topic  
of  “a  special  form  (of  insanity)  we  call  circular”  (Falret,  1851,  quoted  in  Pichot,  
1995,   p4).   In   a   paper   published   in   1854   he   expanded   his   discussion   of   “Folie  
Circulaire”  –  a  circular  madness  consisting  of  periods  of  mania  and  depression:  
In  order   to  be  called   folie  circulaire,  depression  and  excitement  must  
succeed   one   another   for   a   long   time,   usually   for   the   whole   of   the  
patient’s  life,  and  in  a  fashion  very  nearly  regular,  always  in  the  same  
order,   and   with   intervals   of   rationality,   which   are   usually   short  
compared  with  the  length  of  episodes.  (Falret,  1854,  quoted  in  Healy,  
2008,  p61)  
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In  the  same  year  Jules  Baillarger  proposed  a  similar  category7  –  ‘folie  à  double  
forme’:  
All  writers  on  mania  have  considered  the  transformation  of  mania  into  
melancholia   or   vice   versa   to   be   fairly   common.   They   have   also   all  
perceived  these  facts  to  be  two  different  disorders,  two  distinct  attacks,  
which  succeed  each  other  more  or  less  within  a  single  patient.  This  is  
an   opinion   which   I   have   sought   to   combat.   Indeed   I   would   like   to  
demonstrate   that  we  have  not   two  diseases  but  a  single  one;   the   two  
supposed  attacks  are  nothing  but  two  stages  of  a  single  attack.  
(Baillarger,  1854,  quoted  in  Healy,  2008,  p55)  
There  are  obvious  similarities  between  these  two  accounts.  Both  can  be  seen  to  
bring   together   the   concepts   of   mania   and   depression   into   a   single   entity.  
However,  we  also  find  significant  differences.  For  example,  Falret,  in  contrast  to  
Baillarger,   stressed   the   importance   of   a   period   of   euthymia   (a   positive  mood  
appropriate  to  circumstance),   in  addition  to  episodes  of  mania  and  depression  
(Angst   and  Marenos,   2001,   p7).  We   also   find   that   Falret   understood   the   two  
phases  to  be  distinct,  whereas  for  Baillarger  “the  manic  period  is  a  “reaction”  to  
the  preceding  depression  and  is  proportional  to  it”  (Pichot,  1995,  p4).    
Although   mania   and   depression   were   first   brought   together   into   a   distinct  
entity   in   the  nineteenth  century,  Goodwin  and   Jamison  suggest  “most  clinical  
observers   continued   to   regard   mania   and   melancholia   as   separate   entities”  
(2007,  p7).  We  also  find  that  later  concepts  of  ‘manic  depressive  insanity’  differ  
significantly  from  the  concepts  of  folie  à  double  forme  and  folie  circulaire.  One  
influential   example   of   these   later   concepts   can   be   found   in   the  work   of   Emil  
Kraepelin.  
                                                                                                 
7  There  is  significant  disagreement  about  whether  Baillarger  or  Falret  ought  to  be  credited  with  
first  proposing  the  single  entity  that  became  manic  depression.  For  discussion  of  this  topic  see  
Pichot  (1995).  
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Kraepelin  and  Manic  Depressive  Insanity  
The  work   of   Kraepelin   has   been   influential   due   to   the   classifications   that   he  
provided   and   the   methodology   he   employed.   Kraepelin   classified   mental  
disorders   on   the   basis   of   “the   severity   of   the   disorder…;   the   identification   of  
groups  of  symptom-­‐‑complexes  with  the  same  evolutions  and  outcomes;  and  the  
assumption   that   heredity   played   a   prominent   role   in   the   causation   of   these  
disorders”   (Perris,   1992,   p57).   He   provided   detailed   descriptions   of   the  
symptoms  and  course  of   ‘manic  depressive   insanity’,  contrasting  this  with  the  
concepts   of      ‘dementia   praecox’   and   paranoia.8   One   example   of   the   kind   of  
descriptions  he  provided  can  be  seen  below,  where  he  contrasts  the  manic  and  
depressed  states  found  in  ‘manic  depressive  insanity’:  
On   the  one  hand  we  meet  with  distractibility,   flight  of   ideas,   exalted  
ideas,  cheerful  mood,  volitional  excitement;  on  the  other  sluggishness  
of  attention  and  of  thinking,  ideas  of  sin  and  of  persecution,  mournful  
or  anxious  mood,  volitional  inhibition.  (Kraepelin,  2010,  p64)  
Despite  linking  the  concepts  of  mania  and  depression,  Kraepelin  did  not  hold  to  
the  narrow  concepts  of  folie  circulair  or  folie  à  double  forme.  The  early  editions  
of  Kraepelin’s  textbook  on  psychiatry  were  perhaps  more  sympathetic  to  these  
concepts,  describing  Falret’s  folie  circulaire  as  “a  very  well  established  type  of  
mental  disorder”   (Quoted   in  Angst   and  Marenos,   2001,  p8).  However,   by   the  
eighth   edition   of   his   textbook   of   psychiatry,   Kraepelin   had   broadened   the  
category  of  ‘manic  depressive  insanity’  to  include  “virtually  all  of  melancholia”  
(Goodwin  and   Jamison,   1990,  p60).  Mania  and  depression   therefore   remained  
‘together’   under   Kraepelin,   but   not   as   a   distinct   entity   set   apart   from   other  
forms  of   affective  disorders.   Indeed,   so   broad  was  Kraepelin’s   concept   that   it  
has  been  suggested  that  “the  history  of  affective  disorder  after  1910  is  no  more  
                                                                                                 
8  The  concept  of  dementia  praecox  can  be  seen  to  be  the  forerunner  of  our  modern  concept  of  
schizophrenia.  Whilst  much  of  the  focus  at  the  time  was  on  this  category  of  dementia  praecox  
(Healy,  2008,  p74),  Kraepelin’s  work  has  been  “enormously”  influential  in  bipolar  research  
(Angst  and  Marenos,  2001,  p8).    
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than   the   analysis   of   the   fragmentation   of   the   Kraepelinian   notion”   (Berrios,  
1992,  p45).  
Kraepelin   also   marked   a   distinct   change   in   the   understanding   of   mania   and  
depression   through   his   discussion   of   the   possibility   of   ‘mixed   states’:   “states  
which  do  not   exactly   correspond  either   to  manic  excitement  or   to  depression,  
but  represent  a  mixture  of  morbid  symptoms  of  both  forms  of  manic-­‐‑depressive  
insanity”  (2010,  p64).  Identifying  eight  different  ways  the  states  may  manifest,  
Kraepelin   understood  mania   and   depression   not   simply   as   distinct   phases   of  
the  same  disorder,  but  as  states  that  may  also  co-­‐‑occur.9  This  broad  category  of  
‘manic  depressive  insanity’  can  therefore  be  seen  to  differ  significantly  from  the  
mania   and   melancholia   found   in   Greek   and   Roman   texts,   as   well   as   the  
folie  circulair  and  folie  à  double  forme  of  the  mid-­‐‑nineteenth  century.  
We   have   already   seen   how   Kraepelin’s   thought   began   to   develop   and   alter,  
with  marked  differences   between   his   earlier   and   later   classification   of   ‘manic  
depressive  insanity’.  It  is  notable  that  Kraepelin  was  also  open  to  the  possibility  
that   significant   changes   would   be   made   to   his   classifications   through   future  
research.  In  this  way,  we  can  see  that  he  did  not  view  his  categories  as  rigid  or  
unchanging.  For  example,  he  wrote:  “What  we  have  formulated  here  is  only  a  
first  sketch,  which  the  advance  of  our  science  will  often  have  occasion  to  change  
and  to  enlarge  in  its  details,  and  perhaps  even  in  its  principal  lines”  (Kraepelin,  
1913,   p345,   quoted   in  Decker,   2007,   p356).  Whilst  Kraepelin   brought   together  
mania  and  depression  into  the  same  category,  it  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  
he  did  not  view  this  category  as  necessarily  being  static.    
                                                                                                 
9  These  are:  mania,  depressive  or  anxious  mania,  excited  depression,  mania  with  poverty  of  
thought,  orthodox  depression,  manic  stupor,  depression  with  flight  of  ideas,  and  inhibited  
mania  (Kraepelin,  2010,  p66-­‐‑70).  Whilst  Kraepelin  provides  brief  descriptions  of  each  of  these,  
he  notes  that  “The  doctrine  of  the  mixed  states  is  still  too  incomplete  for  a  more  thorough  
characterization  of  the  individual  forms  to  be  advisable  at  present”  (2010,  p70).  
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Bipolar  Disorder,  Unipolar  Depression,  and  DSM-­‐‑III  
Bipolar  disorder,  broadly  understood  as  periods  of  mania  and  depression  in  the  
same  person,   did  not   gain   acceptance   as   a  distinct   entity   separate   from  other  
affective   disorders   (including   unipolar   depression)   until   the   mid-­‐‑1960s.  
Drawing   on   Karl   Leonard’s   distinction   between   bipolar   and   ‘monopolar’  
affective   disorders,   Angst   and   Perris   independently   and   simultaneously   put  
forward   the   claim   that   bipolar   disorder   ought   to   be   viewed   as   a   separate  
disorder  distinct  from  unipolar  depression,  even  if  the  unipolar  depression  was  
recurrent.10    Interestingly,  they  based  this  distinction  not  simply  on  differences  
in   clinical   description,   but   also   differences   they   found   in   terms   of   “genetics,  
gender,   cause,   and   premorbid   personality”   (Angst   and   Marenos,   2001,   p10).  
The  impact  these  studies  had  on  the  general  acceptance  of  bipolar  disorder  as  a  
distinct  entity  led  Pichot  to  describe  1966  as  the  year  of  the  “rebirth”  of  bipolar  
disorder  (1995,  p1).  This  move  away  from  Kraepelin’s  broad  category  of  ‘manic  
depressive   insanity’   towards   narrower   categories   of   ‘bipolar   disorder’   and  
‘unipolar   depression’   can   be   seen   to   be   a   significant   alteration   in   how   the  
relationship  between  mania  and  depression  was  understood.    
The   third   edition   of   The   American   Psychiatric   Association’s   Diagnostic   and  
Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  (DSM-­‐‑III)  (1980)  marked  the  first  formal  
recognition   of   bipolar   disorder   as   a   distinct   entity.  DSM-­‐‑III   aimed   to  provide  
descriptive   classifications   of   mental   disorders,   “eschewing   psychoanalytical  
aetiologies,   stressing   that   psychiatry   was   decidedly   a   part   of   medicine,   and  
emphasizing  the  importance  of  follow-­‐‑up  studies  and  family  histories”  (Decker,  
2007,   p354).11   In   this   sense,   it  may   be   thought   to   be   continuing   the   legacy   of  
                                                                                                 
10  Angst,  Perris,  and  Leonard  were  primarily  concerned  with  differentiating  between  different  
forms  of  recurrent  affective  disorders.  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp8-­‐‑9)  for  discussion  of  
this  point  .  See  Perris  (1992)  for  broader  discussion  of  the  bipolar-­‐‑unipolar  distinction.  
Particularly  see  pp57-­‐‑59  for  an  account  of  Leonard’s  work  in  this  area.  
11  Earlier  editions  of  DSM  were  criticised  for  being  overly-­‐‑influenced  by  common  
psychoanalytical  theories  of  the  time.  See  Decker  (2007)  for  discussion  of  this  point.  
   50  
Kraepelinian   descriptive   classification.   This   form   of   classification   occurred  
against  a  background  of  significant  criticism  regarding  what  was  known  as  the  
‘unreliability’   of   diagnosis   –   a   common   concern   in   the   1960s   and   1970s   that  
“different   psychiatrists   would   not   diagnose   the   same   person   with   the   same  
symptoms   in   the   same  way”   (Horwitz   and  Wakefield,   2007,   p7).12   Thus,   one  
goal   of   DSM-­‐‑III   was   to   improve   the   reliability   of   diagnosis,   producing   clear  
descriptions   of   psychiatric   disorders   in   order   to   enable   psychiatrists   to  
consistently  diagnose  in  the  same  way.  As  the  aetiology  of  psychiatric  disorders  
was  unknown,  Robert   Spitzer,   chair   of   the  DSM-­‐‑III   taskforce,   had   the   task   of  
producing  a   classification  manual   “that   limited   itself   to   the  description  of   the  
mentally   ill   and   avoided   speculation   about   aetiology”   (Decker,   2007,   p345).  
According   to  Hannah  Decker,   Spitzer’s  hope  was   that  DSM-­‐‑III  would  help   to  
improve   communication   in   psychiatry   as   well   as   diagnostic   reliability   (2007,  
p352).    
Whilst   the   World   Health   Organisation’s   ninth   edition   of   the   International  
Classification  of  Diseases  (ICD-­‐‑9)  (WHO,  1977)  did  not  formally  incorporate  this  
bipolar-­‐‑unipolar  distinction,  the  widespread  acceptance  of  bipolar  disorder  as  a  
distinct  entity  can  be  seen  through  its  inclusion  in  ICD-­‐‑10  (WHO,  1992),  and  its  
continued   place   in   future   editions   of   DSM,   including   the   revised   edition   of  
DSM-­‐‑III  (DSM-­‐‑III-­‐‑R)  (APA,  1987),  as  well  as  DSM-­‐‑IV  (APA,  1995),  DSM-­‐‑IV-­‐‑TR  
(APA,  2000),  and  DSM-­‐‑5  (APA,  2013).13  
The  Category  of  “Bipolar  Disorder”  
What  this  brief  historical  overview  highlights   is   the  varying  ways  that  bipolar  
disorder,  and  the  broader  relationship  between  mania  and  depression,  has  been  
understood.  Far  from  Goodwin  and  Jamison’s  claim  of  “unvarying  language”,  
                                                                                                 
12  See  Ghaemi  (2009)  for  discussion  of  the  different  diagnoses  that  were  made  in  London  vs  
New  York  in  a  study  carried  out  in  1970.    
13  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (1990,  p62;  1990,  pp86-­‐‑7)  for  discussion  of  this  point.  
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we   find   that  mania,   depression,   and   bipolar   disorder   are   not   static   concepts.  
Even  they  concede  that  “the  boundaries  that  define  mania  and  depression  and  
the   relationship   between   them  have   changed   [over   the   centuries]”   (2007,   p3).  
The   understanding   of  what   constitutes   an   experience   of  mania   or   depression  
has  altered  significantly  –  even  within  the  last  two  centuries.14  We  also  find  that  
at  different  points   in  history   the   relationship  between   the   two  states  has  been  
understood  in  different  ways:  Mania  as  a  worsening  of  melancholia;  mania  and  
depression   as  distinct  periods   of   the   same  disorder;  mania   and  depression   as  
states   that   may   co-­‐‑occur,   and   so   on.  We   cannot,   therefore,   point   to   a   single,  
unchanging   description   of   bipolar   disorder.   As   such,   it   seems   implausible   to  
suggest  that  the  long  history  is  indicative  of  a  developed  understanding  of  the  
experience  of  mania,  depression,  or  bipolar  disorder.    
At  this  point  it  might  be  objected  that  regardless  of  the  historical  understanding  
of  bipolar  disorder,  surely  we  now  have  clear  knowledge  of  these  experiences.  
We   find   that   a   number   of   questions   immediately   arise:   Are   our   current  
classifications  any  more  stable  or   resistant   to  change   than  our  historical  ones?  
Are   these   categories   empirically   sound?   Can  we   look   to   the   descriptions   we  
find   in   these   classifications   for   a   clear  understanding  of   experiences  of  mania  
and   depression?   It   is,   therefore,   to   contemporary   classifications   that   we   now  
turn.  I  begin  this  next  section  by  describing  how  mania,  depression,  and  bipolar  
disorder   are   classified   and   described   in   DSM-­‐‑IV.   Having   established   this,   I  
move   on   to   discuss   the   stability   of   this   category   through   comparison   with  
DSM-­‐‑III   and   DSM-­‐‑5.   Through   an   examination   of   contemporary   debates   and  
discussions   surrounding   the  diagnosis   I  highlight   the  extent   to  which   there   is  
uncertainty   in   these  categories   regarding   the  experience  of  mania,  depression,  
and  bipolar  disorder.  
                                                                                                 
14  See  Radden  (2000)  for  further  discussion  of  historical  understandings  of  melancholy.  
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Bipolar  Disorder  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  
The   American   Psychiatric   Association’s   Diagnostic   and   Statistical   Manual  
remains,   along   with   the   World   Health   Organisation’s   International  
Classification   of   Diseases,   one   of   the   most   influential   classification   manuals  
currently   in   use.   As  Horwitz   and  Wakefield   explain,   “these   DSM   definitions  
have  become  the  authoritative  arbiter  of  what   is  and  is  not  considered  mental  
disorder  throughout  our  society”  (2007,  p7).  The  classifications  contained  in  the  
DSM  are  used  in  a  number  of  different  contexts,  including  for  research,  for  the  
collection  of  public  health   statistics,   as  well   as   the  diagnosis   and   treatment  of  
service  users.  The  fourth  edition  of  the  manual  was  first  published  in  1994,  with  
a  text  revision  in  2000.15  
Bipolar  disorders  are  classified  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  as  Mood  Disorders  –  “disorders  that  
have   a   disturbance   in  mood   as   the   predominant   feature”   (APA,   2000,   p345).  
They   are   distinguished   from   depressive   disorders   by   the   presence   of   manic,  
hypomanic,  or  mixed  episodes.    The  two  main  types  of  bipolar  disorder  that  we  
find   described   in   DSM-­‐‑IV   are   Bipolar   I   Disorder   and   Bipolar   II   Disorder.  
Bipolar  I  Disorder  “is  characterized  by  one  or  more  Manic  or  Mixed  Episodes,  
usually   accompanied   by   Major   Depressive   Episodes”   (APA,   2000,   p345).  
Bipolar   II   Disorder,   by   contrast,   “is   characterized   by   one   or   more   Major  
Depressive  Episodes  accompanied  by  at  least  one  Hypomanic  Episode”  (APA,  
2000,   p345).   In   order   to   understand   these   categories,   and   so   to   assess   their  
stability  and  value  in  helping  us  to  understand  experiences  of  bipolar  disorder,  
we  must   look   in   greater   detail   at   what   is   meant   by   a   manic,   hypomanic,   or  
major   depressive   episode.   In   other   words,   we   must   explore   the   “building  
blocks”  of  these  diagnoses  (APA,  2000,  p345).    
                                                                                                 
15  However,  in  DSM-­‐‑IV-­‐‑TR  it  is  explained  that  “No  substantive  changes  in  the  criteria  sets  were  
considered,  nor  were  any  proposals  entertained  for  new  disorders,  new  subtypes,  or  changes  in  
the  status  of  the  DSM-­‐‑IV  appendix  categories”  (APA,  2000,  pxxix).  
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Major  Depressive  Episodes  
A  major   depressive   episode   must   include   a   period   of   at   least   two   weeks   in  
which   the  person  experiences   a   “depressed  mood”  or   “diminished   interest  or  
pleasure   in   all,   or   almost   all,   activities”   (APA,   2000,   p356).   At   least   a   further  
four  symptoms  are  necessary  for  diagnosis,  taken  from  a  list  of  seven  possible  
symptoms.   These   include   changes   in   appetite   and   weight,   changes   in   sleep  
patterns  or  ability  to  sleep,  fatigue,  feelings  of  worthlessness  or  guilt,  difficulties  
in   thought   or   concentration,   experiences   of   agitation   or   retardation,   and  
thoughts   of   death   or   suicide.   In   order   to   count   towards   diagnosis,   these  
experiences   must   cause   significant   impairment   in   the   person’s   ability   to  
function   in   social,   occupational,   or   other   similar   settings.   For   example,   in   an  
extreme  case  a  person  may  struggle  with  basic   self-­‐‑care  such  as   showering  or  
preparing  food.  In  milder  cases,  a  person  may  struggle  to  complete  tasks  that  he  
previously   found   easy   to   complete,   or  may   experience   difficulties   interacting  
with  other  people.   In  addition  to  these  symptoms,  a  major  depressive  episode  
may  also  include  psychotic  features.    
It   is   noted   in   DSM-­‐‑IV   that   “periods   of   sadness   are   inherent   aspects   of   the  
human  experience”   (APA,  2000,  p355).   Seeking   to   avoid  diagnosing  everyday  
sadness   as   depression,   DSM-­‐‑IV   attempts   to   distinguish   between   these  
experiences   on   the  basis   of  duration   (consistent   experience   for   a  minimum  of  
two  weeks),  severity  (the  presence  of  five  out  of   the  nine  possible  symptoms),  
and   the   presence   of   the   aforementioned   clinically   significant   distress   or  
impairment  (APA,  2000,  pp355-­‐‑6).  Similarly,   there  is  an  attempt  to  distinguish  
between  a  major  depressive  episode  and  periods  of  grief.  The  criteria  includes  a  
bereavement  exclusion  clause:  
The  symptoms  are  not  better  accounted  for  by  Bereavement,  i.e.,  after  
the  loss  of  a  loved  one,  the  symptoms  persist  for  longer  than  2  months  
or   are   characterized   by   marked   functional   impairment,   morbid  
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preoccupation   with   worthlessness,   suicidal   ideation,   psychotic  
symptoms,  or  psychomotor  retardation.  (APA,  2000,  p356)  
Manic  and  Hypomanic  Episodes  
The   defining   feature   of   a   manic   episode   is   an   “abnormally   and   persistently  
elevated,  expansive,  or  irritable  mood”  (APA,  2000,  p357)  that  lasts  for  at  least  
one  week  (or  any  length  of  time  if  hospitalisation  is  required).  At  the  same  time,  
there   must   be   three   additional   symptoms   present,   or   four   if   the   mood   is  
irritable.  These  are   taken   from  a   list   that   includes   the   following:     Grandiosity,  
decreased  need  for  sleep,  a  feeling  of  pressure  to  keep  talking,  flight  of  ideas  or  
racing   thoughts,   distractibility,   increased   goal-­‐‑directed   activity,   and  
engagement   in  high-­‐‑risk  pleasurable   activities   (APA,   2000,  p362).   Similarly   to  
the  criteria  for  a  major  depressive  episode,  the  severity  of  the  mood  disturbance  
must   be   apparent.   In   order   to   be   classified   as   a  manic   episode   there  must   be  
either   marked   impairment   in   occupational   or   social   functioning   or   in   the  
person’s  relationships  with  others,  a  necessitation  of  hospitalisation  in  order  to  
prevent   harm   to   self   or   others,   or   psychosis   must   be   present.   Psychotic  
experiences  in  cases  of  mania  may  include  grandiose  delusions  (for  example,  a  
person’s  belief   that   they  have  a   special   relationship   to  God)  or  hallucinations.  
Such  experiences  are  usually  mood  congruent  –  “the  content  of  the  delusions  or  
hallucinations  is  consistent  with  the  manic  themes”  (APA,  2000,  p414).  
This   severity   clause   distinguishes   between   manic   and   hypomanic   episodes.  
Whilst  the  two  have  identical  lists  of  symptoms,  a  hypomanic  episode  does  not  
cause  marked   impairment   in   functioning,   necessitate   hospitalisation,   or   allow  
for  the  presence  of  psychosis.  As  Goodwin  and  Jamison  explain,  “there  should  
be  no  such  thing  as  a  hypomanic  hospitalized  patient;   if  manic-­‐‑like  symptoms  
lead  to  hospitalization,  the  diagnosis  must  be  mania,  not  hypomania.  The  same  
holds   true   if   psychosis   is   present”   (2007,   p95).   Instead,   DSM-­‐‑IV   requires   a  
change  in  functioning  for  a  diagnosis  of  hypomania  to  be  made.  This  change  in  
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functioning   may   be   “a   marked   increase   in   efficiency,   accomplishments,   or  
creativity”   (APA,   2000,   p365).   Alternatively,   there   may   be   a   decrease   in  
functioning,   with   some   occupational   or   social   impairment.   This   change   in  
functioning   must   not   be   characteristic   of   the   person’s   usual   non-­‐‑hypomanic  
experience  and  it  must  be  observable  to  others.  In  contrast  to  the  week  duration  
that   is   required   for  a  diagnosis  of  mania,  a  hypomanic  episode  need  only   last  
for  a  minimum  of   four  days.  Manic  and  hypomanic  episodes  that  come  about  
due  to  medical  treatments,  including  treatments  for  depression  (such  as  the  use  
of   antidepressants   or   electroconvulsive   therapy)   do   not   count   towards   the  
diagnosis  of  bipolar  I  disorder  or  bipolar  II  disorder.    
Mixed  Episodes  
A  mixed  episode  is  defined  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  as  a  period  of  at  least  one  week  in  which  
a  person  meets  the  criteria  both  for  a  manic  episode  and  for  a  major  depressive  
episode   (APA,   2000,   p365).  As   in   the   case   of   a  manic   episode,   the   experience  
must   either   cause   marked   impairment   in   functioning,   or   necessitate  
hospitalisation,  or  psychotic  features  must  be  present.    Apart  from  a  clause  that  
excludes  symptoms  caused  by  a  medical  condition  or  drug  induction,  these  are  
the  only   criteria  given   for   the  diagnosis  of   a  mixed  episode.  However,  we  do  
find  one  further  description  of  mixed  episodes  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  under  the  heading  of  
Episode  Features:  
The   individual   experiences   rapidly   alternating   moods   (sadness,  
irritability,   euphoria)   accompanied   by   symptoms   of   a  manic   episode  
and  a  major  depressive  episode.  (APA,  2000,  p362)  
Bipolar  I  Disorder  and  Bipolar  II  Disorder  
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  understand  the  distinction  between  the  two  types  
of   bipolar   disorder   given   in  DSM-­‐‑IV.   Bipolar   I   Disorder,  we   have   seen,  must  
feature   at   least   one  manic   or  mixed   episode.  Hypomanic   or  major  depressive  
episodes   may   also   be   experienced,   but   are   not   necessary   for   diagnosis.   In  
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contrast,  bipolar  II  disorder  must  feature  at  least  one  major  depressive  episode  
and   at   least   one   hypomanic   episode.   It   cannot   feature   any  mixed   episodes   or  
manic  episodes.    
Having  established  how  mania,  depression,  and  bipolar  disorder  are  classified  
in  DSM-­‐‑IV,  we  can  now  return  to  our  earlier  questions  regarding  the  stability  of  
the   categories   and   the  necessity  of  understanding   these   experiences.  We  have  
already   seen   that   our   historical   classifications   altered   significantly   over   time.  
Can  the  same  be  said  to  be  true  of  our  contemporary  classifications?  In  the  next  
section  I  explore  this  question,  noting  the  continued  instability  of  the  categories  
of  mania  and  depression  and  highlighting  how  current  debates  regarding  these  
categories  suggest  a  need  for  further  understanding  of  the  experiences  of  these  
states.    
From  DSM-­‐‑III  to  DSM-­‐‑IV  
DSM-­‐‑III  was   first  published   in   1980,  with   a   text   revision   in   1987.  Even   in   the  
short   time   period   between   the   publication   of   DSM-­‐‑III   and   DSM-­‐‑IV   we   find  
significant   alterations   in   the   category   of   bipolar   disorder.   Perhaps   the   most  
notable  change  between  the  editions   is   the  addition  of  bipolar  II  disorder  as  a  
distinct  diagnostic  entity   in  DSM-­‐‑IV,  along  with  a  consequently  necessary  full  
criteria   set   for   a   hypomanic   episode   as   distinct   from   a   manic   episode.   We  
therefore   find   that   an   experience   that  would  warrant   a   DSM-­‐‑IV   diagnosis   of  
‘bipolar   II  disorder’  would,  using  DSM-­‐‑III-­‐‑R  classification,   receive  a  diagnosis  
of   “Bipolar   Disorder   Not   Otherwise   Specified”   (APA,   1987,   p228).16   The  
diagnostic  category  of  bipolar  II  disorder,  we  are  told,  was  added  “in  response  
to  the  evidence  from  the  literature  review  and  data  reanalysis  that  suggested  its  
                                                                                                 
16  It  is  notable  that  the  concept  of  bipolar  II  disorder  was  not  present  at  all  in  DSM-­‐‑III  and  was  
only  included  as  an  example  of  bipolar  NOS  in  DSM-­‐‑III-­‐‑R.  This  alteration  is  noted  in  appendix  
D  of  DSM-­‐‑III-­‐‑R  (1987,  p422).  
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utility   and   to   increase   diagnostic   coverage”   (APA,   1995,   p799).17   It   therefore  
seems  that  even  within  the  last  few  decades  the  category  of  bipolar  disorder  has  
been  significantly  altered  and  expanded.    
Whilst   the   addition   of   the   category   of   bipolar   II   disorder   is   the  most   notable  
alteration   that  we   find   between   the   editions,   alterations  within   the   categories  
themselves  were  also  made.  For  example,  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  we  find  that,  in  contrast  to  
DSM-­‐‑III,   antidepressant   induced   mood   alterations   do   not   count   towards   a  
diagnosis  of  bipolar  disorder.18  Additionally,  DSM-­‐‑IV   includes  explicit   criteria  
for  the  category  of  mixed  states  –  something  that  was  again  absent  in  DSM-­‐‑III  
and  DSM-­‐‑III-­‐‑R.    
Such  changes  warn  us  against  assuming   that  our  contemporary  classifications  
are   any   more   stable   or   resistant   to   change   than   our   historical   ones.   ‘Bipolar  
disorder’   is   not   a   static   concept.   As   Healy   writes,   “The   landscape   of   bipolar  
disorder   is   changing   from   month   to   month,   never   mind   decade   to   decade”  
(2008,  pxv).  We  can  see  further  evidence  of  this  in  the  debates  and  discussions  
that  have  surrounded  the  recent  publication  of  DSM-­‐‑5.    
DSM-­‐‑5  and  Beyond  
DSM-­‐‑5  was  published  on  the  18th  May  2013.  Whilst  it  is  too  soon  to  assess  how  
the   changes   that   have   been   made   will   be   interpreted   and   used   in   clinical  
practice,  we  can  look  to  these  alterations  as  a  means  of  highlighting  some  of  the  
contemporary  discussions   regarding   bipolar   disorder.19   These  discussions,  we  
                                                                                                 
17  See,  for  example,  Dunner  et  al  (1976).  
18  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  p93)  for  discussion  of  this  point.  
19  It  is  notable  that  the  National  Institute  of  Mental  Health  has  announced  their  intention  to  
abandon  the  DSM-­‐‑5  categories  and  work  to  replace  them  with  a  more  biologically  informed  
classification  system  (NIMH,  29th  April,  2013).  This  demonstrates  a  notable  unease  with  this  
new  edition  of  the  DSM  that  suggests  we  ought  be  cautious  about  assuming  it  will  continue  to  
be  used  in  the  same  way  and  to  the  same  extent  as  DSM-­‐‑IV.    
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will   see,   highlight   the   very   real   need   for   further   research   into   experiences   of  
mania,  depression,  and  bipolar  disorder.  
We  saw  earlier  that  DSM-­‐‑IV  defines  a  mixed  episode  as  a  period  in  which  the  
criteria   for  both  a  manic  episode  and  a  major  depressive  episode  are  met.      In  
DSM-­‐‑5  we  find  a  move  away  from  this  conceptualisation  of  mixed  episodes  as  
both   states   being   wholly   present,   and   towards   an   understanding   of   mixed  
episodes  as  an  episode  in  which  a  person  is  predominantly  either  depressed  or  
manic,  with  features  of  the  opposing  state.20  The  APA  explains:  
The  DSM-­‐‑IV  diagnosis  of  bipolar  I  disorder,  mixed  episode,  requiring  
that   the   individual   simultaneously   meet   full   criteria   for   both   mania  
and   major   depressive   episode,   has   been   removed.   Instead,   a   new  
specifier,  “with  mixed  features”,  has  been  added  that  can  be  applied  to  
episodes   of   mania   or   hypomania   when   depressive   features   are  
present,   and   to   episodes   of   depression   in   the   context   of   major  
depressive   disorder   or   bipolar   disorder   when   features   of  
mania/hypomania  are  present.  (APA,  3rd  May  2013,  p4)  
The  mixed  features  specifier  can  be  used  when  a  person  meets  the  full  criteria  
for   mania   or   hypomania,   and   experiences   at   least   three   features   of   a   major  
depressive   episode,   or   when   a   person   meets   the   full   criteria   for   a   major  
depressive  episode  and  experiences  at  least  three  features  of  mania/hypomania  
(APA,  2013,  pp149-­‐‑50).  
The   descriptions   we   find   of   mixed   episodes   in   DSM-­‐‑5,   and   particularly   in  
DSM-­‐‑IV,  provide  us  with  minimal  information  about  exactly  how  the  states  of  
mania   and  depression  may   come   together.21  Understanding   these   experiences  
can  be  seen  to  be  of  central  importance  in  bipolar  research  -­‐‑  how  we  understand  
mixed  episodes  has  significant  implications  for  how  we  understand  the  related  
                                                                                                 
20  APA  publications  suggest  that  this  is  due  to  the  rarity  with  which  the  full  DSM-­‐‑IV  mixed  
episode  criteria  was  met  in  clinical  reality  (APA,  1st  February  2013).  
21  We  might  contrast  this  with  the  significantly  richer  descriptions  of  different  forms  of  mixed  
episodes  found  in  the  work  of  Kraepelin  (2010).  
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categories   of   mania   and   depression.   For   example,   we   cannot   simply   assume  
that  mania   is  an   ‘opposite  pole’  of  depression   if  we  have  evidence  of   the   two  
co-­‐‑occurring.   Alternatively,   if   we   find   that   mania   and   depression   feature  
mutually  exclusive  core  features  we  must  conclude  that  a  mixed  episode  could  
not  manifest  as  a  state  in  which  both  mania  and  depression  were  fully  present.  
Such   an   understanding  would   rule   out   the   possibility   of   a  mixed   episode   as  
conceptualised  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  and  place  clear  limitations  on  the  DSM-­‐‑5  concept.    
In   either   case,   we   can   find   a   clear   need   to   understand  what   the   relationship  
between  mania   and   depression   consists   of,   and  whether   the   two   states   share  
any  common  features.  Even  if  we  reject  the  understanding  of  a  mixed  episode  
as  mania  and  depression  simultaneously  co-­‐‑occurring,  we  still  need  to  consider  
how   mixed   episodes   are   experienced   and   which   features   of   mania   and  
depression  may  be  present   in  different   forms  or  variations  of  mixed  episodes.  
At  the  very  least,  the  category  of  mixed  episodes  can  be  seen  to  provide  us  with  
a  clear  challenge:  How  can  these  seemingly  opposed  states  come  together,  and  
what   does   their   co-­‐‑occurrence   tell   us   about  mania   and   depression   as   distinct  
states?   The   instability   of   the   category   of  mixed   episodes   suggests   a   need   for  
further   research   in   this   area.   Thus,   one   central   research   topic   following   the  
publication   of   DSM-­‐‑5   must   be   to   explore   the   experience   of   mixed   episodes.  
Such  research  has   implications  both   for   the  understanding  of  mixed  episodes,  
as  well  as  the  distinct  states  of  mania  and  depression.  
Another  much  debated  alteration  from  DSM-­‐‑IV  to  DSM-­‐‑5  is  the  removal  of  the  
bereavement  exclusion  clause  for  a  major  depressive  episode.22  However,  there  
does  remain  a  cautionary  note  in  the  classification:  
Responses   to   a   significant   loss…may   include   the   feelings   of   intense  
sadness,   rumination   about   the   loss,   insomnia,   poor   appetite,   and  
weight   loss…which   may   resemble   a   depressive   episode.   Although  
                                                                                                 
22  For  one  discussion  of  this  see  Parker  (2013).  
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such  symptoms  may  be  understandable  or  considered  appropriate   to  
the  loss,  the  presence  of  a  major  depressive  episode  in  addition  to  the  
normal   response   to   a   significant   loss   should   also   be   carefully  
considered.   This   decision   inevitably   requires   the   exercise   of   clinical  
judgment  based  on  the  individual’s  history  and  the  cultural  norms  for  
the  expression  of  distress  in  the  context  of  loss.  (APA,  2013,  p161)  
The  APA  explains  its  decision,  writing,  “By  advising  clinicians  not  to  diagnose  
depression   in   recently   bereaved   individuals,   the   DSM-­‐‑IV   bereavement  
exclusion   suggested   that   grief   somehow   protected   someone   from   major  
depression”   (APA,   15th   February   2013,   p1).   However,   Allen   Frances,   former  
chair  of  the  DSM-­‐‑IV  task  force  warns:  
Normal   grief   will   become   Major   Depressive   Disorder,   thus  
medicalizing  and  trivializing  our  expectable  and  necessary  emotional  
reactions  to  the  loss  of  a  loved  one  and  substituting  pills  and  medical  
rituals   for   the   deep   consolations   of   family,   friends,   religion,   and   the  
resiliency  that  comes  with  time  and  the  acceptance  of  the  limitations  of  
life.  (2nd  December  2012)  
This   suggestion   speaks   to   broader   concerns   regarding   the   extent   to   which  
DSM-­‐‑IV  and  DSM-­‐‑5  fail  to  distinguish  between  mental  disorder  and  everyday  
distress.23  The  British  Psychological  Society,  for  example,  has  written:  
The   Society   is   concerned   that   clients   and   the   general   public   are  
negatively  affected  by  the  continued  and  continuous  medicalisation  of  
their   natural   and   normal   responses   to   their   experiences;   responses  
which   undoubtedly   have   distressing   consequences   which   demand  
helping   responses,   but   which   do   not   reflect   illnesses   so   much   as  
normal  individual  variation.  (British  Psychological  Society,  2011,  p2)    
The  dramatic   increase   in  diagnosis  of  bipolar  disorder,  what  Robert  Whitaker  
refer   to   as   the   “bipolar   boom”   (2010,   p172),   has   meant   that   the   concepts   of  
                                                                                                 
23  See  Horwitz  and  Wakefield  (2007)  for  one  detailed  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  
depression  and  everyday  sadness  or  distress.  
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mania,   depression,   and   bipolar   disorder   have   been   at   the   heart   of   these  
discussions.  24    
Debates   regarding   the   distinction   between   depression   and   grief   further  
highlight   the   need   for   greater   understanding   regarding   these   experiences.   In  
order  to  answer  the  question  of  how,  or  indeed  whether,  to  distinguish  between  
these   two   states   we   must   move   beyond   externally   observable   signs   and  
symptoms,  and  develop  a  nuanced  understanding  of  how  each  are  experienced.  
Indeed,  we  can  begin  to  see  recognition  of  this  point  even  within  DSM-­‐‑5.  In  a  
footnote  to  the  note  on  bereavement  found  in  the  criteria  for  a  major  depressive  
episode,  we  find  the  beginnings  of  a  discussion  of  the  different  experiences  of  
grief   and   depression:   “it   is   useful   to   consider   that   in   grief   the   predominant  
affect  is  feelings  of  emptiness  and  loss,  while  in  MDE  it  is  persistent  depressed  
mood  and  the  inability  to  anticipate  happiness  or  pleasure”  (APA,  2013,  p161).  
We  also  find  here  brief  discussion  of  differences  in  self-­‐‑esteem,  thought  content,  
and  attitude  towards  death.  Whilst  such  descriptions  do  not  amount  to  detailed  
or  nuanced  understanding  of  these  experiences,  it  does  indicate  the  necessity  of  
such   descriptions   in   order   to   adequately   distinguish   between   the   two   states.  
Greater  understanding  of  the  experience  of  depression  can  therefore  be  seen  to  
improve  our  understanding  of  both  depression  and  bipolar  disorder,  as  well  as  
helping  us  to  distinguish  depression  from  similar  but  distinct  experiences.    
Finally,  we  find  differences  between  DSM-­‐‑IV  and  DSM-­‐‑5  in  the  classification  of  
episodes   of   mania.   In   DSM-­‐‑5   there   is   a   move   towards   emphasising   the  
centrality   of   changes   in   energy   and   activity,   rather   than   focussing   on   simple  
changes   in   mood.   Whilst   DSM-­‐‑IV-­‐‑TR   specifies   an   “elevated,   expansive,   or  
irritable  mood”   as   a   necessary   criterion   for   a  manic   state   (APA,   2000,   p362),  
DSM-­‐‑5   additionally   requires   “persistently   increased   goal-­‐‑directed   activity   or  
                                                                                                 
24  Moreno  and  colleagues  found  that  between  1994-­‐‑5  and  2002-­‐‑3  there  was  a  two-­‐‑fold  increase  in  
the  diagnosis  of  bipolar  disorder  for  adults  in  the  US,  and  an  approximately  forty-­‐‑fold  increase  
in  youth  (Moreno  et  al.,  2007,  p1035).  
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energy”  (APA,  2013,  p124).25  Whilst  this  may  seem  to  be  a  minor  change,  it  once  
again  highlights  the  lack  of  long-­‐‑term  consensus  regarding  what  an  experience  
of  mania  consists  of  and  what  we  can  take  to  be  the  central  or  defining  features  
of  such  a  state.  Furthermore,  it  raises  additional  questions  regarding  our  depth  
of   understanding   of   these   states.   Can   we   move   beyond   these   externally  
observable   signs   and   symptoms   in   order   to   access   and   understand   the   lived  
experience?    
We   began   this   chapter   with   the   worry   that   there   may   be   no   need   for  
phenomenological  studies  of  mania  and  depression.  By  this  point   it  should  be  
clear   that   this   is   not   the   case.  Whilst  mania,   depression,   and  bipolar  disorder  
can  be  seen  to  have  a  long  history,  these  categories  are  not  static.  The  constantly  
changing   categories   caution   us   against   assuming   that   we   have   a   robust  
understanding  of  these  states.  Furthermore,  the  current  debates  regarding  these  
categories   suggest   that   it   is   specifically   an  understanding  of   the   experiences   of  
mania  and  depression  that  is  lacking.  Accurately  understanding  and  describing  
mixed   episodes,   distinguishing   depression   from   grief   and   everyday   sadness,  
and   determining   the   central   features   of   mania   all   require   a   robust  
understanding  of  the  experiences  of  these  states.  However,  even  if  we  assume  
that   the   current   classifications   are   stable   and   reliable   in   identifying   states   of  
mania  and  depression,  we  still  find  that  there  is  phenomenological  work  to  be  
done.   As   we   saw   in   the   last   chapter,   our   classifications   are   reliant   on  
descriptions  of  experiences  and  the  relevant  phenomenology   is   far   from  clear.  
As   such,   even   if   we   set   aside   current   concerns   regarding   mixed   episodes,  
depression   and   everyday   distress,   and   the   central   features   of  mania,   there   is  
still  a  need  for  phenomenological  studies  of  mania  and  depression.    Stability  of  
a   category  does  not   rule   out   the  need   for   further  phenomenological   research,  
particularly  when  that  categorisation  is  at  least  partially  based  on  descriptions  
                                                                                                 
25  Both  of  these  criteria  sets  require  three  more  symptoms  in  addition  to  the  changes  in  
mood/activity.  
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of   experience.   However,   this   need   for   phenomenological   enquiry   is   further  
highlighted  when  we  consider  that  these  categories  are  not  stable,  and  that  this  
instability   appears   to   be   at   least   in   part   due   to   uncertainty   regarding  
experiences  of  these  states.    
A  Phenomenological  Study  of  Mania  and  Depression  
We  have  seen  that  the  way  that  experiences  of  mania,  depression,  and  bipolar  
disorder   have   been   classified   has   varied   significantly.   The   instability   of   these  
categories  cannot  be  seen  to  be  merely  a  feature  of  the  past:  The  alterations  from  
DSM-­‐‑IV  to  DSM-­‐‑5,  and  the  on-­‐‑going  discussions  regarding  the  classification  of  
these   states   even   beyond   DSM-­‐‑5,26   caution   us   against   assuming   that   our  
contemporary   classifications   are   any   more   resistant   to   change   than   our  
historical  ones.  Given  this  lack  of  stability,  we  may  be  concerned  about  making  
use  of  such  categories  in  our  research.  Such  concerns  may  be  compounded  by  
broader   criticisms   and   discussions   regarding   the   nature   of   psychiatric  
classification.   Crucial   debates   have   arisen   in   this   area,27   concerning   what   a  
psychiatric   disorder   is,28   what   the   purpose   of   the   classification   of   psychiatric  
disorders   is,29   and  whether   it’s   possible   to   develop   a   truly   neutral   system   of  
classification.30   We   are   therefore   led   to   ask   how   it   is   possible   to   explore  
experiences  of  mania  and  depression,  given  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  status  
of  the  categories.  
                                                                                                 
26  For  example,  discussion  regarding  the  broadening  of  the  category  of  ‘bipolar  disorder’  to  
include  a  ‘bipolar  spectrum’  can  be  found  in  a  special  issue  of  The  Journal  of  Affective  Disorders  73  
(1-­‐‑2).  See  also  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp19-­‐‑24).  
27  See  Radden  (1994)  for  an  overview  of  common  criticisms  and  discussions  regarding  
psychiatric  classification.  
28  See  Horwitz  and  Wakefield  (2007)  for  discussion  of  mental  disorder  as  “harmful  
dysfunction”.  See  Zachar  (2000)  for  one  argument  that  psychiatric  disorder  should  be  
understood  as  ‘practical  kinds’  rather  than  ‘natural  kinds’.  
29  See  Frances  (26th  April  2010)  and  Ghaemi  (24th  April  2010)  for  debate  about  whether  the  DSM  
ought  to  be  mindful  of  the  potential  uses  of  classification,  as  well  as  descriptive  accuracy.  
30  See  Cooper  (2005,  pp77-­‐‑104)  for  discussion  of  the  problem  of  theory-­‐‑ladenness.  
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However,  we  can  make  practical  use  of   the  categories  provided   in  DSM-­‐‑IV   in  
order   to   identify   a   set   of   experiences,   without   necessarily   endorsing   these  
categories   as   the   best  or  most   accurate  way   to   classify   these   experiences.  Our  
use  of   the   categories  does  not  mean   that  we  must  adopt  an  understanding  of  
the  experiences  identified  as  disordered  or  as  constituting  an  ‘illness’,  nor  does  
it   entail   understanding   such   experiences   as   being   part   of   a   distinct   and  
unchanging   entity.   It   should   also   be   clear   that   any   use   of   the  DSM  does   not  
necessitate   thinking   that   the   descriptions   offered   in   the   manual   exhaust   the  
possible  descriptions  of   the  experiences  categorised.   Instead,  we  can  use  these  
categories  as  a  starting  point  for  our  research,  helping  to  identify  or  mark  out  a  
particular   set   of   experiences.  However,  we   can   still  maintain   a   critical   stance  
towards   those   categories,   allowing   for   the   possibility   of   circling   back   and  
criticising  or  evaluating  them.  
In   this   study   of   mania   and   depression   I   will   therefore   be   exploring   the  
experiences   that   fall   under   the   categories   of   a   ‘major   depressive   episode’,   a  
‘manic  episode’,  and   ‘a  hypomanic  episode’   in  DSM-­‐‑IV.  Whilst  many  of   those  
experiences  would  fall  under  the  categories  of  ‘bipolar  I  disorder’  or  ‘bipolar  II  
disorder’,  my   focus   here   is   on  mania   and   depression,   rather   than   on   bipolar  
disorder  as  a  distinct  category.    This  broader  focus  allows  for  the  possibility  of  
exploring   the   different  ways   that   these   states  may  manifest   and   interact,   not  
ruling   out   the   possibility   that   such   states   could   occur   independently   of   one  
another.    As  such,  I  do  not  restrict  my  discussion  of  depression  to  merely  those  
cases   in  which   the   person   has   also   experienced  mania,   nor  my   discussion   of  
mania   to   those   that   have   also   experienced   depression.31   This   focus   on  mania  
and  depression   rather   than  merely   bipolar   disorder   thus   allows  us   to   further  
our  understanding  of   unipolar  depression   as  well   as   bipolar  disorder.  As   the  
                                                                                                 
31  However,  as  Nassir  Ghaemi  points  out,  those  that  experience  episodes  of  mania  will  usually  
also  experience  episodes  of  depression  (2003,  pp31-­‐‑2).  For  further  discussion  of  ‘unipolar  
mania’  see  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp13-­‐‑14).  
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main   criteria   for   mania   and   hypomania   are   identical   (the   difference   being  
degree  of   impairment  or   the  presence  of  psychosis,  rather  than  a  difference   in  
the   symptoms   present),   I   will   not   provide   separate   discussions   of   these  
experiences.   I  will,  however,  note  when  the  experiences  are   likely   to  differ,  or  
when  particular  features  of  experience  may  be  more  likely  to  occur  in  one  state  
rather  than  the  other.  
One  aim  of  this  study  is  to  explore  how  the  states  of  mania  and  depression  may  
come  together  in  forms  of  mixed  episodes.  The  use  of  the  DSM-­‐‑IV  criteria  for  a  
mixed  episode  –  “The  criteria  are  met  both  for  a  Manic  Episode  and  for  a  Major  
Depressive  Episode”  (APA,  2000,  p365)  –  would  involve  presupposing  what  the  
experiences   of  mania   and   depression   are,   and  what   the   relationship   between  
the  two  consists  of.  For  example,  the  criteria  given  for  a  mixed  episode  already  
presupposes   that   none   of   the   central   features   of   manic   episodes   and   major  
depressive  episodes  are  mutually  exclusive.  Whilst  I  therefore  make  use  of  the  
categories   for   a   manic   episode   and   a   major   depressive   episode,   I   make   no  
assumptions   in  my   definitions   regarding   how   to   understand   the   relationship  
between   the   two.  Given   the   changes   that   have   been  made   to   this   category   in  
DSM-­‐‑5,  and   the  particular  uncertainty   that  we  have  seen  exists   regarding   this  
category,   to   restrict   the  discussion   to   the  DSM-­‐‑IV  category  of  mixed  episodes  
would  be   to   impose  an  unnecessary  and  potentially  detrimental   limitation  on  
the  study.    Instead,  I  will  begin  with  the  experiences  as  described  in  first  person  
accounts,  allowing  for  an  exploration  of  common  ways  in  which  features  of  the  
two  states  may  co-­‐‑occur.  Whilst  this  may  include  the  presentation  described  in  
DSM-­‐‑IV,  it  does  not  restrict  our  discussion  to  merely  this  presentation.  
Despite   the   recent  publication  of  DSM-­‐‑5,   I   have   chosen   to  direct  my   research  
using   the   earlier   categories  described   in  DSM-­‐‑IV.  This   is,   in  part,   because   the  
vast  majority  of   this   research  was  carried  out  before   the  DSM-­‐‑5  classifications  
were  published.  However,  there  are  additional  reasons  why  we  might  choose  to  
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continue   to   use   the   earlier   classifications   in   the   early   stages   following   the  
publication   of   DSM-­‐‑5.   Many   of   the   changes   made   in   this   new   edition   have  
proved  controversial,  and  it  is  not  yet  clear  how  they  will  influence  diagnostic  
practice.  We  cannot  yet  be  certain  how  best  to  interpret  the  changed  criteria,  nor  
can  we  know  how  they  will  typically  or  commonly  be  interpreted.  This  presents  
a  difficulty  in  identifying  which  experiences  would  fall  under  the  categories  of  
a   ‘manic   episode’   and   a   ‘major   depressive   episode’   in   the   new   DSM.   Using  
DSM-­‐‑IV  we  can  have  greater  confidence  regarding  how  the  criteria  is  typically  
interpreted   and  which   experiences   could   or  would   be  diagnosed  under   these  
categories.   Until   the   full   implications   of   the   changes  made   to   the   DSM   have  
been  explored,  it  would  be  unwise  to  rest  our  research  upon  it.    
Personal   experiences  of  mania   and  depression  are   likely   to  vary   significantly,  
with   different   individuals   experiencing   different   combinations   of   signs   and  
‘symptoms’.32  The  individual  may  have  further  complicating  factors,  such  as  an  
additional  diagnosis  or  a  major  life  event  that  has  impacted  on  his  experience.  
Even   if   these   kinds   of   significant   complicating   factors   are   not   present,   the  
individual’s  experience  will  always  be  affected,  at  least  to  some  degree,  by  his  
individual   situation,   personality,   relationships,   and   so   on.   As   Schwartz   and  
Wiggins  write,   “the   facts   pertaining   to   any   person,  when   considered   in   their  
concrete  fullness,  are  virtually  infinite”  (1987,  p280).  We  can  therefore  see  that  
the  experience  of  mania  and  depression  will  not  be  static  for  the  individual,  nor  
is  it  likely  to  exactly  resemble  any  other  individual’s  experience  of  these  states.    
This   complexity   of   individual   experience   poses   a   problem   for   our   research.  
How   are   we   to   develop   an   understanding   of   the   experience   of   mania   and  
depression  when  each   individual’s   experience   is  unique?     Even   if  we  were   to  
                                                                                                 
32  By  my  use  of  the  term  ‘symptoms’  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  mania  and  depression  are  
necessarily  illnesses  or  diseases,  nor  that  the  symptoms  are  manifestations  of  a  disease  or  
illness.  Instead,  I  simply  use  it  as  a  descriptive  term  for  features  of  experiences  commonly  found  
in  cases  of  mania  and  depression.  
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restrict  our  enquiry  to  one  person’s  experience  of  mania  and  depression,  we  still  
find   that   at   different   times   the   experience   may   have   altered,   with   different  
features   present   or   absent.   One   possible   solution   to   this   problem,   a   way   to  
move  beyond  individual  experience,  is  the  use  of  ‘ideal  types’.    
First  developed  by  sociologist  Max  Weber  and  later  applied  to  psychiatry  in  the  
work  of  Jaspers  (e.g.  1997),  an  ideal  type  can  be  understood  to  be  a  “standard,  
or   simplified   version   of   reality”   (Ghaemi,   2009).33   We   develop   these   types  
through  a  process  of  abstraction,  “focusing  exclusively  on  the  data  that  interest  
us”  (Schwartz  and  Wiggins,  1987,  p280).  Thus,  the  types  are  not  an  averaging  of  
different   individuals’   experiences,   nor   do   they   represent   any   one   particular  
person’s   experience,   but   rather   they   are   abstract   concepts   that   pick   out   the  
salient   features   of   those   experiences   –   that   which   is   distinctive   of   those  
experiences.  As  Schwartz  and  Wiggins  explain,   “In  defining  an   ideal   type  we  
try   to   set   aside   this   indistinctness,   ambiguity,   and   extreme   variation   and  
imagine  a  pure  case   in  which   the  relevant   features  are  distinct,  unambiguous,  
and   invariant”   (1987,   p282).   This   pure   case   is   thus   one   in   which   all   of   the  
distinctive  features  of  that  experience  are  fully  present.  However,  this  ‘pure’  or  
‘perfect’   case   need  not   correspond  directly   to   any   one   instance   of   the   type   in  
reality.   It   is   an   abstraction,   an   idealised   description   of   the   experiences   in  
question.  In  reality,  many  of  the  cases  we  identify  as  instances  of  that  type  may  
lack   some   of   the   features   present   in   the   ideal   type,   or   those   features   may  
present  in  only  a  minimal  or  ambiguous  way.    
Applied  to  psychiatry,  an  ideal  type  of  a  particular  psychiatric  disorder  would  
identify  those  features  that  are  distinctive  of  that  disorder  or  experience,  rather  
than  providing  a  comprehensive  description  of  any  one  individual’s  experience  
or   an   averaging   of   different   experiences.   Notably,   this   does   not   entail   a  
                                                                                                 
33  See  Ghaemi  (2009)  and  Schwartz  and  Wiggins  (1987)  for  full  discussion  of  Weber’s  concept  of  
ideal  types  and  how  it  is  applicable  to  psychiatry.  
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commitment   to   that   ideal   type   being   a   distinct   disease   entity,   nor   does   it  
suggest  that  an  instance  of  that  type  must  possess  all  of  the  identified  features.34  
Clinicians   may   instead   identify   “imperfect   cases   by   their   resemblance   or  
approximation   to   the  perfect   case  described  by   the   ideal   type”   (Schwartz  and  
Wiggins,   1987,   p282).35   In   this   way   we   can   move   beyond   the   individual’s  
experience  and  overcome  the  problem  of   the   infinite  complexities   that  exist   in  
any  one  person’s  experience.    
In  this  thesis  I  make  use  of  this  concept  of   ideal  types,  focussing  my  study  on  
identifying   the   distinctive   features   of   mania   and   depression.36   As   such,   the  
descriptions   I   offer   may   not   correspond   directly   to   any   one   individual’s  
experience,   and   I   am   certainly   not   suggesting   that   the   features   discussed   are  
present   in  all  experiences  of  mania  or  depression.   Instead,   I  seek  to  clarify   the  
typical  or  distinctive  features  of  these  states,  features  that  may  be  more  or  less  
present  in  any  one  individual’s  experience.  However,  such  ideal  types  may  later  
be  used  to  help  clarify  an  individual’s  experience  –  aiding  the  understanding  of  
particular  features  of  the  experience,  even  if  those  features  are  not  fully  present  
or  present  in  a  ‘pure’  way.  In  this  way  we  are  able  to  overcome  the  problem  of  
the   complexities   of   individual   experiences   of  mania   and   depression,   but   still  
provide  valuable  descriptions  of  experiences  of  these  states.  
Having   established   the   value   of   describing   these   experiences,   and   having  
identified  ways   of   constraining   and  directing   our   research,  we   find   ourselves  
led   to   one   final   pressing   question:   How   are   we   to   gain   access   to   these  
experiences?   In   the   next   chapter   I   therefore   turn   to   the   topic   of   narratives,  
                                                                                                 
34  See  Ghaemi  (2009)  for  discussion  of  ideal  types,  psychiatric  nosology,  and  disease  entities.  
35  See  Schwartz  and  Wiggins  (1987),  and  particularly  pp285-­‐‑7  for  discussion  of  the  clinical  
application  of  ideal  types  and  how  they  can  help  to  guide  psychiatric  research.  
36  I  am  not,  however,  claiming  that  this  discussion  exhausts  description  of  the  distinctive  
features  of  mania  and  depression.  It  is  possible,  and  indeed  likely,  that  further  research  in  this  
area  would  reveal  additional  distinctive  features  of  manic  and  depressed  experiences.  
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exploring   how   these   first   person   accounts   can   inform   our   phenomenological  
research.  
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Chapter  3:  Narratives  of  Mania  and  Depression  
Introduction  
Broadly,  a  narrative  can  be  understood  to  be  a  “representation  of  a  sequence  of  
events”  (Goldie,  2009,  p98).  Peter  Goldie  clarifies  that  a  narrative  must  be,  
more  than  just  a  bare  annal  or  chronicle  or  list  of  sequence  of  events,  
but  a  representation  of  these  events,  and  the  people  involved  in  them,  
from   a   certain   perspective   or   perspectives,   and   thereby   giving  
narrative   structure   –   coherence,  meaningfulness,   and   evaluative   and  
emotional  import  –  to  what  is  related.  (2012,  p2)  
  In  this  study  I  am  concerned  with  publically  accessible  narratives,  rather  than  
what  Goldie  terms  ‘narrative  thinking’  (a  narrative  that  is  represented  simply  in  
thought  rather  than  in  a  publically  accessible  form  such  as  text).  A  narrative,  in  
the   sense   I  use   it,  might   therefore   include  pieces  of  writing,  drawings,1   comic  
strips,2   dance,   theatre,3   everyday   narrations   through   conversations,4   pieces   of  
music,   and   so   on.   One   of   the   most   common   forms   of   narrative   used   in  
phenomenological  studies  of  psychiatric  disorders  is  the  published  first  person  
account.  In  this  chapter  I  therefore  focus  on  the  value  that  these  accounts  have  
for  phenomenologists.  Within  the  category  of  ‘first-­‐‑person  published  account’  I  
include   published   book-­‐‑length  memoirs,   published   diaries,   and   collections   of  
shorter   accounts   by   multiple   authors.   I   discuss   both   published   and  
self-­‐‑published  works,  though  I  do  not  assess  the  value  of  internet  blogs  or  other  
                                                                                                 
1  For  an  example  of  a  narrative  of  depression  depicted  in  drawings  see  Baker  (2010).  
2  For  examples  of  narratives  of  psychiatric  disorders  in  cartoon  strip  form  see  Hyperbole  and  a  
Half:  Adventures  in  Depression  (Brosh,  2011)  and  I  do  not  have  an  Eating  Disorder  (McHurst,  2011).  
3  See  Kane  (2006)  for  an  example  of  a  semi-­‐‑autobiographical  play  depicting  depression.  
4  See  Linde  (1993)  for  a  discussion  of  what  she  terms  ‘life  stories’.  
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narratives   that   are   not   formally   published.5   I   begin   by   outlining   some   of   the  
advantages   of   using   narrative   accounts   in   phenomenological   research,   before  
moving  on  to  examine  some  of  the  potential  problems.  These  include  the  ways  
in  which  narrative  structure,  motivation,  and  cultural  influence  may  obscure  or  
distort   a   representation   of   an   experience.   I   conclude   by   putting   forward   an  
account   of   how   we   can   use   narratives   in   our   enquiries   whilst   remaining  
mindful  of  the  problematic  aspects  of  the  narrative  form.    
The  Value  of  Narrative  Accounts  
The  sheer  number  of  available  published  narratives  of  mania  and  depression,6  
combined   with   the   rich   descriptions   so   often   contained   within   them   makes  
these   accounts   an   attractive   resource   for   the   phenomenologist.   The   extended  
length   of   the   narrative   allows   for   a   degree   of   depth   and   context   to   be   seen,  
albeit   always   through   the   lens   of   how   the   person   himself   interprets   his  
experience  and  broader  life  story.  That  the  accounts  are  so  subjective  need  not  
necessarily  be  seen  as  a  disadvantage.  After  all,  part  of  what  we  are  interested  
in   is   precisely   the   subjective   nature   of   the   experience.7   Our   focus   is   on   how  
events  were   experienced,   rather   than  merely   the   events   themselves.   Through  
the   narrative   we   can   gain   access   to   descriptions   of   the   same   person’s  
experiences  of  mania,  depression,  and  euthymia.    Knowledge  of  how  the  person  
acts,  what  he  values,  and  how  he  views  the  world  in  each  of  these  states  helps  
to  bring  greater  depth  of  meaning   to   the  changes   that  occur  when   the  person  
becomes  depressed  or  manic.  Whilst  an  individual  may  state  that  he  is  punctual  
when  manic,   for   example,   this   information   is  most   valuable  when   put   in   the  
context   of   a   person   who   is   usually   late   for   meetings.   The   reflection   on  
experience   commonly   found   in   narrative   accounts   allows   us   to   appreciate  
                                                                                                 
5  However,  see  Benzon  (2008)  for  a  discussion  of  the  use  of  internet  blogs  in  the  study  of  
psychiatric  illness.  
6  See  Hornstein  (2011)  for  an  extensive  list  of  first  person  narratives  of  madness.  
7  For  example,  I  discuss  the  subjective  experience  of  time  in  chapters  five  and  six.  
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distinctions  between  the  person’s  typical  values  and  experiences  and  how  these  
altered  when  he  was  manic  or  depressed.      
Narratives   also   have   the   advantage   of   frequently   containing   descriptions   of  
multiple  episodes  of  both  mania  and  depression.  This  allows  us  to  explore  how  
the  person  is  affected  at  different  periods  of  her  life,  hinting  at  whether  aspects  
of  the  disorder  are  constrained  by  the  individual’s  particular  situation.  Hearing  
that   a   person   overspent   during   a   manic   episode   both   when   she   was   going  
through  a  financially  secure  period  as  well  as  when  she  was  not,   for  example,  
gives  us  a  more  meaningful  picture  of  that  particular  behaviour.  Additionally,  
narrative   accounts   give   us   greater   understanding   of   the   sequences   of   these  
events.   We   learn   not   merely   about   a   person’s   experience   of   depression   at   a  
particular   point   in   time,   but   also   how   that   experience   progressed   and  
developed.  Goldie  notes   that   the  meaning   that   is   found   in  narratives   is  partly  
due   to   the   “narrative-­‐‑historical”   (2012,   p20)   explanations   of   situations.   He  
explains:  
[T]hey   locate   the  motive,   the   trait,   the   undue   influence   on   thinking,  
within   a  wider   nexus,   in   a  way   that   enables   us   to   understand  more  
deeply  why   someone   did   the   thing   that   they   did   through   appeal   to  
aspects  of  their  personal  history  or  circumstances.  (2012,  p20)  
Whilst  situating  individual  events  within  a  wider  context  cannot  be  seen  to  give  
us  access  to  the  full  causal  story  of  that  event,8  it  can  provide  us  with  a  greater  
degree   of   insight   than   we   might   find   in   alternative   forms   of   accounts   (for  
example,   in   medical   notes   or   in   a   questionnaire).   Mania   and   depression   are  
typically  not  short-­‐‑lived,  and  it  is  common  for  a  person  to  experience  multiple  
episodes   over   the   course   of   a   lifetime.   As   such,   narratives   that   enable  
longer-­‐‑term  context  seem  to  be  a  particularly  appropriate  way  to  represent  the  
experience  of  bipolar  disorder.  
                                                                                                 
8  As  Goldie  notes,  “narratives  characteristically  leave  substantial  explanatory  gaps  to  be  filled  
in”  (2012,  p21).  
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Finally,   as   Jennifer   Radden   and   Somogy   Varga   have   argued,   narratives   of  
psychiatric   disorders   can   help   to   demonstrate   the   relationship   that   a   person  
holds  with  her  disorder  or   the   symptoms  of   that  disorder   (e.g.  Radden,   2008;  
Radden  and  Varga,  2013).  They  explain:    
Today’s   identity   politics   and   unprecedented   emphasis   on   personal  
identity  make   some   description   of   the   relationship   between   self   and  
illness,   or   self   and   symptoms   almost   de   rigueur   in   contemporary  
first-­‐‑person  accounts.  (Radden  and  Varga,  2013,  p105)  
Through  studying  narratives  we  may  be  able  to  access  not  only  a  description  of  
what  an  experience  consisted  of,  but  also  what  the  person’s  relationship  to  that  
experience  was  and  is.  For  example,  different  accounts  of  mania  and  depression  
may  depict  the  disorder  either  as  an  extension  of  the  person’s  personality,  or  as  
an   outside   or   invading   force.9   In   some   accounts   we   may   also   be   able   to  
distinguish  between   the  person’s   relationship   to  her   symptoms  at   the   time  of  
the   experience   and   how   she   views   her   symptoms   at   the   time   of   writing.   As  
narratives  of  mania  and  depression  are  frequently  written  after  the  person  has  
recovered,  or  during  a  time  of  stability,  this  later  reflection  can  provide  valuable  
insight  into  how  the  experience  of  mania  or  depression  differed  from  her  usual  
or  everyday  experience.  
However,   despite   my   use   of   narratives,   I   recognise   that   there   are   significant  
issues   regarding   the   reliability   and   usefulness   of   such   accounts.   As   Paul  
Atkinson   cautions,   we   cannot   “assume   that   autobiographical   accounts   or  
narratives   of   personal   experience   grant  us  untrammelled   access   to   a   realm  of  
hyperauthenticity”   (1997,   p341).   Whilst   I   attempt   to   show   that   many   of   the  
issues  raised  against  the  use  of  narrative  can  be  largely  overcome  or  mitigated,  
it   is   important   that   any   phenomenological   account   that   draws   on   narratives  
remains  mindful  of  these  potential  issues.  
                                                                                                 
9  See  Radden  (2008)  for  a  full  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  ‘symptom  integrating’  and  
‘symptom  alienating’  narratives.  
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Narratives  and  Phenomenological  Study  
The   value   a   narrative   holds   for   a   phenomenologist   is   based   on   the   extent   to  
which   it   reveals   an   original   experience.   There   is   an   active   debate   regarding  
whether  and  to  what  extent  we  experience  life  as  a  narrative.  David  Carr  argues  
that,   “narrative   structure   pervades   our   very   experience   of   time   and   social  
existence,  independently  of  our  contemplating  the  past”  (1991,  p9).  In  contrast,  
Galen  Strawson  argues  that  “There  are  deeply  non-­‐‑Narrative  people  and  there  
are   good   ways   to   live   that   are   deeply   non-­‐‑Narrative”   (2004,   p429).10   The  
question  of  whether  a  written  narrative  distorts  an  original   experience   can  be  
seen  to  be  of  particular  importance  if  Strawson’s  view  is  correct.  However,  even  
if   we   accept   that   our   everyday   experiences   are   in   some   sense   narratively  
structured,  this  still  does  not  lessen  the  importance  of  such  questions.  The  act  of  
placing   a   narrative   experience   into   a   written   and   published   illness   narrative  
may  still  be  thought  to  potentially  distort  aspects  of  that  experience.  My  focus  
here  is   therefore  not  on  whether  or  not  experiences  are  narratively  structured.  
Instead,  I  look  at  the  related  issue  of  whether  placing  an  original  experience  into  
a   written   and   published   narrative   may   be   thought   to   significantly   distort   or  
obscure   that   experience,   even   if   that   experience   had   some   form   of   narrative  
structure  to  begin  with.    
With   this   in  mind,   I   will   discuss   features   of  written   narratives   that   have   the  
potential   to   obscure,   distort,   or   clarify   a   representation   of   an   experience   of  
mania  or  depression.  This   includes   the   structure  of   the  narrative,   the   focus  of  
the  narrative,  the  cultural  background  of  the  writer,  and  the  motivation  that  she  
has  for  writing.  I  take  care  to  note  how  narratives  of  mania  and  depression  are  
particularly  vulnerable  to  certain  issues.  
                                                                                                 
10  See  Angela  Woods  (2011)  for  one  discussion  of  the  implications  of  Strawson’s  paper  for  the  
use  of  narratives  in  the  medical  humanities.  
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Narrative  Structure  
The  structure  used  in  a  written  narrative  can  present  a  particular  challenge  for  
the   author.   A   written   narrative   of   illness   or   disorder   is   necessarily   selective,  
forcing  an  experience  into  a  particular  structure  with  a  beginning,  middle,  and  
end.  In  contrast,  the  original  experience    -­‐‑  even  if  we  grant  that  it  was,  to  some  
degree,  originally  narratively  structured  -­‐‑  will  have  been  broader,  with  various  
features  of  the  person’s  life  being  present  that  are  not  necessarily  relevant  to  the  
illness  narrative.  The  same  person,   for  example,  could  write  a  narrative  about  
his   career   that  may  highlight   and  neglect  very  different   aspects  of   experience  
than   a   narrative   about   his   depression.   This   seems   to   hold   even   if   the   two  
narratives   cover   the   same   period.   In   putting   the   experience   into   a   narrative  
structure   the  person  must  decide  which  aspects  of   the  experience  are  relevant  
and  which   are   not,   as  well   as   highlighting   the   particular  meaning   that   these  
experiences  hold  for  him.  As  Anne  Hawkins  writes:  
The   narrative   description   of   illness   is   both   less   and   more   than   the  
actual  experience:   less,   in   that  remembering  and  writing  are  selective  
processes   –   certain   facts   are   dropped   because   they   do   not   fit   the  
author’s   narrative   design;   and   more,   in   that   the   act   of   committing  
experience   to   narrative   form   inevitably   confers   upon   it   a   particular  
sequence  of  events  and  endows  it  with  significance  that  was  probably  
only  latent  in  the  original  experience.  (1999,  pp14-­‐‑15)  
The   act   of   putting   an   experience   into   narrative   form   seems   to   become   even  
more  problematic  in  cases  of  mania  and  depression.  Whilst  we  might  be  able  to  
fit  our  day  to  day  lives  into  a  simple  narrative,   it  seems  harder  to  fit  dramatic  
and   unexpected   events   into   the   structure.   Sudden   life   changes   seem   to   resist  
simple   explanations,  making   a   linear,   causal,   structure   insufficient   to   express  
the   full   experience.   It  may  be  hard   for   the  person   to   know  what   ‘caused’   the  
depression,  or  to  fully  explore  the  events  and  thought  processes  that  lead  to  and  
result   from   a   suicide   attempt.   Elizabeth   Wurtzel   explains   in   her   memoir   of  
depression  the  difficulty  she  had  understanding  her  own  suicide  attempt:  “The  
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suicide   attempt   startled   even  me.   It   seemed   to   happen   out   of   context”   (1996,  
p279).   Perhaps   especially   in   cases   of   mania   there   will   be   aspects   of   the  
experience   that  may  not   seem   to   ‘fit’   into  a   smooth  narrative.  Extreme  events  
that   may   occur   in   manic   states,   such   as   deciding   to   move   countries,   leave   a  
partner,   or   quit   a   job,   may   not   have   the   same   kind   of   causal   structures   that  
would   be   expected   in   a   narrative   of   everyday   life.   The   lack   of   reflection   that  
forms   part   of   the   manic   experience,11   along   with   the   memory   loss   that   is  
commonly  reported,  would  also  make  it  hard  for  the  person  to  place  the  events  
into  a  simple  and  communicable  narrative  structure.  Landis  quotes  one  person  
who  describes   this  difficulty  of  accurately  remembering  the  manic  experience:  
“I  recollect  only  by  fits  and  starts,  with  complete  gaps”  (Graves,  1942,  quoted  in  
Landis,   1964,   p668).   In   her   memoir   of   bipolar   disorder,   Marya   Hornbacher  
explains  the  difficulties  this  poses  for  creating  a  coherent  narrative:  
  Madness   strips   you   of   your   memory   and   leaves   you   scrabbling  
around  on  the  floor  of  your  brain  for  the  snatches  and  snippets  of  what  
happened,  what  was  said,  and  when…This  is  the  best  I  can  do  to  piece  
the   scattered   memories   together,   to   give   some   semblance   of  
continuous  time.  (2008,  p175)  
It   is   interesting   to  note   that   in  placing  experiences  of   illness   in  narrative   form  
writers   often   make   use   of   the   same   narrative   structures   –   a   journey,   for  
example.12  Given  this,  it  is  worth  raising  the  question  of  whether,  and  the  extent  
to   which,   written   descriptions   of   experiences   are   altered   to   fit   into   familiar  
structures   in   order   to   allow   for   ease   of   communication   or   to   aid  
self-­‐‑understanding.  Particularly  in  the  case  of  psychiatric  disorders,  experiences  
of  which  we  have   seen  may  be  hard   to   articulate   and  may   involve   traumatic  
events,  it  may  be  an  inviting  option  to  cast  the  description  in  familiar  terms  and  
structures   in   order   to   try   to   make   sense   of   the   experience.   The   value   of  
                                                                                                 
11  See  chapter  five  for  a  discussion  of  the  loss  of  reflection  in  mania.  
12  Hawkins  (1999)  discusses  common  ‘myths’  that  structure  illness  narratives  (what  she  terms  
‘pathographies’),  such  as  that  of  rebirth  and  the  journey.  
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constructing   narratives   in   order   to   bring   meaning   to   an   experience   is   well  
documented.13   Howard   Brody,   for   example,   writes,   “both   sick   persons   and  
physicians  make  the  experience  of  sickness  more  meaningful  (thereby  reducing  
suffering)  by  placing  it  within  the  context  of  a  meaningful  story”  (1987,  p182).  
Those   that   write   narratives   of   mania   and   depression   frequently   discuss   the  
value  of  placing  traumatic  events  into  a  narrative  structure.  For  example,  Fiona  
Shaw  writes   the   following   in  her  memoir  of  post-­‐‑natal  depression:  “What  has  
been   important   has   been   the   act   of   turning   blankness   and   confusion   into  
narrative  coherence,  however  provisional”  (1997,  p72).  
What   is   of   central   concern   for   the   phenomenologist,   however,   is  whether   the  
use  of  familiar  narrative  structures  in  published  accounts  significantly  alters  or  
obscures  the  original  experience.  Even  if  we  grant   that   the  original  experience  
was   at   least   partly   narrative   in   nature,   we   might   still   question   whether   this  
narrative   was   altered   in   order   to   fit   in   with   familiar   structures   found   in  
published  accounts.   Johanna  Shapiro   suggests   that   there   is   a   justified  concern  
that  such  familiar  structures  may  “prevent  other  patient  voices  from  emerging”  
(2011,   p69).   This  may  be   because   those  whose   experiences  do  not   conform   to  
those   structures   are   reluctant   to   go   against   the   grain   and   express   those  
differences.  Alternatively,  when   the  majority  of   accounts   conform   to   common  
structures,   researchers   may   focus   on   these   at   the   expense   of   the   atypical  
examples.   However,   Shapiro   also   notes   that   for   some   writers   of   illness  
narratives   these   structures   may   simply   “speak   their   truth”   (2011,   p70).   We  
might  be  suspicious  of  the  accuracy  of  an  illness  narrative  in  which  the  writer  
suffers  great   trials   through   the   illness  only   to  emerge  having  acquired  greater  
self-­‐‑knowledge  from  the  process,  having  seen  a  large  number  of  accounts  with  
the  same  structure.  However,  it  is  possible  that  the  reason  why  this  structure  is  
so  popular  is  because  it  resonates  with  the  experience  of  the  illness  or  disorder.  
                                                                                                 
13  See,  for  example,  Arthur  Frank  (1995).  
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These  structures  may  have  emerged  because  they  tell  us  something  meaningful  
about  many  illness  experiences.  
It  is  also  possible  that  the  structure  a  person  uses  to  discuss  his  experience  can  
be  revealing  of   that  experience.  This  might   include  the  overall  structure  of   the  
narrative,  as  well  as  individual  life  episodes,  paragraph  structure,  and  the  sense  
of  progression  from  one  section  to  the  next  –  all  may  express  particular  feelings  
that  reveal  something  about  the  experience  described.  This  may  be  because  the  
structure   of   the   experience   resists   description   in   certain   structural   forms,  
limiting  how  it  can  be  presented,14  or  it  may  be  a  purposeful  method  taken  up  
by  the  writer  in  order  to  express  hard  to  articulate  experiences.  
This   point   might   be   illuminated   by   a   comparison   of   the   structure   of   Lizzie  
Simon’s  memoir  of  bipolar  disorder  Detour:  My  Bipolar  Road  Trip   in  4-­‐‑D   (2003)  
with   that   of   W.   G.   Sebald’s   semi-­‐‑autobiographical   novel   The   Rings   of   Saturn  
(2002).    
Simon’s  narrative  describing  her  experience  of  mania  and  depression  makes  use  
of  brief  sentences  and  paragraphs,  frequently  changing  from  one  time  period  to  
another   without   any   sense   of   smooth   progression.   For   example,   one   typical  
section  reads:  
I’m  heading  West,  no  particular  destination  in  mind.  
(Use  this  blank  page  to  color  a  picture  about  a  time  you  were  freaking  out  so  
bad  you  couldn’t  even  describe  it  to  another  person.)  
(2003,  p167)  
                                                                                                 
14  For  example,  Gallagher  (2009)  discusses  the  difficulties  those  with  schizophrenia  face  in  
constructing  coherent  narratives.  
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This  single  section   is  all   that   is  written  on  the  page.  A  second  example  of   this  
short,  almost  scattered  approach  can  be  seen  in  the  following  section:  
What  started  that  day  after  I  found  out  I  was  accepted  to  college  was  
an  episode  so  horrific  that  it  would  become  impossible  for  me  to  deny  
that  I  had  a  mental  illness  for  the  rest  of  my  life.  
  Though   I   had   always   known   that   something   was   wrong   with   me,  
what  started  that  day  was  evidence,  concrete  evidence.  
   Yes.  True.  
(2003,  p3)  
Again,  this  single  section  is  all  that  is  on  the  page.  The  following  page  switches  
to   events   that   took   place   seventeen   years   previously.   The   literal   meaning   of  
what  is  written  tells  only  half  the  story  here.  Simon’s  chosen  style  of  recording  
her   experience   teaches   us   something   about   the   experience   she   is   undergoing.  
The   thoughts   often   seem   scattered,   the   paragraphs   and   sections   frequently  
unlinked.    The  structure  of  the  book  allows  for  the  impression  of  constant  and  
unstructured   change,   swiftly   moving   from   one   topic   to   the   next.   What   we  
encounter   through   the   structure   of   Simon’s   book   is   a   feeling   of   constant,  
sudden,   and   radical   change,   a   disorientating   and   often   uncomfortable  
experience   that   might   be   thought   to   highlight   elements   of   the   experience   of  
bipolar  disorder.  
In  contrast,  Sebald’s  The  Rings  of  Saturn  is  more  complete,  with  rich  descriptions  
and   lengthy   paragraphs   that   frequently   loop   back   upon   themselves.   Sebald  
returns  to  the  same  themes  time  and  time  again,  interweaving  multiple  stories  
within  the  one  central  narrative.  This  constant  returning  reminds  the  reader  of  
the  weight  of  what  has  gone  before  and  the  possibility  of  history  returning  and  
overwhelming   the  present.   The  use   of   this   structure   is   a   powerful  method   of  
provoking  in  us  some  of  the  feelings  of  depression  the  book  may  be  thought  to  
express.  The  sense  of  the  past  being  overly  present  is  felt  not  only  through  the  
descriptions   themselves,   but   also   through   the   structure   which   allows   past  
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aspects  of   the  book  to  constantly  resurface.  Sebald’s   long,  circling,  paragraphs  
contrast  with  Simon’s   sharp   fragments  –  even  were   the  descriptions   to  be   the  
same,   the   structures   of   the   two   pieces   would   represent   very   different  
experiences.  
Attending  to  the  structure  of  a  narrative  in  order  to  gain  information  about  the  
experience  can  be  particularly  useful  when  studying  psychiatric  disorders  such  
as   bipolar   disorder.   Those  with   the   disorder   often   describe   the   difficulties   of  
accurately   articulating   their   experiences   of   mania   and   depression.   Andrew  
Solomon,   for   example,   writes   that   depression   “can   be   described   only   in  
metaphor   and   allegory”   (2002,   p16).   The   use   of   structure,   therefore,   is   an  
opportunity   to   express   aspects   of   the   disorder   that   may   be   hard   to   put   into  
words.   Indeed,   this   use   of   structure   to   express   aspects   of   experience   is  
sometimes  directly  mentioned  by  the  writers  themselves:  
I  wanted  this  book  to  mirror  the  disease,  to  give  the  reader  a  visceral  
experience.   That’s  why   I’ve   chosen   to   tell  my   life   story   episodically,  
rather  than  in  any  chronological  order.  It’s  truer  to  the  way  I  think.  
(Cheney,  2008,  p1)  
Cheney  has  chosen  a  particular  way  of  structuring  her  narrative  account,   in  a  
non-­‐‑chronological  order,  in  order  to  give  the  reader  a  deeper  understanding  of  
the  experience  of  bipolar  disorder.    As  this  illustrates,  in  some  cases  we  not  only  
can   infer   information  about   the  experience  from  the  structure  of   the  book,  but  
we  are  in  fact  meant  to  do  so.  
It   seems,   therefore,   that   at   the   very   least   the   structure   used   in   a   narrative   of  
mania   or   depression   cannot   be   held   to   be   meaningless.   Whilst   we   must   be  
mindful  of  the  potential  for  distortion  when  narrative  structure  is  imposed  on  a  
broader  experience,  we  must  also  be  aware   that   the   structure  of   the  narrative  
can  be  used  in  order  to  communicate  part  of  the  experience  to  the  reader.      
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Byron   Good   (1994)   argues   that   the   culture   a   person   is   in   can   influence   the  
structure  or   form  used  when  constructing  an   illness  narrative.  Shapiro  agrees,  
writing   that   people   are   “deeply   constrained   by   the   power   of   the   dominant  
narrative   conventions   and   meta-­‐‑narratives   that   are   most   readily   available   to  
them  as  a   result  of   their  particular  place   in   time,  history,  culture  and  society”  
(2011,   p69).   Radden   similarly   suggests   that   “rather   than   being   mere  
phenomenological  reports,  individual  narratives  reflect  the  “framing”  ideas  and  
explanations  accepted  and   imagined  at   their  given   time  and  place   in  history”  
(2008,  p25).  We  can  see  that  the  cultural  background  of  a  person  may  affect  the  
narrative  in  at  least  two  ways:  Firstly,  the  narrative  might  have  meaning  that  is  
only   apparent   to   those   familiar   with   that   society   or   culture.   That   a   person  
chooses   to   structure   his   experience   of   illness   in   the   form   of   a   journey,   for  
example,   may   communicate   different   meanings   depending   on   the   culture   in  
which   he   is   writing.   Secondly,   the   narrative   structures   that   the   person   is  
familiar  with,  and  therefore  we  might  say  are  available  to  him  as  potential  ways  
to   represent  his   experience,  will  be  dependent  upon  his   culture.  For  example,  
the  ways  in  which  a  person  may  frame  his  relationship  with  the  disorder  may  
be,   in  part,   due   to   the   culture   in  which  he   lives.   Thus   the   choice   of   structure  
made   may   not   be   straightforwardly   comparable   to   the   structures   chosen   by  
those  in  other  cultures.  
In   order   to   avoid   these   complicating   factors,   I   have   restricted   my   use   of  
narratives   to   those   from  Western  countries.  Whilst   this  may  place  a   limitation  
on   the   conclusions   that   can   be   drawn,   it   allows   for   a   more   accurate  
interpretation  and  use  of  the  narratives.  Further  studies  would  have  to  be  done  
in   order   to   compare   the   experience   of  mania   and  depression,   and   indeed   the  
narratives  of  mania  and  depression,  in  different  cultures.    
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Narrative  Focus  and  Motivation  
The  motivation   a   person   has   for  writing  may   impact   on   the   narrative   that   is  
told.  This  seems  particularly   to  be  the  case  when  the  narrative   is  written  with  
the   intent   of   publication.   It   must   be   remembered,   after   all,   that   the   writer’s  
primary  aim  is  not  usually   to  provide  an  accurate  resource  for   the  purpose  of  
phenomenological   study.   It   is,   therefore,   not   surprising   that   the   focus   is   not  
always  on  providing  the  most  accurate  and  rich  description  of  an  experience  as  
possible,   and   that   sometimes   accuracy  may   be   sacrificed   for   features   that   are  
more  relevant  to  the  writer’s  aims.  This  does  not  mean  that  we  cannot  use  such  
accounts  as  resources  for  phenomenological  enquiry,  but  simply  that  we  must  
be   aware   of   alternative   motivations   and   the   impact   that   they   may   have   on  
relevant   features  of   the  narrative.  Motivations   that  might  distort   the  narrative  
produced  include  a  desire  for  monetary  gain,  to  preserve  a  reputation,  to  help  
or   offer   support   to   others,   or   to   lend   support   to   a   particular   account   of   the  
causal   factors  or   treatment  options  for   the  disorder.  The  significant  amount  of  
time   spent   completing   the  narrative,   and   the  decision  an   individual  makes   to  
put   her   personal   life   into   the   public   sphere   will   not   have   been   undertaken  
without  some  kind  of  strong  motivation  to  do  so.  As  such,  we  should  be  aware  
of  the  motivations  that  may  have  influenced  the  narrative  produced.  
One  of   the  most  worrying  motivations   for  writing   that  must  be   considered   is  
the  extent  to  which  the  narrative  is  altered  in  order  to  create  a  book  that  will  sell  
well.   There   is   a   danger   that   passages   or,   indeed,   entire   works   may   be  
sensationalised   in   order   to   ‘tell   a   good   story’.   Accuracy   in   reporting   the  
experience   may   be   lost   as   the   writer   attempts,   either   consciously   or  
unconsciously,   to   provide   the   reader  with   an   interesting   and   engaging   book.  
The   influence   of   editors   and   publishers,   who  may   be   particularly   concerned  
with   the   potential   marketability   of   the   book,   may   compound   the   issue.   In   a  
narrative  of  mania  or  depression  there  is  a  particular  concern  that  dramatic  or  
unusual  experiences  will  be  emphasised.  We  might  expect   that  events  such  as  
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suicide   attempts,   wild   manic   behaviour,   or   sudden   recoveries,   will   be   given  
priority   in   the   narrative   over   the   longer   term   and   less   exciting   everyday  
experiences  of  mania  and  depression.  This  may  be  through  exaggeration  or  by  
simply  focussing  on  the  dramatic  events   to   the  exclusion  of   the  non-­‐‑dramatic.  
Either   of   these   situations   would   lead   to   an   inaccurate   representation   of   the  
experience  of  mania  or  depression.  
Linked  to  this  is  the  concern  that  the  narrative  may  be  altered  in  order  to  give  a  
more   favourable   impression  of   the  writer,   or  of  other  people  or  organisations  
that  appear  in  the  narrative.  This  may  be  a  result  of  personal  desire  or  specific  
advice  given  by  a  publisher  or  editor.  A  person  may  be  reluctant,  for  example,  
to  discuss  the  more  embarrassing  events  or  experiences  that  occurred.  She  may  
also   be   unwilling   to   discuss   events   that   show   another   person   in   an  
unfavourable  light.  Attempting  to  paint  a  positive,  or  at  least  neutral,  picture  of  
herself   and  others  may   result   in   an  unbalanced   account  with   aspects   that   are  
dull,   embarrassing,  or  otherwise  unsympathetic   to   the  writer  being  neglected.  
Aware  of  this  tendency,  some  writers  have  specifically  set  out  with  the  purpose  
of  writing  an  account  that  is  ‘true’  to  the  uncomfortable  and  often  unflattering  
experience  of  mania  or  depression.  For  example,  Elizabeth  Wurtzel  writes:  
I  wanted  this  book  to  dare  to  be  completely  self-­‐‑indulgent,  unhesitant,  
and   forthright   in   its   telling   of   what   clinical   depression   feels   like…I  
wanted  to  be  completely  true  to  the  experience  of  depression  –  to  the  
thing   itself,   and   not   to   the  mitigations   of   translating   it.   I   wanted   to  
portray  myself   in   the   midst   of   this   mental   crisis   precisely   as   I   was:  
difficult,   demanding,   impossible,   unsatisfiable,   self-­‐‑centered,  
self-­‐‑involved,  and  above  all,  self-­‐‑indulgent.  (1996,  p316)  
We  cannot,  therefore,  assume  that  all  narratives  of  mania  and  depression  have  
been  edited  specifically  in  order  to  give  a  favourable  impression  of  the  author.  
However,   we   must   still   be   aware   that   this   may   be   an   influencing   factor   for  
many  writers,  and  some  narratives  of  mania  and  depression  might  have  been  
altered  in  this  way.  
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This  kind  of  external  pressure  on  the  writer  to  conform  to  a  particular  narrative  
in  order  to  produce  a  successful  book  is  obviously  problematic  for  the  study  of  
the   resulting   narrative.   However,   writers   will   also   have   various   internal  
motivations  for  publishing  a  narrative  that  can  put  limitations  on  the  extent  to  
which  we  can  take  the  narrative  as  offering  a  reliable  insight  into  the  experience  
described.  
Those  who  publish  narratives  of  illness  often  cite  a  desire  to  help  others  as  a  key  
motivation.   Sally   Brampton,   for   example,   writes   in   the   introduction   to   her  
memoir  of  depression:  
Life   is   about   connection.   There   is   nothing   else.   Depression   is   the  
opposite;   it   is  an   illness  defined  by  alienation.  So  I  offer   this  book  by  
way  of   connection.   I   offer   it   too,   as   a   source   of   hope.   I   hope   that   by  
sharing  what  I  was  like,  what  happened  and  what  I  am  like  now,  that  
it  may  bring  someone  else  comfort.  (2009,  pp1-­‐‑2)  
Jason  Pegler,  in  his  memoir  of  bipolar  disorder  explains:    
When  writing  this  book,  I  often  thought  back  to  how  long  it  took  me  to  
accept  my  own  illness.  I  now  know  I  can  help  at  least  one  person  cope  
with   their   illness   better   than   I   did.   This   alone   makes   the   pain   of  
writing  it  worthwhile.  (2003,  p7)  
Marya   Hornbacher,   in   contrast,   offers   her   memoir   of   Anorexia   and   Bulimia  
Nervosa  as  a  means  of  a  warning:  
I  would  do  anything  to  keep  people  from  going  where  I  went.  Writing  
this  book  was  the  only  thing  I  could  think  of.  (1999,  p7)  
Brampton,  Pegler,  and  Hornbacher,   though  desiring  different  outcomes,  share  
the  broad  motivation  of  wishing   to  help  others  who  are  undergoing   the  same  
experience  as  they  did.  This  motivation,  to  warn  or  to  comfort,  has  the  potential  
to   influence   the  way   in  which   the   narrative   is   framed.   If   someone  wishes   to  
warn  against  a  certain  way  of   living  or  acting,   it   is   likely   that  she’ll   stress   the  
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negatives   that   result.   Someone  wishing   to   offer   comfort   for   others  may   stress  
the  possibility   of   recovery.   She  may  highlight   the   times  when   she  was   at   her  
worst,   to   show   others   that   recovery   is   possible   no   matter   how   severe   their  
situation.  Alternatively,  she  may  choose  to  overlook  particularly  difficult  times,  
in  order   to   stress   to  others   that   the  disorder  does  not  have   to  be  as   severe   as  
they  might   expect.  When   bipolar   disorder   is   so   often   described   as   a   ‘lifelong  
condition’,15  it  seems  likely  that  the  desire  to  comfort  and  reassure  others  that  it  
can  be  ‘managed’  must  inform  at  least  some  accounts  of  the  disorder.  As  Simon  
writes   in   her   narrative   of   bipolar   disorder   and   subsequent   interviews   with  
others  who  have  the  disorder:  
I  want  to  demonstrate  how  it  feels  to  be  young  and  bipolar,  and  I  want  
to   show   that   people   survive   this   illness   and   live   full   lives.   I  want   to  
figure   out   what   worked   in   people   who   are   success   cases,   and   shift  
people’s   focus   away   from  all   the  media   attention  on  destructive   and  
violent  cases…I  want  to  produce  a  new  image  for  bipolar  people.  
(2003,  p41)  
I  previously  noted  that  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  creation  of  narratives  can  
serve   a   purpose   in   helping   to   reduce   the   distress   associated   with   illness   or  
traumatic  events.  Arthur  Frank  argues  that,  “becoming  seriously  ill  is  a  call  for  
stories”   (1995,   p53).   The   ill   person,   he   suggests,   uses   narratives   in   order   to  
“repair  the  damage  that  illness  has  done  to  the  ill  person’s  sense  of  where  she  is  
in   life,  and  where  she  may  be  going”   (1995,  p53).  The  narrative   is  a  means  of  
re-­‐‑orientating  the  person,  helping  her  to  make  sense  of  the  past  and  preparing  
her   for   future   events.   If   this   view   is   correct,   then   this   need   for   narrative  
coherence  may  well  impact  upon  the  accuracy  of  the  narratives  told.  We  must  
be   aware   of   the   extent   to   which   the   writer   may   be   merely   attempting   to  
construct  any  coherent  narrative  that  fulfils  this  purpose  of  reorientation,  rather  
than  necessarily  attempting   to  put   forward  an  accurate  narrative.  This  need  or  
                                                                                                 
15  For  example,  The  National  Institute  of  Mental  Health  describes  bipolar  disorder  as  “a  lifelong  
and  recurrent  illness”  (2009,  p9).  
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desire   to   make   sense   of   the   experience   may   well   override   the   desire   to  
accurately  report  that  experience.  Tim  Lott,  for  example,  writes  in  his  memoir  of  
his  and  his  mother’s  depression,  “We  make  it  up  as  we  go  along,  then  forget  it,  
and  make   up   something   else,   because  we   cannot   live  without   stories”   (1997,  
p132).  
A   final   motivation   that   must   be   considered   is   a   desire   to   lend   support   to   a  
particular  account  of  the  aetiology,  understanding  of  the  disorder,  or  a  method  
of   treatment.   There   is   no   widespread   consensus   over   the   causes   of   bipolar  
disorder,   and   discussions   regarding   the   best   course   of   treatment   bring   out  
strongly   conflicting   views.   It’s   been   suggested   that   certain   understandings   of  
psychiatric  disorders  are  more  or  less  likely  to  reduce  stigma.  For  example,  the  
medical  model  may   be   thought   to   support   a   view  of   psychiatric   disorders   as  
something  that  happens  to  a  person,  separate  from  the  person’s  character  or  life  
choices.   In   this  way   it  may   be   thought   to   be   non-­‐‑judgmental,   shifting   blame  
away  from  the  person  with  the  disorder.16  As  Miklowitz  writes  in  his  ‘survival  
guide’  for  those  with  bipolar  disorder,  “getting  the  disorder  in  the  first  place  is  
heavily  influenced  by  your  genetic  makeup…in  other  words,  it  isn’t  your  fault”  
(2002,   p83).   Alternatively,   it   might   be   thought   that   adopting   a   view   of  
psychiatric   disorders   as   biologically   based   illnesses  may  make   recovery   seem  
unlikely  or   impossible,  whilst  a  disorder  caused  by  difficult   life  circumstances  
allows  for  the  possibility  of  recovery.  As  Corrigan  and  Watson  write,  “Framing  
mental   illness   as   a  brain  disorder  may   resolve  onset  questions  but   exacerbate  
offset  issues”  (2004,  p77).  
  It  is  likely  that  at  least  some  narratives  of  mania  and  depression  are  written  as  a  
means   of   contributing   to   these   debates.   It   is   common   for   these   narratives   to  
include   advice   on   achieving   or  maintaining   recovery   from   states   of  mania   or  
                                                                                                 
16  For  discussion  of  stigma  and  the  medical  model  see  Corrigan  and  Watson  (2004)  and  
Corrigan  et  al  (2002).  
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depression,   or   to   discuss   contributing   factors   in   the   development   of   the  
disorder.  Occasionally   these  go  as   far  as   to  have  separate  sections  of   the  book  
written   by   health   care   professionals   explaining   what   the   disorder   is,   what  
causes  it,  and  how  best  to  treat  it.17  More  commonly,  writers  will  highlight  how  
their   narrative   fits   into  debates   regarding,   for   example,   the  use   of   psychiatric  
medication,  or  the  existence  of  childhood  bipolar  disorder.    
Narratives  of  mania  and  depression  are  written  against  a  background  of  debate  
about   access   to   treatment,  what   the   diagnostic   criteria   ought   to   be,   and   how  
best  to  confront  stigma.  Some  writers  deal  explicitly  with  these  themes  in  their  
narratives   and   it   is   likely   that   even   those  who  do  not  will   have   been   at   least  
influenced  by  the  on-­‐‑going  debates.  What  is  included  or  left  out  of  a  narrative  
may   well   have   been   influenced   by   the   writer’s   desire   to   lend   support   to  
particular  theories  or  viewpoints.  As  Radden  explains,  “In  reading  these  works  
we   must   be   alert   to   the   inevitable   reconfigurations   imposed   on   all  
self-­‐‑narratives   in   their   retelling,   but   very  often  heightened,  here,   by   efforts   to  
explain   or   excuse   states   so   extreme,   unsought,   unwelcome,   and   stigmatized”  
(2008,  p19).  This  need  not  mean  that  what  is  written  is  untrue  or  unreliable,  but  
simply  that  it  may  not  express  the  full  experience.    
However,  the  narrative  account  can  still  provide  a  starting  point  through  which  
to   focus   further   research.   It   seems  highly   unlikely   that   any   one  methodology  
could   give   us   access   to   a   ‘full’   or   ‘pure’   experience   of   mania   or   depression.  
Through   studying   narratives   we   are   able   to   see   what   the   person   with   the  
disorder  considers  central  to  her  experience,  unconstrained  by  the  focus  of  the  
researcher.  Whilst   a   person  may  be   able   to   talk   about   a  particular   experience  
when  prompted,  for  example,  the  fact  that  she  does  not  mention  it  as  part  of  her  
life   narrative   is   interesting   in   itself   and   can   provide   a   focus   for   potential  
                                                                                                 
17  For  example,  see  Patty  Duke’s  narrative  of  bipolar  disorder  A  Brilliant  Madness  (1992),  
co-­‐‑written  with  Gloria  Hochman.    
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enquiries.  Equally,  without  the  constraint  of  fixed  questions  the  narrative  may  
focus   on   aspects   of   experience   that   might   otherwise   be   overlooked   by   a  
researcher   in   an   interview.   Therefore,   whilst   the   narrative   account   may   not  
provide   a   complete   representation   of   the   original   experience,   it   is   a   useful  
starting  point  in  a  phenomenological  enquiry.  The  focus  the  narrative  provides  
can   then   be   further   explored   in   an   interview   or   questionnaire,   where  
descriptions  can  be  clarified  and  refined  through  questioning.    
In   part   to   corroborate   the   descriptions   found   in   narratives,   and   in   part   to  
provide   greater   focus   on   phenomenological   issues,   my   colleagues   and   I  
constructed  a  questionnaire  on  the  experience  of  depression.  Matthew  Ratcliffe,  
Benedict   Smith   and   I   initially   constructed   the   questionnaire   as   part   of   the  
project   ‘Emotional   Experience   in   Depression:   A   Philosophical   Study’.   We  
revised  it   following  input  from  colleagues  at   the  University  of  Osnabrück  and  
researchers   at   the   UK  mental   health   charity   SANE.   The   Durham   Depression  
Questionnaire   was   reviewed   by   the   Department   of   Philosophy   Ethics  
Committee,   Durham   University,   and   was   placed   on   the   SANE   website  
throughout   2011.   The   questionnaire   included   three   sections.   The   first   was   a  
description   of   the   questionnaire   and   a   consent   form.   The   second   section  
included  basic  details,  such  as  age,  gender,  diagnosis,  co-­‐‑morbidities,  treatment  
received,   and   asked   whether   the   person   was   currently   depressed.   The   third  
section   asked   thirteen   questions,   chosen   because   they   represented   common  
themes   found   in  narratives  of  depression,  as  well  as  aspects  of   the  experience  
that  are  relevant   to  current  discussions   in   the  Philosophy  of  Psychiatry   (a   full  
copy   of   the   questionnaire   can   be   found   in   the   appendix).   Respondents   were  
given  open  text  boxes  in  which  to  write  as  much  or  as  little  as  they  wished.  It  
was  also  possible   for  respondents   to  choose  not   to  respond  to  a  question,  and  
the  questions  could  be  answered   in  any  order.  The  completed  responses  were  
stored  both  as  answers  to  individual  questions,  as  well  as  each  individual’s  full  
questionnaire.  I  initially  analysed  the  results  with  colleagues  in  project  meetings  
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at   Durham   University,   and   with   research   associates   from   the   mental   health  
charity  SANE.  My  later  individual  analysis  focussed  more  directly  on  responses  
that  were  most  relevant  to  this  thesis.  
The   responses   from   this   questionnaire,18   combined   with   narrative   accounts,  
give  us  a  fuller  picture  of  the  experience.  We  must  resist  the  urge  to  assume  that  
questionnaire   responses   are   in   some  way  purer   than   the  narrative   accounts   –  
after  all,  cultural   influences  may  well   impact  upon  questionnaire  responses  as  
much  as  they  do  narratives  of  depression.  Additionally,  the  shortened  form  of  
the  questionnaire  response  does  not  allow  access  to  the  longer-­‐‑term  information  
that  we  find  in  published  memoirs.  For  example,  we  would  be  unlikely  to  find  
detailed  descriptions  of  multiple   episodes  of  mania   and  depression,   complete  
with  the  relevant  life-­‐‑context  for  each  episode.  However,  the  anonymous  nature  
of   the   questionnaire   does   mitigate   some   of   the   more   worrying   potential  
distortions   that   may   occur   in   published   narratives.   There   would   be,   for  
example,   no   concern   about   the   distortions   caused   by   motivations   associated  
with   monetary   gain   or   popular   success.   The   lack   of   extensive   editing   in  
questionnaire  responses  may  be  seen  as  both  an  advantage  and  a  disadvantage.  
The  more  spontaneous  nature  of   the  responses  means  there   is   little  risk  that  a  
third  person,  such  as  a  publisher,  will  have  exerted  undue  influence  over  what  
is  written.  However,  the  lack  of  extensive  reflection  may  mean  that  descriptions  
remain   somewhat   superficial   in   contrast   to   published   narratives.   Using   both  
types  of  account,  therefore,  allows  us  to  have  greater  confidence  that  the  focus  
has   not   been   overly   influenced   either   by   personal   motivations   or   narrow  
research  aims.  
                                                                                                 
18  We  had  147  responses  to  the  questionnaire,  with  an  age  range  of  between  16  and  76.  82%  of  
the  respondents  were  female.  Whilst  depression  has  a  higher  rate  of  diagnosis  in  women  than  
men,  this  split  is  still  not  fully  representative  of  those  diagnosed  with  the  disorder.  
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Societal  Influence  on  Narratives  
I  have  already  suggested  that  culture  can  play  a  part  in  structuring  a  narrative.  
However,  we  must  also  be  aware  of   the   impact   that   the  society  a  person   is   in  
can  have  upon  the  descriptions  and  metaphors  used  to  describe  an  experience  
of   mania   or   depression.   Those   who   experience   bipolar   disorder   and   write  
narratives  of   those  experiences  do  not  do  so  within  a  vacuum.  It   is   likely   that  
they  will  be   influenced,  at   least   to  some  extent,  by  what  they  have  read,  seen,  
and  the  conversations  that  they  have  had.  This  might  be  through  reading  other  
people’s  accounts  of  mania  and  depression,  watching  depictions  of  those  with  
the  disorders  on  television  or  film,  through  mental  health  charity  campaigns,  or  
even  through  conversations  had  with  health  care  professionals.  As  such,  even  if  
we   restrict   our   use   of   narratives   to   only   those   from   the   same   cultural  
background,  we  can  still  find  outside  influences  on  these  accounts,  of  which  the  
phenomenologist  must  remain  aware.  
When  describing  the  experience  of  depression,  people  consistently  use  the  same  
or  similar  metaphors.  Many  describe  depression  as  a  ‘black  dog’,19  talk  of  being  
stuck  behind  a  pane  of  glass,  or  describe  the  body  as  being  ‘as  heavy  as  lead’.20  
There   is   a   concern   that   these   metaphors   might   have   been   taken   from   other  
sources,  or  heavily   influenced  by   those  sources,   rather   than  being  an  accurate  
description  of  that  person’s  own  experience.  If  a  person  describes  depression  as  
like  being  stuck  in  a  bell  jar,  can  we  be  certain  that  this  is  anything  more  than  
familiarity  with  Sylvia  Plath’s  The  Bell  Jar  (1966)?  We  might  ask  whether  this  is  a  
                                                                                                 
19  The  use  of  the  metaphor  of  depression  as  ‘the  black  dog’  can  be  seen  in  a  variety  of  different  
projects,  including  SANE’s  ‘black  dog  campaign’  for  raising  awareness  of  mental  illness  (SANE,  
n.d.)  Matthew  Johnstone’s  illustrated  guide  to  depression  I  Had  a  Black  Dog  (2007),  and  Sally  
Brampton’s  memoir  of  depression  Shoot  the  Damn  Dog  (2009).  See  also  Rebecca  Hunt’s  novel  Mr  
Chartwell  (2011),  based  on  Winston  Churchill’s  ‘black  dog’.  
20  For  example,  one  respondent  to  the  depression  questionnaire  wrote  that  “its  (sic)  like  walking  
around  in  lead  boots”  (#34).  Respondent  #26  described  the  body  as  being  “as  heavy  as  lead”  
when  depressed.  
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true   representation   of   the   experience   of   depression,   or   simply   a   familiar  
description  that  falls  somewhat  short  of  reality.    
We  can  begin  to  quell  such  fears  by  pointing  to  the  sheer  number  of  narratives  
of   mania   and   depression   that   use   similar   metaphors.   These   metaphors   and  
descriptions  seem  to  be  used  regardless  of  the  educational  status  of  the  person,  
whether   they’re  male   or   female,   the   class   background   they   come   from,  what  
their  hobbies  and   interests  are,   and   the   length  of   time   that   they  have  had   the  
disorder.  That  they  still,  despite  this,  describe  their  experiences  in  similar  ways,  
using  similar  metaphors,  suggests  some  degree  of  accuracy.  Whilst  some  may  
be   overly   influenced   by   common  metaphors,   it   seems   unlikely   that   so  many,  
from   such   a   broad   range   of   backgrounds,   would   continue   to   use   these  
metaphors  if  they  didn’t  capture  something  important  about  the  experience.  
It  could,  however,  be  suggested  that  this  widespread  use  of  the  same  metaphors  
simply   shows   the   extent   to  which   they   have   become   a   part   of   our   everyday  
culture.  Whilst  it  is  unlikely  that  all  those  who  write  narratives  are  familiar  with  
Plath’s   The   Bell   Jar   (1966),   it’s   possible   that   they   may   still   be   aware   of   the  
popular   metaphors   contained   within   it   –   even   if   they   are   not   aware   of   the  
metaphors’  origins.  As  such,  we  may  still  wonder  if  the  descriptions  are  simply  
familiar   rather   than   accurate,   even   if   the   person   denies   familiarity   with   the  
associated  popular  narratives.    
However,   we   might   counter   this   concern   by   pointing   out   that   those   with  
depression  or  bipolar  disorder  will  also  occasionally  discuss  the  metaphors  that  
they’re  using,  reflecting  on  whether  they  are  wholly  accurate  and  pointing  out  
where  they  fall  short  of  the  experience.  Brian  Adams,  for  example,  writes  in  his  
narrative   of   bipolar   disorder,   “In  manic-­‐‑depressive   imagery   the   pendulum   is  
often   utilized…Yet,   I   have   to   say   that   the   image   of   the   pendulum   has   never  
really   represented   the   chaotic   nature   of   my   manic   depression”   (2003,   p22).  
Responding  to  a  question  in  the  Durham  Depression  Questionnaire  asking  for  a  
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description  of  moods  and  emotions  during  periods  of  depression,  one  person  
wrote,   “For   me   depression   is   not   a   black   dog   as   I   love   dogs   and   have   one  
myself.   For  me   depression   is   like   a   big   black   blanket”   (#228).  Another,  when  
asked   whether   the   world   looks   different   when   depressed,   wrote,   “Despite  
sounding   cliched   [sic],   the   colour   does   drain   from   the  world   and   everything  
seems   to   be   tuned   to   a   grey”   (#370). There   seems   to   be   an   evaluation   of  
common  metaphors,  using  them  when  appropriate  to  the  writer’s  situation  but  
equally   feeling   able   to   reject   them   when   they   do   not   resonate   with   the  
experience.  
Are  Narratives  Representative?  
One   concern   with   using   published   narratives   in   order   to   inform  
phenomenological  study  is  the  extent  to  which  it  is  possible  to  generalise  from  
individual   narrative   descriptions.   Whilst   we   may   be   able   to   find   common  
themes   and   descriptions   throughout   different   published   accounts,   it   could  
plausibly  be  suggested  that  only  a  certain  type  of  person  writes  a  narrative  of  
depression   or   mania.   The   experience   of   mania   or   depression   may   be   quite  
different   for   those  who  would   not   be   inclined   to   publish   an   account   of   their  
experiences.  
Whilst  this  would  be  a  serious  concern  if  we  found  that  narratives  of  mania  and  
depression  are   consistently  written  by   the   same  kind  of  person,   this  does  not  
seem   to   be   the   case.   A   wide   range   of   people   write   narratives   of   mania   and  
depression,  differing   in  gender,   age,   and   social   background.  Many  are  highly  
educated   professionals,   such   as   Professor   Kay   Redfield   Jamison   (1997)   or  
Lawyer   Terri   Cheney   (2008).   Some   are   professional   writers   (for   example,  
William  Styron  (2004)  or  Marya  Hornbacher  (2008)).  However,  many  narratives  
are  written  by   those  with  a  different  background.   John  O’Donogue   (2009),   for  
example,   is   homeless   and   unemployed   for   much   of   the   period   his   narrative  
covers.  Suzy  Johnston’s  When  do  I  get  my  Shoelaces  Back  (2010)  is  a  self-­‐‑published  
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copy  of  diaries  kept  during  a  stay  in  a  psychiatric  hospital.  Whilst  there  may  be  
a   ‘type’   of   person   who   writes   a   narrative,   this   type   does   not   seem   to   be  
particularly  narrow.    
In   order   to   increase   confidence   we   can   consider   the   narrative   accounts  
alongside  other  sources.  Whilst  published  narratives  may  favour  those  who  are  
articulate,   confident,   and   well-­‐‑connected   within   the   publishing   world,   other  
methods  of  gaining  first  person  accounts  do  not  have  this  problem.  If  we  find  
similar   descriptions   in   interview   or   questionnaire   responses   to   the   ones   that  
appear   in  narrative  accounts,   then   it  seems  that   there   is   less  reason  to  suspect  
that  the  published  account  is  unrepresentative.  Put  simply,  the  wider  the  range  
of   methodologies   used,   the   less   likely   it   is   that   we   are   only   accessing   the  
experience  of  one  ‘type’  of  person.    
The  Durham  Depression  Questionnaire  may  be  a  useful  tool  in  this  regard.  The  
descriptions  given  in  response  to  the  questionnaire  were  remarkably  similar  to  
descriptions   given   in   narrative   accounts   of   depression.21   Similar   themes  were  
highlighted   as   being   central   to   the   experience,   and   the   same   or   similar  
metaphors  were  consistently  used.  The   large  number  of  people   responding   to  
the  questionnaire,  some  of  whom  would  not  be  thought  to  be  the    ‘typical’  type  
of   person   to   publish   a   narrative,22   gives   weight   to   the   position   that   the  
descriptions   in   published   narrative   accounts   are   representative   of   the   wider  
experience  of  depression.    
The  Value  of  Narratives  
Given  the  issues  discussed,  what  value  should  we  place  on  narratives?  Despite  
the  potential  problems  with   the  use  of  narrative   accounts,   I   suggest   that   they  
                                                                                                 
21  For  example,  both  narrative  accounts  and  questionnaire  respondents  describe  similar  bodily  
experiences  in  depression  (see  chapter  four  for  further  discussion  of  this  point).  
22  For  example,  the  age  range  seen  in  the  questionnaire  respondents  (between  ages  sixteen  and  
seventy-­‐‑six)  extends  beyond  those  typically  seen  in  published  narratives.  
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can   still   make   a   unique   contribution   to   our   understanding   of   an   experience.  
Whilst   they   may   not   be   able   to   provide   a   ‘complete’   representation   of   the  
experience  of  mania  or  depression,  it  is  questionable  whether  any  methodology  
would  give  us  this  kind  of  access.  We  have  already  seen  some  of  the  limitations  
on   the   ability   of   questionnaire   responses   to   grant   us   access   to   experiences   of  
mania  and  depression.  Similar  issues  regarding  societal  and  cultural  influences  
are   found   in   the   use   of   interviews   and   clinical   reports.   In   addition,   any  
description   that   has   already   been   interpreted   by,   for   example,   a   healthcare  
professional,   must   be   seen   to   have   drawbacks   that   are   not   seen   to   the   same  
extent   in   first  person  accounts.  We  cannot,   therefore,  assume  that   there   is  any  
one   methodology   that   would   allow   us   access   to   a   pure   or   complete  
representation  of  the  experience.  
Given   these  difficulties,  we  must  value  narratives   for   the   access   that   they   can  
provide,  whilst  remaining  aware  that  we  can  gain  insight  into  different  aspects  
of  the  experience  through  a  variety  of  means.  The  context,  focus,  and  structure  
provided  by  the  narrative  can,  when  used  in  conjunction  with  other  resources,  
help  us  to  construct  a  richer  account  of  the  experience  of  mania  and  depression.  
We  must,  however,  take  care  to  respect  the  narrative  that  is  told.  This  requires  
taking  the  narrative  as  a  whole  in  our  studies,  rather  than  merely  focussing  on  
short   sections   or   quotations   extracted   from   the  original   source.  This  need  not  
mean   that  entire  narratives  must  be  explicitly  discussed   in  a  piece  of  work.   It  
simply   requires   that,   during   our   initial   study,  we   remain   aware   of   the  wider  
narrative   and   not   treat   individual   sections   as   ‘data’   whilst   discarding   the  
context  and  structure  in  which  they  rest.  There  is  a  clear  epistemic  need  to  treat  
narratives  in  this  way;  by  paying  attention  to  the  full  context  of  a  quotation  we  
can   lessen   many   of   the   potential   problems   that   have   been   discussed   in   this  
chapter.  Knowing  the  person’s  social  background,  her  life  experiences,  and  her  
conscious  motivations   for  writing   can   allow   us   to   begin   to   assess   the   impact  
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these   might   have   had   upon   the   aspects   of   the   narrative   directly   relevant   to  
phenomenological  enquiry.  
In  what   follows,   I   therefore  make   frequent  use   of   narratives,   as  well   as   other  
forms   of   first   person   accounts,   including   questionnaire   responses   and  
published   interviews.   I  also  use  a  number  of  descriptions  of   the  experience  of  
mania   and   depression   that   are   not   written   by   those   with   lived   first   person  
experience.  For  example,  descriptions  written  by  a  partner  or  carer,  or  by  health  
care  professionals.  The  value  of  narrative  accounts  is  strengthened  through  the  
bringing   together   of   these   different   resources,   enabling  us   to   develop   a  more  
accurate  and  richer  account  of  the  experiences  of  mania  and  depression.    
With   these   qualifications   in   mind,   I   now   want   to   turn   to   a   subject   that   is  
highlighted   both   in   narrative   accounts   as   well   as   questionnaire   responses:  
Alterations  in  experiences  of  the  body  in  cases  of  depression  and  mania.  
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Chapter  4:  The  Body  in  Depression  and  Mania  
Introduction  
Those   with   depression   often   highlight   the   embodied   nature   of   their  
experiences.  Memoirs  of  depression  frequently  describe  experiences  of  the  body  
as  “tired”,  “leaden”  and  difficult  to  move  in  the  usual  way.  For  example,  Fiona  
Shaw  writes   in   her  memoir   of   postnatal   depression,   “My   body   became   inert,  
heavy  and  burdensome.  Every  gesture  was  hard”  (1997,  p26).  Andrew  Solomon  
provides  a  similar  description  of  his  experience  in  depression:    
It  is  like  feeling  your  clothing  slowly  turning  to  wood  on  your  body,  a  
stiffness   in   the  elbows  and  the  knees  progressing  to  a   terrible  weight  
and  an  isolating  immobility  that  will  atrophy  you  and  in  time  destroy  
you.  (2002,  p50)  
In   the   Durham  Depression  Questionnaire  we   asked   the   question   “How   does  
your  body  feel  when  you’re  depressed?”  Of  the  136  people  who  answered  the  
question  (eleven  who  completed  the  questionnaire  did  not),  only  two  said  that  
there  was   no   difference   from   their   non-­‐‑depressed   experiences.   In   addition   to  
these,  one  person  spoke  of  the  effects  of  medication  on  her  body,  and  another  
respondent   said   that   she   couldn’t   answer   the   question   as   other   health   issues  
meant  she  had  “no  way  of  knowing  what'ʹs  depression  related  and  what  isn'ʹt”  
(#212).  
All  other   respondents  noted  a  change   in  how  the  body   feels  when  depressed.  
Most   frequently   this   was   described   as   feeling   tired,   lethargic,   or   lacking   in  
energy.  For  example,  sixty-­‐‑one  respondents  used  the  word  “tired”   to  describe  
how   their   body   felt   when   depressed.   Almost   every   other   response   used   a  
related   descriptive   term,   such   as   “fatigued”,   “lacking   in   energy”,   or  
“exhausted”:    
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Tired  -­‐‑  really  really  tired  -­‐‑  the  stairs  in  my  house  seem  like  a  mountain.  
(#147)  
lethargic  is  the  best  word  to  describe  it.  It  just  feels  so  heavy  and  worn  
out  and  tired  all  the  time,  which  doesnt  [sic]  help  if  you  cannot  sleep  
anyway.  (#232)  
Other  common  descriptions  included  feelings  of  the  body  as  “heavy”,  as  well  as  
various  evaluative  claims  describing  the  body  as  “disgusting”  or  “useless”:  
As  heavy  as  lead.  I  can'ʹt  drag  it  out  of  bed  most  of  the  time.  (#26)  
Physically   low,  really  really   'ʹheavy'ʹ,   it'ʹs   like   there'ʹs  a  physical  weight  
pulling  you  down.   It  makes  you   really   tired   so  you  have  no   energy.  
And  I  hate  my  body.  I  look  in  the  mirror  and  I  can'ʹt  stand  what  I  see,  
it'ʹs  digusting  [sic].  (#49)  
Huge,  an  appendage.  Grotesque.  (#224)  
Whilst   international   studies  have  noted   the  centrality  of  bodily  experiences   in  
depression,1   the   diagnostic   and   treatment   focus   in   Western   psychiatry   has  
tended  to  be  almost  exclusively  on  the   ‘mental’.  Descriptions  such  as  the  ones  
quoted   above   challenge   this   view   of   depression   as   being   largely   ‘mental’   in  
nature.  As  one  respondent  explained:  
I  think  a  lot  of  people  have  this  impression  that  depression  is  a  purely  
mental  illness,  and  I  can'ʹt  explain  it  but  it  totally  affects  you  physically  
as  well  and  your  body  just  goes  into  meltdown  mode.  (#22)  
In   this   chapter   I   examine   these   alterations   in   bodily   experience,   developing  
phenomenological  accounts  of  the  body  in  depression  and  mania.  I  begin  with  a  
discussion   of   the   everyday,   non-­‐‑depressed   and   non-­‐‑manic   experience   of   the  
body,  as  described  by  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  and  Sartre.  Following  a  description  of  the  
phenomenology  of  shame,  I  turn  to  the  topic  of  depression,  exploring  Thomas  
                                                                                                 
1  See,  for  example,  Simon  et  al.  (1999),  a  study  that  highlights  the  frequency  with  which  those  
with  depression  report  somatic  symptoms.  See  also  Kapfhammer  (2006)  for  further  discussion  
of  this  point.  
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Fuchs’s   characterisation   of   the   depressed   body   as   “corporealized”   (2003).   I  
follow   this   with   a   discussion   of   the   experience   of   the   body   in   mania,  
highlighting  the  somewhat  surprising  descriptions  that  we  find  in  first  person  
accounts.    
The  Lived  Body  
Whilst   our   bodies   are   objects   in   the   sense   that   they   have   physical   properties  
such  as  weight,  size,  and  so  on,  phenomenologists  have  argued  that  they  hold  a  
special   phenomenological   status   amongst   other   objects   in   the   world.2  We   do  
not,  for  example,  experience  them  in  the  same  way  we  might  a  table,  chair,  or  
coffee   cup.      In   this   section   I   outline   the   ways   in   which   we   experience   our  
bodies,   focussing   on   their   status   as   perceived-­‐‑perceivers,   as   well   as   their  
transparency  in  our  everyday  experiences.  
I  cannot  be  without  my  body,  and  I  cannot  change  my  position  in  relation  to  it  –  
it   is  always  present  as  my  opening  or  perspective  onto  the  world.  This   is   true  
even   if   I   were   to   imagine   some   perspective   other   than   my   current   actual  
perspective.   In   my   imagining   it   can   be   seen   that   I   still   perceive   from   some  
viewpoint,  and  that  viewpoint  is  bodily  in  nature.  Describing  Husserl’s  position,  
Zahavi   writes,   “there   is   no   pure   point   of   view   and   there   is   no   view   from  
nowhere,   there   is   only   an   embodied  point   of   view”   (2003,  p98).   For   example,  
were  I  to  imagine  the  view  of  a  city  from  above,  this  viewpoint  would  still  be  
the   imagining   of   myself   as   an   embodied   being   viewing   from   above.   As  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  writes,   “[I]   cannot   conceive   a   perceptible   place   in  which   I   am  
not  myself  present”  (1964,  p16).    
In  contrast,  other  objects  are  not  always  present  –  an  object’s  “presence  is  such  
that  it  entails  a  possible  absence”  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  2002,  p103).  The  table  may  be  
in  front  of  me,  or  it  may  not  be;  I  can  move  closer  to  or  further  away  from  it.  In  
                                                                                                 
2  Whilst  I  primarily  concentrate  on  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  account  of  bodily  experience,  relevantly  
similar  discussions  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  Sartre  (e.g.  2003)  and  Husserl  (e.g.1973a).  
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addition,  I  always  perceive  the  location  of  the  object  in  relation  to  my  body.  The  
coffee   cup   is   to   the   left   or   right   of   my   body,   not   ‘left’   in   some   meaningless  
ungrounded  way.  Indeed,  it  seems  that  it  is  only  through  my  embodied  nature  
that  I  can  understand  relations  such  as  ‘left’,  ‘right’,  or  ‘under’  at  all.  According  
to  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty:    
When   I   say   that  an  object   is  on  a   table,   I  always  mentally  put  myself  
either   in   the   table   or   in   the   object,   and   I   apply   to   them   a   category  
which  theoretically  fits  the  relationship  of  my  body  to  external  objects.  
Stripped   of   this   anthropological   association,   the   word   on   is  
indistinguishable  from  the  word  ‘under’  or  the  word  ‘beside’.    
(2002,  p116)  
I   therefore  understand   the   relationships   between   objects   in   the  way   that   I   do  
because  I  am  embodied.  These  relationships  are  understood  either  through  an  
imagining   of  myself   in   the   position   of   the   object,   or   through   the   relationship  
between   the   two   objects   and   the   location   of   my   body.   For   example,   the  
relationship  between  a  cup  and  a  glass  sitting  next  to  each  other  is  of  the  glass  
being  ‘to  the  left  of’  the  cup  or  ‘behind’  the  cup  depending  on  where  my  body  is  
located:  “Spatial  forms  or  distances  are  not  so  much  relations  between  different  
points  in  objective  space  as  they  are  relations  between  these  points  and  a  central  
perspective   –   our   body”   (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   1964,   p5).   In   being   my   perspective  
onto  the  world,  therefore,  my  body  acts  as  a  means  of  framing  my  experience  of  
objects  in  the  world.    
It   might   be   asked   whether   this   understanding   of   the   body   as   a   fixed,  
omnipresent  viewpoint  necessarily  distinguishes  it  from  other  objects.  After  all,  
I   could   carry   with   me   at   all   times   some   other   object   –   a   wedding   ring,   for  
example.  Objects  in  the  world  would  then  present  as  closer  to  or  further  away  
from  the  ring,  just  as  they  might  a  part  of  my  body.  Why,  then,  does  the  body  
have  a  different  status  from  that  of  the  wedding  ring?    
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We  might  argue  that  even  if  I  never  take  off  this  ring  I  still  retain  the  possibility  
of  taking  it  off,  or  could  imagine  myself  taking  it  off.  The  ring  is  not  necessary  
for   my   interaction   with   the   world,   even   if   it   happens   to   be   part   of   it   at   a  
particular  time.  In  contrast,  I  do  not  have  the  possibility  of  stepping  away  from  
my   body   or   even   imagining   doing   so.  However,   even   if  we  were   to   say   that  
there  was  no  possibility  of  taking  off  the  ring,  or  of  imagining  taking  it  off,  we  
would   still   be   able   to  distinguish  between   the   status  of  objects   and  my  body.  
This  distinction  comes  about  due  to  the  dual  function  of  the  body.    
A  ring  around  my  finger  can  be  perceived  –  I  can  touch  it,  feel  its  weight,  how  
smooth  it  is,  and  so  on.  In  the  same  way  my  body  can  be  perceived  –  someone  
could  touch  my  hand,  feel  how  smooth  or  rough  the  skin  is,  what  temperature  
it   is,   and   so   on.   However,   along  with   this   possibility   of   being   perceived,  my  
body  has  the  second  function  of  being  able  to  perceive.  Whilst  my  hand  can  be  
felt,   at   the   same   time   it   can   also   feel.   This   can   perhaps   be   best   illustrated  
through  the  sensation  of  double  touch.  When  I  touch  together  my  left  and  right  
hands   the   dual   function   of   the   body   becomes   apparent   –   my   left   hand   is  
perceiving  my  right  hand  and  my  right  hand  is  being  perceived.  At  the  same  time,  
however,  my   right   hand   is   perceiving  my   left   hand   and  my   left   hand   is   being  
perceived.  As  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  describes:  
When   I   press   my   two   hands   together,   it   is   not   a   matter   of   two  
sensations   felt   together   as   one   perceives   two   objects   placed   side   by  
side,  but  of  an  ambiguous  set-­‐‑up  in  which  both  hands  can  alternate  the  
roles  of  ‘touching’  and  ‘being  touched’.  (2002,  p106)  
The  body,  therefore,  is  neither  solely  the  perceiver  nor  the  perceived.  It  must  be  
understood  in  a  third  way,  as  a  perceived-­‐‑perceiver.   In  this  way  it   is  different  
from  other  objects  in  the  world,  those  that  can  only  be  perceived.    
So  how  should  we  understand  this  perceiving  role  of  the  body?  We  ought  not  
think  of  it  as  a  detached  observer  of  the  world,  merely  taking  in  details  that  are  
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somehow  separate  from  it.  Rather,  our  perception  of  the  world  is  of  a  network  
of  practical  bodily  possibilities;  the  way  we  perceive  the  world  is  framed  by  our  
embodiment.   As   Gallagher   and   Zahavi   note,   “To   be   situated   in   the   world  
means  not  simply  to  be  located  someplace  in  a  physical  environment,  but  to  be  
in  rapport  with  circumstances  that  are  bodily  meaningful”  (2008,  p137).    
When  I  perceive  an  object  I  perceive  more  than  that  which  is  currently  visible.  I  
also  perceive  the  ‘horizons’  of  the  object  –  I  am  aware  that  I  or  another  person  
could   view   the   object   from   other   angles,   and   that   there   are   various   practical  
possibilities   associated   with   that   object   that   I   might   choose   to   take   up.3   My  
perception  of  a  water  glass,  for  example,  includes  in  it  the  possibilities  for  that  
glass,   not   merely   acknowledgement   of   its   physical   properties.   I   perceive   not  
only  that  it  is  a  certain  size  and  shape,  but  also  that  it  has  the  possibility  of  my  
picking   it   up,   turning   it   upside   down   and   looking   at   it   from   another   angle,  
drinking  water  out  of  it,  or  smashing  it  against  a  wall.  These  possibilities  make  
up   the   ‘horizonal   structure’   of   the   glass.   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   discusses   a   piece   of  
leather   appearing   as   “to   be   cut   up”,   and   lining   as   “to   be   sewn”   (2002,   p122).  
These  possibilities  exist   for  me  because  of  my  practical  embodied  abilities.   If   I  
broke  both  of  my  arms  I  would  perceive  the  glass  in  quite  a  different  way  –  it  
would,  for  example,  no  longer  contain  the  possibility  of  my  picking  it  up.    
An   object’s   perceived   possibilities   are   therefore   constrained   by  my   embodied  
nature.   My   body   both   highlights   and   provides   limitations   on   possibilities.   I  
perceive  the  table  as  too  heavy   to  pick  up  because  I  am  not  strong  enough  and  
the  top  shelf  as  being  too  high  to  reach  because  I  am  not  tall  enough.  The  rickety  
bridge  is  experienced  as  dangerous  due  to  the  possibility  of  my  falling  off.  The  
way  my  body  is,  my  height  and  physical  capabilities,  the  robustness  or  fragility  
of   my   body,   along   with   the   projects   in   which   I   am   engaged,   determine   a  
                                                                                                 
3  The  concept  of  a  ‘horizonal  structure’  perhaps  most  notably  appears  in  the  work  of  Husserl  
(e.g.  1973b).  However,  it  is  also  found,  for  example,  in  the  work  of  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  (e.g.  2002).  
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network  of  practical  possibilities  that  give  the  world  meaning.  This  relationship  
between  my   embodiment   and   the  way   I   experience   the  world   highlights   the  
intimate   connection   between   experiences   of   the   body   and   experiences   of   the  
world.  
Transparency  of  the  Lived  Body  
We  have  established  that  our  bodies  occupy  a  privileged  status  amongst  objects  
in   the  world:  They   are   constantly  present,   act   as   our  point   of   access   onto   the  
world,  and  structure  our  perception  of  the  world.  However,  in  order  to  answer  
our  original  query  of  how  we  experience  our  bodies,  we  must  further  investigate  
the   ways   and   extent   to   which   we   are   aware   of   our   bodies   in   everyday  
experiences.    
It   is   possible   to   directly   focus   on   our   bodies.   I   can   contemplate  my   hand   by  
stretching   it  out   in   front  of  me:   I  can  study  what   it   looks   like,  how  it   feels,  or  
take  note  of  a  number  of  other  properties.   In  a   similar  way,   I   could   look   in  a  
mirror  in  order  to  focus  on  my  body,  or  a  doctor  could  study  my  body  in  order  
to  diagnose  some  condition.  In  all  of  these  cases  my  body  is  at  the  forefront  of  
my  attention  and  I  am  explicitly  conscious  of  it.    
However,  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  primary  way  of  experiencing  the  body  in  
most   situations.   My   attention   is   usually   focussed   not   towards   the   body,   but  
towards   the   world.   As   I   cross   a   road   I   am   not   explicitly   thinking   about   my  
body;   instead  my  attention   is  directed   towards  my  goal  of   reaching   the  other  
side  of  the  road.  As  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  note,  in  normal  circumstances  “I  do  
not  observe  or  contemplate  my  hand,  I  reach  out  with  it  and  grab  something”  
(2008,   p136).   My   body   is   primarily   a   means   of   interacting   with   the   world,  
something  I  act  with,  directed  towards  practical  projects  in  the  world.  
As   I   act   in   the   world,   therefore,   my   body   gains   a   degree   of   transparency.   It  
fades   into   the   background   as   I   focus   on   the   projects   and   tasks   that   I   am  
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undertaking.  The  body,  it  seems,  “tries  to  stay  out  of  our  way  so  that  we  can  get  
on  with  our  task”  (Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008,  p145).  However,  it  would  be  a  
mistake  to  assume  that  our  interaction  with  the  world  entirely  hides  our  bodies  
from  us.  Whilst  I  may  not  be  explicitly  concentrating  on  my  hand  when  I  reach  
out  for  a  drink,  I  still  retain  a  background  awareness  of  it  and  of  the  rest  of  my  
body   in   relation   to   it:   “one’s   own   body   is   the   third   term,   always   tacitly  
understood,   in   the   figure-­‐‑background   structure”   (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,   2002,   p115).  
As  I  walk  up  a  flight  of  stairs,  for  example,  I  have  a  proprioceptive  awareness  of  
the  positioning  of  my  body,  a   ‘body  schema’,   that  allows  me   to   carry  out  my  
movement   without   having   to   overtly   concentrate   on   my   foot’s   placement.  
Everyday  actions  such  as  walking,  climbing  stairs,  and  picking  up  small  objects,  
are   undertaken  without  my   studying   the   body   in   the   same  way   that   I  might  
when   I   look   in   the   mirror   or   examine   a   cut   on   my   hand.   Instead,   I   have   a  
background  awareness  of  the  body  that  allows  me  to  focus  on  the  action  or  task  
itself.   Indeed,   if  we  think  too  carefully  about   the  exact  placement  of  our  body  
parts,   reducing   them   to   a  more  object-­‐‑like   status,  we   tend   lose   the   fluidity  of  
our  movements.  The  experience  of  running  down  a  hill  and  losing  your  footing  
when   you   start   to   concentrate   on   the   placement   of   your   feet   is   a   common  
experience  that  highlights  this  relationship  that  we  have  with  our  bodies.  
We   can   see,   therefore,   that   the   body   in   ordinary,   everyday,   circumstances   is  
experienced   as   a   form   of   subject-­‐‑object   –   that   which   constantly   holds   the  
possibilities  of  both  perceiving  and  being  perceived.    We  retain  an  awareness  of  
our  bodies,   but   they   fade  out   of   explicit   consciousness  during  our   interaction  
with  the  world  through  various  tasks  and  projects.  Our  bodies  set  up  a  network  
of  practical  significance,  being  both  the  set-­‐‑point  from  which  we  experience  the  
world,  as  well  as  allowing  for   the  practical  possibilities  of  objects.   In   this  way  
our  bodies  are  experienced  as  more  than  mere  objects.    
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However,  there  are  times  when  we  do  not  experience  our  bodies  in  this  way.    In  
certain  situations  we  lose  the  transparency  of  the  lived  body  and  find  ourselves  
confronted   with   the   corporeal   perceived   body.   This   might   occur   in   cases   of  
fatigue,   illness,   or  when   attempting   to   learn   a   difficult   new   skill.   This   switch  
between  perceiver  and  perceived  is,  however,  perhaps  most  strikingly  apparent  
in  the  case  of  shame.  
Shame  and  the  Body  
Sartre   puts   forward   an   account   of   our   embodied   experience   of   interpersonal  
relations,   suggesting   that   in   “being-­‐‑seen-­‐‑by-­‐‑another”   (2003,   p281)   our   bodies  
present   themselves  as  object-­‐‑like.4  Whilst,   as  we  have   seen,   in  most   situations  
our  bodies  present  with  a  degree  of  transparency,  under  the  gaze  of  the  Other  I  
become  aware  of  the  corporeal  nature  of  my  body.  As  the  person  looks  at  me  I  
cease   to   be   the   centre   of   my   own   world,   directing   my   attention   outwards  
towards   projects   and   tasks,   becoming   instead   an   object   in   the   world   of   the  
Other.  As  Thomas  Fuchs  explains,    
if  this  roaming  gaze  turns  on  me,  I  am  suddenly  caught,  as  it  were,  in  a  
forcefield,  in  a  suction  that  attracts  me,  or  in  a  stream  that  floods  me.  I  
am  torn  out  of   the  centrality  of  my   lived-­‐‑body  and  become  an  object  
inside  another  world.  (2003,  p226)  
The   central   perspective   is   no   longer   my   own,   but   the   other   person’s,   and   I  
become  aware  of  my  body  not   as   that  which  perceives   the  world,  but   as   that  
which  is  perceived  by  others.  
Sartre   illustrates   this   experience   with   the   example   of   a   person   spying   on  
someone   else   by   listening   to   a   conversation   through   a   door   and   watching  
through  the  keyhole.  The  person  is  originally  absorbed  in  the  activity,  the  body  
                                                                                                 
4  Sartre  distinguishes  between  this  experience  of  being-­‐‑seen-­‐‑by-­‐‑another  and  other  situations  in  
which  the  body  may  be  experienced  as  conspicuous  (when  in  pain,  for  example).  See  Svenaeus  
(2009)  for  an  interesting  discussion  and  critique  of  Sartre’s  theory.  
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fading   into   the   background   as   he   becomes   engrossed.   Sartre   refers   to   this   as  
“a  pure   process   of   relating   the   instrument   (the   keyhole)   to   the   end   to   be  
attained  (the  spectacle  to  be  seen),  a  pure  mode  of  losing  myself  in  the  world”  
(2003,   p283)   –   the   person   is   caught   up   in   his   practical   activity,   his   task   of  
listening   in   on   the   conversation.   However,   upon   suddenly   hearing   footsteps  
behind  him,  the  person’s  experience  of  the  body  alters.  He  ceases  to  be  caught  
up   in  his  project   and   find  his   focus   thrown  back  upon  his  physical   body.  He  
becomes   aware   of   himself   as   an   object   in   the   Other’s   sight   –   fragile   and  
vulnerable.  The  person,  in  that  instant,  realises  “that  I  have  a  body  which  can  be  
hurt,  that  I  occupy  a  place  and  that  I  can  not  in  any  case  escape  from  the  space  
in  which  I  am  without  defence  –  in  short,  that  I  am  seen”  (Sartre,  2003,  p282).  
In  being  seen,  the  body  no  longer  presents  as  a  locus  of  possibilities,  extending  
out   from   the   body   to   the   world,   but   instead   appears   as   something   that   may  
block   possibilities:   There   is   a   “solidification   and   alienation   of   my   own  
possibilities”  (Sartre,  2003,  p286)  as  I  see  myself  through  the  eyes  of  the  Other.  I  
appear   as   an   object,   arranged  with   other   objects   around  me   according   to   the  
projects  of  the  Other:    
For  the  Other  I  am  seated  as  this  inkwell  is  on  the  table;  for  the  Other,  I  
am   leaning  over   the  keyhole  as   this   tree   is  bent  by   this  wind.  Thus   for  
the  Other  I  have  stripped  myself  of  my  transcendence.    
(Sartre,  2003,  p286)  
As   such,   my   own   network   of   possibilities   is   taken   over   by   the   Other’s,   my  
projects  fading  as  I  am  objectified.      
Whilst   this   view   must   surely   be   seen   as   too   extreme   for   a   description   of  
ordinary  encounters  with  other  people,   it  does  seem  to  accurately  characterise  
the   feeling   of   ‘being   seen’   that   occurs   in   our   experiences   of   shame.   In   such  
situations  a  person  feels  the  judgemental  eyes  of  another  person  on  him    -­‐‑  he  is  
revealed   as   “vulnerable”,   “awkward”,   “artificial”,   or   “unseemly”,   and  
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experiences  a  “corporealization”  of  the  lived  body  as  he  internalises  the  gaze  of  
the   Other   (Fuchs,   2003,   p227).      The   shamed   person   experiences   his   body   as  
obvious  or  clumsy,  seeming  to  further  attract  the  objectifying  gaze  of  the  Other.  
The   familiar   ways   of   responding   to   shame,   such   as   looking   down,   socially  
withdrawing,   covering  up   the  body,  or  putting  on  an  exaggerated  act,   can  all  
then  be  seen  as  attempts  to  avoid  or  hide  from  the  Other’s  gaze.  
The  Body  in  Depression  
As  we  have  seen,  those  with  depression  often  comment  on  an  alteration  in  their  
experience  of  the  body.  Fuchs  suggests  that  this  alteration  is  best  understood  as  
a  “corporealization”  of  the  Lived  Body  (e.g.  2003;  2005a;  2013b),  where  the  body  
loses  its  everyday  transparency,  and  instead  presents  itself  as  painfully  present  
and  object-­‐‑like.  As   in   the  case  of  shame,   the  depressed  person   internalises   the  
gaze  of  the  other,  taking  on  the  “devaluating  gaze  or  voice  which  corporealizes  
the   lived   body”   (Fuchs,   2003,   p240).  However,   it   is   suggested   that  whilst   the  
shamed   person   may   adopt   another   perspective,   a   “metaperspective”   on   the  
situation   in   order   to   overcome   the   Other’s   gaze,   the   depressed   person   is  
incapable   of   such   a   move   (Fuchs,   2003).   The   depressed   person,   therefore,  
remains  in  a  state  of  corporealization,  an  experience  characterised  by  restriction  
and  rigidity.  As  Fuchs  explains,  “the  lived  body  loses  the  lightness,  fluidity  and  
mobility   of   a   medium   and   turns   into   a   heavy,   solid   body   which   puts   up  
resistance   to   all   intentions   and   impulses   directed   towards   the  world”   (2013b,  
p226).  In  contrast  with  the  engaged  and  transparent  body  of  the  everyday,  the  
depressed   person   loses   his   engagement  with   the  world   as   the   body   becomes  
conspicuous.    
The  Corporealization  of  the  Lived  Body  
“Melancholia”   Fuchs   writes,   “may   be   regarded   as   a   “stasis”,   a   freezing   or  
rigidity   of   the   lived-­‐‑body”   (2003,   p237).   He   suggests   that   as   the   depressed  
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person   internalises   the   gaze   of   the  Other   the   body   loses   its   transparency   and  
becomes   object-­‐‑like   –   “By   the   gaze   and   the   voice   of   the   other,   primordial  
bodiliness  receives  a  rupture  which  never  wholly  heals  again”  (2003,  p240).  The  
restriction  that  is  experienced  causes  the  body  to  lose  its  ease  of  movement  and  
take  on  a  rigidity  that  is  “clearly  visible  in  the  gaze,  the  face  or  gestures”  (2003,  
p238).   This   oppression   may   be   experienced   as   a   slowing   down   of   the   body  
coupled  with   feelings   of   pressure,   tension,   or  weight.   The   body   “regain[s]   its  
materiality  and   turn[s]   into  an  obstacle”   (Fuchs,   2005a,  p96),   thus  becoming  a  
painful,  dense,  and  heavy  ‘thing’  that  the  person  ‘has’,  rather  than  that  which  is  
lived  through.  
Descriptions  of  the  body  as  heavy,  painful,  and  object-­‐‑like  are,   indeed,  exactly  
what  we  find  in  first  person  accounts  of  depression.  John  O’Donogue  writes,  “I  
feel  like  I  have  become  an  object,  that  I  have  turned  to  wood,  that  I’m  mired  in  
my  own  inertia”  (2009,  p47).  Lizzie  Simon  similarly  talks  of  alterations  in  bodily  
experience  during  a  period  of  depression:  “By  that  point  I  was  a  slug,  and  my  
dad  led  my  sluggy  body  to  the  car”  (2003,  p14).  William  Styron,  in  a  quotation  
that’s  strikingly  reminiscent  of  Sartre’s  description  of  the  body  under  the  gaze  
of  the  Other,  explains  that  he  experienced  his  body  as  having  “an  odd  fragility  –  
as  if  my  body  had  actually  become  frail,  hypersensitive  and  somehow  clumsy,  
lacking  normal  coordination…Nothing  felt  quite  right  with  my  corporeal  self”  
(2004,  p43).  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  given  this  description  of  his  body,  Stryon  
goes   on   to   discuss   the   link   he   experienced   between   depression   and  
hypochondria.   Given   that   many   descriptions   of   depression   contain   bodily  
experiences   similar   to   those   in   somatic   illnesses,   this   tendency   towards  
hypochondria  is  understandable.  As  Fuchs  explains,  with  the  body  demanding  
constant   focus,   the   depressed   person  may   “become   preoccupied   with   bodily  
malfunctions  or  possible  diseases”  (2005a,  p99).  This  is  also  seen  in  responses  to  
the  Durham  Depression  Questionnaire.  For  example,  one  respondent  described  
her   bodily   experience   in   the   following   way:   “I   notice   small   aches   and   pains  
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more   and   also   feel   nauseous   and   have   an   undefineable   [sic]   feeling   of   being  
unwell”  (#352).  Another  writes,  “it  felt  as  though  something  'ʹwasn'ʹt  quite  right'ʹ  
in  that  I  generally  felt  under  the  weather.  It  felt  as  though  I  was  always  coming  
down  with  a  cold  in  that  I  felt  'ʹbelow  par'ʹ”  (#334).5  
It  may  also  be  possible   to   interpret   some  of   the  more  evaluative  claims  about  
bodily   experience   in   light   of   this   corporealization.  Questionnaire   respondents  
frequently  described  negative  attitudes  towards  their  bodies.  For  example,  one  
wrote:      “You   look   at   youre   [sic]   body   and   it   looks   disgusting,   you   hate   it”  
(#112).   Another   wrote,   “heavy,   slow,   big,   ugly,   hidious   [sic],   painful”   (#326).  
Many   described   their   bodies   as   “fat”   or   “overweight”.   If   the   bodily  
phenomenology  outlined   in   this  chapter   is  correct,   then   these  descriptions  are  
unsurprising.  The  body  has  become  object-­‐‑like,  a  ‘thing’  to  look  at  and  to  assess.  
As  such,  we  would  expect  a  depressed  person  to  evaluate  her  body  –  whether  
positively  or  negatively  –  more  often  than  a  non-­‐‑depressed  person  might.  The  
non-­‐‑depressed   person   would,   in   most   situations,   have   her   attention   directed  
outwards   towards   the   world,   rather   than   focusing   back   upon   the   body.   As  
such,  she  would  only  apprehend  the  body  as  a  thing-­‐‑to-­‐‑be-­‐‑evaluated  in  certain  
circumstances,   such   as   in   sickness,   when   looking   in   the  mirror,   or   when   the  
body  fails  to  carry  out  a  task  in  some  way.  
The  depressed  person’s  experience  of  this  object-­‐‑like  body  is  of  something  that  
is  too  large  and  heavy;  she  has  a  constant  feeling  of  oppression  and  restriction.  
Having   lost   the   potential   for   action,   the   body   appears   as   corpse-­‐‑like,   with   a  
diminished  capacity   for  a  perceiving  access  onto   the  world.      It   causes  pain,   is  
clumsy   and   awkward,   and   requires   constant   monitoring.   To   ‘hate’   such   an  
object,  or  to  be  embarrassed  or  ashamed  of  it,  seems  not  to  be  an  unreasonable  
response   to   such   an   alteration.  A  description   of   the   body   as   ‘fat’   or   ‘ugly’   is,  
                                                                                                 
5  For  discussion  of  the  comparative  phenomenology  of  depression  and  somatic  illness  see  
Ratcliffe  et  al.  (2013).  
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again,   unsurprising,   especially   given   the   contemporary  Western   cultural   and  
societal  emphasis  put  on  weight  and  attractiveness.  The  prominence  of  these  as  
evaluative   categories   means   we   might   expect   evaluation   on   their   basis.   The  
descriptive  term  chosen  –  ‘fat’  –  is,  given  current  cultural  norms,  an  easy  way  to  
communicate   the   experience   of   the   body   as   ‘too   heavy’,   ‘object-­‐‑like’,   and  
something  that  ‘takes  up  too  much  space’.6    
As  we  have  seen,  those  with  depression  also  commonly  describe  their  bodies  as  
“disgusting”   or   “grotesque”.   David   Lovelace   writes,   “I   stopped   bathing.   My  
body  disgusted  me”  (2010,  p119).  Our  propensity  to  be  disgusted  by  death  and  
decay,  or  “life  turning  towards  death”  (Korsmeyer,  2011,  p36),  may,  in  part,  be  
able   to   explain   such   a   reaction.7   The   depressed   body   is   corpse-­‐‑like   in   its  
presentation   –   restricted   to   its   corporeal   features,   reduced   to   a  mere  mass   of  
flesh,  providing  limited  access  onto  the  world.  As  one  questionnaire  respondent  
put  it,  the  body  is  “really  old  dead  fat”  (#199).  It  does  not  seem  to  be  much  of  a  
stretch   to  suppose   that   this  corpse-­‐‑like  mass  would  elicit  a  disgust  reaction   in  
many  with  depression.8  
Experiences  of  the  World  in  Depression  
The  intimate  link  between  our  experiences  of  the  body  and  our  experiences  of  
the   world   suggest   that   such   a   corporealization   would   impact   both   areas   of  
experience.  Those  with  depression  frequently  describe,  in  combination  with  an  
                                                                                                 
6  For  a  further  discussion  of  how  the  experience  of  the  body  as  object-­‐‑like  may  lead  to  a  
description  of  it  as  ‘fat’  see  Bowden  (2012).  
7  The  link  between  death,  decay  and  disgust  is  far  from  universally  accepted  (See  chapter  one  in  
Korsmeyer,  2011  for  a  discussion  of  common  theories  of  disgust).  However,  even  if  we  do  not  
wish  to  accept  that  all  disgusting  things  are  “pregnant  with  death”  (Kolnai.  1929,  quoted  in  
Korsmeyer,  2011,  p36),  it  seems  relatively  uncontroversial  to  suggest  that  in  western  society  a  
confrontation  with  a  corpse  would  prove  to  be  disgusting  for  many.  
8  This  perception  of  the  depressed  body  as  something  that  is  dying  or  corpse-­‐‑like  can  be  seen  in  
its  most  extreme  form  in  cases  of  Cotard’s  delusion.  In  these  cases,  it  is  argued  that  the  severely  
depressed  person  comes  to  interpret  alterations  in  the  experience  of  the  body  and  the  world  as  
evidence  that  he  is  dead.  See,  for  example,  Fuchs  (2003;  2013b).  
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alteration  in  the  experience  of  the  body,  an  alteration  in  their  experience  of  the  
world.   This   change   in   world   experience   includes   an   increased   difficulty  
interacting   with   or   carrying   out   tasks   within   the   world.   For   example,   one  
questionnaire  respondent  wrote:  
Often,  the  world  feels  as  though  it  is  a  very  long  way  away  and  that  it  
takes   an   enormous   amount   of   effort   to   engage   with   the   world   and  
your  own  life…A  feeling  of  exhaustion  often  prevented  me  from  being  
able  to  interact  with  the  world,  adding  to  the  inability  to  process  what  
was  going  on  around  me.  (#17)    
Another  explained:  
The  most  basic  tasks  can  seem  insurmountable,  as  though  washing  up  
is  suddenly  the  equivalent  of  scaling  the  empire  state  building.  (#118)  
Whilst   I   do   not  wish   to   say   that   these   experiences   are  wholly   attributable   to  
alterations   in   bodily   experience,   it   does   seem   that   the   way   the   body   is  
experienced  in  depression  would  have  a  significant  effect  on  the  experience  of  
the   world  more   generally,   and  may   be   able   to   begin   to   explain   some   of   the  
descriptions   given   by   those  with   depression   regarding  world-­‐‑experience.     As  
we  saw  in  the  case  of  shame,  it  has  been  suggested  that  when  the  body  shows  
itself  as  object-­‐‑like  there  is  a  resultant  loss  of  experienced  possibilities.  This  loss  
may   be   characterised   in   two  key  ways:   Through   the   resistance   to   action,   and  
through   the   loss   of   the   perception   of   possibilities.   In   this   way   we   see   the  
person’s  ability  to  act  within  the  world  altered,  as  well  as  his  perception  of  it.    
In  order  to  highlight  the  ways  in  which  the  slow,  heavy,  cumbersome  body  in  
depression  impacts  on  the  person’s  interaction  with  the  world,  we  might  draw  
a   comparison   with   the   way   the   world   is   experienced   during   periods   of  
exhaustion  or  illness.    Indeed,  one  questionnaire  respondent  does  exactly  this  in  
order   to   attempt   to   describe   her   experience   of   carrying   out   everyday   tasks  
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when  depressed:  “It'ʹs  harder  because  my  body  feels  heavy  and  I  feel  tired  so  it'ʹs  
sort  of  like  trying  to  do  things  when  you  have  a  bad  cold”  (#235).9    
In  many  cases  of  illness  everyday  tasks  become  more  difficult  to  carry  out.  The  
ill  body  puts  up  resistance,  blocking  potential  action.  The  task  itself  is  revealed  
to  the  person  as  challenging,  difficult,  or  impossible;  the  objects  associated  with  
the   task   stand   out   not   as   tools   with   which   to   complete   it,   but   rather  
unconnected  objects,  or  even  obstacles,  that  no  longer  serve  the  purposes  they  
once  did.  There  is,  therefore,  not  only  an  alteration  in  how  the  body  is  perceived  
–   as   something   that   cannot   act   –   but   also   in   how   the  world   is   perceived   –   as  
confusing,   troubling,   or   exhausting.   If   you   think   of   how   a   flight   of   stairs  
presents  itself  when  you’re  standing  at  the  bottom  of  them  suffering  with  a  bad  
cold,   your   limbs  heavy   and  your  balance  unsteady,   you   can  begin   to   see   just  
how  much   our   experiences   of   our   bodies   affect   our   experiences   of   the  world  
more   generally.   When   healthy   (and   physically   fit   and   able),   the   staircase   is  
barely  noticed;  it  is  simply  a  means  of  getting  quickly  to  another  floor.  When  ill,  
however,   it   transforms   into  a   challenge;   something   that   is  preventing   access   to  
the   floor   above   -­‐‑   it   looms  above,   standing  out   as  part  of   an   ‘impossible’   task.  
The   alteration   in   bodily   experience   therefore   impacts   both   on   the   person’s  
ability   to   climb   the   stairs   as   well   as   altering   the   person’s   experience   of   the  
staircase  itself.  
A   similar   experience   occurs   in   depression,   with   the   heavy,   object-­‐‑like   body  
preventing   ease   of   interaction   with   the   world,   much   as   the   ill   body   does.  
Everyday   tasks   become   more   difficult   as   the   body   has   to   be   consciously  
observed   and  moved,   rather   than   the   usual   experience   of   acting   through   the  
body  whilst   focusing   on   the   task   itself.   As   Fuchs   explains,   “Corporealization  
                                                                                                 
9  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  frequency  with  which  respondents  referred  to  experiences  of  the  
body  even  in  response  to  questions  that  were  not  directly  enquiring  about  bodily  experience.  
The  quotation  above  was  responding  to  the  question,  “How  does  depression  affect  your  ability  
to  perform  routine  tasks  and  other  everyday  activities?”  
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thus   means   that   the   body   does   not   give   access   to   the   world   any   more,   but  
stands  in  the  way  as  an  insistent  and  vexing  obstacle”  (2003,  p238).  Objects   in  
the  world  would,  much  as  in  the  case  of  illness,  stand  out  as  part  of  impossible  
or   difficult   tasks.   Given   this   difficulty   interacting   with   the   world,   it   seems  
understandable   that  many   describe   their   depressed   experience   of   world   as   a  
place   that   is   exhausting   and  more   difficult   to   negotiate,   filled  with   tasks   that  
stand  out  as  being  beyond  the  capabilities  of  the  person.  As  one  questionnaire  
respondent  describes,   “Everything  seems  harder  and  needs  more  energy   than  
usual  -­‐‑  just  having  a  shower  can  feel  like  a  huge  task”  (#147).    
However,  alterations  in  the  experience  of  the  body  may  also  affect  the  person’s  
experience  of  the  world  in  a  more  fundamental  way.  Our  bodies,  we  have  seen,  
provide  a  network  of  salience   through  which  we   interact  with   the  world.   It   is  
through  our  embodiment  that  we  come  to  experience  the  practical  possibilities  
an  object  holds.  With  an  alteration  of  this  embodiment,  the  body  may  no  longer  
project  meaningful   possibilities   onto   the  world,   and   so   the   depressed   person  
may  begin  to  not  only  find  interacting  with  the  world  more  difficult,  but  may  
actively   perceive   the   world   in   a   different   way.   Fuchs   describes   a   loss   of   the  
“conative   dimension   of   the   body”   (2005a,   p99)   –   that   which   “opens   up   the  
peripersonal   space   as   a   realm   of   possibilities,   “affordances”,   and   goals   for  
action”   (2005a,   p99).  We  would   expect   the   depressed   person   to   view   objects  
differently,   no   longer   containing   the   same   everyday   potential   for   action.   The  
coffee   cup   may   no   longer   be   perceived   as   containing   the   possibility   of   my  
holding   it,   smashing   it,   filling   it  with   coffee,   or   drinking   out   of   it.   Instead,   it  
may   take   on   a   peculiar   quality   of   an   object   without   possibilities,   or   with  
diminished  possibilities.  The  depressed  person  encounters  a  feeling  of  absence  
in  the  objects  and  the  world  more  generally,  a  felt  awareness  of  what  has  been  
lost  from  experience:  “It  is  conspicuous,  a  very  real  part  of  the  experience;  there  
is   a  painful   awareness  of   the   loss  of   feeling”   (Ratcliffe,   2009,  p230).  The  body  
thus   becomes   not   only   something   that   stands   in   the   way   of   carrying   out  
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everyday   tasks,   but   through   its   alteration   it   may   contribute   to   a   felt   loss   of  
possibilities.    
This   deeper   loss   of   possibilities   is,   indeed,   described   as   occurring   in   severe  
cases  of  depression.  In  such  situations  it  is  not  that  carrying  out  everyday  tasks  
simply   becomes  harder   or  more   exhausting,  we   can   see   instead   that   the   very  
possibility  of  the  task  is  no  longer  available  to  the  person.  As  ‘James’  describes  
in  his  interview  with  Gail  Hornstein:  
It  was  as  if  the  whatness  of  each  thing  –  I’m  no  good  at  philosophical  
vocabulary  –  but  the  essence  of  each  thing  in  the  sense  of  the  tableness  
of   the   table  or   the   chairness  of   the   chair   or   the   floorness  of   the   floor  
was   gone.   There  was   a  mute   and   indifferent   object   in   that   place.   Its  
availability   to   human   living,   to   human   dwelling   in   the   world   was  
drained  out  of   it…It  became  impossible   to  reach  anything.  Like,  how  
do  I  get  up  and  walk  to  that  chair  if  the  essential  thing  that  we  mean  
by  chair,  something  that  lets  us  sit  down  and  rest  or  upholds  us  as  we  
read   a   book,   something   that   shares   our   life   in   that  way,   has   lost   the  
quality  of  being  able  to  do  that?  (Hornstein,  2009,  p213)  
Evaluative   comments   may,   again,   be   better   understood   in   light   of   our  
understanding   of   the   impact   of   alterations   in   bodily   experience.   Along   with  
descriptions   of   the   body   as   fat   and   grotesque,   we   equally   find   frequent  
reference   to   the   body   as   “pointless”   or   “useless”:   “It   feels   fat   and   useless”  
(#110),   one   questionnaire   respondent   writes.   Another   describes   the   body   as  
“Heavy,   tired,  useless”  (#311).  Such  evaluative  comments  seem  un-­‐‑mysterious  
when   considered   in   the   context   of   a   body   that   both  puts  up   resistance   to   the  
carrying  out  of  tasks,  as  well  as  one  that  fails  to  highlight  meaningful  practical  
possibilities   in   the  world.  A  body   that  does  not  allow   the  person   to   carry  out  
potential   actions,   and   one   that   no   longer   fulfills   the   role   of   highlighting  
possibilities   in   the   world   does,   indeed,   seem   not   to   be   as   ‘useful’   as   the  
non-­‐‑depressed   body.   The   frustration   felt   by   those   with   depression   towards  
their   bodies   seems   to   be   an   understandable   response   to   this   alteration   in  
experience.  
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This  alteration  may  also  be  thought  to  contribute  to  the  experience  of  separation  
or   distancing   that   many   with   depression   report.   A   world   which   offers   no  
opportunities   for   interaction,   with   little   highlighted   as   salient   or   indeed  
possible,  may  indeed  be  experienced  as  ‘far  away’  or  ‘inaccessible’.  Descriptions  
common   in  memoirs   of   depression   describing   a   separation   from   the  world   –  
such   as   looking   at   it   through   a   glass   window,   or   through   a   bubble,   may   be  
thought  to  be  describing  this  kind  of  experience.  As  the  person  cannot  act  in  the  
world   in  his  usual  way,  he  does  not   feel   that  he   is   ‘in’   the  world   in   the   same  
way.  When   this   is   coupled  with   an   experience  of   the  body  as   something   that  
puts  up  constant  resistance,  blocking  possibilities,  this  experience  of  separation  
may   be   heightened.   A   loss   of   connection   with   the   world   seems   somewhat  
inevitable  if  the  world  no  longer  offers  possibilities  for  interaction.10    
We  can,   therefore,   see   the  centrality  of   the  body   in  experiences  of  depression.    
Some   form   of   alteration   in   bodily   experience   appears   to   occur   in   almost   all  
depressive  episodes.  This  alteration  may  be  described  as  a  ‘corporealization’  or  
‘reification’  of  the  lived  body,  in  which  the  body  ceases  to  be  that  which  is  lived  
through,   and   instead  becomes  painfully   object-­‐‑like,   putting  up   resistance   and  
blocking   activity.   This   corporealization,   we   have   seen,   also   impacts   on   the  
depressed   person’s   experience   of   the   world.   Everyday   tasks   appear   as   more  
difficult,  and  in  severe  cases  the  person  may  experience  a  diminishment  or  even  
loss   of   possibilities.   These   changes   may   help   to   account   for   evaluative  
comments  made   about   the   body,   including   descriptions   of   the   body   as   “fat”,  
“disgusting”,  and  “useless”.  Finally,  we  have  seen  how  this  range  of  alterations  
in  experiences  of  the  body  and  the  world  may  lead  to  feelings  of  distance  and  
separation.  
                                                                                                 
10  Thomas  Fuchs  (2013b)  also  suggests  that  the  corporealization  of  the  body  can  negatively  affect  
the  person’s  interaction  with  other  people.  If  Fuchs  is  correct,  it  seems  likely  that  this  social  
separation  would  contribute  to  feelings  of  distance  and  separation  more  generally.    
   115  
The  Body  in  Mania  
The  manic  person,  unlike  the  depressed  person,  is  very  active  within  the  world.  
During   an   episode   of  mania   it   is   common   for   the  person   to   find  herself  with  
endless  energy,  a  reduced  need  for  sleep,  and  increased  productivity.  Those  in  
manic  states  will  often   take  on  ambitious   tasks,  or  a   large  number  of  projects.  
Whilst   the  depressed  person’s   experience  may  be   characterised  by   feelings   of  
impossibility,   the   manic   person’s   experience   is   one   of   endless   possibility.   As  
Patty  Duke  writes   in  her  memoir  of  bipolar  disorder,  “When  I’m  manic,   I   just  
don’t  think  rationally.  Anything  I  want  to  do  is  possible”  (Duke  and  Hochman,  
1992,   p37).   Kay  Redfield   Jamison   provides   a   strikingly   similar   description,   “I  
felt  I  could  do  anything,  that  no  task  was  too  difficult”  (1997,  p36).  The  manic  
person   perceives   objects   as   containing   a   wealth   of   possibilities   that   in   many  
cases   are   highlighted   not   only   as   containing   the   potential   for   action,   but   as  
demanding  action  or  use.    Everyday  objects  may  seem  not  to  be  restricted  to  their  
usual  uses,   but   rather   are   open   to   a   range  of   imaginative  possibilities.  Whilst  
there  may  be  a  neglect  of  everyday  tasks,  we  find  that  this  has  less  to  do  with  
the   sense   of   impossibility   and   exhaustion   that   the   depressed   person  
experiences,   and  more   due   to   a   feeling   of   the   relative   unimportance   of   such  
mundane  activities.  Marya  Hornbacher  recalls  the  following  exchange  between  
herself,  her  husband,  and  her  psychiatrist:  
“…How  much  is  she  working?”  Lentz  asks  Jeff.  
“All   the   time.   She   even   works   when   someone’s   talking   to   her.   She  
won’t   change   her   clothes   because   she   says   it   would   interrupt   her  
‘things.’”  
“I  wrote  fifty  pages  yesterday,”  I  tell  him,  quite  smug.  
“Good  for  you.  Are  you  eating?”  Lentz  asks.  
“She’s  not  eating,”  Jeff  says.  (2008,  p263)  
The   manic   person   still   experiences   a   world   in   which   everyday   tasks   can   be  
carried  out  with  ease,  though  often  she  may  choose  not  to  complete  them.    
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This   degree   of   energy   and   activity   within   the   world   contrasts   with   the  
depressed   person’s   experience   of   restriction,   distance,   and   impossibility.   We  
might,   therefore,   initially   assume   that   the   manic   person’s   experience   of   the  
body   would   be   markedly   different   from   the   depressed   person’s   experience.  
Fuchs  describes  an  opposition  between  the  inactive  object-­‐‑like  body  that  we  see  
in  depression,  and  the  active,  inconspicuous  body.  He  explains:  
Primordial   or   lived   bodiliness   is   a   constant   outward   movement,  
directed  to  the  environment  from  a  hidden  center,  and  participating  in  
the  world.  Corporeality  appears  whenever  this  movement  is  paralysed  
or   stopped,  when   the   lived   body   is   thrown   back   on   itself,   reified   or  
“corporealized”.  (2003,  p225)  
Motivated   by   such   a   distinction,   we   might   expect   that   in   opposition   to   the  
heavy   and   object-­‐‑like   body   of   depression,   the  manic   body  would   take   on   an  
increased   degree   of   transparency,   fading   further   into   the   background   as   a  
‘hidden  centre’  as  the  person  is  caught  up  in  the  completion  of  tasks.  The  more  
active  the  person  becomes,  the  more  we  would  expect  the  body  to  fade  out  of  
conscious  awareness.    
There   are   hints   of   this   kind   of   understanding   in   some   first   person   accounts:  
John   O’Donoghue   describes   feeling   “loose,   disconnected,   as   if   I’m   made   of  
mercury,  of  quicksilver”  (2009,  p47).  The  manic  body,  we  might  expect,  would  
be  light  and  unnoticeable,  allowing  access  onto  the  world,  but  not  forming  part  
of   the   person’s   conscious   awareness.   The   constant   activity,   the   ease   of  
movement  and  the  increased  perception  of  possibilities  may  be  thought  to  point  
to  an  invisible  body  that  never  ‘stands  in  the  way’  of  activity.  
Such   an   understanding   of   the   manic   body   might   be   thought   to   explain   the  
increase   in   possibilities   that   occur   in   mania.   With   the   body   losing   its  
experienced  materiality,  it  may  no  longer  provide  limitations  on  possible  action.  
As  such,  the  manic  person  would  experience  all  practical  activities  as  possible.    
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I  judge  a  hill  as  ‘too  steep  to  climb’  because  of  my  awareness  of  my  body  and  its  
inability   to  climb  steep  hills.  However,   if   the  manic  person  does  not  have  this  
awareness  of   the   limitations  of  his  body  –   if  his   focus   is  always  on   the  world  
and  the  potential  for  action,  rather  than  the  body  itself  –  then  the  hill  may  not  
be  seen  to  hold  that  same  restriction.  The  transparency  of   the  body,   therefore,  
may   be   thought   to   result   in   an   increase   in   the   amount   of   activities   that   are  
experienced  as  possible  for  the  manic  person.  
Such  a  diminished  awareness  of   the  body  may  also  be   thought   to  account   for  
the   apparent   loss   of   fear   or   concern   for   consequences   that   occurs   during  
episodes  of  mania.  The  manic  person  may  engage  in  high-­‐‑risk  activities  without  
worrying  about   the  potential  negative  outcomes   that  may  occur.  Examples  of  
these  activities  include  driving  very  fast  or  walking  down  a  street  known  to  be  
dangerous.  Terri  Cheney  describes,  during  one  episode  of  mania,  climbing  past  
a  sign  reading  “Do  Not  Enter.  Danger.  Riptide”   in  order   to  go   for  a  midnight  
swim   in   the   ocean   (2008,   p108).   Using   the   understanding   of   the  manic   body  
proposed   above,   we   might   suggest   that   the   manic   person   engages   in   these  
kinds  of  activities  because  he  has  lost  the  awareness  of  the  fragility  of  the  body.  
Without   the   awareness   that   he   is   a   body,   that   his   body   can   be   harmed   or  
damaged,  activities  that  carry  a  high  risk  of  bodily  injury  would  not  necessarily  
stand  out  as  dangerous.  With   the   focus  entirely  on  the  activity  or   final  aim  of  
the   task,   the  potential   consequences   to   the  body  may  seem  to   fade  away.  The  
manic  person,  therefore,  would  not  necessarily  perceive  the  danger  in  what  are  
objectively  dangerous  situations.    
Whilst  such  an  understanding  is  an  intuitively  plausible  description  of  the  body  
in  mania,  we  must  reject  it  as  false.  The  consequences  we  would  wish  to  draw  
from  such  an  understanding,  such  as  the  increase  in  possibilities  and  decrease  
in   awareness   of   threat   and   danger,   do   not   hold   up   to   philosophical  
examination.  Just  as  crucially,  however,  we  find  that  first  person  accounts  of  the  
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bodily  experience  of  mania  contradict  this  understanding  of  the  body  as  fading  
out  of  conscious  awareness.  
Firstly,  it  does  not  seem  obvious  that  it  is  possible  for  the  body  to  lose  sufficient  
materiality   in  order   to  no   longer  pose   a   limitation  on  possibilities,  whilst   still  
retaining   enough   materiality   to   open   up   practical   possibilities   in   the   world.  
Whilst  it  is  true  that  the  body  provides  a  degree  of  limitation  on  possibilities  –  I  
perceive  certain  actions  as  impossible  because  of  my  awareness  of  the  way  my  
body  is  –  the  body  is  also  that  through  which  things  first  appear  as  possible.  A  
cup   only   contains   the   practical   possibility   of   my   picking   it   up   because   I   am  
aware  that   I  have  arms  and  hands  and  fingers  that  can  carry  out  the  requisite  
actions.  In  most  everyday  situations  the  body  takes  on  a  degree  of  transparency,  
but  retains  enough  materiality  to  structure  practical  possibilities  in  the  world  –  
the   body   is   not   wholly   invisible.   If   there   were   to   be   a   greater   degree   of  
transparency,   as   might   be   suggested   occurs   in   the   case   of   mania,   then   it   is  
questionable   as   to   whether   the   body   would   still   be   able   to   provide   this  
necessary   structuring.   As   such,   we   might   expect   there   to   be   a   contraction   in  
experienced  possibilities,  rather  than  an  increase.  
The  same  criticism  can  be  levelled  at  the  suggestion  that  an  overly-­‐‑transparent  
body  would   lead   to  a   loss  of   the  perception  of  activities  as  dangerous.  Whilst  
such   an   experience  may   lessen   the   perceived   danger   of   the   activity,   it   seems  
likely   that   the   decrease   in   the   experienced   materiality   of   the   body   would  
equally  prevent  some  actions  as  being  highlighted  as  possible  at  all.  It  can  also  
be  seen  that  an  understanding  of   the  manic  person  undertaking  activities   that  
pose  a  high  degree  of   risk   to   the  body   is   too  narrow  an  understanding  of   the  
types   of   high-­‐‑risk   activities   that   are   common   in   mania.   Whilst   some   manic  
people   do   drive   too   quickly,   walk   down   streets   known   to   be   dangerous,   or  
swim   in   risky   areas   of   the   ocean,   others   spend   large   amounts   of   money   or  
engage   in   unwise   business   transactions.   As   one   person   describes,   “I   had   six  
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hundred  dollars  in  overdraft  charges,  in  overdraft  charges  –  that’s  not  counting  
the  amount  that  the  check  was  for”  (Simon,  2003,  p106).    As  we  can  see,  not  all  
high-­‐‑risk   activities   undertaken  whilst  manic   involve  physical   risk   –   gambling  
large   amounts   of   money   on   the   stock  market   is   certainly   risky,   but   it   is   not  
obvious  that  it  poses  any  direct  risk  to  the  person’s  physical  wellbeing.  As  such,  
this   picture   of   involvement   in   high-­‐‑risk   activities   resulting   from   an   increased  
degree  of  bodily  transparency  must,  at  the  very  least,  be  seen  to  be  incomplete.  
However,   even   if   valid   responses   to   these   criticisms   can   be   found,11  we  must  
still  reject  this  understanding  of  the  body  in  mania.  The  clearest  indication  that  
this  view  is  inaccurate  is  that  it  does  not  match  the  descriptions  given  by  those  
with   bipolar   disorder.      Far   from   the   transparent   body   described   above,   first  
person   accounts   describe   the   manic   body   as   overly-­‐‑present,   hyper-­‐‑sensitive,  
and  as  standing  out  as  something  that  is  ‘seen’  by  others.  Cheney  describes  her  
experience   of   her   body   as   she   took   a   bath  whilst  manic:   “the   pressure   of   the  
warm,   soapy  water   against  my   skin  was   unbearable”   (2008,   p204).   Later,   she  
again  describes  this  overly-­‐‑sensitive,  present,  body  –  “The  satin  sheets  felt  like  
sandpaper   against   my   flesh”   (2008,   p205).   Not   only   is   Cheney   aware   of   her  
body,   she   is   excessively   aware   of   it.   In   situations   where   the   body   would  
normally  fade  into  the  background,  we  see  that  in  mania  the  person’s  focus  and  
attention  is  still  drawn  to  the  body.  The  manic  person  remains  acutely  aware  of  
how  the  world  may  affect  or  be  experienced  by  the  body:  “Everything  is  tactile,  
the  taste  of  wine,  the  feel  of  the  excellent  fabric,   the  heel  of  the  fabulous  shoe,  
the  thrum  of  the  road  under  the  wheels  of  the  car”  (Hornbacher,  2008,  p99).    
The  manic  person  is  not  only  aware  of  how  the  body  feels  or  how  it  can  act,  but  
also   how   it   looks.   The   body   is,   much   as   in   the   case   of   depression,   ‘seen’.  
However,  in  contrast  to  the  experience  of  the  body  in  depression,  in  mania  this  
                                                                                                 
11  We  might,  for  example,  suggest  that  the  body  does  not  become  more  transparent,  but  is  
simply  transparent  in  more  situations.    
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process   of   being   seen   is   not   always   unpleasant.  Whilst   the   experience   of   the  
manic   body   is   frequently   distressing   –   reports   of   being   overwhelmed   by  
sensations   are   common   –   the   manic   person   is   not   normally   ashamed   or  
disgusted   by   the   body,   rather   flaunting   it,   seeking   out   the   gaze   of   the  Other.  
This   awareness   of   the   object-­‐‑like   status   of   the   body   can   be   seen   through   the  
attention-­‐‑grabbing   manner   of   dressing   that   is   common   during   episodes   of  
mania.  Kay  Redfield   Jamison  describes  dressing   in  a  “remarkably  provocative  
way”   (1997,   p71)   when   manic.   She   explains,   “My   normal   Brooks   Brothers  
conservatism  would  go  by  the  board;  my  hemlines  would  go  up,  my  neckline  
down,  and   I  would  enjoy   the   sensuality  of  my  youth”   (1997,  p42).  The  manic  
person   is   aware   of   her   body   as   an   object   for   both   her   and   others.   It   has   not  
faded   away   or   become   transparent,   but   rather   stands   at   the   forefront   of   the  
person’s  attention,  as  a  conspicuous  object  to  be  ‘seen’.    
Despite   this   retention   of   materiality,   the   manic   person   does   not   appear   to  
experience   the   rigidity   or   weight   that   is   common   in   depressed   experiences.  
Whilst  the  body  is  conspicuous,  the  world,  for  the  manic  person,  still  contains  a  
wealth  of  practical  possibilities.  The  body  does  not  ‘stand  in  the  way’  of  tasks  as  
an  obstacle  to  be  overcome,  as  the  depressed  body  does.  The  manic  body  may  
be  insistent  in  its  materiality,  but  it  does  not  lose  its  fluidity  of  movement,  nor  
its  ability  to  carry  out  tasks.  
This   engaged   but   still   conspicuous   body   provides   a   challenge   to   Fuchs’s  
implied  distinction  between  the  active  and  invisible  body,  and  the  inactive  and  
conspicuous  body.  “The  body”,  Fuchs  writes,  “oscillates  in  the  polarity  of  being  
unnoticed  or   conspicuous,   of   automatic  performance  or   interfering   resistance,  
of   being   subject   or   object,   being   lived   or   being   had”   (2003,   p225).   This   link  
between  action   in   the  world  and  the   invisibility  of   the  body  would   lead  us   to  
expect  the  manic  body  to  take  on  a  greater  degree  of  transparency.  Our  thinking  
might  go  as  follows:    If  the  manic  body  were  to  be  object-­‐‑like,  we  would  expect  
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it   to   block   potential   action.   As   it   does   not   block   action,   it   must   be   ‘hidden’.  
However,   as   I   have   shown,   this   understanding   of   the   manic   body   is   not  
accurate.  The  manic  body  is  conspicuous,  often  to  a  distressing  degree,  and  yet  
it  is  still  active  in  the  world  –  it  still  highlights  potential  action.  That  this  could  
be  the  case  suggests  that  the  link  between  activity  and  invisibility  is  not  as  close  
as  Fuchs  seems  to  suggest.    
The  manic  body,  therefore,  can  be  seen  to  raise  an  interesting  challenge  for  the  
phenomenologist.  How  are  we  to  understand  this  overly  obvious,  ‘seen’,  body  
that   does   not   result   in   an   experience   of   restriction   or   rigidity,   but   rather   is  
experienced   as   “loose”   and   “disconnected”?   Why   is   the   manic   body   so  
conspicuous   when   our   intuitions   suggest   that   it   ought   to   be   hidden?  
Furthermore,  how  are  we  to  understand  the  restriction  in  depression,  given  that  
the   experience   of   the   body   as   conspicuous   does   not   always   result   in   a  
contraction   of   experienced  possibilities?  We   can   summarise   these   concerns   in  
two  key  questions  regarding  the  bodily  experience  of  mania  and  depression:  
1. How  can   the  manic  body  be  active   in   the  world  and  yet  not   fade   from  
explicit  awareness?  
2. Why   is   the   depressed   body   both   conspicuous   and   inactive,   when   we  
have  a  clear  example  of  a  conspicuous  body  that  does  not  prevent  action  
in  the  case  of  mania?  
One  potential   answer,   I   suggest,   lies   in   the  way   in  which   time   is   experienced  
during  episodes  of  mania  and  depression.   It   is,   therefore,   to   the   issue  of   time  
that  we  should  now  turn  our  attention.  Through  this  discussion  I  show  how  we  
can  deepen  our  understanding  of  both  mania  and  depression,  building  a  richer  
account  of  the  bodily  experiences  of  the  two  states.  
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Chapter  5:  Experiences  of  Time  in  Mania  and  
Depression  
Introduction  
First   person   accounts   of   mania   and   depression   frequently   highlight   the  
occurrence   of   alterations   in   temporal   experience   during   both   states.   When  
respondents  to  the  Durham  Depression  Questionnaire  were  asked  the  question,  
“When  you  are  depressed,  does  time  seem  different  to  you?  If  so,  how?”,  they  
described  a  variety  of  different  experiences  of  time.  Although  a  few  stated  that  
they  experienced  no  change  –  by  answering,  for  example,  “No  it  doesn’t”  (#105)  
and   “I   personally   don’t   feel   that   time   seems   different   to   me,   when   I   am  
depressed”   (#20)   –   most   described   changes   in   both   shorter   and   longer-­‐‑term  
experiences  of  time.  
One  of  the  most  common  descriptions  was  of  time  seeming  to  slow  down  when  
depressed.  For  example:  
It   goes   slower,   it   drags.  Occasionaly   [sic]   I   just   loose   [sic]   chunks   of  
time.  (#8)  
Time   slows   down   and   I   feel   like   that   bad   feelings   will   last   forever.  
(#147)  
Time  seems  to  go  very  slowly.  (#292)  
Others  described  the  loss  of  the  significance  of  time,  or  an  inability  to  keep  track  
of  time:  
Time   is   immaterial   to  me  during  a  depressional   [sic]   episode.   I   loose  
[sic]  track  of  time.  I  wonder  what  I’ve  done  all  day  when  the  children  
suddenly  burst  through  the  door  from  school.  Time  has  gone  by,  but  I  
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have  done  nothing,  even  to  think  one  thought  seems  to  have  taken  all  
day….  (#117)  
I  don’t   tend   to  have  any   track  of   time  when   I’m  depressed.  My  wife  
writes  me  lists  so  I  remember  to  do  things  at  certain  times.  When  not  
depressed   I   am   very   punctual,   and   always   know  what   needs   doing  
and  when.  (#157)  
When  I  am  depressed  I  don'ʹt  seem  to  notice  time,  it  just  doesn'ʹt  matter  
to  me,   it   all   seems   to  blend   in   to  a  mass  of  nothing.   I   always  wear  a  
watch,   to   try  when   things   are   bad   to   try   and   regulate  my   days   into  
some  sort  of  order,  but  i  [sic]  never  seem  able  to  manage  it.  Time  loses  
significance.  (#54)  
In   cases  of  mania,  we   can  also   see   an   alteration   in   temporal   experience.  Terri  
Cheney,   for  example,  describes  how  “Tomorrow  meant  nothing   to  me”   (2008,  
p179).  Marya  Hornbacher  writes,  “We  walk  in  circles  for  weeks,  or  minutes,  or  
years.  Time  has  escaped  me”  (2008,  p119).  In  contrast  to  the  descriptions  we  see  
in   cases   of   depression,   she   also   describes   “rac[ing]   through   the   hours”   (2008,  
p100).   Kay   Redfield   Jamison   describes   a   similar   experience,   writing   that   her  
“life  and  mind  were  going  at  an  ever  faster  and  faster  clip”  (1997,  p68).    
From   these  descriptions   it   seems   clear   that   alterations   in   temporal   experience  
occur  during  episodes  of  mania  and  depression.  These  changes  are  described  as  
involving  the  speed  of   time,   the  relevance  of   time,   fragmentation  of   time,  and  
the  existence  of  time.  In  this  chapter  I  begin  to  explore  these  various  temporal  
experiences.   I   look   at   both   the   experience   of   time   itself,   as  well   as   how   these  
alterations  in  temporal  experience  can  impact  upon  other  aspects  of  experience,  
thus  aiding  our  understanding  of  common  features  of  mania  and  depression.    
I   begin   by   discussing   the   distinction   between   objective   and   subjective   time,  
before  moving  on   to  discuss   subjective   time   in  more  detail.   I   show  how  basic  
accounts  of  the  temporal  experience  of  mania  and  depression  can  be  enhanced  
by  an  appreciation  of  the  distinction  between  implicit  and  explicit  time,  as  well  
as  the  role  of  the  intersubjective.  Through  this  I  explore  common  experiences  in  
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depression,  such  as  a  loss  of  the  appreciation  of  the  possibility  of  recovery  and  
intense   feelings   of   irrevocable   guilt.   I   argue   that   an   understanding   of   the  
temporal  experience  of  mania  as  ‘time  speeding  up’  is  inadequate,  and  provide  
an   alterative   account   using   the   work   of   Husserl   to   suggest   that   there   is   a  
disruption  in  temporal  synthesis  during  manic  episodes.  This  account  allows  us  
to  understand  a  wide  variety  of  experiences   that  are  common  in  manic  states,  
including  an  inability  to  reflect  upon  the  self  and  action,  a  lack  of  engagement  
with  the  world,  a  fragmentation  of  time,  and  a  diminished  sense  of  ownership  
of  actions.  
Objective  and  Subjective  Time  
Recent   literature   has   focussed   on   the   distinction   between   objective   time,   and  
subjective  or  ‘lived’  time.  Objective  time  can  be  defined  as  ‘clock’  time,  the  time  
it  takes  in  seconds,  minutes,  or  hours  for  something  to  happen.  Subjective  time  
is   time   as   it   is   experienced   by   the   person.   For   example,   if   you’re   in   a   boring  
meeting,   time  may  appear   to  go   slowly   relative   to   the  actual   rate  of  objective  
time.  When   spending   time  with   a   loved   one,   it  might   seem   to   go   quickly   in  
comparison.  
This   distinction   allows   us   to   construct   a   basic   account   of   the   temporal  
experience   of   mania   and   depression.   It   has   been   suggested   that   in   cases   of  
depression  time  appears  subjectively  to  slow  down  in  contrast  to  objective  time  
(e.g.   Kitamura   and   Kumar,   1982)   and   that   in   mania   it   is   experienced   as  
speeding  up.  Vogeley  and  Kupke  state  that  “Non-­‐‑psychotic  affective  disorders  
seem   to   present   a   systematic   change   of   velocity:   acceleration   (mania)   or  
deceleration  (depression)  of  time  experience,  with  the  basic  temporal  structure  
being  preserved”   (2007,  p162).  This  understanding  of   the   temporal  experience  
of   mania   and   depression   seems   to   be   supported   by   psychological   studies  
showing  that  people  who  are  depressed  report  a  slowed  experience  of  time,  and  
those   who   are   manic   report   an   accelerated   experience   (Bschor   et   al.,   2004).  
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When  asked  to  estimate  elapsed  time  periods,  people  with  depression  will  tend  
to  over-­‐‑estimate  both  long  and  short  intervals  (Bschor  et  al.,  2004;  Kitamura  and  
Kumar,  1982).    
This   alteration   in   temporal   experience   is   also   backed   up   by   first   person  
accounts.  Andrew  Solomon,  for  example,  writes,  “Depression  minutes  are  like  
dog   years,   based   on   some   artificial   notion   of   time”   (Solomon,   2002,   p52).  
Respondents   to   the   Durham   Depression   Questionnaire   also   reported   similar  
experiences  of  a  slowing  of  subjective  time  during  depressed  episodes:  
‘Time  seems  to  drag.  A  day  feels  like  a  year.’  (#26)  
‘Time  goes  so  slowly  when  I’m  depressed.  Painfully  slow.’  (#14)  
In   cases   of  mania,   first   person   accounts   also   seem   to   suggest   an   alteration   in  
subjective   temporal   velocity.   Emma   Forrest   writes   in   her   memoir   of   bipolar  
disorder  that  “Mania  flows  like  a  river  approaching  a  waterfall.  Depression  is  a  
stagnant   lake”   (2011,   p29).   Hornbacher   also   describes   experiences   of   time  
seeming   to   speed   up   during   manic   episodes:   “I   can’t   deal   with   it…It’s   too  
much.   It’s  going   too   fast.”   (2008,  p109).  Responses   to   the  Durham  Depression  
Questionnaire   again   support   this   understanding   of   temporal   experience.  One  
respondent   who   had   been   diagnosed   with   bipolar   disorder   described   her  
experience  in  the  following  way:  “the  hours  seem  to  drag  on…but  sleep  cures  
that.  total  reverse  in  mania…no  sleep  at  all  and  ti[m]e  flies”  (#269).  
These   first  person  accounts,   combined  with   the  psychological   studies,   suggest  
that   some   kind   of   change   in   temporal   experience   occurs   during   episodes   of  
mania   and   depression.   However,   describing   these   experiences   as   a   simple  
‘speeding  up’  or  ‘slowing  down’  of  subjective  time  does  not  adequately  account  
for   the   full   range  of   temporal   experiences   that  occur  within   these   states.   First  
person  accounts  of  mania  do  not  simply  describe  experiences  of  time  speeding  
up.  We   also   find   descriptions   of   altered   experiences   of   the   past,   present   and  
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future;   and   of   time   becoming   irrelevant,   fragmented,   or   losing   meaning.  
Jamison,  for  example,  writes  of  a  manic  episode:  “Of  course,  I  had  no  notion  of  
time”   (1997,   p83).   Cheney,   similarly,   describes   alterations   in   temporal  
experience:  “When  I’m  manic,  all  I  remember  is  the  moment”  (2008,  p2).  
The  psychological  studies,  similarly,  do  not  provide  clear  support  for  the  view  
that   time   is   simply   experienced   as   passing   more   quickly   in   cases   of   mania.  
Although   people   do   describe   time   as   seeming   to   speed   up   during   manic  
episodes,   time-­‐‑estimation   tests  suggest  a  more  complex  experience.  Whilst  we  
would  expect  people  who  are  manic  to  under-­‐‑estimate  elapsed  periods  of  time  
–  estimating   that  a  shorter  period  of   time  had  passed   in  contrast   to   the  actual  
period   -­‐‑   this   is   not   seen   in   all   or   even   a  majority   of   results.   Like   those  with  
depression  and  schizophrenia,  those  in  manic  states  also  tend  to  over-­‐‑estimate  
elapsed   periods   of   time   (Bschor   et   al.,   2004;   Tysk,   1984).   These   psychological  
studies   seem   not   to   point   towards   a   simple   ‘speeding   up’   of   time,   but  
something  richer  and  more  complex.  
Equally,  we  see  that  a  description  of  the  temporal  experience  of  depression  as  
being  a  simple  ‘slowing  down’  of  subjective  time  fails  to  take  into  account  the  
variety  of  experiences  commonly  described  in  first  person  accounts.  Along  with  
descriptions   of   time   slowing   down,   there   are   also   reports   of   time   losing  
meaning   or   becoming   irrelevant,   of   it   seeming   to   stop   altogether,   and   of  
alterations  in  how  the  person  relates  to  the  past  and  future.    
Whilst  the  distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  time  therefore  allows  us  
to   construct   a   very   basic   account   of   the   temporal   experiences   in   mania   and  
depression,  we  can  see  that  a  richer  account  is  needed  in  order  to  provide  a  full  
description  of  the  experience.  In  order  to  develop  such  an  account,  we  first  need  
to  look  more  closely  at  the  structure  of  the  subjective  experience  of  time.  
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Subjective  Time  
Subjective   time   is   time   as   the   person   himself   experiences   it.   Thomas   Fuchs  
introduces   the   helpful   distinction   in   experiences   of   subjective   time   between  
“Explicit  Time”  and  “Implicit  Time”  (e.g.  2005b;  2013a).  Explicit  time  is  the  flow  
of   time   as   it   is   consciously   experienced.   For   example,   we  might   point   to   the  
awareness   of   time   when   running   late   for   a   meeting,   or   when   waiting   for   a  
delayed  bus   to  arrive.  Fuchs  suggests   that   time  becomes  explicit  when  “a  gap  
arises   between   need   and   satisfaction,   desire   and   fulfillment,   or   plan   and  
execution”  (2005b,  p195).  
  In  contrast,  we  do  not  consciously  observe  implicit  time  –  it   instead  passes  as  
we  are  engaged  in  activities;  it  “runs  with  the  movement  of  life”  (Fuchs,  2005b,  
p195).  Fuchs  uses  the  example  of  a  child  playing  with  toys,  but  any  time  we’re  
wholly   engaged   in   carrying   out   a   task   would   equally   demonstrate   the  
experience.   Time   unfolds,   but   the   child   is   not   explicitly   concentrating   on   the  
passage   of   time.   Instead,   time   is   “pre-­‐‑reflectively   lived”   (Fuchs,   2013a,   p77).  
Fuchs   points   to   two   preconditions   for   this   implicit,   lived,   time:  Conation   and  
temporal  synthesis.    
Conation   may   be   described   as   the   “basic   “energetic”   momentum   of   mental  
life…expressed  by   concepts   such   as  drive,   striving,   urge   or   affection”   (Fuchs,  
2013a,   p78).1   It   is   the   orientation   towards   the   future,   drawing   us   in   to  
meaningful  action  and  giving  energy  and  forward  movement   to  our   temporal  
experiences.  Matthew  Ratcliffe  suggests  that  this  conative  drive  “does  not  have  
a  purely   internal  phenomenology;   it  manifests   itself  as  a  subset  of   the  world’s  
possibilities”  (2012a,  p119).  Through  conation  there  is  a  form  of  practical  allure  
–   we   find   possibilities   within   the   world   to   be   enticing   in   various   ways.   The  
world,  it  seems,  draws  us  in  towards  both  perceptual  and  practical  possibilities.  
                                                                                                 
1  Matthew  Ratcliffe  (2012a)  notes  similarities  between  this  concept  and  Eugene  Minkowski’s  
(1970)  “elan  vital”  and  Erwin  Straus’s  (1947)  state  of  “becoming”.  
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We  might,  therefore  define  conation  as  a  future-­‐‑directed  drive  that  draws  us  in  
to  possible  action.  
This   conative   drive   is   combined   with   a   basic   synthesis   of   temporality.   Here  
Fuchs   appeals   to   the   Husserlian   analysis   of   the   continuity   of   inner   time  
consciousness.  
Husserl  on  Time  
It  is  often  thought  that  we  experience  time  as  a  series  of  moments  –  a  constant  
progression   of   ‘Nows’.   Instant   a,   b,   and   c   following   on   from   each   other,  
separate  from  that  which  has  gone  before.  Husserl  sought  to  understand  how  it  
is  that  we  can  experience  continuity  through  time,  through  these  moments.  This  
refers   both   to   the   continuity   of   objects   and   of   the   self.   He   suggests   that   our  
feelings  of  continuity  do  not  make  sense  when  we  think  of  time  as  being  merely  
a   series   of   Nows.   Instead,   he   proposes   a   tripartite   structure   of   temporal  
consciousness   that   allows   us   to   experience   this   sense   of   continuity   and  
unification  (e.g.  Husserl,  1991).  
Husserl   terms   our   initial   consciousness   of   the   present   Now   the   ‘primal  
impression’.  Within   the  current   temporal  phase  –   that  which  we  are  currently  
experiencing  –  we  do  not  only  have  awareness  of  the  Now,  but  also  experience  
the   ‘retention’   of   the   just-­‐‑past   and   the   ‘protention’   of   what   will   immediately  
follow.  Husserl  describes  this  as  “the  living  horizon  of  the  now”  (1991,  p45).  As  
such,  moving  through  time  we  experience  a  degree  of  continuity,  through  our  
retention  and  protention.  We  are  aware  of  the  current  Now  being  after  the  prior  
Now   and   before   the   next,   due   to   our   retention   of   that   prior  Now   –   and   our  
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protention  of  the  Now-­‐‑to-­‐‑come.2  The  popular  example  of  a  melody  may  help  to  
illustrate   this:   When   we   hear   the   note   ‘E’   in   the   tune,   we   also   have   an  
experience  of  the  note  ‘D’  that  came  before  it  –  experiencing  it  as  past.  Husserl  
writes,   “it   is   actually   present   itself   (but   not   an   actually   present   tone),   it   is   a  
retention   of   the   tone   that   has   been”   (1991,   p31).   Similarly,   we   have   an  
experience  of  the  note  that  will  come  next  –  ‘F’.  Our  protention  need  not  be  as  
specific  as  ‘F’  follows  ‘E’,  but  rather  merely  that  something  will  follow  ‘E’.  If  we  
consider   our   surprise  when   a  melody   suddenly   stops   short,  we   can   begin   to  
understand  how  intuitive  this  tripartite  understanding  is.  In  this  way,  we  hear  a  
unified   melody,   rather   than   merely   a   series   of   individual   notes.   We   can  
therefore  see  how  our  retention  of  the  immediate  past  and  the  protention  of  the  
immediate  future  allows  for  a  unification  of  our  temporal  experiences.    
The  retentional-­‐‑protentional  structure  underlies  our  feeling  of  continuity  in  our  
pre-­‐‑reflective   experience   of   time.   The   conative   drive   adds  momentum   to   this  
structure,   resulting   in   an   implicit,   pre-­‐‑reflective   experience   of   time   as  
future-­‐‑directed  and  unified.  
Intersubjective  Time  
Philosophers  such  as  Fuchs  (2013a)  and  Martin  Wyllie  (2005)  have  stressed  the  
importance   of   the   intersubjective   in   implicit   and   explicit   experiences   of  
subjective  time.  We  find  that  our  experience  of  time  is  synchronized  with  those  
around  us,  a  “lived  synchronization”  as  Minkowski  puts  it  (1970,  p65,  quoted  in  
Wyllie,   2005,   p177).   This   can   be   seen   not   only   in   our   shared   methods   of  
measuring   periods   of   time,   becoming   attuned   with   one   another   through   the  
passage  of  a  day,  a  calendar  month,  or  the  celebration  of  annual  holidays,  but  
                                                                                                 
2  It  is  important  that  we  note  that  the  retention  and  protention  occur  at  the  same  time  as  the  
primal  impression  –  retention  is  a  present  experience  of  the  immediately  past  as  past,  rather  than  
being  part  of  that  past.  This  does  not,  however,  mean  that  the  person  experiences  the  events  as  
occurring  concurrently  –  what  is  retained  is  the  immediate  past  as  past,  rather  than  the  past  as  
present.  
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also   through   a  more  basic   sense   of   being   ““in   tune”  with   the   time  of   others”  
(Wyllie,  2005,  p177).  This  feeling  of  being  “in  tune”  with  others  is  experienced  
through  our  “simultaneous  referral  to  the  world”  (Fuchs,  2013a,  p82)  –  through  
shared  attention,  projects,  and  actions.    
The  importance  of  intersubjective  time  is  particularly  highlighted  when  there  is  
a  desynchronization  between  the  subjective  and  the  intersubjective.  A  somewhat  
everyday  example  is  the  experience  of  boredom,  where  one  finds  a  “stagnation  
of  one’s  personal  lived  time  against  the  dynamic  background  of  intersubjective  
time”  (Wyllie,  2005,  p178).  This  intersubjective  domain  becomes  apparent  if  we  
imagine   the   experience   of  waiting   for   a   delayed   bus,   wherein   the   individual  
experiences   a   subjective   slowing   of   time   as   everyone   around   him   hurries   on  
with  their  tasks.  Equally,  we  might  point  to  the  uncomfortable  feeling  of  trying  
to  catch  up  in  a  meeting  when  arriving  late  –  highlighting  the  often  distressing  
feeling  of  being  out  of  synch  with  other  people’s  experiences  of  time.      
This  disruption  to  the  lived  synchronization  of  intersubjective  time  results  in  an  
experience  of  time  as  explicit.  Whilst  the  person  may  previously  have  not  been  
aware   of   the   passing   of   time,   when   there   is   a   desynchronization   of   the  
subjective  and  the   intersubjective  she  will  begin   to  be  aware  of,  and  focus  on,  
the  passing  of   time.  Again,  we  might   think  of   the  experience  of  waiting   for  a  
delayed  bus.  We  become  more  aware  of  the  time  that  passes,  feeling  frustrated  
that  we  are  not  able  to  get  on  with  our  tasks  or  frequently  checking  a  watch  or  
clock.    
Temporal  Experiences  in  Depression  
This  more  detailed  description  of  subjective  time  allows  us  to  construct  a  richer  
account   of   the   experience   of   time   in   depression.   It   is   suggested   that   during  
episodes   of   depression   there   are   alterations   in   both   subjective   and  
intersubjective  time  (e.g.  Fuchs,  2013a;  Wyllie,  2005).  
   131  
In   cases   of   depression   Fuchs   suggests   that   there   is   a   loss   of   conation   whilst  
temporal   synthesis   –   the   underlying   retentional-­‐‑protentional   structure   –  
remains   unaffected.3   This   disruption   of   the   future   directed   momentum  
manifests  “in  psychomotor   inhibition,   thought   inhibition,  and   in  a  slow-­‐‑down  
or  standstill  of  lived  time”  (Fuchs,  2013a,  p96).  The  depressed  person  therefore  
experiences  difficulties  in  both  thought  and  action,  along  with  direct  alterations  
to  the  experience  of  temporal  progression.  The  playwright  Sarah  Kane  describes  
this  experience  of  thought  inhibition  in  her  play  4.48  Psychosis,  which  is  based  
on  her  experience  of  depression:4  
tongue  out  
thought  stalled  
the  piecemeal  crumple  of  my  mind.  (2006,  p23)  
The   individual   experiences   time   as   moving   much   more   slowly,   or   even  
stopping   altogether.   This   description   is   consistent  with  what  we   find   in   first  
person  accounts.  For  example,  one  respondent  to  the  questionnaire  wrote  of  his  
temporal  experience:  
Time   stops.   Days   last   forever,   especially   evenings   when   tired   but  
victim  to  insomnia.  (#180)  
This  slowing  of  lived  time  results  in  a  loss  of  synchrony  between  subjective  and  
intersubjective   experiences   of   time.   The   person   not   only   experiences   time   as  
slowing   down   or   stopping,   he   also   experiences   a   feeling   of   ‘lagging   behind’  
                                                                                                 
3  This  is  often  contrasted  with  the  breakdown  of  temporal  synthesis  that  is  thought  to  occur  in  
cases  of  schizophrenia  (see,  for  example,  Fuchs,  2013a).  Sass  and  Pienkos  summarise  this  
position:  “In  schizophrenia,  a  mode  of  temporality  (perhaps  better,  of  a-­‐‑temporality)  that,  
together  with  collapse  of  protention  and  retention,  loses  all  organization  and  meaning;  in  
melancholia,  a  foundering  of  drive  and  associated  projection  of  the  self  into  the  future,  that  
leaves  one  dominated  by  the  past,  futility,  and  fatigue”  (2013b,  p141).  
4  Kane  committed  suicide  shortly  after  completing  the  play  and  before  its  publication  or  
performance.  I  have  retained  Kane’s  original  formatting.  We  might  wonder  whether  the  
fragmented  structure  similarly  hints  at  this  experience  of  thought  having  stalled.  
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others  or  of  being  out  of   synch  with  other  people’s   temporal  experiences.  For  
example,   one   person   described   how   she   felt   that   she  was   “experiencing   time  
much   slower   than   others”   (#169).   These   feelings   of   desynchronization  
contribute   to   more   general   feelings   of   distance   or   separation,   both   from  
individuals   as   well   as   from   the   shared   world   that   we   generally   inhabit.   It  
becomes   increasingly  difficult   for   the  person   to   interact   or   engage  with   other  
people,   the   feeling   of   being   ‘out   of   step’   with   others   heightening   an   already  
present   experience   of   isolation.      When   asked   whether   other   people   seem  
different  during  periods  of  depression,  one  person  wrote,  “they  seem  far  away  
hard   to   relate   to   them”   (#80).   Another  wrote   that   she   “feel[s]   detached   from  
them”  (#228).  Sally  Brampton  similarly  writes  in  her  memoir:  “Depression  feels  
like   the   most   isolated   place   on   earth.   No   wonder   they   call   it   a   disease   of  
loneliness”   (2009,  p1).  H.  Rachelle  Graham  provides   the   following  description  
of  this  experience  of  isolation:  
I  am  at  the  bottom  of  a  dark  ocean  with  a  hundred  pounds  of  concrete  
on  top  of  my  body.  My  friends  and  family  are  snorkeling  nearby.  I  can  
hear  them  call  out  to  me,  but  I  cannot  see  them.  (2010,  p3)  
  The   frequency   with   which   such   descriptions   appear   both   in   narratives   of  
depression   as  well   as   the  questionnaire   results  highlights  how  common   these  
alterations   of   interpersonal   relations   are   in   cases   of   depression.   Changes   in  
temporal   experience   contribute   to   and   thus   help   us   to   understand   such  
experiences.  
Similarly   to   the   case   of   boredom,   this   desynchronization   of   subjective   and  
intersubjective   time   results   in   a   reification   of   time.   For   the   depressed   person,  
time  is  explicit,  heavy,  or  ‘dead’.  As  Fuchs  writes,  “explicit  time  is  experienced  
as   a   painful   burden”   (2013a,   p97).   The  depressed  person  no   longer   implicitly  
lives  time  –  like  the  child  playing  with  her  toys  –  but  rather  is  explicitly  aware  
of   the   progression   of   time   or,   more   accurately,   the   lack   of   progression.   Von  
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Gebsattel   quotes   a   depressed   girl   who   can   be   seen   to   be   having   an   extreme  
experience   of   time   becoming   explicit.   She   describes   her   experience   in   the  
following  way:  
As  I  am  speaking  to  you,  with  every  word  I’m  thinking  ‘past’,   ‘past’,  
‘past’…Water  dripping  is  unbearable  and  it  drives  me  mad,  because  I  
always   have   to   think:   Now   another   second   has   gone   past,   now  
another.  (2012,  p215)  
As   von   Gebsattel   writes,   this   is   a   girl   who   “is   compulsively,   constantly,  
preoccupied   with   time”   (2012,   p216).   Whilst   most   temporal   experiences   in  
depression   are   not   this   severe,   we   do   find   that   there   is   a   more   general  
experience   of   time  becoming   explicit.   This   loss   of   the  usual   implicit   temporal  
experience   is   felt   painfully,   the   loss   of   synchrony   and   conative   dynamism  
impacting  not  only  on  the  person’s  experiences  of  the  progression  of  time,  but  
also  her  ability  to  relate  and  interact  with  others.  In  addition,  we  find  that  these  
alterations  have  implications  for  the  person’s  experience  of  the  past  and  future.    
The  experience  of   the  future  as  open,  a  field  of  potential  possibilities,  requires  
an  ability   to  project   into   that   future.   If  we  accept   the  account  put   forward  by  
Fuchs   we   can   see   that   the   depressed   person   still   has   an   intact   experience   of  
temporal   synthesis   and   so  maintains   her   protentional   capacity   –   she   can   still  
anticipate  the  immediate  future  and  so  may  be  able  to  follow  a  piece  of  music  or  
a  conversation.  However,  with  the  loss  of  conation,  we  find  that  the  depressed  
person  no  longer  experiences  a  draw  towards  the  future,  and  so  can  no  longer  
project   into   it   or   experience   it   as   open.   Straus   explains,   “With   a   standstill   of  
becoming,  future  is  rendered  inaccessible.  We  do  not  proceed  anymore  towards  
the   future”   (1947,  p257).  For   the  depressed  person,   the   future  no   longer  holds  
the  possibility  of  progression  or  change.   Instead,   the   future   is  blocked  –   there  
are   no   new   possibilities   available,   only   a   static,   unchanging,   present   that   the  
person   has   no   control   over.   One   person   described   her   experience   in   the  
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following  way:  “There  is  no  hope  for  a  better  future.  Everything  feels  inevitable,  
out  of  control  and  all  attempts  at  anything  are  pointless”  (#280).  
The  loss  of  conation  prevents  the  person  from  being  drawn  into  the  future,  and  
the  future  is  therefore  experienced  as  closed  or  blocked.  The  depressed  person  
thus   experiences   an   unchanging   and   eternal   present   over   which   she   has  
minimal   control   –   she   cannot   change   things   in   the   future.   This   account   of  
temporal   experience   helps   us   to   understand   a   common   complaint   in  
descriptions   of   depression   –   the   loss   of   the   belief   that   it   is   possible   to   ever  
recover  from  a  depressive  episode.    
This   feeling   of   the   impossibility   of   recovery   arises   in   most   depression  
narratives.   Brampton,   for   example,   writes,   “Nobody   thinks   they’ll   ever   get  
better.   They   think   they’ll   cry   until   eternity”   (2009,   p80).   Solomon   describes   a  
similar  experience  in  his  memoir  of  depression:    
When  you  are  depressed,  the  past  and  future  are  absorbed  entirely  by  
the  present  moment,   as   in   the  world  of  a   three  year  old.  You  cannot  
remember   a   time  when   you   felt   better,   at   least   not   clearly;   and   you  
certainly  cannot  imagine  a  future  time  when  you  will  feel  better.    
(2002,  p55)  
Similar   themes   are   echoed   in   responses   to   the   Durham   Depression  
Questionnaire.  For  example,  one  person  wrote,  “When  depressed  I   feel   I  have  
no  future  and  lose  any  hope  in  things  improving  in  my  life.  I  just  feel  generally  
hopeless”  (#158).  Another  wrote,  “There  seemed  to  be  no  future,  no  possibility  
that  I  could  ever  be  happy  again  or  that  life  was  worth  living”  (#160).  
In   light   of   our   understanding   of   the   depressed   person’s   loss   of   conation   and  
subsequent   disruption   to   the   synchronization   of   intersubjective   time,   these  
descriptions  ought  not   to   surprise  us.   If   the  person  no   longer   experiences   the  
future   as   containing   the   possibility   of   meaningful   change,   then   this   would  
suggest   that   she   could   not   envisage   the   possibility   that   she   might   not   be  
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depressed   in   the   future.   As   Wyllie   explains,   “The   sufferer   cannot   project  
themselves   into   a   future   of   events   and   there   is   therefore   no   sense   of   “things  
getting   better””   (2005,   p182).   The   closed   future   blocks   off   any   possibility   of  
recovery,   and   the   depressed   person   instead   experiences   her   depression   as  
eternal.  
The   experience   of   a   blocked   future   can   be   seen   to   have   even   further  
consequences  for  the  depressed  person.  With  this  alteration  of  the  experience  of  
the  future,  we  find  that  the  person’s  experiences  of  the  past  and  the  present  are  
equally  affected.  One  area   in  which  we  can  see  this  change  is   in  the   increased  
frequency  and  intensity  of  feelings  of  guilt  that  occur  in  depression.    
Depression  and  Guilt  
Heightened   feelings   of   guilt   are   common   during   episodes   of   depression.5  
Ratcliffe   (2010)   notes   that   whilst   these   experiences   of   guilt   are   superficially  
similar  to  everyday  experiences  of  guilt,  we  find  that  in  severe  depression  there  
is  often  no  specific  object  or  incident  to  which  the  guilt  refers.  Instead,  there  is  a  
generalised   feeling   of   guilt   –   the   person   feels   that   he   himself   is  guilty,   rather  
than  merely  having  performed  a  specific  immoral  act,  “Whereas  object-­‐‑directed  
guilt   is   one   of  many   emotional   attitudes   that   one  might   adopt   towards   one’s  
various   deeds,   guilt   in   severe   depression   envelops   all   experience”   (Ratcliffe,  
2010,   p612).   As   one   person   with   depression   describes,   “The   sense   of   sin…in  
depression   is   dominating   and   all   pervading”   (Custance,   1952,   p79,   quoted   in  
Landis,  1964,  p262).  Ratcliffe  identifies  at  least  four  distinct  qualities  common  to  
the  guilt  experience  of  both  everyday  and  depressed  circumstances:  
                                                                                                 
5  It  should  be  noted  that  not  all  people  with  depression  experience  an  increase  of  feelings  of  
guilt,  nor  are  experiences  of  guilt  in  any  way  unique  to  depression.  The  diagnosis  of  depression  
encompasses  a  wide  range  of  different  experiences,  and  it  is  possible  that  feelings  of  guilt  are  
more  commonly  associated  with  only  a  particular  ‘type’  or  ‘form’  of  depression.  Such  concerns  
point  more  broadly  to  the  issue  of  the  heterogeneity  of  depression,  reminding  us  that  our  
descriptions  of  depression  cannot  be  taken  to  be  representative  of  all  depression  experiences.  
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1. A  focus  upon  past  deeds.  
2. Recognition  of  the  effects  of  those  past  deeds  as  unchangeable.  
3. Estrangement  from  others,  in  whose  eyes  one  has  done  wrong.  
4. Anticipation  of  being  harmed  or  punished  (2010,  p612).  
Each   of   these,   we   shall   see,   may   in   part   come   about   due   to   alterations   in  
temporal  experience.    
Gallagher   notes   that   in   depression   “there   is   a   reorientation   away   from   the  
future   towards   present   and   especially   past   dimensions”   (2012,   p128).   Straus  
similarly  writes,  “the  more  firmly  the  future  is  closed  off  to  the  depressive,  the  
more  strongly  he   feels  overcome  by  and  tied   to   the  past”   (2012,  p212).  This   is  
backed  up  by  first  person  accounts.  One  respondent  to  the  Durham  Depression  
Questionnaire,  for  example,  wrote  that  when  depressed  “time  is  backwards  all  
i  [sic]   can   think   about   is   the   past   all   the   horrible   things   that   happened   -­‐‑   but  
when  i'ʹm  [sic]  happy  i  [sic]  don'ʹt  think  about  those  things  at  all”  (#199).  Whilst  
the  everyday  is  directed  towards  the  future,  the  loss  of  conation  prevents  access  
to   this   possible   future,   forcing   attention   to   towards   the   past.   With   the  
desynchronization   of   interpersonal   time   and   subsequent   reification   of   time,  
“mistakes  made  long  ago  are  experienced  as  if  they  had  just  been  committed”  
(Fuchs,  2013a,  p98).  Sarah  Kane  describes  this  experience  in  her  play:  “a  wound  
from  two  years  ago  opens  like  a  cadaver  and  a  long  buried  shame  roars  its  foul  
decaying  grief”  (2006,  p7).  
Whilst   the   non-­‐‑depressed   person   has   some   distance   from   his   past,   and   can  
eventually   forget   regretted  deeds,   for   the  depressed  person   the  past  begins   to  
overwhelm   the   static   present   –   he   cannot   escape   his   mistakes   or   shameful  
experiences.   Fuchs   remarks   that,   for   the   depressed   person,   “the   past   is   not  
actually  over,  it  can  no  longer  be  forgotten  and  becomes  a  facticity  accumulated  
in  the  present”  (2013a,  p98).  There  is,  therefore,  not  only  a  focus  on  past  deeds,  
but  also  an  inescapability  of  those  deeds.    
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The  feeling  of  guilt  that  may  arise  from  this  focus  on  past  events  is  heightened  
by  the  experience  of  a  blocked  future.  Without  the  possibility  of  a  meaningfully  
different   future,   the  depressed  person  finds  himself  with  no  way  to  overcome  
or   make   amends   for   his   perceived   wrongdoings   –   he   cannot   rebuild   broken  
relationships,  atone  for  immoral  acts,  or  gain  any  distance  from  the  past  events.  
As  Wyllie   explains,   “The  past   itself   becomes   fixed  once   and   for   all   because   it  
cannot   be   abolished   by   any   future   living”   (2005,   p183).6   In   this   way   the  
depressed  person  experiences  not  only  an  increase  in  feelings  of  guilt,  but  also  a  
transformation  of   that   guilt   into   constant   and   irrevocable  guilt.  With   the  past  
and  future  fixed,  the  depressed  person  cannot  overcome  or  forget  any  mistakes  
or   wrongdoings.   The   person   cannot   gain   distance   from   the   perceived  
wrongdoings,  and  the  effects  of  these  acts  cannot  be  undone,  compensated  for,  
or  in  any  way  altered.    
Desynchronization  between  the  person’s  subjective  experience  of  time  and  the  
time   of   others   exacerbates   already   present   feelings   of   distance   and   alienation  
from  others.   In  severe  depression  emotional  connection  appears   to   the  person  
not  just  as  altered,  but  as  impossible.7  As  David  Karp  explains:  
Much   of   depression’s   pain   arises   out   of   the   recognition   that   what  
might  make  me  feel  better  –  human  connection  –  seems  impossible  in  
the  midst  of  a  paralyzing  episode  of  depression.  It  is  rather  like  dying  
from  thirst  while  looking  at  a  glass  of  water,   just  beyond  one’s  reach.  
(1996,  p16)  
Brampton   describes   the   loss   of   connection   to   others   in   the   following   way:  
“Everybody  feels  that  way  sometimes.  It  is  just  that  in  depression,  that  feeling  is  
magnified  to  become  a  supreme,  unsplendid  isolation”  (2009,  p101).  Similarly,  
Solomon  writes,  “I  saw  friends  and  tried  and  failed  to  connect”  (2002,  p45).    
                                                                                                 
6  See  also  Fuchs  (2001)  for  further  discussion  of  this  point.    
7  For  further  discussion  of  the  role  of  the  intersubjective  in  depression  see:  Fuchs  (2013b)  and  
Taylor  Aiken  (2011).  
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This  social  estrangement  heightens  the  inescapable  feelings  of  guilt  experienced  
by  the  depressed  person.  The  distancing  and  alienation  prevent  the  person  from  
overcoming   guilt   experiences   through   establishing   a   connection   with   others.  
Firstly,   we   find   that   the   person   straightforwardly   cannot   be   reassured   by  
others,   the  distancing  prevents   such   emotional   connection.  However,  we   also  
find  that  without  the  connection  usually  present  in  interpersonal  relations,  the  
depressed   person   may   begin   to   experience   other   people   as   cold,   distant,   or  
judgmental.   One   questionnaire   respondent   wrote,   “I   feel   very   separate   from  
people,  fearing  that  if  I  talk  about  how  I’m  feeling  they’ll  reject  or  disapprove  of  
me”  (#21).  Another  response  stated  that  “[other  people]  seem  more  distant  and  
harder   to   hold   a   simple   conversation  with.   I   begin   to   feel   very   alone”   (#369).  
This   experience   of   isolation   fulfills   Ratcliffe’s   third   criterion   of   estrangement  
from  others.    
Finally,  we  see  that  in  depression  the  world  is  often  experienced  as  taking  on  a  
threatening   quality.   As   one   respondent   to   the   Durham   Depression  
Questionnaire  put  it,  “The  world  appears  to  be  a  frightening  place  full  of  people  
who  are  bad  and  threatening”  (#66).  This  feeling  of  anxiety  is  often  particularly  
related   to   the   future;  people  with  depression   frequently  describe  a  dangerous  
future   seeming   to   rush   towards   them.   Another   respondent   described   this  
experience  as  feeling  like  “I  -­‐‑  or  anyone  else-­‐‑  has  hardly  any  time  to  live  at  all.  It  
feels   as   if   time   is   running   out”   (#45).   Such   an   experience   is   understandable  
within  the  context  of  the  altered  temporal  experience.  The  loss  or  retardation  of  
the   conative  drive,   coupled  with   the  general   feelings  of   impossibility   that   are  
present   in   depression,   unite   to   create   an   experience   in   which   the   person   is  
passive  before  a  future  that  holds  no  possibility  of  improvement.  Ratcliffe  notes  
that  such  an  experience  can  incorporate  a  “feeling  of  impending  death”  (2012a,  
p127).  Solomon  describes  this  experience  in  his  memoir  of  depression:  “Among  
other  things,  you  feel  you  are  about  to  die.  The  dying  would  not  be  so  bad,  but  
the   living   at   the   brink   of   dying,   the   not-­‐‑quite-­‐‑over   the-­‐‑geographical-­‐‑edge  
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condition,  is  horrible”  (2002,  p28).  
Without   the   forward   directed   momentum   and   feeling   of   progression   that   is  
usually   found   in   the   everyday   experience,   the   depressed   person   experiences  
death  as  imminent.  There  is  no  distance  from  death,  because  “there  is  no  longer  
an  organized  sequence  of  significant  events  in  which  to  situate  it  and  distance  it  
from   the   present”   (Ratcliffe,   2012a,   p127).   Von   Gebsattel   quotes   a   girl   with  
depression  who  illustrates  this  experience  with  a  sketch:  
[A  –>  death]  
She  explains:  
Everything  I  do  makes  the  line  that  separates  me  from  death  shorter.  
That’s  why  I  am  anxious  of  everything.  (von  Gebsattel,  2012,  p215)  
Passive   before   a   future   that   holds   no   meaningful   possibilities   apart   from  
inevitable  and  imminent  death,  the  depressed  person  experiences  the  future  as  
seeming  to  rush  toward  him,  threatening  and  overwhelming  him.    
Collectively,   these   temporal   alterations   amount   to   an   experience   of   deep,  
irrevocable,  groundless  guilt.  This   is   a  guilt   that   cannot  be  overcome   through  
future  deeds  or  nullified  through  human  connection.  The  fixed  past  encroaches  
upon   the  present,   and   the   threatening   future,   promising  harm  or   even  death,  
bears   down  upon   the   person.   This   encroaching   past,   blocked   but   threatening  
future,  and  separation  from  other  people,  leads  to  the  person  experiencing  not  
just  an  instance  of  guilt,  but  rather  all  experience  taking  on  the  form  of  guilt.    
We  can  therefore  see  the  ways  in  which  alterations  in  temporal  experience  can  
account   for   a   number   of   distressing   experiences   common   to   depression.   This  
includes   the   slowing   or   stopping   of   lived   time,   the   failure   to   grasp   the  
possibility  of  recovering,  and  increased  feelings  of  guilt.  The  depressed  person  
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experiences  changes  in  both  subjective  and  intersubjective  time,  resulting  in  an  
experience   of   isolation   or   distance   from   those   around   him.   This   account   of  
temporal  experience  in  depression  helps  us  to  understand  some  of  the  common  
descriptions  we   find   in   first  person  accounts.  For   example,   at   the   start  of   this  
chapter  I  quoted  a  number  of  respondents  to  the  depression  questionnaire.  One  
wrote:  “Time  loses  significance”  (#54).  Another  explained:  “I  don’t  tend  to  have  
any   track   of   time   when   I’m   depressed”   (#157).   With   alterations   in   both  
subjective  and  intersubjective  time  it  seems  likely  that  time  would  lose  its  usual  
significance  or  meaning   for   the  person,   just   as   the   first  quotation  describes  as  
occurring.   It   is  a   strange  and  distressing  experience,  holding   little   in  common  
with   his   usual   temporal   experience.   The   desynchronization   with   the   time   of  
others   means   that   the   significance   or   meaning   of   time   would   be   profoundly  
altered.   The   descriptions   of   losing   track   of   time   or   becoming   confused   about  
how  much  time  has  passed  also  seem  to  be  unsurprising  given  the  alterations  in  
temporal   experience.      The   depressed   person   experiences   a   loss   of   the   usual  
temporal  relationship  that  he  has  with  others,  alongside  a  significantly  altered  
experience  of  the  past  and  future.  This  seems  to  constitute  a  form  of  temporal  
disorientation,  a  confusing  and  often  distressing  change  in  the  way  the  person  
lives  through  time.  Given  this,  we  might  expect  the  depressed  person  to  find  it  
harder   to   accurately   keep   track   of   time,   particularly   when   attempting   to  
co-­‐‑ordinate  with  others.    
Having   seen   the  ways   in  which   alterations   in   temporal   experience  help  us   to  
understand  a   range  of   common  experiences   in  depression,   I  will   now   turn   to  
the  experience  of  time  in  mania.    
Temporal  Experiences  in  Mania  
  Fuchs  suggests  that  in  mania  there  is  an  increase  of  conation,  causing  the  manic  
person  to  ‘surge  ahead’–  “an  acceleration  of  one’s  own  time  in  relation  to  social  
processes”  (2013a,  p82).  As  in  depression,  this  consists  of  alterations  in  both  the  
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subjective  and   intersubjective  experiences  of   time.   I  previously  acknowledged  
the   common  descriptions   of   time   seeming   to   speed  up   in  mania,   seen   in   first  
person   memoirs,   questionnaire   results,   and   psychological   studies.   These  
descriptions   are   enriched   by   an   appreciation   of   the   intersubjective   temporal  
experience   –   the  manic  person   constantly   feeling   ‘held  back’   by  others   as  her  
own  personal  time  races  ahead  of  the  intersubjective.  Such  a  loss  of  synchrony  
may  well  help  us  to  understand  the  feelings  of  frustration  with  others  that  are  
common  in  mania.  Hornbacher,  for  example,  writes:  
  Nothing  is  going  fast  enough.  At  school,  the  teachers  are  talking  as  if  
their  mouths   are   full   of  molasses.   Their   limbs  move   in   slow  motion.  
Pointing   to   call   on   someone   the   teacher   lifts   her   arm  as   if   it   is   filled  
with  wet  sand.  (2008,  p23)  
  Whilst   the  depressed  person   finds   it   hard   to   interact  with   or   relate   to   others  
when  ‘left  behind’,  the  manic  person  may  well  become  irritated  or  frustrated  by  
the  apparent  inactivity  of  others.  
Although  such  an  account  does  seem  informative,  and  is  richer  than  the  one  we  
originally   proposed,   it   still   appears   to   be   incomplete.  Alterations   to   conation,  
even  taking  into  account  the  intersubjective  experience,  still   fail   to  account  for  
the  range  of  temporal  experiences  common  in  mania.  For  example,  an  increase  
of  conation  still  provides  us  with  no  means  of  understanding  the  fragmentation  
that   is   described   as   occurring   in   mania.   Nor   do   we   gain   any   extra  
understanding   of   the   alterations   reported   in   the   person’s   relationship   to   the  
past,   present,   and   future   –   including,   for   example,   the   swift   abandonment   of  
previously  made  plans,  or  the  loss  of  regard  for  the  consequences  of  actions.  I  
suggest   that   in   addition   to   the   understanding   of   manic   temporal   experience  
involving  a  change  in  conative  dynamism,  we  also  must  look  at  the  underlying  
temporal   synthesis.   In   looking   at   the   ways   in   which   temporal   synthesis   is  
affected   in   mania,   we   can   build   up   a   more   complete   account   of   the   manic  
experience  of   time.  Such  an  account  allows  us   to  understand  several  common  
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features  of  mania,   including   loss  of   engagement,   reflection,   and  ownership  of  
actions.    
However,   in  order   to   allow   for   accurate  discussion  of   the   features  of   a  manic  
temporal   experience,  we   first   need   to   return   to   the  Husserlian   description   of  
temporal  synthesis,  focusing  on  the  role  that  retention  plays  in  our  experiences.      
Husserl  and  Time  Revisited  
We’ve   established   that   our   sense   of   continuity   and   synthesis   through   time  
comes   about   due   to   the   tripartite   structure   of   retention   (perception   of   the  
just-­‐‑past   as   past),   the   Now,   and   protention   (anticipation   of   the   immediate  
future).  This  can  be  compared  with  the  experience  of  reading  a  sentence  –  when  
we  read  a  particular  word  we  also  perceive  the  word  that  has  come  before,  and  
the   word  which   will   come   afterwards   (or,   at   least,   the   expectation   that   some  
word   will   come   afterwards).   In   this   way,   the   sentence   becomes   more   than  
merely  a  series  of  words,  and  our  experience  of  time  is  of  a  unified  process,  not  
a  merely  disconnected  series  of  Nows.  Recent   literature  has  been   illuminating  
on  the  role  that  disruptions  to  protention  may  play  in  schizophrenia  (e.g.  Fuchs,  
2013a;  Gallagher,  2006).  However,  my  focus  in  this  section  is  not  on  protention,  
but  instead  on  the  related  retention.  
It  is  important  that  retention  is  not  thought  of  as  part  of  the  past  or  as  a  memory  
of  the  past.  It   is  a  present  experience  of  the   immediate  past  as  past  –  part  of  the  
horizon  of  the  present  moment.  There  are  a  number  of  ways  we  can  distinguish  
between   retention  and   recollection:  Firstly,   in   retention  we  are  dealing  with  a  
present   experience   of   the   immediate   past,   whereas   in   recollection   we   are  
concerned  with  memories  of  the  more  distant  past.8  Whilst  I  can,  for  example,  
                                                                                                 
8  By  suggesting  that  recollection  is  concerned  with  the  ‘distant’  past  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  
that  we  can  only  have  memories  of  events  that  occurred  years  or  decades  ago.  In  contrast  with  
the  immediate  past,  events  that  occurred  only  a  matter  of  hours  previously  would  still  be  
‘distant’.  It  is  in  this  latter  sense  that  I  use  the  word  ‘distant’.  
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recollect  what  I  said  five  minutes  ago,  this  is  still  significantly  further  in  the  past  
than  my  retention  of  the  immediately  prior  moment.  More  importantly,  we  find  
that   when   we   recall   the   past   we   are   aware   of   the   structure   of   that   past   –   it  
maintains  the  retentional-­‐‑protentional  structure  of  that  time.     Returning  to  the  
example  of  a  melody,  if  I  have  a  memory  of  hearing  the  tone  ‘E’,  I  experience  in  
that  memory  the  retention  of   the   ‘D’  and  the  protention  of   the   ‘F’.  As  Husserl  
writes,   “In   the   re-­‐‑presentation   we   once   again   have   the   tone   or   the   tonal  
formation   together  with   its  whole   temporal   extension”   (1991,  p48).  Retention,  
and   the   retentional-­‐‑protentional   structure   more   generally,   is   therefore   not  
simply  part  of  the  past,  but  rather  underlies  and  allows  for  our  usual  experience  
of   recollecting   memories   of   the   past.   As   Zahavi   writes,   recollection  
“presuppose[s]  the  work  of  the  retention  and  the  protention”  (2003,  p83).    
Secondly,   recollection   and   retention   can   be   distinguished  with   regards   to   the  
passive   nature   of   the   retentional-­‐‑protentional   structure.  When  we   experience  
the  present  moment,  and  in  that  moment  have  the  retention  of  the  just-­‐‑past  and  
the  protention   of   the   immediate   future,   this   is   a   passive  process   –  we  do  not  
need  to  be  actively  focused  on  the  past  in  order  to  experience  it.  In  contrast,  in  
many   cases   of   recollection  we   are   actively   focusing   on   the   past.  Whilst   some  
memories   do   not   have   this   active   component   –  we  might   involuntarily   recall  
some  past  experience  –  this  still  shows  a  notable  difference  between  recollection  
and  retention.  Recollection  may  be  active  or  passive;  we  can  focus  on  the  past  in  
order   to   bring   about   a   memory   or   that   memory   may   come   to   our   attention  
without   our   explicit   focus.   In   contrast,   retention   is   always   part   of   a   passive  
process.  
Our  sense  of  retention  includes  in  it  not  only  a  sense  of  our  just-­‐‑past,  but  also  an  
ownership   of   that   just-­‐‑past.   When   I   utter   a   sentence,   I   retain   not   only   the  
previous   word,   but   also   my   consciousness   that   I   spoke   the   previous   word,  
establishing  continuity  of  self.  This  consciousness  is  prereflective  and  passive.  I  
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do  not  have  to  focus  on  my  past  utterances  in  order  to  know  that  it  was  I  who  
spoke   them.  However,   retention   is   an   essential   part   not   only   of   prereflective  
consciousness,   but   also   of   reflective   consciousness.   To   reflect   on   something  
requires  some  level  of  awareness  of  it  to  begin  with  –  we  can  only  reflect  on  that  
which  we  have  experienced.  As  such,  reflection  presumes  an  intact   inner  time  
consciousness  –  a  prereflective  consciousness.    
However,  reflection  also  requires  retention  in  a  more  direct  way.  When  I  reflect  
on  myself   and  my   current   acts,   I   reflect   not   only   upon   the   present,   but   also  
upon   the   just-­‐‑past.   As   Zahavi   states,   that   which   I   am   reflecting   on   did   not,  
“commence  the  moment  I  started  paying  attention  to  it”  (2003,  p89).  There  must  
have  been  a  motivating  element  prior  to  my  reflection.  This  motivation  must  be  
retained  in  order  to  be  reflected  on.  When  I  reflect,  therefore,  I  am  reflecting  on  
the  just-­‐‑past  –  that  which  is  retained.  This  is  particularly  apparent  with  regards  
to  the  initial  motivating  factor,  but  my  ongoing  reflection  would  also  necessitate  
a  retentional  aspect  to  inner  time  consciousness.  
We   can,   therefore,   see   the   essential   role   that   retention   plays   not   only   in   the  
continuity  of   temporal  experiences,  but  also   the  sense  of  ownership  of  actions  
and  the  ability  to  reflect  on  the  self  and  action.  
Mania  and  Retention  
What  I  wish  to  propose   is   that  rather   than  there  merely  being  an  alteration  to  
conation  in  cases  of  mania,  the  manic  person  also  has  a  disruption  to  the  basic  
structure   of   temporal   synthesis.   Specifically,   I   am   suggesting   that   there   is   a  
weakening  of  the  process  of  retention  –  the  perception  and  appreciation  of  the  
just-­‐‑past  –  in  addition  to  an  increase  in  conative  dynamism.  Importantly,  I  am  
not  stating  that   it   is  entirely  disrupted  or  broken,  but  rather   that   there   is  some  
level  of  disruption  that  prevents  the  normal  process  of  synthesis.  
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In   order   to   explore   how   such   a   disruption   would   be   experienced,   I   will  
highlight  three  key  areas  of  alteration:  The  fragmentation  of  experience,  loss  of  
reflection,  and  diminished  feelings  of  ownership  of  action.  Whilst  parts  of  this  
experience  may  be  able   to  be  explained  by  appealing   to   longer-­‐‑term  temporal  
structures,  collectively  they  provide  us  with  good  reason  to  think  that  temporal  
synthesis  is  disrupted  in  cases  of  mania.  
Fragmentation  
It   seems   clear   that   a   weakening   of   temporal   synthesis   would   involve   a  
fragmentation  of  experience.  The  manic  person  would  begin  to  experience  life  
as  a  series  of  snapshots,  rather  than  as  a  united  whole.  Time  would  no  longer  
seem   to   flow   smoothly,   like   a   melody,   but   rather   as   fragmented,   individual  
experiences  separated  from  each  other  like  pearls  on  a  necklace.  To  put  this  in  
the   context   of   an  overarching  narrative,   it   seems   likely   that   the  manic  person  
would  perceive  experiences  as  discrete  episodes,  which  would  not  necessarily  
be   connected   to   and   therefore   inform   current   and   future   action,   or   allow   for  
focused   and   long   term   projects.   This   is,   indeed,   exactly  what   those   in  manic  
states  report.  Landis  quotes  one  person  who  describes  the  manic  experience  in  
the  following  way:  
Everything  is  absolutely  new,  every  minute  is  as  if  everything  has  just  
started.  (Anderson,  1938,  p85,  quoted  in  Landis,  1964,  p290)  
Leonard  Woolf  describes  his  wife,  Virginia  Woolf,  in  a  manic  state:  
For   about   a   day   what   she   said   was   coherent;   the   sentences   meant  
something,   though   it  was  nearly   all  wildly   insane.  Then  gradually   it  
became  completely  incoherent,  a  mere  jumble  of  disassociated  words.  
(quoted  in  Jamison,  1994,  pp29-­‐‑30)  
Simon  describes  a  similar  difficulty  with   language,  writing   in  her   journal   that  
“It’s  hard  to  remember  the  beginning  of  my  sentence  now  that  I’m  all  the  way  
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at   the   end”   (2003,   p11).   Simon   also  describes   some  of   the  difficulties   she  had  
putting  together  a  coherent  narrative  of  her  experience  of  bipolar  disorder:  
The  history  of  my  head   is   the  hardest   to   tell,   because   it   is  nonlinear,  
because   it   is   fractured,   because   there   are   so   many   subplots,   and  
because  I  have  spent  so  much  of  my  energy…hiding  that  history  from  
the  outside  world.  (2003,  p13)  
Simon   structures   her   memoir   non-­‐‑chronologically   –   a   common   decision   in  
memoirs   of   bipolar   disorder.9   Cheney   provides   an   explanation   of   her   own  
decision  to  structure  her  memoir  non-­‐‑chronologically,  writing  the  following  in  
her  introduction:  
Manic  depression  is  not  a  safe  ride.  It  doesn’t  go  from  point  A  to  point  
B  in  a  familiar,  friendly  pattern…That’s  why  I’ve  chosen  to  tell  my  life  
story  episodically,  rather  than  in  any  chronological  order.  It’s  truer  to  
the  way  I  think.  (Cheney,  2008,  p1)  
In   contrast   to   the   smooth   narratives   we   find   in   first   person   accounts   of  
depression,   accounts   of   bipolar   disorder   are   frequently   disjointed,   lacking   a  
sense  of  progression  (here  we  might  recall   the  contrasting  structures  of  Simon  
(2003)  and  Sebald  (2002)  that  we  saw  in  chapter  three).  Individual  life  episodes  
are   often   presented   in   isolation   from   longer-­‐‑term   goals   or   interpretative  
frameworks.  Given  the  fragmentation  of  temporal  experience,  this  disruption  in  
the  progression  of  bipolar  narratives   is  not  unexpected,  potentially  giving   the  
reader   a   richer   and   more   accurate   account   of   the   experience   itself.   Landis  
explains   that   when   those   who   have   been   manic   attempt   to   recollect   the  
experience  they  find  that  “Memories  are  fragmented  and  so  disconnected  that  
much  of  the  episode  seems  senseless”  (1964,  p293).  Thus,  an  accurate  account  of  
mania  may  well   also   be  disconnected   and   fragmented   in   a  manner  markedly  
different   from   what   we   might   think   of   as   a   typical   or   smooth   narrative  
                                                                                                 
9  This  is  potentially  unsurprising,  given  that  she  later  writes  of  a  manic  episode,  “I  don’t  
remember  anything  chronologically”  (Simon,  2003,  p15).  
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structure.  This  difficulty  of  placing  the  manic  experience  into  a  typical  narrative  
structure   may   also   help   to   us   to   understand   why   memoirs   of   mania   are  
comparatively   rare   and   often   contain   less   experiential   detail   than   those   of  
depression.  Whilst  depression   is  undoubtedly  a  more  common  diagnosis,  and  
as   such   we   would   expect   a   greater   number   of   depression   narratives   than  
bipolar   disorder   narratives,   the   focus   on   depression   at   the   expense   of  mania  
even   in   memoirs   of   bipolar   disorder   is   striking.      However,   if   the   temporal  
experience   of   mania   prevents   ease   of   narrative   coherence,   then   this   is  
unsurprising.   In  her  descriptive  account  of   temporal   experience   following   the  
death   of   her   child   Denise   Riley   writes:   “it   seems   that   the   possibilities   for  
describing,   and   the   kinds   of   temporality   that   you   inhabit,  may   be   intimately  
allied”  (2012).  She  notes  that  her  own  radical  alteration  in  temporal  experience  
prohibited  narrative  description,  writing,  “To  struggle   to  narrate  becomes  not  
only   an   unenticing   prospect,   but   structurally   impossible”   (2012).10  Whilst   the  
temporal   experiences   of   grief   and  mania   are   undoubtedly   different,   it   seems  
reasonable   to   suggest   that   the   radical   alteration   in   temporal   experience   that  
occurs   in  mania  may   equally   result   in   a   resistance   to  description   in   narrative  
form.  A  fragmented  experience  may  well  be  difficult  to  articulate  in  a  standard  
narrative  structure.  In  contrast,  in  cases  of  depression  it  may  be  difficult  for  the  
person  to  structure  a  narrative  when  depressed  –  the  loss  of  conation  making  a  
sense   of   progression   difficult   –   but   after   recovery   the   person   can   reflect   on  
experiences  that  are  less  fragmented,  and  therefore  more  amenable  to  standard  
narrative  forms  than  in  cases  of  mania.11  As  such,  we  should  expect  memoirs  of  
mania   to   be   less   developed   than   memoirs   of   depression,   and   potentially   for  
there  to  be  fewer  in  number.  
                                                                                                 
10  Riley  describes  time  as  having  halted  following  the  death  of  her  son.  She  suggests  that  it  is  
impossible  to  describe  this  experience  whilst  it  is  occurring  because  “Describing  would  involve  
some  notion  of  the  passage  of  time.  Narrating  would  imply  at  least  a  hint  of  ‘and  then’  and  
‘after  that’”  (2012).    
11  We  may,  however,  expect  that  narratives  of  depression  would  largely  be  written  following  
recovery  rather  than  whilst  the  person  is  actually  depressed.  
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This   fragmentation  would   also   lead   to   a   large   degree   of   distractibility.   If   the  
person  experienced   life  without  a   sense  of   continuity,   it  makes   sense   that   she  
would   alter   plans   and   that   the  progression   of   thoughts  would   change   on   the  
basis   of   the   current  moment.   If   the   immediate   past  was,   to   a   certain   degree,  
disconnected  from  the  present  Now  then  it  seems  likely  that  the  person  would  
restructure  her  life  on  the  basis  of  the  immediate  present,  rather  than  by  looking  
to  longer-­‐‑term  plans  and  structures,  which  necessarily  involve  a  perception  and  
appreciation   of   the   immediate   past.   This   restructuring   on   the   basis   of   the  
present  moment   can   frequently   be   seen   in   first   person   accounts.  Hornbacher,  
for  example,  writes,  “This  plan  has  just  occurred  to  me  in  the  last  three  minutes  
but   now   it   is   essential,   imperative,   that   I   go”   (2008,   p38).   Jamison  provides   a  
similar   description:   “I   spent   several   hundreds   of   pounds   on   books   that  
somehow   caught   my   fancy:   books   on   natural   history   of   the   mole,   twenty  
sundry  Penguin  books  because  I  thought  it  could  be  nice  if  the  penguins  could  
form  a  colony”  (1997,  p74).    
The   disruption   to   the   synthesis   between   the   immediate   past   and   the   present  
Now   means   that   the   manic   person   would   not   base   actions   on   the   tasks  
previously   held   to   be   important,   but   rather   on   that  which   is   available   in   the  
immediate   moment.   This   is   demonstrated   in   the   distractibility   of   those   in   a  
manic  state,  where  their  attention  is  grasped  by  whatever  is  presented  to  them,  
often  abandoning  prior  responsibilities.  
This  form  of  distractibility  may  also  help  us  to  understand  the  experience  of  the  
“flight   of   ideas”   (APA,   2000,   p362),   a   common   feature   of   manic   states.   First  
person   accounts   frequently   describe   trains   of   thought   rapidly   altering,   often  
switching   to   seemingly   unrelated   topics.   For   example,   one   person   writes:  
“Fragments  of  ideas,  images,  sentences,  raced  around  and  around  in  my  mind  
like  the  tigers  in  a  children’s  story…a  million  other  thoughts  –  magnificent  and  
morbid,   wove   in   and   raced   by”   (Jamison,   1997,   pp82-­‐‑3).   Landis   quotes   a  
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remarkable  excerpt  from  one  person  in  a  manic  state  that  clearly  illustrates  the  
experience  of  the  flight  of  ideas:  
I  have   to   choose  my  words  very   carefully.   For  what   I   am  doing   is,   I  
believe,   something   which   has   not   very   often   been   attempted  
(BEEZLEBUB  ON  BED   in   form  of  blue   fly).   It   is   to   think  at  precisely  
the   same   point   in   the   space-­‐‑time   continuum   by   both   methods   of  
thought   (coughing,   running   at   the   nose,   bottom   of   feet   wet)   (blue  
check  handkerchief)  –  inductive  and  deductive  (so  hot,  have  to  remove  
coat   and   purple   pullover   query   CASESAR’S)   artistic   and   rational  
(itching),   negative   and   positive   –   in   the   terminology   expounded  
[previously]…  
  First  of  all  it  seems  to  be  (had  to  open  window  owing  to  extreme  sense  
of  heat  query  “real”?)  essential  to  fix  my  exact  position  (fly  on  pipe)  in  
the   space-­‐‑time   continuum,   at   any   rate   by   what   the   sailors   call   D.R.  
(dead   reckoning   query   alive   or   dead?)…   (Custance,   1952,   pp138-­‐‑9,  
quoted  in  Landis,  1964,  p294)  
In   this   last   quotation   we   can   see   how   the   person   is   distracted   by   what   is  
currently   in   front  of  him,   the  progression  of   thoughts  switching   from  topic   to  
topic  with  little  to  unify  them.  Just  as  we  saw  occurs  with  the  person’s  actions  
and  tasks  –  the  person  constantly  switching  to  carry  out  what  is  immediately  in  
front   of   him   rather   than   by   looking   to   longer   term   plans   or   structures   –   the  
manic   person   equally   finds   his   thoughts   constantly   distracted   and   diverted.  
When  coupled  with  the  increased  conative  dynamism  that  we  have  seen  occurs  
in  cases  of  mania,  these  flighty  ideas  may  seem  to  “race”.    
Engagement  
However,   it  would  not   just  be  the  feeling  of  continuity  that  would  be  affected  
by   such   a   disruption.   As   previously   noted,   the   intact   tripartite   structure   is  
essential   for   the   ability   to   meaningfully   reflect   on   the   self.   With   the   manic  
person’s  retention  weakened,  it  seems  unlikely  that  she  would  be  able  to  reflect  
on   herself   and   her   current   actions   in   any  meaningful  way.   This  would  mean  
that   the  manic  person  would   lose   the  ability   to  engage  meaningfully  with   the  
world,   leaving   her   with   only   a   superficial   level   of   engagement.   Any   type   of  
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meaningful   engagement,   whether   it   is   with   others,   with   the   self,   or   various  
projects  within  the  world,  presupposes  an  ability  to  reflect  upon  those  features.  
Such   reflection   requires   intact   temporal   consciousness   and,   as   such,  
engagement  with   the  world  ought   to  be  diminished  during  manic  states.  This  
is,   again,   exactly   what   is   seen   in   cases   of   mania.   One   of   the   most   striking  
features  of  the  manic  state  is  how,  despite  being  very  active  within  the  world,  
the  person  is  in  fact  only  superficially  engaged.  As  Binswanger  comments:  
…this   heightened   facility   in   communication   is   only   apparent;   it  
remains  superficial.  If  a  second  or  third  party  appears,  the  patient  loses  
you  from  sight  just  as  quickly  as  he  first  laid  eyes  on  you…you  quickly  
get  the  impression  that  the  patient  is  not  close  to  himself,  but  lives,  as  
it  were,  away  from  himself.  (1964,  p129)  
Discussing   the  manic   person’s   grasp   of   ideas,   Binswanger   comments   that   the  
individual  “superficially  apprehends  every  germ  of  idea  as  soon  as  it  comes  to  
consciousness”,  but  notes  that  this   is  done  “without  reaching  into  the  depths”  
(1964,  p138).  
Minkowski  draws  similar  conclusions,  stating  that,  “a  person  in  a  state  of  manic  
excitement  lives  only  in  the  now,  and  this  is  a  now  which  limits  his  contact  with  
the   environment”   (1970,   p291).   Likewise,   Kraepelin   describes   how   manic  
patients   “usually   perceive   only   in   a   fugitive   and   imprecise  manner,   seeming  
scarcely   to   care   very   much   about   what   goes   on   around   them”   (quoted   in  
Minkowski,  1970,  p295).  
If   the   temporal   structure   was   disrupted   at   a   retentional   level   this   loss   of  
reflective   engagement   is   precisely   what   we   would   expect   to   see.   The   manic  
person   lives   in   a   world   in   which   only   the   immediate   Now   is   relevant,   her  
temporal  synthesis  having  been  disrupted.  However,  she  also   lacks  the  ability  
to   reflect   upon   that  Now,   leaving   her   to   skip   along   the   surface   of   a   constant  
series   of   unrelated   moments   –   flightly   and   detached   from   reality.   Andy  
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Behrman   provides   a   description   of   this   experience   in   his   memoir   of   bipolar  
disorder,   writing   “In   truth,   I   am   removed   from   reality   and   have   no   way   to  
connect   to   it”   (2003,  pxxi).  Hornbacher  similarly  writes:  “Manic,  made   further  
manic  by  the  wrong  meds,  I  simply  do  it,  unaware  in  the  instant  that  there  will  
be  any  consequence  at  all”  (2008,  p7).    
This   inability   to  meaningfully   reflect   on   herself   and   her   actions   prevents   the  
manic  person  both  from  fully  engaging  with  the  world,  and  also  means  that  she  
has   only   a   superficial   understanding   of   the   consequences   of   her   actions.  
Stephanie   Merrit,   for   example,   describes   this   loss   of   the   perception   of   the  
consequences   of   her   actions  during  manic   states:   “No   consequences:   this  was  
how  it  always  felt  in  these  taut,  vibrant  moods”  (2009,  p94).  This  may  also  aid  
our  understanding  of   the  manic  person’s  engagement   in  high-­‐‑risk  pleasurable  
activities.   Caught   in   a   series   of   unrelated   Nows,   incapable   of   meaningful  
reflection,   it’s  easy  to  understand  why  the  person  may  act   in  ways  she  would  
not  were  she  not  manic.  Being  unable  to  grasp  the  potential  consequences  of  her  
actions,  the  manic  person  seems  just  as  likely  to  engage  in  high-­‐‑risk  activities  as  
low-­‐‑risk  ones,  unable  to  sufficiently  differentiate  between  the  two.  We  therefore  
find   that   a  person   in   a  manic   state  may   engage  both   in  physically  dangerous  
tasks,   such  as  swimming   in  an  unsafe  area,  as  well  as   tasks   that  may  risk  her  
financial  safety  or  the  state  of  her  relationships  –  for  example,  by  spending  large  
amounts   of   money   on   unnecessary   items   or   cheating   on   a   partner.   The  
consequences   of   these   actions   are   not   apparent   to   her,   nor   is   she   able   to  
sufficiently  reflect  on  the  actions.  
Diminished  Ownership  of  Action  
I   previously   discussed   the   ways   in   which   an   intact   temporal   synthesis   is  
necessary  for  a  continuity  of  the  self  and  a  sense  of  ownership  of  that  self.  It  is  
through  the  retentional  structure  that  I  gain  a  sense  not  only  of  a  word  having  
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just   been   spoken,   or   an   action   completed,   but   also   of  my  having   spoken   that  
word  or  completed  that  action.    
With   retention  disrupted   it   seems  possible,   and   indeed   likely,   that   feelings  of  
ownership  would  be  diminished.  The  manic  person  may,  in  milder  cases  (such  
as  in  states  of  hypomania),  have  a  strange  feeling  of  separation  from  his  actions.  
In   more   severe   cases,   including   those   in   which   psychosis   is   present,   this  
separation   may   extend   to   an   experience   of   a   complete   loss   of   ownership   of  
action,  which  may  incorporate  a  misattribution  of  the  source  of  that  action  –  a  
loss   of   agency.12   Again,   this   can   be   seen   in   reports   of   people   with   bipolar  
disorder.   One   person   describes   being   manic   as   being   “a   seemingly   helpless  
passenger   in   my   own   body”   (Zanoni   2010.   p139).   Jamison   describes   her  
confusion   regarding  whether   she   actually   performed   certain   actions:   “Once   I  
think  I  shoplifted  a  blouse…Or  maybe  I   just   thought  about  shoplifting”  (1997,  
p74).  She  seems  to  maintain  a  sense  that  she  willed  the  action,  or  was  the  source  
of   that   action,   but   has   lost   the   sense   that   she   actually  did   perform   the   action.  
Landis   discusses   one   person’s   experience   of   mania   in   which   “she   seemed  
convinced  that  she  had  come  under  the  control  of  some  outside  power”  (1964,  
p50).  Hornbacher  similarly  describes  her  experience  of  mania   in   the  following  
way:  
The   rages  always  come  at  night.  They  control  my  voice,  my  hands,   I  
scream  and   throw  myself  against   the  walls…It  slides  under  my  skin,  
borrowing  my  body  without  asking;  my  hands  are   its  hands,  and   its  
hands  are  filled  with  an  other  worldly  strength.  (2008,  p56)  
                                                                                                 
12  Whilst  a  sense  of  agency  and  an  ownership  of  action  are  intimately  linked,  it  does  seem  
possible  to  draw  them  apart.  I  have  agency  of  an  action  if  I  experience  myself  as  having  being  
the  source  of  that  action.  In  contrast,  I  experience  ownership  of  an  action  if  I  experience  that  
action  as  having  occurred  to  me  –  I  am  the  subject  of  the  action.  For  more  on  this  see  Gallagher  
(2006,  chapter  eight).  Particularly  see  pp.  173-­‐‑4  for  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  
ownership  of  action  and  agency.  Whilst  Gallagher  goes  on  in  this  chapter  to  explore  the  
connection  between  protention  and  agency,  it  is  notable  that  he  suggests  that  “The  function  of  
retention…is,  in  part,  to  provide  a  sense  of  ownership  for  thought”  (2006,  p193).  
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It  seems  that  in  this  case  the  sense  that  she  willed  the  action  is  not  experienced  –  
she  knows   that   she  performed   the  action,  but  does  not   feel   a   sense  of   control  
over   her   performance.   As   such,   when   Hornbacher   looks   back   at   the   actions  
performed   she   does   not   see   the   continuity   of   her   conceiving   of   an   action,  
willing  it,  and  then  performing  it.    
The  manic   person   seems   not   only   to   have   a   superficial   engagement  with   the  
world  and  a  diminished  understanding  of   the  consequences  of  his  actions,  he  
also  struggles  to  retain  ownership  of  those  actions,  and  even  a  reduced  ability  
to   recognise   such  actions   and  events   as  having   taken  place.  This   is   consistent  
with   a   disrupted   inner   time   consciousness,   which   includes   a   disrupted  
retention  of  ownership  of  the  immediate  past.    
The  manic  experience,  as  described  in  first  person  accounts,  seems  to  point  to  a  
flighty,  distractible,  unengaged  and  unreflective  way  of  being.  Those  in  manic  
states   appear   to   skip   along   the   surface   of   experience,   without   ever   fully  
engaging,  or  grasping,  matters  in  the  world  or  their  own  actions.  They  seem  to  
have   little   concept   of   the   consequences   of   their   actions,   and   swiftly   abandon  
previously   held   beliefs   and   plans   as   soon   as   something   new   catches   the   eye.  
They  engage  in  high-­‐‑risk  activities,  appearing  to  understand  only  superficially  
the  possible  consequences  of  such  acts.  Experiences  of  time,  whilst  described  as  
seeming  to  ‘speed  up’,  are  also  described  as  fragmented.  This  experience  seems  
not  to  be  able  to  be  explained  by  a  mere  speeding  up  of  subjective  time,  or  even  
by   the   loss   of   synchrony   with   intersubjective   time.   However,   this   is   exactly  
what  we  would  expect  were  the  manic  person’s  retentional  structure  weakened.  
The  Manic  Experience  of  Time  
This  account  of  experiences  of  time  in  mania  helps  us  to  understand  some  of  the  
first   person   descriptions   highlighted   at   the   beginning   of   this   chapter.  
Descriptions   of   temporal   experience   discussed   how   time   seemed   to   lose  
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meaning   during   episodes   of   mania.   For   example,   I   quoted   Hornbacher   who  
writes,  “We  walk   in  circles   for  weeks,  or  minutes,  or  years.  Time  has  escaped  
me”  (2008,  p119).  This  and  other  similar  descriptions  seem  unsurprising  in  light  
of  the  radical  alteration  in  temporal  experience  that  I  have  described.  If  time  is  
experienced   by   the  manic   person   as   fragmented   and   out   of   synch  with   both  
objective   and   intersubjective   time,   then   it   seems   likely   that   it   would   lose   its  
usual  meaning  or  significance  and  that  the  individual  would  find  it  difficult  to  
keep  track  of  it  in  the  usual  ways.    
It   also  now  seems  possible   to  explain   the   seemingly  unusual   responses   to   the  
time  estimation  tests  –  where  those  who  are  manic  tended  to  overestimate  the  
duration  of  an  elapsed  period  of   time.  We  originally  predicted   that   the  manic  
person   would   tend   to   underestimate   an   interval   of   time,   as   his   subjective  
experience  is  that  time  speeds  up.  However,  we  can  point  to  two  reasons  why  
such  a  result  may  not  occur:  Firstly,  we  find  that  the  manic  person  is  very  active  
within   the  world.  He  may   accomplish  more   tasks  within   a   shorter   period   of  
time,  or  at   least  be   involved  with  more   tasks   than  a  non-­‐‑manic  person  would  
be.   Equally,   racing   thoughts   are   common   during   episodes   of  mania.   Jamison  
describes  the  experience  in  her  memoir  of  bipolar  disorder:  “the  fast   ideas  are  
far  too  fast,  and  there  are  far  too  many”  (1997,  p67).  Behrman  provides  a  similar  
description   in   his   account   bipolar   disorder:   “My   manic   mind   teems   with  
rapidly   changing   ideas   and   needs;   my   head   is   cluttered   with   vibrant   colors,  
wild  images,  bizarre  thoughts,  sharp  details,  secret  codes,  symbols,  and  foreign  
languages”   (2003,   pxix).   The   combination   of   racing   thoughts   and   increased  
activity   leads   the   manic   person   to   overestimate   the   duration   of   an   elapsed  
period  of  time  because  so  much  seems  to  have  happened  to  and  for  him.    
Secondly,   I   have   shown   how   the   experience   of   time   for   the  manic   person   is  
fragmented,  with  a  diminished  retention  of  the  immediate  past.  If  I  am  correct,  
we  might  expect  the  manic  person  to  struggle  to  accurately  keep  track  of  time,  
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as  this  seems  to  involve  an  appreciation  of  time  that  has  just-­‐‑been.  We  would,  
therefore,   expect   the  manic   person   to   be   less   accurate   in   his   time   estimation,  
perhaps  having  to  overly  rely  on  more  easily  observable  features  –  such  as  how  
much   has   happened   during   the   time   period   –   rather   than   on   his   subjective  
experience  of  time.    
There   are,   however,   two   potential   objections   to   the   account   of   temporal  
experience  in  mania  that  I  have  outlined.  We  might  worry  that  a  disruption  of  
temporal   synthesis   produces   unwanted   consequences   that   are   not   part   of   the  
usual  manic  experience;  and,  furthermore,  that  such  a  disruption  is  unnecessary  
in  order  to  explain  the  alterations  that  we  do  see  in  mania.  
Firstly,  it  may  be  thought  that  there  are  some  experiences  that  we  would  expect  
to  result  from  a  disruption  in  the  protentional-­‐‑retentional  structure  that  do  not  
seem  to  occur  during  episodes  of  mania.  Those  in  manic  states,  for  example,  do  
not  encounter  difficulties   in  carrying  out  a  basic   task  to  completion  –  they  are  
still  able   to  cook  basic  meals,  or  go  shopping,  or  choose  and  put  on  an  outfit.  
We   might   contrast   this   with   the   impact   that   the   disruption   to   protention   is  
thought  to  have  on  those  with  schizophrenia.  Shaun  Gallagher,  amongst  others,  
has  outlined  the  ways  in  which  “protentional  mechanism  malfunctions”  (2006,  
p197)   may   account   for   a   number   of   symptoms   common   in   schizophrenia,  
including  difficulties  planning  and  carrying  out  actions,  and  the  experience  of  
thought-­‐‑insertion.13  If  temporal  synthesis  has  been  disrupted  in  both  cases,  we  
might  wonder  why  we  do  not  see  such  extreme  experiences  in  cases  of  mania.  
However,   this   objection   mischaracterises   the   extent   to   which   the   process   of  
temporal   synthesis   has   been   disrupted.   Whilst   we   would   expect   significant  
implications  for  the  carrying  out  of  everyday  tasks  were  there  to  be  a  complete  
breakdown  of   temporal   synthesis,   it   is  not  obvious   that   it   is  necessitated  by  a  
                                                                                                 
13  For  a  discussion  of  protention  and  schizophrenia  see  chapter  eight  in  Gallagher  (2006).  
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mere  disruption  or  weakening  of   the  process.   I   have   suggested   that   in  mania  
there   is   a   weakening   of   the   retentional-­‐‑protentional   structure   rather   than   a  
complete  breakdown  and,   therefore,  we  would  not  necessarily  expect   there   to  
be   such   severe   effects   upon   the   ability   to   carry   out   basic   everyday   tasks.14   It  
might   also   be   suggested   that   habitual   tasks,   such   as  making   a   cup   of   tea   or  
getting  dressed,  are  more  stable  than  non-­‐‑habitual  tasks  and  would  therefore  be  
less   vulnerable   to   disruption   from   alteration   in   temporal   experience.   It   is   the  
tasks  or  projects  that  require  reflection  and  engagement  that  are  most  disrupted  
in  cases  of  mania.  As  most  everyday  habitual   tasks,   like  making  a   cup  of   tea,  
require  minimal   reflection   and   engagement   they  would   be   largely   unaffected  
by   the   temporal   changes.      In   contrast,   non-­‐‑habitual   or   novel   tasks   would  
become  difficult   for   the  manic  person.  We  would,   therefore,   expect   the  manic  
person  to  have  difficulties  following  conversations  in  the  usual  way  (a  task  that  
requires  both   reflection  and  engagement,  and  cannot  be  completed  merely  by  
relying  on  habit),  but  would  not  expect  her  to  encounter  difficulties  walking  or  
getting  dressed.      
The   second   concern   suggests   that   the   manic   experience   can   be   adequately  
explained  without  the  need  to  posit  any  alterations  in  temporal  synthesis.  The  
disruption   to   narrative   structures,  without   the   loss   of   the   ability   to   carry   out  
everyday   tasks,   may   be   thought   to   point   to   problems   with   longer-­‐‑term  
experiences   of   the   past,   present,   and   future,   rather   than   disruption   to   the  
shorter-­‐‑term   retentional-­‐‑protentional   structures   that   I   have   focused   on.   We  
might  think  that  the  difficulties  in  progressing  or  unifying  life  narratives  can  be  
explained   simply  by  a   changed   relationship  with   the  past   and  present,   rather  
than  necessitating  the  kind  of  fragmentation  that  I  have  outlined.  
                                                                                                 
14  This  is,  however,  not  to  discount  the  possibility  that  in  severe  episodes  of  mania  there  may  be  
significant  impairment  of  everyday  functioning.    
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Studying  the  longer-­‐‑term  structures  of  the  past,  present,  and  future  is  vital  if  we  
wish  to  fully  understand  the  temporal  experience  in  mania,15  and  it  is  likely  that  
the   ways   in   which   narrative   accounts   of   mania   are   structured   is   affected   by  
those  longer-­‐‑term  temporal  experiences.  However,  even  if  the  lack  of  narrative  
progression  can  be  explained  without  discussion  of  temporal  synthesis,  it  does  
not   seem   clear   that   certain   other   aspects   of   the   manic   experience   could   be  
explained  simply  through  altered  experiences  of  the  past  or  future.  Reflection,  
engagement,   and   ownership   of   action   are   all   intimately   bound   up   with   our  
experiences  of  temporal  synthesis.  A  disruption  at  this  level,  therefore,  helps  us  
to  understand  why  each  of   these   experiences  may  occur.   It   is  not   in  any  way  
obvious   that   the   longer-­‐‑term   temporal   structures   can   do   this   crucial  
explanatory   work.   As   such,   I   suggest   that   the   disruption   to   retention   is  
necessary  in  order  to  explain  the  range  of  temporal  experiences  in  mania.    As  I  
argue  that  there  is  a  weakening  of  retention  rather  than  an  entire  breakdown  of  
the   process,   the   concern   that   unwanted   effects   would   occur   appears   to   be  
without  weight.  
Time,  Depression,  and  Mania  
In   this   chapter   I   have   provided   an   account   of   the   ways   in   which   temporal  
experience  is  altered  during  episodes  of  depression  and  mania.  This  includes  a  
desynchronization   of   intersubjective   time,   as   well   as   changes   to   both   the  
conative   drive   and   the   process   of   temporal   synthesis.   I’ve   begun   to   outline  
some  of  the  potential  consequences  of  these  alterations  in  temporal  experience.  
In  the  case  of  depression  this  includes  the  experience  of  time  slowing  down,  an  
inability  to  perceive  the  possibility  of  recovery,  and  increased  feelings  of  guilt.  
Turning  to  the  experience  of  time  in  mania,  I  have  shown  how  a  weakening  of  
retention   results   in   experiences   of   fragmentation,   a   loss   of   reflection,   loss   of  
engagement  with   the  world,  and  a  diminished   feeling  of  ownership  of  action.  
                                                                                                 
15  I  discuss  alterations  in  these  longer-­‐‑term  temporal  structures  in  chapter  six.    
   158  
Having   established   this   account   of   temporal   experience   in   mania   and  
depression,   I   now   want   to   look   further   at   the   ways   in   which   shorter   and  
longer-­‐‑term  temporal  structures  relate  to  and  affect  one  another,  and  the  ways  
in  which  alterations  in  these  structures  impact  on  experiences  of  the  self  and  the  
world.    
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Chapter  6:  Time,  Projects,  and  Possibilities  
Introduction  
In   the   last   chapter   I   discussed   a   number   of   different   aspects   that   constitute   a  
person’s   experience   of   time.   I   explored   concepts   of   objective,   subjective,   and  
intersubjective   time,   expanding   particularly   on   the   role   that   alterations   in  
conation  and  temporal  synthesis  play  in  experiences  of  mania  and  depression.  
As  well  as   looking  at   these   short-­‐‑term  experiences  of   time,   I  noted  how   these  
alterations  were  linked  to  longer-­‐‑term  temporal  experiences.  In  depression,  this  
includes  an  experience  of  a  closed  future  and  an  overwhelming  past.  In  mania,  
this   is   seen   in   the   inability   to   reflect   on   the   past   or   consider   future  
consequences.    
In   this   chapter   I   look   more   closely   at   these   longer-­‐‑term   structures   of   past,  
present,   and   future   –   focussing   on   the   ways   in   which   we   are   meaningfully  
situated   in   time   due   to   our   projects   and   our   self-­‐‑interpretations.   I   draw   on  
recent  work  by  Matthew  Ratcliffe  (2012a)  in  order  to  highlight  some  of  the  ways  
in  which  these  structures  are  altered  in  cases  of  depression.  I  then  turn  to  cases  
of  mania,   showing   how   an   appreciation   of   the   alterations   that   occur   in   these  
longer-­‐‑term   structures   can   help   us   to   understand   a   number   of   experiences  
common  in  episodes  of  mania.  In  particular,  I  note  the  contrasting  responses  to  
the   loss   of   projects   that   are   found   in   experiences   of   depression   and  mania.   I  
then   discuss   how   alterations   in   temporal   experience   can   impact   on   bodily  
experiences,  particularly  noting  how  this  helps  us  to  understand  the  unintuitive  
descriptions  of  bodily  experience  that  we  find  in  the  case  of  mania.  With  these  
accounts   of   mania   and   depression   in   place,   I   consider   how   we   can   best  
understand  the  relationship  between  mania  and  depression,  and  how  the  states  
can  come  together  in  experiences  of  mixed  states.  
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Projects  and  Possibilities  
The  meaning   that  objects   in   the  world  hold   for  us   is  partly  constituted  by   the  
projects   in  which  we   are   engaged.  Objects   are   highlighted   to   us   and   take   on  
varying   degrees   of   enticement   or   calls-­‐‑to-­‐‑action   in   relation   to   our   on-­‐‑going  
projects  –  both  short  and  long-­‐‑term.  Possibilities  are  contextualised  or  brought  
to   life  within  broader  projects,   some  of  which  we  may  be   explicitly   aware  of,  
others   only   implicitly.   Certain   possibilities   appear   as   salient   because   we   are  
seeking  to  achieve  some  further  purpose  –  for  example,  the  possibility  of  typing  
on  the  computer  is  highlighted  to  me  because  I  am  concerned  with  possibilities  
relating   to   my   project   of   writing   this   chapter.   This   short-­‐‑term   project   of   my  
immediate  writing  is  then  given  further  meaning  within  longer-­‐‑term  projects  –  I  
write  this  chapter  for  the  sake  of  completing  a  PhD,  which  rests  within  the  even  
longer-­‐‑term  project  of  being  a  philosopher.  Sartre  uses  the  example  of  a  man’s  
experience   of   a   crag   in   order   to   highlight   the   role   our   projects   play   in  
structuring  our  experiences.  He  writes:  
Here   I   am   at   the   foot   of   this   crag   which   appears   to   me   as   “not  
scalable”.   This   means   that   the   rock   appears   to   me   in   the   light   of   a  
projected   scaling   –   a   secondary   project   which   finds   its   meaning   in  
terms  of  an  initial  project  which  is  my  being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world.  (2003,  p509)  
We   find   similar   discussion   in   the   work   of   Heidegger.   In   Being   and   Time   he  
provides  the  following  description:  
Being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world…amounts   to   a   non-­‐‑thematic   circumspective  
absorption   in   references   or   assignments   constitutive   for   the  
readiness-­‐‑to-­‐‑hand  of  a  totality  of  equipment.  (1962,  p107)  
We  understand  the  world,  it   is  suggested,  because  we  are  absorbed  in  various  
projects   that   give   practical   significance   to   the   objects   that  we   encounter.   The  
possibilities   we   perceive   in   the   world   are   disclosed   to   us   in   networks   of  
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significance  –  an  individual  possibility  does  not  stand  alone,  but  rather  forms  a  
web  of  interrelated  possibilities  providing  structure  to  the  world  as  a  whole.  
As   well   as   forming   an   understanding   of   world,   these   project-­‐‑contextualised  
possibilities  also  constitute  a  form  of  understanding  of  the  self.  To  understand  
myself   as   a   philosopher,   for   example,   is   to   say   that   I   am   concerned   with  
possibilities   relating   to   philosophising.   Actions   relating   to   this   longer-­‐‑term  
project  will   be   highlighted   to  me   as   salient   or   enticing.   In   contrast,  were   I   to  
understand  myself   as   a   farmer   this  would   amount   to   a  very  different  way  of  
being   in   the  world  –  different   actions   in   the  world  would  appear  as  possible,  
enticing,   or   relevant.   As  Heidegger   explains,   “Dasein   always   has   understood  
itself  and  always  will  understand  itself  in  terms  of  possibilities”  (1962,  p185).1  It  
is   in   this   sense   that  Heidegger   is   able   to   describe  Dasein   as   “always   ‘beyond  
itself’”  (1962,  p236)  –  a  person  is,  in  a  sense,  the  very  set  of  possibilities  that  she  
projects  into  the  future.    
Ratcliffe  describes  how  “a  sense  of  the  ongoing  projects  and  commitments  that  
render   things   significant   to  us”   (2012a,  p122)   is   included   in  our   experience  of  
implicit   time,   in   addition   to   temporal   synthesis   and   conation.   Such   projects  
provide  a  framework  of  meaning  to  the  world  we  encounter  that  constitutes  a  
long-­‐‑term  future  directed  orientation  –  a    “teleological  time”  (2012a,  p122).  This  
teleological  time  includes  both  short  and  long-­‐‑term  projects,  providing  a  “sense  
of   working   towards   something,   a   teleological   direction”   (2012a,   p122).   This  
gives   stability   to   our   experiences   of   time   –   a   sense   of   long-­‐‑term   ordered  
progression.   We   can   therefore   see   how   the   projects   to   which   a   person   is  
committed  provide  a  meaningful  structure  to  the  world  as  well  as  forming  part  
of  the  person’s  temporal  experience.  
                                                                                                 
1  Heidegger  uses  the  term  ‘Dasein’  (meaning  ‘Being-­‐‑there’)  to  refer  to  man  –  beings  like  us.  For  
a  clear  description  of  the  meaning  of  the  term  and  Heidegger’s  reasons  for  using  it  rather  than  
the  more  common  ‘human  beings’  or  ‘people’  see  Polt,  1999,  pp29-­‐‑30.  
   162  
Depression  and  the  Loss  of  Projects  
In   many   cases   of   depression   there   appears   to   be   a   loss   of   the   networks   of  
projects   that  usually  structure   the  person’s  experiences.  The  depressed  person  
no  longer  perceives  the  world  through  the  context  of  meaning-­‐‑making  projects  
and  so  the  world  as  a  whole  takes  on  the  characteristic  of  being  grey,  lifeless,  or  
flat.   One   possible   outcome   of   the   loss   of   the   projects   and   commitments   that  
usually  provide  structure  to  the  world  is  that  relevant  possibilities  are  no  longer  
highlighted.   Descriptions   of   the   world   losing   meaning,   relevance,   and  
significance  are  common  in  first  person  accounts  of  depression.  For  example:  
Everything  is  “flatter”  –  there’s  no  depth,  no  intricacy,  no  potential  for  
anything  good  or  positive.  Quite  literally  every  sense  is  more  muted.  
(#307)  
It   seems  more  dull.   I  don’t  notice  anything  so  much.  Nothing  stands  
out.  (#235)  
However,   we   need   to   take   care  when   interpreting   these   kinds   of   descriptive  
statements,  making  sure  to  tease  apart  related  but  distinct  experiences.  Ratcliffe  
(2012a)  distinguishes  two  different  ways  in  which  projects  and  possibilities  may  
be  disrupted  in  cases  of  depression.  In  what  follows  I  draw  on  his  distinction,  
discussing  these  two  forms  of  depression.  
In   some   instances   of   depression   we   find   that   there   is   a   loss   of   a   particular  
project  or  group  of  projects.  This  might  be  through  the  loss  of  a  job,  the  death  of  
a   loved  one,  or  a  breakdown  of  a  relationship.   In  these  kinds  of  situations  the  
person  loses  a  collection  of  ongoing  projects  and  commitments  that  previously  
made  salient  things  in  the  world,  determining  relevant  actions.  The  world  has  
therefore  lost  its  usual  meaning  for  the  person  –  the  usual  possibilities  may  not  
stand  out  or  call  the  person  to  action  –  there  is  a  loss  of  practical  significance.  As  
Ratcliffe   explains,   “projects   that   were   central   to   a   life   have   been   lost.  
Consequently,   things   that   used   to   appear   significant   no   longer   do”   (2012a,  
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p125-­‐‑6).   We   can   find   descriptions   of   this   kind   of   experience   in   first   person  
accounts   of   depression.   Sally   Brampton,   for   example,   provides   the   following  
description  in  her  memoir  of  depression:  “Everything  was  strange.  My  life  was  
strange.   There   were   no   fixed   points   left”   (2009,   p58).   One   respondent   to   the  
Durham   Depression   Questionnaire   offered   a   concise   description   of   this  
experience,  writing,   “When   I   am  depressed   life   loses   its  meaning”   (#54).   The  
depressed   person   has   not   lost   the   capacity   for   action,   but   rather   particular  
possibilities   for   action  no   longer   stand  out   as   being   relevant   or   salient,   having  
been   decontextualised   through   the   loss   of   projects.  We  might   experience   this  
loss   of   salience   to   a   lesser   extent   when   we   finish   a   large   project.   In   his  
semi-­‐‑autobiographical  novel  The  Rings  of  Saturn  Sebald  describes  an  “emptiness  
that   takes  hold  of  me  whenever  I  have  completed  a   long  stint  of  work”  (2002,  
p3).   It   is   not   that   we   cannot   act   in   these   situations,   but   rather   actions   that  
previously  appeared  as  relevant  or  salient  are  no  longer  highlighted.  
Without   projects   to   highlight   relevant   practical   possibilities   in   the   world   the  
depressed   person   may   begin   to   experience   actions   as   ‘pointless’.   As   one  
questionnaire  respondent  described:  
I   lose   interest   in   everyday   activities   and   seem   to   lose   track   of   what  
needs  doing  at  home.  I  find  myself  sitting  alone  more  and  feel  slightly  
removed  from  what'ʹs  going  on  at  home.  Nothing  seems  to  interest  me.  
(#195)  
The   actions   of   the   depressed   person   are   no   longer   contextualised   within  
longer-­‐‑term  structures,  and  so  no  longer  appear  as  relevant  or  meaningful.  We  
therefore  find  descriptions  in  first  person  accounts  of  people  ‘going  through  the  
motions’  or  behaving  mechanistically.     Elizabeth  Wurtzel,   for  example,  writes,  
“I   just   kept  walking   quick   and   straight,   an   automaton   following   a   program”  
(1996,  p101).  One  questionnaire   respondent  explained,  “I  become   like  a   robot.  
It'ʹs   like   I'ʹm   on   auto-­‐‑pilot”   (#51).   The   depressed   person   may   lose   his   usual  
motivation   to   act,   his   everyday   activities   no   longer   given   meaning   through  
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longer-­‐‑term  projects  and  commitments.  However,  he  still   retains   the  ability   to  
act,   and   so   can   still   complete   basic   tasks.   These   actions,   whilst   possible,   will  
have   lost   their   usual   meaning,   motivation,   and   context,   and   so   the   person  
experiences   them  as   ‘pointless’  and  may  only  carry   them  out   in  a  mechanistic  
manner.  
In   these   cases   we   can   see   that   there   is   a   loss   of   the   usual   meaning-­‐‑giving  
projects,   and   so   a   loss   of   significant   practical   possibilities   in   the   world.  
However,   the   possibility   of   practical   significance   remains,   because   new   or  
replacement  projects  may  be  developed.  As  Ratcliffe  puts  it,  “there  is  an  intact  
sense   that   things  could  be  practically  significant  –   the  problem  is   that   they  are  
not”  (2012a,  p125).  Ratcliffe  contrasts   this  with  a  deeper   loss  of  significance   in  
which   there   is  a   loss  of   the  very  capacity   to   find   things   significant.  This   is  not  
simply  a  loss  of  an  individual  project  or  collection  of  projects,  or  even  the  loss  of  
all   projects,   but   rather   the   loss   of   the   possibility   that   there   could   be   any  
possibilities.   The   loss   of   the   possibility   of   practical   significance   precludes   the  
possibility  of  the  development  of  meaningful  projects.    
We   might   think   that   this   deeper   loss   comes   about   as   a   consequence   of   the  
earlier   loss  of  projects  and  practical   significance.   It   seems  plausible   to  suggest  
that  were  a  person  to  live  for  an  extended  time  without  experiencing  practical  
significance,  his  capacity  for  practical  significance  itself  may  begin  to  be  eroded.  
Alternatively,  we  might   think   that   the   two  experiences  have   entirely   separate  
causal  routes  –  that  those  who  experience  the  loss  of  the  possibility  of  practical  
significance  do  not  have  to  have  previously  experienced  a  collapse  of  projects.  It  
is  likely  that  in  some  cases  the  loss  of  significance  is  prior  to  the  loss  of  projects,  
whilst   for   others   the   loss   of   projects   is   the   starting   point   for   the  more   severe  
experience.  What  is  important,  however,  is  that  we  note  the  distinction  between  
the   two  experiences,  despite   superficial   similarities.   In   the   first   case   there   is   a  
loss  of  projects  and  so  a  loss  of  practical  significance.  In  the  second,  the  loss  of  
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the   possibility   of   practical   significance   prevents   the   development   of   new   or  
replacement  projects.  
In   this   second   case   there   is   a   profound   alteration   in   the   experience   of   time.  
Along  with  the  loss  of  the  capacity  for  practical  significance  we  find  that  there  
is   a   “collapse  of   all   the  projects   that   shape  experience  and   regulate  activity,   a  
loss   of   teleological   time”   (Ratcliffe,   2012a,   p123).   The   loss   of   the   capacity   for  
meaning-­‐‑giving   projects   would   be   the   loss   of   a   kind   of   future   directed  
orientation,   distinct   from   conation   but   nonetheless   acting   so   as   to   provide   a  
long-­‐‑term   sense   of   direction   for   the   person.2   Without   current   projects,   and  
having  lost  the  capacity  to  develop  replacement  projects,  the  depressed  person  
finds   that   this   long-­‐‑term  orientation   is   lost.  Ratcliffe   suggests   that   this   loss   of  
teleological  time  may  amount  to  an  experience  of  time  as  cyclical.  He  explains  
that  for  some  people  with  depression  diagnoses  “nothing  matters  and  there   is  
thus  no  way  of   individuating  days  or  putting   them   in   a   linear  order”   (2012a,  
p123).  Without  projects  and  commitments,  “there  is  nothing  to  distinguish  one  
day  from  the  next  –  nothing  stands  out  and  nothing  makes  a  difference”  (2012a,  
p123).   Although   the   days   may   differ   in   certain   ways,   the   person   may   wear  
different   clothes   or   eat   different  meals,   there   is   no   sense   in  which   any  day   is  
meaningfully   different   from   those   that   have   gone   before.   This   account   of  
temporal   experience   is   supported   by   descriptions   found   in   first   person  
accounts.  One  respondent  to  the  depression  questionnaire  explained,  “I  have  to  
re  read  my  memoirs  to  remind  myself  that  things  can  and  will  change”  (#117).  
Another   wrote,   “What   is   the   point   of   any   of   it   anyway?   nothing   changes”  
(#253).  Such  an  experience  clearly  relates  to  our  earlier  discussion  of  guilt  and  
the  experience  of  depression  as  “eternal”.  Whilst  I  earlier  described  how  a  loss  
of   conation   could   bring   about   such   experiences,   it   seems   clear   that   a   loss   of  
                                                                                                 
2  Whilst  we  might  suggest  that  a  similar  experience  may  occur  in  some  cases  where  projects  are  
lost  but  the  capacity  for  practical  significance  is  not,  the  fact  that  the  possibility  for  new  or  
replacement  projects  remains  would  guard  against  more  severe  experiences  of  the  loss  of  
teleological  time.  
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teleological  time  would  compound  the  experience  of  change  being  impossible.  
If  nothing  can  change,  then  the  depressed  person  can  hold  no  hope  of  recovery,  
nor   can   he   perceive   the   possibility   of   making   amends   for   perceived  
wrongdoing  and  thus  overcoming  guilt  experiences.    
Minkowski’s  discussion  of  the  development  of  obsessive  rituals  in  response  to  
depressive  experiences  of  time  seems  particularly  relevant  in  light  of  this  form  
of   temporal   alteration.  Minkowski   suggests   that  behaviours   such  as  obsessive  
counting   and   checking   can   have   a   “compensatory   character”   (1970,   p299),  
making   up   for   the   loss   of   progression   that   may   occur   in   depression.   He  
illustrates  this  using  an  example  originally  given  by  Straus  (2012)  of  a  woman  
who   said   that   “she   felt   time   advancing   only   when   she   was   knitting”  
(Minkowski,  1970,  p299).3  Minkowski  writes:  
All   of   them   –   like   counting,   for   example,   or   a   constant   recording   of  
events   –   can   give   rise   to   the   idea   of   a   progression   –   a   mechanical  
progression,  that  is  –  of  time.  This  progression,  or  rather  this  illusion  of  
progression,  comes  to  fill  in  for  the  weakening  dynamism.  (1970,  p299)  
The   depressed   person   no   longer   experiences  meaningful   change   –   nothing   is  
relevantly  different  from  one  day  to  the  next.  Such  an  experience  is  distressing  
for  the  individual,  and  so  in  some  cases  ritualistic  behaviour  may  develop  as  an  
attempt  to  replace  this  lost  sense  of  progression  and  change.  
We   can   therefore   see   that   the   loss   of   projects   and   commitments   can   have   a  
significant   impact   on   the   depressed   person’s   experience   of   the   world   and   of  
time.   I   distinguished   between   two   different   ways   in   which   this   loss   may   be  
experienced.   In   the   first   case   there   is   a   loss   of   the   usual   world-­‐‑structuring  
projects  that  may  involve  a  loss  of  practical  significance  in  the  present  moment.  
Whilst   this   leads   to   an   experience   of   action   as   pointless   or   unmotivated,   we  
                                                                                                 
3  Straus  suggests  that  these  obsessive  actions  are  partly  an  attempt  to  “drive  stalling  time  
onwards”  (2012,  p212).  
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crucially  discover   that   the  person   retains   the  capacity   for  practical   significance  
and  so  may  replace  past  projects  with  new  projects.  In  the  second  case,  which  I  
suggest  may  either  develop  from  the  first  or  by  a  separate  causal  route,  there  is  
a   loss   of   the   capacity   for   practical   significance   that   incorporates   the   loss   of  
projects.  In  this  case  there  is  not  only  a  loss  of  current  projects,  but  also  the  loss  
of   the   possibility   of   future   or   replacement   projects.   The   person   in   the   second  
case   experiences   a   profound   alteration   in   temporal   experience   including   a  
disruption  to  long-­‐‑term  future  directed  orientation  or  teleological  time.      
In   both   of   these   cases   there   is   a   loss   of   practical   significance.   However,   in  
addition   to   this,   in   some   cases  of  depression  we  may  also   find   that   there   is   a  
loss  of  what  Ratcliffe,  drawing  on  Husserl,  calls  “enticing  possibilities”  (2012a).  
These  can  be  understood  to  be  possibilities  that  “elicit  various  kinds  of  response  
from  us”  (Ratcliffe,  2012a,  p119),  drawing  a  person  in  to  action.  With  the  loss  of  
projects   these   enticing   possibilities   would   certainly   become   unstructured.   The  
depressed   person   would   no   longer   experience   any   draw   to   act   in   order   to  
further   longer-­‐‑term  goals   and   commitments   and   so   there  may  be  no   sense   of  
relevantly   enticing   possibilities.   However,   he   might   retain   the   enticement   to  
non-­‐‑project  contextualised  action  –  the  draw  to  watch  bad  films,  for  example,  or  
to   play   mindless   computer   games.4   However,   in   many   cases   of   depression  
enticing  possibilities  are  entirely,  or  almost  entirely,  lost.  The  depressed  person  
loses   a   sense  of  draw   into   the  world  –  not  only   for   the  purpose  of   furthering  
particular   projects,   but   also   more   general   non-­‐‑project-­‐‑specific   actions.  Whilst  
we  cannot  rule  out   the  possibility   that  enticing  possibilities  are   lost   through  a  
                                                                                                 
4  We  might,  however,  question  the  extent  to  which  such  activities  really  ‘entice’  the  depressed  
person,  rather  than  simply  being  possible  actions  that  require  little  energy.  With  the  distressing  
bodily  alterations  that  occur  in  depression,  the  person  may  default  to  such  activities  rather  than  
ones  that  require  significant  bodily  movement.      
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separate  causal  route,5  it  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  decontextualisation  
of  possibilities  through  the  loss  of  projects  may  in  some  cases  contribute  to  this  
loss.  The  collapse  of  the  usual  networks  of  meaning  and  relevance,  without  any  
replacement  system  of  significance,  may   lead   to  a   loss  of  enticing  possibilities  
more  generally.  If  nothing  is  highlighted  as  relevant,  we  might  expect  that  little,  
if   anything,   would   appear   as   ‘enticing’.   It   is   likely   that   the   extent   to   which  
enticing   possibilities   are   lost   is   in   part   due   to   differences   in   temperament   as  
well   as   the   degree   to  which   the   person   has   robust   habitual   actions   that  may  
continue   to   entice   despite   the   loss   of   projects.   It   is   notable   that   many   of   the  
enticing  possibilities  that  remain  in  cases  of  depression  are  habit-­‐‑based,  rather  
than  novel  or  goal-­‐‑directed.  
This  loss  of  enticing  possibilities  would  not  be  experienced  merely  as  a  loss  of  
motivation   or   desire   to   act.   In   addition,   the   person   may   also   experience   a  
feeling  of  separation  from  the  world.  As  Ratcliffe  explains,  “A  world  drained  of  
the   relevant   kinds   of   affective   import   would   appear   somehow   detached”  
(2012a,  p124).  Descriptions  of   these  kinds  of   feelings  of  distance  or  separation  
are   common   in   accounts   of   depression.   Elizabeth   Wurtzel,   for   example,  
provides   the   following   description   in   her   memoir   of   depression:   “The   Yard  
seemed  like  a  phantom.  I  moved  through  it  in  the  plastic  bubble  that  separated  
my   fogworld   from   everything   around   me”   (1996,   p101).   Sally   Brampton  
similarly  describes  how  she  “cannot  connect  with  life”  instead  writing  that  she  
is  “doomed,  for  ever,  to  have  my  face  pressed  against  the  window  watching  it  
pass  me  by”  (2009,  p244).  Similar  descriptions  can  also  be  found  in  responses  to  
the  depression  questionnaire.  One  person  wrote,  “it  seems  like  there  is  a  barrier  
between  me   and   the   outside   world,   as   if   everything   is   more   distant”   (#129).  
                                                                                                 
5  The  existence  of  projects  does  not  necessarily  equate  to  the  existence  of  enticing  possibilities.  
For  example,  a  person  may  have  an  important  project  and  yet  experience  no  enticement  to  act,  
instead  merely  feeling  an  unpleasant  sensation  that  she  ‘ought’  to  be  acting.  It  is,  however,  clear  
that  in  many  cases  there  is  a  relationship  between  the  two,  at  least  in  determining  which  enticing  
possibilities  are  experienced  as  relevant  or  salient.  
   169  
These  kinds  of  metaphors  point  to  an  experience  of  recognising  the  world  and  
the   possible   actions   that   can   be   carried   out   within   it,   but   feeling   unable   to  
participate   in   the   world   –   to   actually   reach   the   world.   It   seems   plausible   to  
suggest   that   the   loss   of   enticing  possibilities  would   contribute   to   this   kind   of  
experience.   Without   the   draw   to   the   world   and   the   enticement   to   act   the  
depressed  person  will   feel  cut  off  or  disconnected.  He  may  still  recognise  that  
objects  hold  certain  possibilities,  but  none  of  these  would  draw  him  in  to  action  
or  be  highlighted  to  him  in  any  way.    
We  can  therefore  see  that  in  depression  there  may  be  a  loss  of  projects,  practical  
significance,  and  enticing  possibilities.  Whilst   closely  associated,  we  can  draw  
apart   these   related   experiences   in   order   to   better   understand   the   range   of  
experiences  associated  with  depression.   In  what   follows   I  will   explore   further  
consequences   of   the   loss   of   projects,   practical   significance,   and   enticing  
possibilities,   including   a   destabilisation   of   the   conative   drive   and   a   resultant  
impoverishment  of  both  protention  and  retention.  
Conation,  Possibilities,  and  Protention  
I   previously   discussed   how   commitments   and   projects   underpin   a   form   of  
teleological  time.  With  the  loss  of  the  possibility  of  practical  significance  and  so  
the  prevention  of  projects,  we  saw  how  teleological  time  is  disrupted  in  cases  of  
depression.  However,  it  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  loss  of  projects  also  
destabilises  conation.   I  previously  defined  conation  as  a  “future-­‐‑directed  drive  
that  draws  us  in  to  possible  action”,  noting  that  it  manifests  both  as  an  internal  
drive   as  well   as   a   form  of   practical   allure   in   the  world   –  we   are  drawn   in   to  
action  by  enticing  possibilities  within  the  world.    
We   have   seen   that   the   loss   of   projects   contributes   to   a   loss   of   practical  
significance  and  an  unstructuring  of  enticing  possibilities,  including  a  complete  
loss   of   enticing   possibilities   in   some   cases   of   depression.   Without   enticing  
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possibilities   in   the   world,   or   with   a   significant   loss   of   enticing   possibilities,  
conation  would  be  diminished  or  lost.  There  would  be  no  pull  towards  future  
action,   as   the   enticing  possibilities   for   that   action  have  been   lost  or   eroded.   If  
practical  allure  is  one  manifestation  of  conation,  then  the  loss  of  this  allure  must  
at   the   same   time   be   an   impoverishment   or   diminishment   of   conation   itself.   I  
previously   suggested   that   the   loss   of   teleological   time   would   exacerbate  
distressing   experiences   brought   about   through   the   loss   of   conation,   such   as  
experiences   of   guilt.   However,   we   are   now   in   a   position   to   put   forward   the  
much  stronger  claim  that   the   loss  of   teleological   time  and  the   loss  of  conation  
may,  in  some  cases,  come  about  not  by  two  distinct  means,  or  by  coincidence,  
but  as  a  joint  consequence  of  the  loss  of  projects  and  possibilities.    
Through   this   we   can   begin   to   see   the   importance   that   projects   and  
commitments   hold   for   a   stable   conative   drive.   Projects   provide   context   and  
structure  that  make  meaningful  possibilities  in  the  world.  It  is  through  projects  
and   commitments   that  we   encounter  most   possibilities   as   salient   or   enticing.  
We  can  therefore  see  that  if  either  the  capacity  to  develop  projects  is  lost,  or  the  
possibility   of   practical   significance   is   lost,   then   conation   will   also   be  
destabilised.   This   connection   highlights   once  more   the   intimate   link   between  
experiences  of  time  and  experiences  of  the  world.    
  Having   established   the   relationship   between   projects,   possibilities,   and  
conation,   I   now   want   to   explore   how   the   alterations   in   these   features   of  
temporal   experience   impact   on   the   shorter-­‐‑term   retentional-­‐‑protentional  
structure  of  temporal  synthesis.    
Temporal  Synthesis  
Ratcliffe  (2012a)  argues  that  enticing  possibilities  and  practical  significance  both  
form  an  integral  part  of  temporal  synthesis.  Our  protentional  capacity  is  reliant  
on  an  appreciation  and  anticipation  of  the  changing  perception  and  fulfilment  
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of   practical   and   enticing   possibilities.  Husserl   is   clear   that   a   sense   of   striving  
directedness   is   part   of   protention.   Kortooms,   describing   Husserl’s   position,  
explains   that   there   is   a   “directedness   that   intrinsically   belongs   to   protention”  
(2002,   p183).   Such   directedness   is   passive,   not   requiring   active   thought   or  
reflection.   It   is   still   possible   to  have   an   active   directedness   towards   the  past   –  
perhaps   in   the   case   of   reflection   or   recollection.  However,   this   kind   of   active  
directedness   would   be   against   the   flow   of   the   still   present   passive   striving  
directedness   which,   Kortooms   notes,   is   always   “directed   toward   what   is   to  
come”  (2002,  p183).    
What  alteration  to  temporal  synthesis,  and  in  particular  protention,  can  we  say  
occurs  in  cases  of  depression  where  there  may  be  a  loss  of  practical  or  enticing  
possibilities,  and  the  loss  of  conation?  
Conation,  we  have  seen,  may  be  understood  as  a  form  of  “drive,  striving,  urge  
or  affection”  (Fuchs,  2013a,  p78).  It   is  a  future  directed  momentum,  helping  to  
provide  a  form  of  orientation  or  directedness.  It  can  therefore  be  seen  that  a  loss  
of   conation   would   also   be   an   impoverishment   of   the   sense   of   striving  
directedness   that   Husserl   says   is   integral   to   protention.   This   passive  
directedness   is   necessary   to   allow   for   the   anticipatory   role   that   protention  
provides.   Without   a   drive   towards   “what   comes   next”,   there   can   be   only   a  
limited   sense   of   anticipating   that   next   moment.   What   is   therefore   lost   from  
protention  when  conation  is  diminished  is  a  sense  of  a  grasping  anticipation  of  
the  immediate  future.    
Closely  associated  with  the  loss  of  conation  is  the  loss  of  enticing  possibilities  –  
the  world  no  longer  drawing  the  person  in.  We  have  already  seen  how  the  loss  
of  enticing  possibilities  may  lead  the  depressed  person  to  experience  a  feeling  of  
separation  from  the  world.  However,  we  can  also  see  that  such  a  loss  may  entail  
an   impoverishment   of   protention.   As   noted   in   our   discussion   of   conation,  
enticing  possibilities  in  the  world  are  one  aspect  of  our  future-­‐‑directed  striving.  
   172  
The   loss   of   this   enticement   would,   therefore,   be   an   impoverishment   of   the  
protentional  anticipatory  grasp  towards  the  immediate  future.  The  anticipation  
and  fulfillment  of  enticing  possibilities  would  also  be  straightforwardly  lost.  As  
protention   involves   the   perception   and   anticipation   of   possibilities   and   the  
fulfillment  of  possibilities,  the  loss  of  a  class  of  possibilities  and  their  potential  
fulfillment  must  surely  be  seen  as  an  impoverishment  of  protention.    
Ratcliffe   (2012a)   argues   that   the   loss   of   practical   significance   causes   an   even  
greater   alteration   to   protention.      We   have   seen   how   the   loss   of   practical  
significance   may   lead   to   an   experience   of   time   as   cyclical   –   the   depressed  
person   no   longer   experiencing   the   future   as   holding   the   potential   of   being  
meaningfully  different  from  the  present.  Without  significance,   there  can  be  no  
sense  of  things  being  meaningfully  different.  As  Ratcliffe  writes:  
In  so  far  as  our  experience  incorporates  significant  possibilities,  it  also  
incorporates  a  sense  of  its  own  contingency  –  a  sense  that  this  is  not  all  
there  is  or  ever  could  be.  In  their  absence,  the  potential  for  significant  
change  is  gone  from  one’s  world.  (2012a,  p121)  
What   does   this   mean   for   protention?   Without   the   potential   for   meaningful  
change  or  difference,  a  sense  of  anticipation  of  that  change  is  also  missing  from  
the  depressed  person’s  experiences.  There  can  be  no  anticipation  of  alterations  
in   significant   possibilities,   or   of   the   fulfillment   of   these   possibilities,   as   those  
very   possibilities   are   lost.   Protention   involves   this   anticipation   and   so   it   is  
impoverished  if  practical  significance  is  lost.  
It  must  here  be  clarified  that  protention  is  not  lost  or  destroyed;  the  depressed  
person   may   still   possess   an   appreciation   and   perception   of   the   immediate  
future.  There  is  still  some  sense  of  anticipation  of  the  next  moment.  What  occurs  
when   practical   and   enticing   possibilities   are   lost   is   an   impoverishment   of   this  
anticipation.  The  grasp  towards  the  immediate  future  is  diminished,  following  
the   loss   of   enticing   possibilities,   and   the   anticipation   of   possibilities   and   the  
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fulfillment   of   possibilities   is   similarly   stripped   away.   Can   one   anticipate   an  
immediate   future   that   holds   no   significance   or   enticement?   I   think   so,   the  
general   structure   of   anticipation   remains,   but   it  must   be   seen   to   be  markedly  
different  from  our  usual  experience  of  both  anticipation  and  fulfillment.    
From  Protention  to  Retention  
However,   the   impact   of   the   loss   of   enticing   possibilities   and   practical  
significance   on   temporal   synthesis   is   not   limited   to   an   impoverishment   of  
protention.   In   what   follows   I   argue   that   if   we   accept   that   protention   is  
impoverished  in  cases  of  depression,  we  also  need  to  acknowledge  a  necessary  
impoverishment   of   the   content   of   retention   as   well.   A   fully   developed  
protentional   phase,   we   shall   see,   is   essential   for   a   fully   developed   retentional  
phase.  
Protention  involves  an  anticipation  of  the  immediate  future.  This  anticipation  is  
then   fulfilled   in   the   present  moment.  Husserl   explains,   “the  merely   expected  
object   is   identified   with   the   actually   arriving   object,   as   fulfilling   the  
expectation”   (2001,   p122).   The   anticipation   that   belongs   to   the   protentional  
phase  at  time  t1  is  therefore  fulfilled  in  the  primal  impression  of  time  t2  (where  t2  
occurs   immediately   after   t1).   The   present   moment   thus   “functions   as   a  
fulfillment  of   a  preceding  protentional   intentionality”   (Kortooms,   2002,  p178).  
Although  Husserl  is  unclear  on  this  point,  it  seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  in  
order   to   act   as   a   fulfillment   of   this   protentional   anticipation,   the   anticipation  
must  also  be  retained.6  This  anticipation  would  be  modified   through  retention,  
and   as   such   would   be   experienced   as   a   past-­‐‑anticipation,   or   a  
fulfilled-­‐‑anticipation,   rather   than   the  open-­‐‑anticipation  we   find   in   the  original  
protentional   phase.   Husserl   writes,   “The   representation   belonging   to   the  
                                                                                                 
6  Husserl’s  views  on  temporal  consciousness  were  not  static.  As  Kortooms  notes,  Husserl’s  
work  in  this  area  “is  not  so  much  the  result  of  a  thought  process,  but  rather  the  process  itself,  in  
all  its  versatility  and  restlessness”  (2002,  pxiv).  
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fulfilled   expectation   necessarily   “includes”   the   representation   that   the  
expectation   itself   is   past”   (1991,   p160).   Without   the   retention   of   the   prior  
anticipation,   the   primal   impression   cannot   be   experienced   as   a   fulfillment   of  
anything  –   it  would  merely  be  noted  as  occurring  after   the  previous  moment.  
Thus,   we   can   say   that   every   retention   includes   the   fulfilled-­‐‑anticipation   that  
was   a   part   of   the   past   protentional   phase.   Kortooms   explains   that   retention  
includes,  “the  protentional  directedness  toward  fulfillment  that  belonged  to  the  
preceding  phase  of  consciousness”  (2002,  p162).  
We  only  ever  experience  the  primal   impression  in  isolation  from  the  temporal  
horizon  in  which  it  rests  through  a  process  of  abstraction.  Husserl  is  clear  that  
in   retaining  a  past  Now  we  also   retain   the   retentional  phase   that  belonged   to  
that   Now   –  we   do   not   just   retain   the   prior   primal   impression.   As   Gallagher  
explains,   “In   the  now-­‐‑phase   there   is   a   retentioning…of   the  previous  phase  of  
consciousness.  Of  course  the  just-­‐‑past  phase  includes  its  own  retentioning  of  the  
prior  phase.  This  means  that  there  is  retentional  continuum…that  stretches  back  
over   past   experience”   (2006,   p191).   Husserl   is   therefore   able   to   speak   of   a  
“comet’s   tail   of   retentions”   (1991,   p32).   Our   retention   of   a   Now   therefore  
includes  the  primal  impression  and  the  horizon  in  which  it  rests.  I  see  no  reason  
why  this  would  include  retentions  and  not  protentions.    
Indeed,  Rodemeyer   suggests   that   it   is   this   protentional   content   of   a   retention  
that  provides  direction  “from  one  “moment”  or  “phase”  to  the  next  “moment”,  
linking  the  retentions  to  one  another”  (2003,  p132).  The  smooth  progression  of  
the  “comet’s  tail”  is  reliant  on  the  interplay  between  retained-­‐‑anticipation  and  
fulfilment.   DeRoo   similarly   argues   that   it   is   this   structure   that   ““tie[s]”  
retentions   to   the   present   of   the   stream   of   consciousness”   (2010,   p105).   The  
fulfillment  of  a  past  anticipatory  directedness   connects   the   immediate  present  
moment  to  that  past  phase.  The  loss  or   impoverishment  of  this  anticipation  in  
protention,  therefore,  would  equally  be  a  form  of  impoverishment  of  retention,  
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impacting   on   the   relationship   between   the   retained   phase   and   the   current  
primal  impression.    This  is  not  a  complete  loss  of  retention,  nor  is  it  as  severe  a  
breakdown  as  we  have  seen  occurs  in  mania.  The  structure  of  retention  has  not  
been  destroyed.   Instead,   retention   is   damaged   in   a   very   particular  way   –   the  
grasp   of   the   immediate   past   towards   the   present   moment   is   lost   and   so   the  
connection  between  the   two   is  undermined.  The  person  would,   therefore,  still  
have  an  awareness  of  what  occurred  in  the  immediate  past,  and  indeed  a  sense  
of   ownership   of   that   past.      The   ordering   of   temporal   events   would   be  
maintained.   She   would,   however,   experience   a   sense   of   disconnection   that  
would  make  following  action,  speech,  or  thought  across  an  extended  period  of  
time  more  difficult.    
This   kind   of   mild   fragmentation   is   exactly   what   we   see   in   some   cases   of  
depression.  Descriptions  of  difficulties  following  trains  of  thought  are  common  
in   first   person   accounts   of   depression.   One   respondent   to   the   depression  
questionnaire,  for  example,  wrote  that  “Thoughts  become  muddled  and  erratic”  
(#269).  Another  explained  that  she  “Frequently  lost  trail  of  thought”  (#218).  One  
person   described   how   “Everything   is   jumbled   up   like   for   someone   with  
dyslexia   who   can’t   read   the   letters   on   the   page”   (#303).   Another   respondent    
wrote:  
My  concentration  reduces  to  the  point  where  I  cannot  read  and  retain  
pieces  of  writing/information:  I  have  never  been  able  to  "ʺstudy"ʺ  and  it  
is   only   recently,   after   ~4years   of   medication,   that   I   am   able   to   read  
novels   again   although   in   Primary   school   (age   5-­‐‑11)   I   was   near  
infamous  for  my  consumption  of  books.  I'ʹm  not  at  that  level  again  but  
better.  At   its  worst  I  was  able  to   look  up  from  what  I  was  doing  and  
completely  forget  what  it  is  I  was  doing  or  that  I  even  had  something  
to  occupy  my  time  at  all.  I  have,  at  my  worst,  forgotten  to  breathe  and  
have  to  inspire  suddenly  at  the  pain  in  my  chest/realisation  then  focus  
on  it  for  a  few  breaths  until  it  gets  back  into  rhythm.  (#166)  
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We  find  descriptions  of  similar  difficulties  with  speech  and  action.  For  example:  
I  have  trouble  concentrating  and  more  often  than  not  drift  off  topic.  I  
often  forget  what  I'ʹm  talking  about  mid-­‐‑sentance  [sic].  (#20)  
Concentration   and   processing   e.g…Forgetting   what   I   was   talking  
about  midway  through  a  conversation.  (#350)  
I  find  it  hard  to  concentrate  on  every  task  I  try  and  do.  I  give  up  put  
everything  off.  I  wont  [sic]  go  to  the  shops,  I  wont  [sic]  do  housework.  
I  cant  [sic]  do  my  Job  /  lose  my  Job.  I  can  watch  TV  and  not  have  a  clue  
what   is   happening.   I   get   confused   and   I   find   my   memory   really  
suffers.  (#157)  
I   lose   track   of  what   I   am   saying  mid   sentence.  My  mind   goes   blank  
and  I  cant  [sic]  access  information.  (#280)  
Part  of  what  is  going  on  here  is  a  loss  of  a  sense  of  connection  between  temporal  
moments.  This   loss  makes   it  more  difficult   for   the  depressed  person  to   follow  
trains   of   thought,   speech,   and   action.   The   person   is   not   confused   as   to   the  
direction  or  order  of   time,  nor  does  she  experience  a   loss  of  ownership  of  her  
thoughts   or   speech,   as   we  might   expect   were   there   to   be   a   breakdown   of   the  
temporal   structure.  However,   there   is   clearly   still   something   lacking   from   the  
experience   that  means   she   no   longer   experiences   a   smooth   sense   of   temporal  
progression.   I   suggest   that   this   is   partly   due   to   the   impoverishment   of   the  
anticipatory   directedness   in   the   protentional   phase,   leading   to   a   loss   of  
connection  between  the  retentional  phase  and  the  primal  impression.    
We   can   therefore   see   how   projects,   possibilities,   conation,   and   temporal  
synthesis   are   all   intimately   linked.   Disruptions   in   one   aspect   of   temporal  
experience  may   bring   about   disruptions   in   other   areas.  Having   outlined  how  
these  changes  may  be  linked  in  the  case  of  depression  I  now  want  to  turn  to  the  
experience  of  mania,  developing   the  account   I  put   forward   in   the   last  chapter  
through  consideration  of  how  longer  and  shorter-­‐‑term  temporal  structures  may  
relate  in  the  case  of  manic  experiences.  
   177  
Mania,  Projects,  and  Possibilities  
In  my  discussion  of  the  temporal  experience  in  mania  I  have  so  far  concentrated  
on   the   shorter-­‐‑term   alterations   that   occur   in   the   retentional-­‐‑protentional  
structure   and   conative   drive.   I   have   argued   that   there   is   a   weakening   of  
retention   during   manic   episodes   in   addition   to   an   increase   in   conative  
dynamism.  However,  along  with  alterations  to  drive  and  temporal  synthesis,  I  
will  show  that  there  are  also  alterations  in  the  longer-­‐‑term  structures  of  projects  
and  related  possibilities.    
Similarly  to  cases  of  depression,  in  mania  there  is  often  a  loss  of  the  projects  in  
which  the  person  was  previously  engaged.  It  is  notable  that  manic  episodes  are  
often  preceded  by  times  of  great  upheaval  or  change,  such  as  the  birth  of  a  child  
or  a  change  in  career.7  Whilst  the  stress  of  such  events  is  undoubtedly  causally  
significant,   it   seems   plausible   to   suggest   that   the   loss   of   past   structures   and  
projects   also   plays   a   significant   role.   The   loss   of   projects   would   lead   to   a  
decontextualised   present   –   past   projects   no   longer   providing   structure   to  
present  experiences.  
In  addition  to  an  initial  loss  of  projects,  the  weakening  of  retention  prevents  the  
building  of  new  or  replacement  projects,  as  well  as  preventing  the  maintenance  
of   current   projects.   The   manic   person’s   confinement   to   an   unengaged   and  
unreflective  Now  precludes  the  possibility  of  any  form  of  structured  project.  As  
one   person  with   bipolar   disorder   explained,   “To   destroy  myself   or   to   escape  
often   occurred   to   me,   but   my   mind   could   not   hold   on   to   one   subject   long  
enough   to   formulate   any   definite   plan”   (Reiss,   1910,   cited   in   Goodwin   and  
Jamison,   1990,   p27).   Kraepelin   provides   a   similar   description   of   acute  mania:  
“The   patient   is   unable   to   carry   out   any   plan   at   all   involved,   because   new  
                                                                                                 
7  See  (Johnson  2005)  for  full  discussion  of  the  role  of  life  events  in  episodes  of  mania.  Of  
particular  note  is  the  relationship  between  the  achievement  of  goals  and  the  development  of  
mania.  The  achievement  of  a  goal  may  partly  be  seen  to  be  a  loss  of  a  former  project.      
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impulses   continually   intervene,  which   turn   him   aside   from   his   original   aim”  
(2010,  p21).  There  are  at  least  two  implications  of  such  a  loss:  Firstly,  the  manic  
person  may  no  longer  act  in  order  to  further  goals  or  promote  values  previously  
held  to  be  important.  A  manic  person  may  quit  a  job,  leave  a  partner,  or  spend  
all   of   his   life   savings   in   part   because   working   at   a   job,   maintaining   a  
relationship,   or   putting  money   into   savings  would   no   longer   be   given   value  
through  longer-­‐‑term  projects  or  commitments.  The  manic  person  will  have  lost  
the   for-­‐‑the-­‐‑sake-­‐‑of-­‐‑which   that   gives   meaning   to   his   tasks   and   shorter-­‐‑term  
goals.    
It  also  seems  likely  that  this  loss  of  projects  would  amount  to  a  loss  of  a  form  of  
understanding   or   interpretation   of   the   self.   I   previously   noted   the   extent   to  
which  we   understand   ourselves   through   our   commitment   to   certain   relevant  
possibilities.  The  manic  person,  however,  would  no  longer  be  able  to  interpret  
himself   through   longer-­‐‑term   commitments   and   projects   that   usually  
contextualise  and  give  meaning  to  possibilities  within  the  world.  For  example,  a  
man  who  previously  committed  himself  to  the  role  of  being  a  father  may,  when  
manic,   lose   this   self-­‐‑interpretation.   Possibilities   and   shorter-­‐‑term   projects  
related  to  his  longer-­‐‑term  project  of  being  a  father  would  fall  away,  as  he  is  no  
longer   able   to  maintain   this   long-­‐‑term   commitment.   As   such,   the   loss   of   the  
projects  may  also  be  a  loss  of  a  way  in  which  the  person  understands  himself.    
Our  projects  provide  a  form  of  structure  or  context  for  possibilities  in  the  world.  
It  is  partly  through  our  projects  that  we  encounter  various  possibilities  as  more  
or  less  enticing  and  relevant.  The  loss  of  these  projects  may,  therefore,  result  in  
no  possibilities  appearing  as   relevant  or   enticing.  This,  we  have   seen,   is  what  
occurs   in  many  cases  of  depression.  However,   the   loss  of  possibilities   is  not  a  
necessary   outcome   of   the   loss   of   projects.   It   is   also   possible   that   the   loss   of  
projects  may  result  in  all  possibilities  appearing  as  enticing  and  relevant.  Whilst  
projects  help  us   to  determine  what   is   relevant,   they  also,   crucially,  help  us   to  
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determine  what   is  not  relevant.  This  second  scenario,  I  suggest,   is  what  occurs  
in  cases  of  mania.  Far  from  the  grey  and  meaningless  experience  of   the  world  
that  we  find  in  cases  of  depression,  in  mania  the  world  is  experienced  as  being  
full  of  unstructured  meaning  and  colour.  The  loss  of  projects  has  not  resulted  in  
a   contraction   or   loss   of   possibilities,   it   has   instead   resulted   in   a  
decontextualisation   of   possibilities.   Such   a   decontextualisation   means   that   all  
possibilities  are  experienced  as  equally  relevant  and  enticing.    
Whilst   the   depressed   person   loses   practical   significance   and   enticing  
possibilities,   the   manic   person   experiences   an   excess   of   significance   and  
enticement.  All  possibilities  are  meaningful,  and  all  possibilities  draw  the  manic  
person  in  to  action.  The  manic  person  therefore  retains  the  will  to  act  as  well  as  
experiencing  an  increase  of  practical  significance  in  the  world.  In  contrast  to  the  
non-­‐‑manic   person,   however,   these   possibilities   are   not   structured   by  
longer-­‐‑term   goals   or   projects   –   all   possibilities   are   at   each   moment   ‘new’,  
unconstrained   by   longer-­‐‑term   projects   or   meanings.   We   would,   therefore,  
expect   the   manic   person   to   be   overwhelmed   with   possibility.   There   is   a  
‘flattening’   in   the   sense   that   particular   objects   do   not   stand   out   more   than  
others,   but   this   is   not   because   everything   has   lost   its   significance,   but   rather  
because   all   things   have   significance   for   the   manic   person.8   Everything   is  
enticing,   ‘new’,   and   relevant.   Without   the   constraints   of   a   project   the   manic  
person  no   longer  meaningfully  differentiates  between  different  possibilities   in  
the  way  that  the  non-­‐‑manic  person  does.9  In  some  cases  this  may  even  extend  to  
possibilities   that   may   appear   to   the   non-­‐‑manic   person   as   unattractive   or  
                                                                                                 
8  We  can  contrast  this  with  the  ‘flattening’  that  occurs  in  depression  where,  as  one  person  with  
depression  describes  it,  “There  is  little  or  no  discrimination”  (Custance,  1952,  pp76-­‐‑77,  quoted  
in  Landis,  1964,  p262).  
9  Sass  and  Pienkos  suggest  that  one  way  we  can  distinguish  between  cases  of  mania  and  
schizophrenia  is  precisely  in  this  topic  of  “how  things  matter”.  They  write:  “Whereas  for  the  
individual  with  mania…there  are  too  many  things  that  matter,  and  that  come  to  matter  too  
quickly  and  fleetingly,  for  the  individual  with  schizophrenia,  it  is  rather  that  nothing  may  
matter,  or  at  least  matter  in  a  normal  fashion”  (2013a,  p115).  
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repulsive.  As  one  person  writes,  “In   the  manic  phase   repulsion  gives  place   to  
attraction”  (Custance,  1952,  p42,  quoted  in  Landis,  1964,  p291).10  
Conation,  Obsessions,  and  Grandiosity  
Just  as  we  saw  that  a   loss  of  enticing  possibilities   is  a   retardation  of  conation,  
we  can  equally  see  that  an  increase  in  practical  and  enticing  possibilities  would  
be   an   increase  of   conation.  With   all   possibilities   being   experienced   as   enticing  
possibilities,  the  manic  person  will  experience  a  greater  sense  of  being  drawn  in  
to   action.      The   world,   for   the   manic   person,   has   an   increased   allure,   a   pull  
towards  short-­‐‑term  future  possible  action.  This  allure  or  enticement  to  action  is  
part  of  conation.  An  increase  in  enticing  possibilities  is,  therefore,  an  increase  of  
conation.    
The  loss  of  projects,  we  can  therefore  conclude,  destabilises  the  conative  drive.  
However,   this   destabilisation   may   either   take   the   form   of   a   loss   of   conative  
dynamism,  or  of   an   increase   in   that   same  drive.  The   former   is  what  we  have  
seen  occurs  in  cases  of  depression.  The  latter,  we  can  now  see,  is  what  occurs  in  
cases  of  mania.    
As   the   conative   drive   is   preserved,   the  manic   person   retains   some   ability   to  
anticipate  or  project   into   the   future.  As  such,  we   find   that   through   the   loss  of  
projects  he  does  not  simply  lose  his  current  interpretation  of  the  self.  Instead,  he  
begins   a   process   of   constant   radical   reinterpretation.   Andy   Behrman,   for  
example,  writes  of  a  manic  episode:  “I  want  to  be  a  chef,  a  model,  an  architect,  a  
surgeon,   and   an   astronaut”   (2003,   pxx).   The  manic   person  may   no   longer   be  
able   to  maintain  a   commitment   to  his   role  of  being  a   father,   for   example,  but  
rather  would  reinterpret  himself  on  the  basis  of  whatever  he  sees  or  is  involved  
with  in  the  present  moment.  Brian  Adams  describes  this  process  in  his  memoir  
                                                                                                 
10  Custance  contrasts  this  with  his  experiences  in  depression,  where  he  was  disgusted  by  many  
things  and  continually  washed  his  hands  (quoted  in  Landis,  1964,  p291).    
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of   bipolar   disorder,   explaining   how   he   came   to   interpret   himself   and   his  
possibilities  entirely  in  relation  to  Lego:  
Lego,  I  was  sure,  was  what  I  was  meant  to  be,  what  I  was  created  for.  
I'ʹll   get   a   job   with   Lego   now   and   build   Lego   houses   and   Lego  
spaceships  for  a  living.  With  my  talent  for  Lego  I'ʹll  make  a  fortune.  I'ʹll  
get  a   letter  off   to  Lego  today  to  tell   them  all  about  me.   I  need  to  buy  
more  Lego.  
(2003,  p14)  
Adams  has  lost  all  prior  interpretations  of  himself,  thus  allowing  for  this  radical  
reinterpretation   purely   in   terms   of   his   relationship   to   the   currently   present  
Lego.   He   no   longer   structures   the   world   in   relation   to   prior   longer-­‐‑term  
projects,   instead   developing   meaning-­‐‑structures   based   on   his   current  
involvement   in   tasks.   As   Lego-­‐‑related   tasks   dominate   his   present,   so   they  
structure  his  experience  as  a  whole.  He  would,  therefore,  begin  to  neglect  past  
commitments   that  do  not   involve  Lego,   such  as   jobs,   family   commitments,   or  
relationships.  Adams  recalls  another  short-­‐‑lived  manic  obsession  with  cleaning  
a  byre:  
I   had  used   that  byre   as   a  workshop  of  nine   contented  years  without  
ever   thinking   in   that   time   that   the  place  needed  a   special  doing,   but  
suddenly,  all  this,  the  pursuit  of  perfection,  had  to  be  followed  to  the  
exclusion  of  everything  else  in  my  life.  (2003,  p17)  
Anything   that   is   not   immediately   present   to   the   manic   person   would   not  
feature  as  part  of  his  understanding  of  himself,  and  so  we  see  a  development  of  
structures  based  only  in  the  present.  The  manic  person  may  therefore  develop  
deep  obsessions   on   the   basis   of  what   is   immediately   available,   and  may  well  
build  long-­‐‑term  plans  on  the  basis  of  these  obsessions.  Without  the  distraction  
of   past   projects   or   plans   the  manic   person   is   able   to   build   a   structure   based  
around   possibilities   currently   available   to   him,   and   so   those   possibilities  
encompass   and   define   all   of   his   tasks.   One   person   describes   this  
all-­‐‑encompassing  focus  in  the  following  way:  
   182  
The  immediate  stimulus  to  action  or  expression,  whether  that  stimulus  
comes   from   external   circumstances   or   from   the   chance   flow   of  
thought,   is   momentarily   brought   to   represent   the   total   of   pressure.  
(Graves,  1942,  pp671-­‐‑672,  quoted  in  Landis,  1964,  p294)  
This   ability   to   focus   entirely   on   one   thing   without   the   distraction   of   past  
projects  or  commitments  may  contribute  to  the  creativity  and  productivity  that  
is  commonly  reported  in  episodes  of  hypomania.11  The  manic  person  is  able  to  
think   in   new   or   unique  ways,   unconstrained   by   past   associations   or   projects.  
Without   the  usual  context   for  possibilities,   the  person’s  creative  attempts  may  
well  be  more  original  than  those  developed  when  non-­‐‑manic.12  This  experience  
may  be  enhanced  by  the  flight  of  ideas  allowed  by  the  weakening  of  retention.  
It  is,  however,  unlikely  that  any  long-­‐‑term  plans  would  be  able  to  be  carried  out  
in   a   structured   manner,   unless   relevant   features   of   that   project   were   always  
available  in  the  present.  This  would  be  particularly  true  in  more  severe  cases  of  
mania  –  suggesting  that  creative  pursuits  may  become  increasingly  difficult  to  
develop  the  more  severe  the  manic  state  (thus,  such  creativity  may  be  restricted  
to   cases  of  hypomania  or  milder   cases  of  mania).  The  manic  person   therefore  
experiences  deep  but   short-­‐‑lived  obsessions,   constantly  developing  new   tasks  
and  interpretations  of  the  self  based  on  that  which  is  currently  available.    
Terri   Cheney   writes   in   her   memoir   that   “the   danger   of   mania   is   always   its  
grandiosity”   (2008,   p123),   and   grandiosity   even   appears   as   part   of   the  
diagnostic   criteria   for   mania   in   DSM-­‐‑IV   (APA,   2000,   p362).   Goodwin   and  
Jamison   note   that   manic   delusions   “are   usually   grandiose   and   expansive   in  
nature”  (2007,  p57).  The  account  I  have  offered  of  temporal  experience  in  mania  
may   help   us   to   understand  manic   grandiosity.  Without   the   context   given   by  
longer-­‐‑term   projects   the   possibilities   the   manic   person   perceives   are  
                                                                                                 
11  See  Jamison  (1994)  for  a  discussion  of  creativity  in  affective  disorders.  However,  see  also  Sass  
(2000-­‐‑2001a),  Jamison  (2000-­‐‑2001),  and  Sass  (2000-­‐‑2001b)  for  a  useful  discussion  of  the  concept  
of  creativity  and  diagnostic  issues.  
12  See  Jamison  (1994,  p106-­‐‑7)  for  discussion  of  mania  and  ‘divergent’  thinking.  
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unconstrained.   This   lack   of   constraint   is   combined   with   a   loss   of   reflection,  
owing   to   the  weakening   of   retention   –   the  manic   person   therefore   losing   the  
ability   to   realistically   predict   or   envisage   consequences   of   actions.   What   the  
person  wishes   the   outcome   to   be,   therefore,   she  would   envisage   as   being   the  
likely   outcome.   Indeed,   Goodwin   and   Jamison   suggest   that   manic   delusions  
“generally  can  be  differentiated  from  schizophrenic  delusions  by  their  tendency  
to   be   wish-­‐‑fulfilling   in   nature”   (2007,   p57).   The   unconstrained   possibilities  
allow   the  manic   person   to   develop   an   understanding   of   the   self   as   someone  
who  can  do  or  be  anything  she  wishes.  It’s  easy  to  see  how  such  an  experience  
may  be  grandiose  in  nature.  
Delusions  in  manic  states  are  frequently  grandiose,  but  they  are  also  notable  for  
being  remarkably  fleeting  and  unstructured.  Winokur  et  al.  state  that  “They  are  
often  evanescent,  appearing  or  disappearing  during  the  course  of  a  day,  or  even  
during  an  interview”  (1969,  p70,  quoted  in  Jamison  and  Goodwin,  1990,  p265).  
Kraepelin   puts   forward   a   similar   claim,   explaining   that   they   “change  
frequently,   emerge   as   creations   of   the   moment   and   again   disappear”   (2010,  
pp17-­‐‑18).  We  also  find  that  in  “mania  the  delusions  tend  not  to  be  as  fixed  and  
persistent   as   in   schizophrenia”   (Silverstone   and   Hunt,   1992,   p18),13   and  
Goodwin  and  Jamison  note  that  these  delusions  “tend  not  to  be  systematized”  
(1990,   p265).  We   can   therefore  describe  manic  delusions   as   largely  grandiose,  
fleeting,   and   unstructured.   This   understanding   of   manic   delusions   is   also  
backed  up  by   first  person  accounts.  Landis  quotes  one  person  who  described  
his  experience  of  grandiose  delusions  in  manic  states  in  the  following  way:  “To  
be   sure   such   houses   of   cards   almost   immediately   superseded   each   other,   but  
the   vanishing   of   one   could   not   disturb   a   mind   which   had   ever   another  
interesting  bauble  to  take  its  place”  (Beers,  1908,  p193,  quoted  in  Landis,  1964,  
p286).  
                                                                                                 
13  Similarly,  Straus  notes  that  delusions  in  manic  states  tend  to  be  “more  changeable”  (2012,  
p213)  than  delusions  in  states  of  depression.  
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This  form  of  delusion  is  what  we  would  expect  given  the  loss  of  the  capacity  to  
develop   structured   projects   alongside   the   inability   to   meaningfully   reflect   or  
appreciate   likely   consequences.   The   excess   of   possibility   experienced   by   the  
manic   person   allows   for   the   development   of   wish-­‐‑fulfilling   grandiose  
delusions.   However,   the   loss   of   the   capacity   to   maintain   structured   projects  
means  that  such  delusions  are  not  fixed  or  structured.  
Finally,  we  can  see  how  the  decontextualisation  of  possibilities  may  lead  to  the  
manic   person   performing   excessive   or   unnecessary   acts.   For   example,   both  
Hornbacher   and   Cheney   describe   continuing   to   buy   large   quantities   of  
particular   items   despite   already   owning   those   items   and   having   no   need   for  
them.  Hornbacher  writes,  “I  buy  nine  Coach  purses,  twelve  Coach  scarves,  and  
six   identical  Coach  hats,   items   I   obviously  need   immediately,  urgently”   (2008,  
p258).  Cheney   similarly  describes  buying  a   large  number  of  kites  as  presents,  
“High  as  a  Kite.  Perfect,  perfect!  They  have  every  style  of  kite  imaginable…all  
so  colorful,  so  silly,  so  just  what  I  wanted!  I  bought  a  dozen  plus  two  more  for  
luck“(2008,  p167).  
We   can   immediately   suggest   that   the   lack   of   the   contextualisation   of  
possibilities  serves  to  make  relevant  these  otherwise  unnecessary  or   irrelevant  
actions.  The  manic  person  sees  these  possibilities  as  salient  because  the  loss  of  
projects   and   commitments   allows   all   possibilities   to   become   salient   and  
enticing.  Therefore,  whilst  Hornbacher  may  have  no   relevant   reason   to  buy  a  
hat,   the   possibility   is   still   highlighted   to   her   and   appears   as   enticing.    
Additionally,  we  can  see  why  she  might  continue  to  buy  hats,  despite  already  
having  fulfilled  her  desire  to  buy  one;  without  the  contextualisation  of  projects  
and  commitments,  the  possibility  may  remain  ‘relevant’  and  enticing  even  after  
it   has   been   completed.   In   the   non-­‐‑manic   experience,   a   person   may   find   the  
possibility  of  buying  a  hat  becomes  salient  to  her  because  she  is  preparing  for  
an   event   that   requires   a   hat.   As   such,   once   she   has   bought   the   hat,   the  
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possibility   of   buying   a   hat   no   longer   appears   as   salient   or   enticing.   For   the  
manic   person,   however,   all   possibilities   are   salient   and   enticing,   not   because  
there   is   some   further   for-­‐‑the-­‐‑sake-­‐‑of-­‐‑which,   but   because   they   have   been  
decontextualised.   As   such,   the   hat-­‐‑buying   remains   a   salient   possibility,   even  
after  one  hat  has  been  bought.    
We  can,  however,  find  another  potential  contributing  factor  for  this  experience.  
We  earlier  noted  the  intimate  link  between  protention,  fulfilment,  and  retention  
and   saw   how   an   intact   retentional   capacity   is   necessary   for   the   fulfilment   of  
protentional  anticipation.  It  is  this  retentional  capacity  that  is  weakened  in  cases  
of   mania.   As   such,   we   find   that   the   capacity   for   fulfilment   is   undermined.  
Whilst  the  manic  person  is  able  to  perform  the  anticipated  action,  there  would  
be   no   retention   of   the   anticipation   and   therefore   no   experience   of  
‘fulfilled-­‐‑anticipation’.   For   example:   The   manic   person   may   perceive   the  
possibility   of   buying   a   hat.   She   then   acts   to   buy   that   hat   –   to   fulfil   that  
possibility.  However,   because   the  anticipation  of  buying   the  hat  has  not  been  
retained,   there   would   be   only   a   limited   sense   in   which   the   person   could  
experience   the  action  as  being  a   fulfilment  of   the  prior  possibility.  Even   if  we  
grant  that  there  is  a  limited  experience  of  fulfilment,  this  would  not  be  retained  
in   the   next   temporal   moment.   As   such,   the   hat-­‐‑buying   possibility   may   still  
appear   to   the   manic   person   as   being   un-­‐‑fulfilled.   We   therefore   find   that   a  
person   in  a  manic  state  may  buy   large  quantities  of   the  same  or  similar   items  
without  perceiving  such  acts  as  excessive.      
We  must   take  care  here  to  distinguish  between  this   loss  of   fulfilment,  and  the  
everyday   experience   of   failing   to   fulfil   a   possibility   –   an   experience   that  may  
result   in   frustration   or   disappointed.   In   this   everyday   experience,   there   is   a  
retention  of  the  anticipation  of  the  possibility  combined  with  the  experience  of  
it   not   being   fulfilled.   In   contrast,   the  manic   person   does   not   retain   the   prior  
anticipation,   and   so   there   is   no   experience   of   the   fulfilment   having   been  
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frustrated.   The   manic   person   is   simply   left   in   the   same   experiential   state   as  
before   she   bought   the   hat   –   still   perceiving   the   hat-­‐‑buying   possibilities,   and  
with  no  experience  of  having  already  fulfilled  that  possibility.  Thus,  the  manic  
person  may   continue   to  buy  multiple  hats  despite   already  having   carried  out  
this  possibility.    
We  can  therefore  see  that  an  understanding  of  a  person’s  capacity  to  have  and  
maintain  projects  can  help  to  cast  light  on  several  aspects  of  experience  in  both  
mania   and   depression.   In   cases   of   depression   we   can   see   that   the   loss   of  
practical  significance  in  the  world  prevents  the  building  of  meaningful  projects.  
The  resultant  loss  of  enticing  possibilities  is  a  loss  or  diminishment  of  conation.    
The   depressed   person   therefore   begins   to   experience   time   cyclically,   and   the  
world  as  a  whole  takes  on  the  appearance  of  being  grey,  flat,  and  meaningless.  
In   contrast,   we   find   that   in   mania   the   weakening   of   retention   prevents   the  
maintenance  of  long-­‐‑term  projects.  The  decontextualisation  of  possibilities  leads  
to   an   experience   of   all   possibilities   as   enticing   possibilities.   This   increase   in  
enticement   to   action   is   an   increase   of   conation.   Without   the   constraint   of  
projects   the   manic   person   perceives   significance   in   the   world,   but   it   is  
unstructured   and   so   unstable   from   moment   to   moment.      This   allows   for   a  
constant   re-­‐‑interpretation   of   the   self,  with   the   neglect   of   prior   responsibilities  
and  values,  and  may  foster  the  development  of  grandiose  delusions.    
Mania  and  Interpersonal  Relationships  
In   chapter   five   I  highlighted   the   sense  of   frustration   that   a  person   in   a  manic  
state   may   feel   towards   other   people.   I   noted   that   the   desynchronization   of  
interpersonal  time  contributes  to  this  experience,  the  manic  person  feeling  ‘held  
back’  by  others.  Having  further  developed  our  account  of  temporal  experience  
in   mania,   we   can   now   return   to   this   topic   of   interpersonal   relationships,  
exploring  the  ways  in  which  the  manic  person’s  altered  experiences  of  time  and  
the  world  may  affect  his  relationship  with  others.    
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I  have  explored  how  the  weakening  of  retention  that  occurs  in  states  of  mania  
prevents   meaningful   engagement.   The   manic   person   not   only   experiences   a  
diminished   engagement   with   the   world,   he   also   experiences   a   loss   of  
meaningful   engagement  with  other  people.  Recall,   for   example,   the   following  
description  from  Ludwig  Binswanger:  
They   answer   you   easily   and   quickly,   even   breaking   in,   giving   you  
undivided   attention,   admiring   your   mustache   or   your   dress,   your  
intelligence   or   your   manner…But   this   heightened   facility   in  
communication  is  only  apparent;  it  remains  superficial.  If  a  second  or  
third  party  appears,  the  patient  loses  you  from  sight  just  as  quickly  as  
he  first  laid  eyes  on  you….  (1964,  p129)  
Whilst  the  manic  person  is  active  and  talkative,  and  so  may  initially  appear  as  
highly  sociable,  the  connection  with  others  remains  superficial  due  to  the  high  
distractibility   and   loss   of   reflection   that   is   experienced   in   manic   states.   The  
manic  person  is  frequently  distracted  from  the  conversations  he  is  having  with  
others,  and  his  inability  to  meaningfully  reflect  means  that  what  he  says  may  be  
inappropriate  or  irrelevant  to  the  situation.  As  such,  the  manic  person  may  find  
his  ability  to  connect  with  others  undermined,  despite  his  increased  activity.  
The  manic  person’s  relationship  with  others  may  be  further  damaged  through  
his  inability  to  maintain  projects  and  commitments  that  were  previously  held  to  
be   important.   We   have   seen   that   the   weakening   of   retention   prevents   the  
development   and  maintenance   of   projects.   This  may   bring   the  manic   person  
into   conflict   with   friends,   family,   or   work   colleagues   that   still   view   these  
projects  as  important  or  valuable.  Those  around  the  manic  person  may  become  
frustrated  or  angry  with  him  as  he  no  longer  acts  to  further  goals  related  to  the  
previously   held   project.  We   also   find   that   the   loss   of   long-­‐‑term   projects   and  
commitments,  combined  with  a  diminished  capacity  for  meaningful  reflection,  
may   cause   radical   changes   in   behaviour,   such   as   a   person   quitting   his   job   or  
leaving   his   partner.   These   kinds   of   extreme   actions  may  make   it   difficult   for  
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close   relationships   to  be  maintained.  As  Goodwin  and   Jamison  note,   “Bipolar  
illness…inevitably   has   powerful   and   often   painful   effects   on   relationships”  
(2007,  p337).  
Earlier   in   this   chapter   I  discussed  how  short-­‐‑lived  obsessions  may  develop   in  
cases  of  mania,  due  to  the  manic  person’s  experience  being  structured  by  what  
is  available  in  the  present  moment  rather  than  by  longer-­‐‑term  projects.  During  
periods   in   which   these   obsessions   are   present,   prior   responsibilities   may   be  
neglected.  A  man  who,  in  a  manic  state,  becomes  obsessed  with  writing  a  book  
may,   for   example,   continue   to   write   instead   of   looking   after   his   children   or  
carrying   out   tasks   necessary   for   his   job.   This   neglect   of   responsibilities   may  
prove  to  be  frustrating  for  those  who  are  close  to  the  person.  Although  he  may  
still   be   highly   talkative,   social   and   productive,   the   manic   person’s   ability   to  
maintain  longer-­‐‑term  relationships  may  therefore  still  be  undermined.    
The   points   discussed   above   highlight   why   another   person   might   find  
interacting   or   forming   a   relationship   with   a   manic   person   difficult   or  
frustrating.  However,   the  alterations  that  occur   in  temporal  experience  during  
episodes   of  mania  may   also   lead   to   the  manic  person  becoming   frustrated   or  
irritated   with   others.   We   have   already   seen   that   the   desynchonization   of  
temporal  experience  that  occurs  in  mania  may  contribute  to  this  frustration.  We  
can,  however,  find  a  further  reason  why  a  person  in  a  manic  state  may  become  
irritated  or  angry  with  other  people.      
During  a  manic  episode,   the  person  experiences  an  excess  of  possibility,   these  
possibilities  appearing  as  both  relevant  and  enticing.  The  person   is  constantly  
drawn  in  to  action  and,  with  her  capacity  for  reflection  diminished  through  the  
weakening  of  retention,  these  actions  may  not  always  be  appropriate  or  safe.  As  
such,  the  manic  person  may  come  into  conflict  with  other  people,  who  may  be  
reluctant   to   pursue   the   same   actions   or   may   be   trying   to   prevent   the   manic  
person  from  carrying  out  actions  that  are  dangerous.  That  other  people  do  not  
   189  
share  her  experience  of  unstructured  possibility  may  become  frustrating  for  the  
manic  person.  Although  she  may  continue  to  interact  with  others,   irritation  or  
even   anger   is   likely  when   the   other   person   refuses   to   acknowledge   or   act   on  
what  the  manic  person  sees  as  possibilities  that  are  relevant  and  enticing.  This  
frustration  or  anger  may  be  even  more  pronounced  when  the  person  is  trying  to  
stop  the  manic  person  from  carrying  out  a  particular  action,  rather  than  merely  
failing   to   ‘join   in’.   As   Binswanger   notes,   “…there   is   one   thing   they   will   not  
tolerate:   contradiction   and   restriction   of   their   freedom   of   movement”   (1964,  
p132).   Kraepelin   similarly   writes   that   the   manic   person   may   become  
“impertinent   and   even   rough,   when   he   comes   up   against   opposition   to   his  
wishes  and  inclinations”  (2010,  p36).  The  radically  different  ways  in  which  the  
manic  and  non-­‐‑manic  person  experience  the  world  may  bring  them  into  conflict  
with   one   another,   resulting   in   the   manic   person   becoming   annoyed   or   even  
angry  at  the  other  person.    
We  can  therefore  see  that  whilst  a  person  may  become  more  active,  talkative,  or  
sociable  whilst  manic,  her  relationship  with  other  people  will  not  necessarily  be  
improved.  Her   conversations   are   likely   to   remain   superficial,   undermined   by  
her   increased   distractibility.   She   may   neglect   prior   responsibilities   and  
commitments,  or  radically  change  her  behaviour  in  ways  that  are  damaging  for  
family,   friends,   or   colleagues.   She  may   become   frustrated  with   other   people,  
both   due   to   the   feeling   of   being   out   of   synch  with   others,   as   well   as   due   to  
others  failing  to  ‘join  in’  or  recognise  the  possibilities  that  she  perceives  as  being  
enticing.  Her  ability  to  interact  or  connect  with  others  is  therefore  undermined  
both   due   to   her   actions,   which   may   be   damaging   to   others,   and   due   to   the  
radical   difference   between   the   possibilities   she   perceives   and   the   possibilities  
that  are  perceived  by  others.    
Having  examined  the  temporal  experience  of  mania  and  depression  and  noted  
some  of  the  common  implications  of  these  experiences,  we  are  now  finally  in  a  
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position  to  explore  our  earlier  questions  regarding  bodily  experience  in  mania  
and  depression.  
Time  and  the  Body  
In   chapter   three   I   highlighted   the   unintuitive   experience   of   the   body   that   is  
described   in   states   of  mania.  The  manic  body   is   active,   but   in   contrast   to  our  
everyday  non-­‐‑manic  experiences  it  fails  to  fade  into  the  background  through  its  
activity.   Instead,   the   body   remains   conspicuous   to   the  manic   person   –   she   is  
explicitly   aware   of   it.   I   suggested   that   two   key   questions   arise   from   this  
description  of  bodily  experience:    
1. How  can   the  manic  body  be  active   in   the  world  and  yet  not   fade   from  
explicit  awareness?    
2. Why   is   the   depressed   body   both   conspicuous   and   inactive,   when   we  
have  a  clear  example  of  a  conspicuous  body  that  does  not  prevent  action  
in  the  case  of  mania?  
I  suggest  that  both  questions  can  be  answered  with  reference  to  the  contrasting  
temporal  experiences  that  occur  in  mania  and  depression.    
In   cases   of   mania   we   have   seen   how   a   weakening   of   retention   leads   to   a  
decontextualisation  of  possibilities.  The  manic  person  is  no  longer  constrained  
by   past   projects   or   self-­‐‑interpretations   and   so   experiences   a   wealth   of  
possibilities   in   the   world   –   all   possibilities   standing   out   to   her   as   relevant,  
salient,   and   enticing.   Given   this   increase   in   possibilities   it   is   therefore   not  
surprising   that   the   body   in  mania   is   active.  Why   it   is   conspicuous,   however,  
requires  further  examination.    
The   body   becomes   transparent   when   a   person   is   engaged   in   a   task.  When   I  
cross   a   road,   or   drink   from   a  mug,   or   climb   a   flight   of   stairs,   I   am   focussed  
towards   the  world   as   I   carry   out   the   activity.  As   such,  my   bodily   awareness  
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fades  in  order  to  allow  me  to  get  on  with  the  task  –  I  am  directed  towards  the  
world,  not   the  body.  However,   in  mania   the  person   is   only   ever   superficially  
engaged   in   the   tasks   that   she   carries   out.  Whilst   she   is   active,   this   activity   is  
flighty   and   detached   from   the   longer-­‐‑term   purposes   and   projects   that   enable  
meaningful   engagement.   The   manic   person,   in   contrast   with   the   non-­‐‑manic  
person,  is  constantly  re-­‐‑structuring  on  the  basis  of  each  moment.     In  everyday  
situations   the   tasks   I   carry   out   are   situated   in   a   longer-­‐‑term   context.   For  
example,  I  cross  the  road  in  order  to  reach  the  library,  in  order  to  collect  a  book  
that  I  need  in  order  to  complete  some  piece  of  research,  and  so  on.  With  the  loss  
of  this  context  the  manic  person  can  no  longer  meaningfully  engage  in  the  task  
itself,  and  without  this  deeper  engagement  we  find  that  the  body  does  not  fade  
away.   It   is   the   engagement   in   projects   that   allows   the   body   to   fade   into   the  
background,   not   merely   activity.   The   manic   body   therefore   remains  
conspicuous  to  the  person.    
However,  we  find  that  the  manic  person  can  still  act  in  the  world  –  there  is  still  
salience,  there  are  still  possibilities,  and  she  can  still  project  into  the  future.  It  is  
this  wealth   of   possibility   that   allows   the  manic   person   to   describe   the   bodily  
experience  as  “loose,  disconnected,  as   if   I’m  made  of  mercury,  of  quicksilver”  
(O’Donoghue,  2009,  p47).  The  conspicuous  body  of  mania  does  not  block  action;  
it  is  not  objectified  as  it  is  in  cases  of  shame  or  depression.  Instead,  the  inability  
to  meaningfully   engage   in   tasks   that   rest  within  a  wider   context  prevents   the  
person  from  fully  directing  her  attention  towards  the  world.  This  prevents  the  
body  from  ever  fully  fading  out  of  explicit  awareness.  The  manic  experience  of  
the  body  would  therefore  be  comparable  to  that  of  the  non-­‐‑manic  person  at  the  
moment   of   initially   motivating   a   task.   The   person   can   perceive   the   relevant  
practical  possibilities  for  the  object  and  she  can  act  to  perform  them.  However,  
in   cases   of   mania   the   person   will   not   be   able   to   get   beyond   this   initial  
motivation   –   each   action   remains   for   the   sake   of   itself,   rather   than   for   a  
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longer-­‐‑term  purpose.  As  such,  the  manic  person  never  fully  engages  in  the  task,  
and  so  the  body  never  fully  fades  away.    
We  can   therefore  see   that   the  conspicuous  body  and  the   inactive  body  do  not  
necessarily   have   to   coincide.   The   manic   experience   includes   practical   and  
enticing  possibilities,  and  preservation  of  the  conative  drive.  The  manic  person  
is  still  capable  of  projecting  forward  into  the  future,  and  so  can  still  act   in   the  
world.   The   body   becomes   conspicuous   due   to   the   decontextualisation   of   the  
actions  performed,  the  resultant  loss  of  engagement  preventing  the  body  from  
fading  into  the  background.  The  body  is  therefore  both  active  and  conspicuous.    
We   can   also   enrich   our   account   of   bodily   experience   in   depression   by   taking  
into  account  the  impact  of  alterations  in  temporal  experience.  Whilst  the  manic  
person   maintains   the   perception   of   enticing   possibilities   in   the   world,   the  
depressed  person  loses  the  capacity  for  practical  and  enticing  possibilities  and  
experiences   a   loss   of   conation.   This   loss   of   the   forward   directed  momentum  
manifests  in  a  restricted  experience  of  the  body.  As  Fuchs  explains,  “the  patient’s  
imagination,  the  sense  of  the  possible,  fails  to  generate  future  goals  and  plans,  
leaving  the  self  confined  to  the  present  state  of  pure  bodily  restriction”  (2005a,  
p99).  Without   this   capacity   for   practical   significance   the   body   loses   a   central  
element  of   its  perceiving  role,  and  so  the  person  experiences   it  as  object-­‐‑like  –  
“the  person  affected  by  melancholia  collapses  into  the  spatial  boundaries  of  her  
own   solid,   material   body”   (Fuchs,   2005a,   p100).      The   body   in   depression   is  
therefore  not  merely  conspicuous,  as  the  manic  body  is,  but  rather  corporealized.  It  
is  reduced  to  its  corporeal  form  in  part  due  to  the  loss  of  conation  –  an  inability  
to   transcend   the   body’s   materiality.      As   we   saw   in   chapter   four,   this  
corporealized  body  results  in  an  altered  experience  of  the  world  as  well  as  the  
body   itself.   Thus,   we   find   a   mutually   reinforcing   relationship   between  
depressed  experiences  of  time,  the  world,  and  the  body.    
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We   can   therefore   see   how   alteration   in   temporal   experience   impacts   on   the  
bodily  experiences  of  both  mania  and  depression.  This  change  in  embodiment  
results  in  an  altered  experience  of  the  world  as  well  as  the  body.  We  therefore  
see   a   dynamic   relationship   between   experiences   of   time,   the   body,   and   the  
world.  Each  aspect  of  experience  further  influences  and  reinforces  the  way  that  
the  other  aspects  are  experienced.  A  change  in  temporality  would  at  the  same  
time   be   a   change   in   world   experience   and   embodiment,   just   as   a   change   in  
world  experience  would  incorporate  altered  bodily  and  temporal  experiences.  
Mixed  States  
What   I   have   provided   in   this   study   so   far   is   a   discussion   of   ‘pure’   forms   of  
mania  and  depression.  Whilst  such  ideal  types  are  useful  in  order  to  allow  us  to  
understand   the   extremes   of   bipolar   disorder,   it   is   important   that   we  
acknowledge   the  multitude  of  different  ways   that  mania  and  depression  may  
be   experienced.   We   have   already   seen   a   number   of   different   possible  
manifestations  of  depression  and  mania  within  these  ‘pure’  types.  However,  it  
is  also  important  that  our  account  allows  for  the  possibility  of  ‘Mixed  Episodes’  
or  ‘Mixed  States’.  As  we  saw  in  chapter  two,  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  a  mixed  
episode   –  where   a   person  with   bipolar   disorder   experiences   features   of   both  
mania  and  depression  at  the  same  time  –  provide  us  with  little  detail  regarding  
how  to  recognise  or  understand  such  states.  The  vague  and  constantly  changing  
criteria  makes  measuring  exact  rates  of  mixed  states  difficult.  However,  studies  
do   confirm   that   such   states   are   common.14   Nassir   Ghaemi   writes,   “Any  
discussion  of  the  phenomenology  of  mania  and  depression  has  to  cope  with  the  
topic  of  mixed  states”  (2007,  p123).    
                                                                                                 
14  Goodwin  and  Jamison  provide  a  summary  of  18  studies  measuring  rates  of  mixed  states.  In  
these  studies  there  was  an  average  rate  of  28  percent  in  affectively  ill  patients,  though  the  rates  
in  individual  studies  ranged  between  67  percent  and  10  percent.  They  conclude,  “By  any  
standard,  mixed  states  are  not  as  rare  as  they  once  were  reputed  to  be”  (2007,  p78).  See  
Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp78-­‐‑82)  for  full  discussion.  
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Mixed  states  are  difficult   to  understand   if  we  conceive  of  depression  as  being  
nothing  more  than  extreme  unhappiness  and  mania  nothing  more  than  extreme  
elation.   Indeed,   the   existence   of   such   states   appears   to   be   unthinkable   if   we  
understand   mania   and   depression   to   be   opposite   poles   –   how   could   two  
opposite   extremes   exist   in   the   same   person   simultaneously?  As   Swann   et.   al.  
explain:    
The   occurrence   of   simultaneous   depressive   and   manic   states   is  
counterintuitive.  The  term  ‘bipolar’  may  not  be  an  accurate  description  
of   patients  with  manic   or   depressive   states,   implying   as   it   does   that  
manic  and  depressive  syndromes  must  be  polar  opposites.  (1993,  p87)  
In   what   follows   I   show   how   the   accounts   I   have   provided   of   mania   and  
depression  allow  us   to  accommodate  mixed   ‘states’  or   ‘episodes’,  providing  a  
framework  that  helps  us  to  make  sense  of  experiences  that  might  otherwise  be  
difficult  to  understand.  
A  number  of  different   forms  of  mixed  states  have  been   identified  –  Kraepelin  
notably   proposed   eight   distinct   types   of   states   (2010,   p66-­‐‑70).   However,   my  
focus  here   is  not  on  providing  an  account  of   a  particular  diagnostic   category,  
but  rather  on  exploring  the  more  general  question  of  how  features  of  mania  and  
features   of   depression   may   present   simultaneously.      For   the   following  
discussion  I  will  therefore  focus  on  two  of  the  more  commonly  described  states  
in   which   these   features   co-­‐‑occur:   ‘Dysphoric   Mania’   and   ‘Agitated  
Depression’.15   Each   of   these   demonstrates   a   way   in   which   mania   and  
depression  may   come   together   in   a   single   experience.  Once  we  have   grasped  
how   this   is   possible   in   these   accounts   we   can   use   this   insight   in   order   to  
understand   the   variety   of   different   experiences   common   in   bipolar   disorder;  
and  how,  in  contrast  to  the  understandable  intuition  of  the  two  as  opposites,  it  
is  possible  to  reconcile  mania  and  depression  in  a  single  experience.  
                                                                                                 
15  Goodwin  and  Jamison  note  that  research  into  mixed  states  has  largely  focused  on  forms  of  
dysphoric  mania  (2007,  p81).  
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Dysphoric  Mania  and  Agitated  Depression  
There   is   nothing   in   my   account   of   mania   that   restricts   the   mood   to   that   of  
elation.   Certainly,   a   positive   or   even   euphoric   mood   is   likely   given   the  
unconstrained  possibilities  and  the  restricted  ability   to  consider  consequences.  
The  manic  person  feels  that  she  can  do  or  be  anything  she  wishes,  and  she  has  
no  concern  for  possible  negative  consequences.  Without  this  concern  for  future  
negative   experiences,   and  without   the   experience   of   things   being   difficult   or  
impossible   it’s   easy   to   see   why   a   person’s   mood  may   be   joyful   or   euphoric.  
However,  this  need  not  be  the  case.  I  have  already  shown  how  the  experience  of  
intersubjective  temporal  desynchronization  may  be  experienced  as  negative  or  
distressing.  The  manic  person  may  find  being  out  of  synch  with  other  people  as  
upsetting   or   frustrating,   potentially   even   developing   into   anger   at   the   other  
person.   As   such,   whilst   euphoria   is   likely  when   a   person   is  manic,   it   is   also  
possible  that  the  person’s  mood  may  be  one  of  irritation  and  frustration.  Whilst  
a  feeling  of  time  speeding  up,  being  drawn  into  the  world  with  unconstrained  
possibilities,  may  be   a  positive   experience   for  many,   this   excess   of   possibility  
may   be   experienced   by   some   as   unwanted   pressure   or   an   excess   of   demand.  
This  might   be   experienced   as   an   uncomfortable   sensation   of   the  world   being  
‘too  much’   or   of   the   person   feeling   out   of   control.   Patty  Duke  describes   how  
during  manic  episodes  she  experienced  irritation  and  anger:  
My  manias   took   the   form   of   irritability   and   unpredictable   flashes   of  
rage…I  would  start  screaming  ugly  foul  epithets  either  at  a  particular  
kid  or  at   John  or  at   the  group   in  general,  or  at   the  world.  And   if   the  
words  weren’t   enough   and   I   would   feel   physically   on   fire,   I   would  
start  throwing  things  –  the  food,  the  plates,  the  glasses.    
(Duke  and  Hochman,  1992,  pp199-­‐‑200)  
We  can  therefore  see  how  symptoms  that  we  usually  associate  with  a  depressed  
state  may  occur  during  a  manic  state.  The  account  I  have  offered  does  not  limit  
mania   to   being   pleasurable   or   desirable   –   it   also   allows   for   the   possibility   of  
features  of  depression  such  as  frustration,  anger,  or  a  general  negative  mood.    
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Similarly,   it   is  possible  for  a  depressed  state  to  contain  features  of  mania.  One  
way   in   which   this   may   occur   is   if   enticing   possibilities   are   lost,   but   some  
projects   and   commitments   remain.16   We   have   seen   that   projects   and  
commitments  provide  a  form  of  long-­‐‑term  temporal  orientation  for  the  person  –  
a   teleological   time.   This   teleological   time   allows   for   an   experience   of   the  
progression  of  time,  including  a  sense  of  being  drawn  into  the  long-­‐‑term  future.  
As  such,  we  see   that  with   the  maintenance  of  projects   there   remains  what  we  
might  characterise  as  a   form  of  drive   towards   the   long-­‐‑term  future.  However,  
without   enticing   possibilities   the   person   finds   her   ability   to   act   in   the  world  
restricted   –   she   experiences   a   sense  of   separation  or  distance   from   the  world.  
Whilst  possibilities  may  appear  as  relevant  –  she  could  or  indeed  ought  to  act  in  
that  way   -­‐‑   she  does  not   experience   them  with  varying  degrees  of   enticement.  
Such  an  experience  may  bring  about  agitation  or  provoke  anxiety  in  at  least  two  
ways:  
Firstly,   without   enticing   possibilities   the   person   has   lost   a   crucial   ability   to  
distinguish  which  possibilities  are  necessary  for  her  particular  course  of  action.  
Whilst  possibilities  may  be  highlighted  as  relevant,   this   is  not  backed  up  by  a  
feeling   of   being   drawn   to   fulfil   them.   The   person  may   therefore   find   herself  
conflicted  as  to  whether  that  particular  possibility  is  actually  the  relevant  one  –  
she  does  not  experience  the  usual  draw  to  the  world  that  allows  her  to  commit  
to  actions.  This  experience  of  tension  between  the  possibility  being  revealed  as  
relevant  but  not  enticing  may  prove  to  be  anxiety-­‐‑provoking  or  distressing.    
Secondly,  we  find  that  due  to  the  maintenance  of  projects  and  commitments  the  
person   still   perceives   possibilities   that   show   how   she   ought   to   act.   Various  
possibilities  are  shown  as  relevant  within  the  context  of  furthering  a  project.  We  
also   find   that,   as   teleological   time   is   maintained,   she   is   still   drawn   into   the  
                                                                                                 
16  See  Ratcliffe  (2012a)  for  a  similar  proposal  that  suggests  one  form  of  mixed  state  may  come  
about  due  to  the  loss  of  enticing  possibilities  combined  with  an  intact  conative  drive.  
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long-­‐‑term  future.  As  such,  she  not  only  finds  relevant  possibilities  highlighted,  
she   also   experiences   a   sense   of   pressure   or   drive.   However,   with   the   loss   of  
enticing  possibilities  she  does  not  experience  a  draw  into  the  world  that  entices  
her  to  act.  She  recognises  the  need  to  act,  and  still  experiences  a  draw  towards  
the  future,  but  remains  disconnected  from  the  world,  feeling  blocked  or  unable  
to  act.  The  resultant  pressure  thus  manifests  as  a  form  of  bodily  agitation  rather  
than   an   enticement   to   productive   action.   This   is   a   distressing   but   still   active  
state   distinct   from   the   rigid   and   inactive   state   commonly   associated   with   a  
‘pure’  depression.  Hornbacher  describes  her  experience  of  one  mixed  episode:  
I’m   agitated,   constantly   anxious,   gripped   by   random,   sudden   fears,  
and  I  whip  around  aimlessly,  compulsively  making  lists,  worried  that  
I   will   forget   something,   that   I’ll   lose   something,   that   I’ll   fail   at  
something  important,  that  I  won’t  get  something  done.  (2008,  p169)  
The  loss  of  enticing  possibilities  cuts  the  person  off  from  the  world,  preventing  
productive   action   that   might   alleviate   the   pressure   experienced   due   to   the  
maintenance  of  projects  and  commitments.  She  also  experiences  anxiety  due  to  
the   tension   between   possibilities   appearing   as   relevant   but   not   enticing.   Her  
recognition   that   she   ought   to   be   carrying   out   certain   actions   for   the   sake   of  
furthering  a  particular  project,  combined  with  her  feeling  blocked  from  actually  
carrying   out   such   actions,  may   result   in   her   beginning   to   evaluate   herself   as  
‘useless’   or   ‘worthless’.   It   is   therefore   unsurprising   that   the   person   becomes  
concerned  that  she  might  ‘fail  at  something  important’  or  ‘forget  something’.    
We   can   therefore   see   how   the   agitation   and  pressure   usually   associated  with  
mania  may   occur   in   a   state   of   depression,   producing   a   form   of   ‘agitated’   or  
‘anxious’  depression.  This  type  of  state  is  perhaps  more  closely  related  to  ‘pure’  
presentations   of   depression   than   to   states   of   mania,   with   only   a   few   manic  
   198  
features  being  present.17  However,  what  is  key  for  our  purposes  here  is  that  this  
form  of  depression  can  be  seen  to  be  distinct  from  the  forms  of  depression  we  
have   previously   discussed,   and   that   it   combines   features   of   depression   with  
features   of  mania.   The   accounts   of  mania   and   depression   that   I   have   offered  
allow   us   to   bring   together   these   features,   revealing   states   in   which   they   are  
mixed  to  be  non-­‐‑mysterious.      
Kraepelin  notes  that  mixed  states  commonly  occur  during  “periods  of  transition  
between   states   of   depression   and   mania”   (2010,   p19).   This   fits   with   our  
understanding  of  mania  and  depression  not  as  two  extremes  on  opposite  poles,  
but   rather   two  manifestations   of   alterations   to   similar   structural   elements.   A  
loss  of  projects,  for  example,  may  lead  to  either  a  manic,  a  depressed  or,  as  we  
have   just   seen,   a  dysphoric  manic   state.  Disturbances   in   temporal   and  bodily  
experience  are  central  to  both  states.  Common  features  of  mania  and  depression  
need   not   be   seen   as   unique   to   those   states,   and   some   ‘symptoms’   typically  
associated  with  depression  may  also  occur  during  manic  states,  and  vice  versa.  
This  complexity  suggests  that  transition  periods  are  unlikely  to  consist  of  sharp  
switches  between  a  ‘pure’  state  of  depression  and  a  ‘pure’  state  of  mania.    
As  similar  structural  features  are  altered  or  lost  to  produce  both  states  of  mania  
and  depression,   a  person  may  easily   switch  between   the   two.  This   allows   for  
the   possibility   of   a   rapid   cycling   bipolar   disorder.   According   to   DSM-­‐‑IV,   this  
type   of   bipolar   disorder   –   where   four   or   more   distinct   mood   episodes   are  
experienced  within  a  twelve-­‐‑month  period  –  occurs  in  “approximately  10%-­‐‑20%  
of   individuals   with   Bipolar   Disorder   seen   in   Mood   Disorders   clinics”   (APA,  
2000,   p427).   The   relatively   high   rate   of   rapid   cycling   bipolar   disorder   is  
understandable   given   the   similar   structures   that   underlie   both   mania   and  
depression.   This   relationship   between   the   two   states   also   allows   for   the  
                                                                                                 
17  See  Akiskal  et  al.  (2005)  for  discussion  of  whether  forms  of  agitated  depression  ought  to  be  
conceptualised  as  types  of  mixed  state.  
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possibility   of   a   type   of   mixed   episode   characterised   by   constant   short-­‐‑term  
switching  between   the   two  states,   rather   than   the  co-­‐‑occurrence  of   features  of  
both   states.   Indeed,   this   is   how   a   mixed   episode   is   initially   characterised   in  
DSM-­‐‑IV:   “the   individual   experiences   rapidly   alternating  moods”   (APA,   2000,  
p362).  Thus,   the  accounts   I  have  outlined  of  mania  and  depression  help  us   to  
make   sense   of   episodes   in   which   features   of   mania   and   depression   occur  
simultaneously,   as   well   as   episodes   in   which   the   person   experiences   rapid  
switching  between  the  two  states.    
The  accounts  of  mixed  episodes  that  I  have  offered  here  ought  not  be  thought  to  
exhaust  the  possible  ways  in  which  mania  and  depression  may  come  together.  
Instead,   they   illustrate   the   more   general   point   that   states   that   appear   as  
mysterious  when  we  conceive  of  mania  and  depression  as  polar  opposites,  are  
rendered  non-­‐‑mysterious  when  we  recognise  that  the  two  states  rest  on  similar  
structural  alterations.  This  acknowledgement   that   the  experiential   structure  of  
mania   allows   for   the   development   of   features  we  might   commonly   associate  
with   depression   (and   vice   versa)   reveals   the   possibility   of   understanding   a  
broader  range  of  experiences  common  in  bipolar  disorder.  It  is  notable  that  this  
conception  of  mixed  episodes   is   closer   to   the  descriptions  provided   in  DSM-­‐‑5  
(APA,   2013,   pp149-­‐‑50)   than   those   provided   in  DSM-­‐‑IV   (APA,   2000,   p365).   In  
line   with   DSM-­‐‑5,   these   accounts   of   mania   and   depression   support   an  
understanding   of   mixed   episodes   as   involving   features   typically   associated  
with  the  other  state,  rather  than  the  full  co-­‐‑occurrence  of   two  opposing  states.  
This   understanding   allows   us   to   better   account   for   a   broader   range   of  
experiences  that  occur  in  bipolar  disorder.  
It   can   therefore   be   seen   that   the   accounts   I   have   offered   of   mania   and  
depression  help  us  to  better  understand  the  ‘pure’  states  as  well  as  experiences  
with  mixed  features.  
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Depression,  Mixed  States,  and  Suicide  
Suicide,   suicide   attempts,   and   suicidal   thoughts   and   feelings   are   common   in  
bipolar   disorder   –   about   half   of   those   with   bipolar   disorder   attempt   suicide  
(Lönnqvist,  2002).18  Indeed,  such  features  form  part  of  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  
a  major  depressive  episode  (APA,  2000,  p356).  We  find  written  in  DSM-­‐‑IV  that  
“These  thoughts  range  from  a  belief  that  others  would  be  better  off  if  the  person  
were  dead,  to  transient  but  recurrent  thoughts  of  committing  suicide,  to  actual  
specific   plans   of   how   to   commit   suicide”      (APA,   2000,   pp350-­‐‑351).  
Understanding   the   experience   of   feeling   suicidal   is   a   complex   topic,   and   one  
that  I  will  touch  on  only  briefly  in  this  thesis.19  It  must  be  remembered  that  we  
cannot  straightforwardly  assume  suicidal  thoughts  are  evidence  of  depression,  
nor  are  thoughts  of  suicide  a  necessary  symptom  of  a  depressed  state.  It  is  also  
likely   that   there   are   numerous   different   experiences   of   feeling   suicidal   (for  
example,  the  distinction  between  wishing  that  one  was  dead  versus  having  an  
active   wish   to   kill   oneself).20   There   are   also   difficulties   with   accessing   first  
person  accounts  of  suicidal  thoughts  and  behaviours  –  we  cannot  assume  that  
the  experience   leading   to  an   ‘attempted’  suicide   is   the  same  as   the  experience  
leading  to  a   ‘completed’  suicide,  and  first  person  descriptions  of   the   latter  are  
rare  for  obvious  reasons.21  
That  said,   there  are   features  of   the  accounts   I  have  put   forward  of  mania  and  
depression   that   cast   light   on   some   aspects   of   the   experience   of   suicidality.   In  
                                                                                                 
18  See  Lönnqvist  (2002)  for  a  discussion  of  the  risks  of  suicide  in  depressive  disorders.  However,  
see  also  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (1990,  pp227-­‐‑228)  for  a  discussion  of  the  difficulties  of  accurately  
measuring  the  rate  of  suicide  and  suicidal  thoughts  in  bipolar  disorder.  
19  For  one  in  depth  discussion  of  suicide  and  the  relationship  between  bipolar  disorder,  
depression,  and  suicidality  see  Jamison  (2001).  
20  See  Benson  et  al  (2013)  for  a  discussion  of  the  distinction  between  suicidal  thoughts  and  
suicidal  feelings.  
21  We  can,  however,  draw  on  diary  and  journal  accounts  for  descriptions  of  this  type.  See,  for  
example,  Keith  Vaughan’s  journals  (Vaughan,  2010),  which  include  a  journal  entry  written  after  
he’d  taken  a  fatal  overdose.    
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what   follows   I   will   focus   on   four   common   features   of   the   experience   of  
depression,  showing  how  each  may  contribute  to  thoughts  of  suicide.  These  are  
alterations  in  experiences  of  the  body  and  world,  isolation  from  the  world  and  
others,  hopelessness,  and  experiences  of  a  ‘threatening’  future.    Following  this,  I  
discuss   how   common   features   of   mixed   states   may   contribute   to   suicidal  
thoughts.   Exploring   these   features   will   not   amount   to   full   account   of   the  
experience   of   feeling   suicidal,   nor   will   it   provide   a   full   explanation   of   the  
reasons  why   a   person  may   become   suicidal.   Instead,   I   aim   simply   to  make   a  
modest   contribution   to  our  understanding  of   the   relationship  between  mania,  
depression,  and  suicidality.    
Firstly,  we  have  seen  how  alterations   in  bodily  experience   that  occur   in  many  
cases   of   depression   can   lead   to   difficulties   interacting   with   the   world.   The  
corporealized  body  is  experienced  as  an  obstacle  when  the  person  attempts  to  
act,   seemingly  confining  and  restricting   the  person  to  his   ‘corporeal’  self.  This  
leads  some  to  evaluate  their  bodies  and  themselves  as  ‘useless’.  Further  to  this,  
we  have  seen  how  the  depressed  body  may  fail  to  highlight  potential  practical  
actions  within  the  world.  The  usual  bodily  structures  that  reveal  and  highlight  
practical  possibilities   are   eroded,   leading   to   feelings  of   restriction,   frustration,  
and  isolation.  These  feelings  of  being  unable  to  act  within  the  world,  combined  
with   the   experience   of   being   trapped   in   an   exhausted,   painful   body   may  
plausibly   be   thought   to   contribute   to   experiences   of   suicidality.   For   example,  
one   person   described   her   experience   shortly   before   a   suicide   attempt,  
explaining,   “my   body   is   uninhabitable”   (Goodwin   and   Jamison,   1990,   p236).  
Another   person,   diagnosed  with   bipolar   disorder,   writes,   “I   hated  my   body.  
When  I  went  out  in  public  I  thought  everyone  was  staring  at  me  with  disgust.  I  
believed  I  would  only  feel  better  if  I  were  dead.  So  I  overdosed  again”  (Graham,  
2010,  p4).  This  is  not  simply  an  experience  of  ‘hating’  or  strongly  disliking  the  
body  –  the  bodily  experience  is  also  one  of  extreme  and  distressing  restriction.  
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William  Styron  describes  the  connection  between  this  feeling  of  restriction  and  
suicidal  thoughts:  
The  gray  drizzle  of  horror  induced  by  depression  takes  on  the  quality  
of   physical   pain…[D]espair…comes   to   resemble   the   diabolical  
discomfort   of   being   imprisoned   in   a   fiercely   overheated   room.   And  
because  no  breeze   stirs   this   caldron,  because   there   is  no  escape   from  
this   smothering   confinement,   it   is   entirely   natural   that   the   victim  
begins  to  think  ceaselessly  of  oblivion.  (2004,  pp49-­‐‑50)  
However,   this   relationship  between  bodily   experience   and   suicidal   feelings   is  
not   straightforward.  First  person  accounts  describe  how   the  experience  of   the  
body  being  slow,  heavy,  and  difficult  to  move,  in  many  cases  helped  to  prevent  
the  person  from  attempting  suicide.  Terri  Cheney,  for  example,  explains:  
I   just   lay   there   –   unwashed,   uncombed,   and   drowning   in   inertia,  
struggling   with   the   need   to   breathe   in   and   out…the   paralysis   is   no  
doubt  what  kept  me  alive.  Had  I  been  able  to  move  the  least  little  bit,  I  
would  surely  have  seized  the  first  chance  to  die.  (2008,  p199)  
Alterations   in   bodily   and   thus  world   experience  may   therefore   be   thought   to  
contribute  to  a  person  feeling  suicidal,  but  the  physical  restriction  experienced  
may  prevent  the  person  from  actually  carrying  out  such  plans.  
Isolation   from   the   world   and   others   is   a   consistent   theme   in   first   person  
accounts  of  depression.    I  have  shown  how  alterations  in  both  bodily  experience  
and   temporal   experience  may   contribute   to   this   experience   of   alienation.   The  
depressed  body,  we  have  seen,  blocks  access  onto  the  world,  appearing  to  the  
person  as  a  heavy  and  difficult   to  move   ‘object’.  Combined  with   its   failure   to  
highlight   relevant   possibilities   for   action,   an   experience   of   distance   or  
separation   from   the  world   is   likely   to   result.     We  have   also   seen  how  altered  
experiences  of   time  may  contribute   to   this  kind  of   experience.  The   loss  of   the  
capacity   for   practical   significance   and   enticing  possibilities   contributes   to   this  
feeling   of   separation.   Similarly,   desynchronization   of   the   depressed   person’s  
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subjective  time  with  the  time  of  others  can  result  in  a  feeling  of  separation  from  
other   people   as   well   as   leading   to   difficulties   in   interaction.   In   severe  
depression  we  have  seen  how  this  may  be  experienced  as  a  sense  of  emotional  
connection  being   ‘impossible’.  First  person  accounts  of  experiences  of   suicidal  
thoughts   often   stress   how   this   feeling   of   being   irreconcilably   separate   from  
others   contributes   to   thoughts   of   suicide.   For   example,   one   person   described  
her  experience  of  feeling  suicidal  in  the  following  way:  
I  have  prayed  to  God  to  kill  me  –  isn’t  there  some  pill  they  can  give  me  
to  take  my  life?…I  dread  to  wake  up  in  the  morning  and  face  another  
day   of   emptiness.   I’m   tired   of   feeling   as   though   I’m   standing   in   the  
foyer  of  mankind  and   can’t  go   in.   (Quoted   in  Goodwin  and   Jamison  
1990,  p236)  
Sally  Brampton  provides  a  similar  description  in  her  memoir  of  depression:  
At   times   like   that   suicide,   or   death,   presses   heavy   on  my  mind.   If   I  
cannot  live,  cannot  connect  with  life  but  am  doomed,  for  ever,  to  have  
my  face  pressed  against  the  window  watching  it  pass  me  by,  then  why  
not  die?  What  is  that  already,  if  not  a  living  death?  (2009,  p244)  
Feelings   of   isolation   from   the  world   and   others,  we  might   plausibly   suggest,  
contribute  to  a  person  feeling  suicidal.  It  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  a  person  
who  feels   that  she  cannot   interact  with  either  other  people  or   the  world  more  
generally  may  begin  to  feel  that  her  life  is  ‘pointless’  or  a  form  of  ‘living  death’.  
Another  feature  of  temporal  experience  in  depression  that  I  have  highlighted  is  
the   experience   of   depression   as   eternal.  We   have   seen   that   the   retardation   of  
conation  may  lead  to  an  experience  of  the  future  as  blocked  or  inaccessible.  The  
depressed  person  therefore  experiences  the  present  as  eternal  and  unchanging  –  
there  is  no  sense  of  things  altering  or  improving  in  the  future.  I  demonstrated  in  
this  chapter  how  the  loss  of  practical  and  enticing  possibilities  might  exacerbate  
such  an  experience.  The  depressed  person  can  no  longer  perceive  the  possibility  
of  the  future  being  meaningfully  different  from  the  present,  and  so  the  current  
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state  of  depression  is  felt  to  be  both  eternal  and  impossible  to  recover  from.  This  
experience  of  recovery  as  impossible  may  be  thought  to  contribute  to  a  person  
becoming   suicidal.  Without   the  possibility   of   ‘escaping’   the  depression   in   the  
future,  death  may  begin  to  seem  to  be  the  only  way  out  of  the  current  state.  As  
Andrew  Solomon  writes   in  his  memoir  of  depression,  “If   I  had   truly  believed  
when   I  was   ill   that  my  situation  was  permanent,   I  would  have  killed  myself”  
(2002,   p274).   The   temporal   structure   that   we   encounter   in   many   cases   of  
depression  may  cause  a  person  to  believe  that  her  situation   is  permanent,  that  
she  will  always  be  depressed.  Hopelessness  has  been  identified  as  an  important  
risk   factor   for   the  development  of   suicidal   thoughts  and  behaviours   (Mann  et  
al,   1999;   Goodwin   and   Jamison,   2007,   pp261-­‐‑2),   and   this   form   of   temporal  
structure  appears  to  cause  the  person  to  lose  hope  of  recovery.  Mark  Williams  
writes,  “People  seem  able   to  bear  depression  so   long  as   they  are  able   to   think  
the  future  might  improve,  but  if  they  begin  to  feel  hopeless,  the  risk  of  suicidal  
behaviour   rises”   (2001,   p91).  We  might   suggest,   therefore,   that   this   temporal  
structure  increases  the  likelihood  of  the  person  developing  thoughts  of  suicide.  
As  one  person  with  bipolar  disorder  explains:  
…in   my   most   desperate   moments   I   believe   I   would   do,   will   do,  
anything   to   stop   the   suffocating,   all   consuming   excruciating   misery  
and  panic.  And  In  those  moments/hours/days/weeks  I  cannot  fathom  
the  possibility  that  it  might  stop  on  its  own.  (Garey,  2010,  p8)  
Finally,  I  noted  how  temporal  structures  common  in  depression  not  only  lead  to  
an   experience   of   depression   as   eternal;   they   also   create   an   experience   of   the  
future  as  threatening  and  death  as  imminent.  With  the  loss  of  the  possibility  of  
meaningful   change   in   the   future,   the  person   experiences  no  distance  between  
her  and  death  –  there  are  no  meaningful  activities  or  possibilities  that  provide  
this   necessary   separation.   As   such,   the   depressed   person’s   experience   is  
characterised  by  a  sense  of  passivity  before  a  future  that  holds  no  possibility  of  
improvement  as  well  as  a  feeling  that  death  is  bearing  down  on  her.  The  feeling  
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that  she  is  about  to  die  is  both  distressing  and  exhausting  for  the  person.  Given  
this,  it  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  many  in  this  situation  begin  to  think  about  
suicide.22   If   all   she   perceives   her   life   to   consist   of   is   a   painful   present   and   a  
threatening  future,  taking  control  of  her  own  death  may  begin  to  appear  to  be  
an  attractive  alternative  –   the   exhaustion  of   constantly  perceiving  death   to  be  
imminent   may   contribute   to   a   person   becoming   suicidal.23   Solomon   writes,  
“Though  suicide  assuages  present  suffering,  in  most  instances  it  is  undertaken  
to   avoid   future   suffering”   (2002,   p260).   Von   Gebsattel   quotes   a   girl   with  
depression  who  makes  this  link  between  suicidality  and  a  threatening  future:  
when  I  am  crocheting,  too,  the  emphasis  isn’t  on  the  fact  that  the  cover  
I’m  crocheting  is  getting  bigger,  but  on  the  fact  that  as  the  cover  gets  
bigger   the   lifeline   is   getting   shorter   and   shorter.   I   find   that   terrible.  
That   is   why   I   always   want   to   take   my   life,   to   escape   from   this  
thought….  (2012,  p215)  
Given  these  alterations   in   temporal  experience,   it   is  possible   that  some  people  
with   depression   will   experience   their   future   as   consisting   of   nothing   but  
suffering.  Thoughts  of  suicide  may,  in  such  situations,  arise  as  a  potential  way  
of  avoiding  seemingly  inevitable  suffering  in  the  future.  
Whilst  the  link  between  depressed  states  and  suicidality  may  appear  to  be  clear,  
the   link   between   forms   of   mixed   episodes   and   suicidality   is   perhaps   less  
obvious.   Suicide   attempts   are   uncommon   in   manic   states   (Goodwin   and  
Jamison,   1990,   pp240-­‐‑241).   In   contrast,   suicidal   thoughts   and   attempts  
                                                                                                 
22  Benson  et  al.  suggest  that  in  some  cases  suicide  attempts  may  be  seen  as  a  case  of  “letting  
nature  take  its  course”  (2013,  p77)  –  bringing  about  a  situation  that  appears  to  the  person  to  be  
inevitable.  
23  Benson  et  al.  note  that  “an  integral  part  of  the  feeling  of  being  suicidal  is  a  sense  of  
overwhelming  demand  on  one’s  mental  resources”  (2013,  p66).  This  feeling  of  being  near  death  
might  plausibly  be  thought  to  contribute  to  this  overwhelming  mental  demand.  
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frequently  occur  in  mixed  states  (APA,  2000,  p362).24  This  heightened  risk  may,  
in  part,  be  due  to  increased  energy  that  is  seen  in  many  mixed  states  (Goodwin  
and   Jamison,   1990,   p241).   The   person   in   a  mixed   state   has   both   the   desire   to  
commit  suicide,  and  the  energy  to  carry  out  such  a  task.  However,  the  account  I  
have   offered   of   the   possibility   of   mixed   states   helps   to   cast   light   on   other  
potential  contributing  factors.    
Earlier  in  this  chapter  I  provided  an  outline  of  how  we  might  understand  cases  
of   dysphoric  mania   –   a   form   of  mixed   state.   I   noted   how   the   account   I   have  
offered  of  mania  is  not  reliant  on  the  person  being  in  a  particular  mood  state  –  
the   temporal   and  bodily   experiences  may  underlie   a  dysphoric   experience,   as  
well  as  the  more  classical  euphoric.  A  dysphoric  manic  state,  therefore,  would  
contain  many  of  the  same  features  of  experience  that  I  suggested  occur  in  states  
of   euphoric   mania.   These,   crucially   for   our   current   discussion,   include   a  
reduced  ability   to   reflect  on   thought  or  action  and   the   loss  of  previously  held  
projects  and  commitments.    
The  manic  person,  we  have  seen,  loses  the  long-­‐‑term  projects  and  commitments  
that   previously   provided   structure   to   her   life.   Instead,   she   begins   to   develop  
tasks   and   interpretations   of   herself   that   are   entirely   based   on   what   she  
experiences   in   the   present   moment.   She   is   flighty,   detached,   and   highly  
distractible.   The   reduced   ability   to   reflect   means   she   is   no   longer   able   to  
perceive   likely   consequences   to   her   actions.   This   kind   of   experience,   when  
combined  with  a  dysphoric  mood,  may  make   the  person  more   likely   to   carry  
out  impulsive  suicidal  acts.25  If  the  thought  of  suicide  occurs  to  her,  or  she  finds  
herself   in   a   situation   in   which   suicide   is   a   possibility,   she   may   act   on   that  
                                                                                                 
24  See  Jamison  (2001,  pp111-­‐‑113)  for  one  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  mixed  states  and  
suicidality.  See  also  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp263)  for  discussion  of  the  rate  of  suicidality  
in  mixed  states.  
25  We  might  note  that  “impulsivity  is  associated  with  suicide  risk”  (Williams  and  Pollock,  2002,  
p81).  See  also  Mann  et  al  (1999).  
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thought  without  the  reflection  or  regard  to  consequence  that  we  might  usually  
expect.   Hornbacher,   for   example,   recalls   an   incident   during   a  mixed   state   in  
which  she  impulsively  slit  her  wrists:    
Mania   triggers   wildly   impulsive   behaviours…Who   knows,   really,  
what  leads  to  my  sudden,  uncontrollable  desire  to  cut  myself?  I  don’t  
know…I   simply   do   it,   unaware   in   the   instant   that   there  will   be   any  
consequence  at  all.  I  watch  my  right  hand  put  the  razor  in  my  left  arm.  
(2008,  pp6-­‐‑7)  
It   is   therefore   not   simply   that   the   person   in   a   dysphoric  manic   state   has   the  
energy   to   carry   out   suicidal   acts,   she   may   also   have   lost   the   ability   to  
meaningfully   reflect   on   her   current   situation   and   the   consequences   of   her  
actions.  Thus,  if  she  feels  suicidal  in  that  particular  moment,  or  if  the  thought  of  
suicide  occurs  to  her,  she  may  act  without  fully  reflecting  on  the  experience  in  a  
way  that  she  might  in  a  non-­‐‑mixed  state.  
The   loss   of   the   person’s   previously   held   projects   and   commitments  may   also  
contribute  to  this  impulsive  act  –  the  person  would  not,  for  example,  be  able  to  
maintain  the  same  commitment  to  life  goals  or  family  responsibilities.  Jamison  
notes   that   “Often   only   a   sense   of   responsibility   to   other   family   members   or  
concerns  about   the  effects  of  suicide  on   their  children  keep  some  people  alive  
who   otherwise   have   a   strong   desire   to   commit   suicide”   (2001,   p93).   As   this  
ability   to  maintain   long-­‐‑term  commitments   is  eroded   in  some   forms  of  mixed  
state,   these   responsibilities  may   no   longer   dissuade   the   person   from   carrying  
out  suicidal  acts.  Whilst  the  reduced  ability  to  maintain  projects  may  lessen  the  
likelihood  of  a  person  in  a  mixed  state  carrying  out  a  planned  suicide,  the  risk  of  
impulsively  carrying  out  suicidal  acts  must  therefore  be  seen  to  be  higher  than  
in  the  non-­‐‑mixed  state.  
We   can   therefore   see   how   common   features   of   experience   in   depression   and  
mixed  states  may  contribute  to  suicidal  thoughts  and  behaviours.  We  can  also  
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see  how   the   experience  of   suicidality   in   cases  of  depression  and   in  dysphoric  
manic  states  may  differ  significantly,  and  how  certain  features  of  the  depressed  
experience  –  such  as  the  heavy,  object-­‐‑like  body  –  may  in  fact  prevent  or  make  it  
less   likely   that   the  person  will   carry  out  suicidal  acts.  Whilst  we  cannot  make  
any  necessary  causal  links  between  experiences  of  depression  and  mixed  states  
and   suicidal   thoughts   and   feelings,   we   might   plausibly   suggest   that   certain  
common   features   of   these   states   play   some   role   in   the   development   of   such  
thoughts  and  feelings.  
Experiences  of  Time  in  Mania,  Depression,  and  Mixed  States  
In   this   chapter   I   have   explored   the   role   that   projects   play   in   structuring   our  
experiences   of   the   world   and   the   way   in   which   they   constitute   a   long-­‐‑term  
sense   of   temporal  direction.   I   discussed   the  different  ways   that   these  projects  
may  be  lost  or  altered  in  cases  of  mania  and  depression,  and  the  impact  that  this  
loss   may   have   on   world-­‐‑experience.   I   highlighted   the   relationship   between  
possibilities   and   conation,   and   noted   how   these   structures   can   help   us   to  
understand  why  the  loss  of  projects  is  experienced  differently  in  manic  versus  
depressed   states.   I   returned   to   our   earlier   questions   concerning   bodily  
experience,  showing  how  different  temporal  experiences  can  impact  on  the  way  
in   which   the   body   itself   is   experienced.   I   particularly   noted   how   the   loss   of  
projects   in  mania,   combined  with   the   continued   capacity   to   act,   allows   us   to  
understand  the  initially  unintuitive  descriptions  we  find  of  bodily  experience  in  
manic  episodes.  Next,  I  showed  how  this  account  of  mania  and  depression  can  
help   us   to   understand  mixed   states,  where   features   of  mania   and   depression  
co-­‐‑occur.   I   demonstrated   how   we   can   account   for   these   states   through  
descriptions   of   two   varieties   of   mixed   state:   Dysphoric   mania   and   agitated  
depression.  This  discussion  highlights  the  central  role  that  temporality  plays  in  
bipolar  disorder,  helping  to  enrich  our  understanding  of  both  the  manic  and  the  
depressed  state.  I  ended  with  a  brief  exploration  of  the  ways  key  temporal  and  
bodily  alterations  in  depression  and  mixed  states  may  contribute  to  experiences  
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of  suicidality.  This  final  discussion  highlights  the  importance  of  considering  the  
ways   in   which   phenomenological   research   may   be   developed   for   practical  
application.   In   my   concluding   chapter   I   therefore   turn   to   the   clinical   and  
philosophical   implications   of   this   thesis   as   well   as   considering   potential  
directions  for  further  research.  
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Conclusion  
The  aim  of  this  thesis  was  to  develop  a  cohesive  phenomenological  account  of  
mania  and  depression.  In  contrast  to  the  rich  philosophical  work  that  has  been  
developed  on   a  number  of  psychiatric  disorders,  most  notably   schizophrenia,  
mania,  depression,  and  bipolar  disorder  have  been  neglected.  This  is  despite  a  
marked  uncertainty  regarding  how  to  understand  experiences  of  these  states,  as  
evidenced   in   contemporary  debates   in   bipolar   disorder   research.  Drawing   on  
narrative   accounts   and   questionnaire   responses   I   have   sought   to   correct   this  
imbalance.   In   developing   my   account   I   have   addressed   alterations   in  
experiences  of  time,  the  body,  the  world,  and  other  people.    
Accounts  of  temporal  experience  in  mania  typically  suggest  that  in  manic  states  
the  person  experiences  an   increase   in  subjective   temporal  velocity   (e.g.  Fuchs,  
2013a).  In  contrast,  I  have  argued  that  in  cases  of  mania  there  is  a  weakening  of  
retention   and   an   increase   of   conation.   This   leads   to   experiences   of  
fragmentation,  loss  of  reflection,  loss  of  engagement,  and  a  diminished  sense  of  
ownership  of  actions.  I  demonstrated  how  the  weakening  of  retention  prevents  
the  maintenance  and  development  of  projects,  as  well  as  allowing  for  a  constant  
re-­‐‑interpretation   of   the   self   and   values.   In   manic   states,   the   loss   of   projects  
decontextualises  possibilities,   leading  to  an  excess  of  possibility.  This  helps  us  
to   understand   manic   grandiosity,   short-­‐‑lived   obsessions,   and   increased  
creativity.  
I  also  explored  the  effect  of  the  loss  of  projects  in  depression.  In  contrast  to  the  
manic  experience,  I  argued  that  in  depression  the  loss  of  projects  can  lead  to  a  
loss   of   practical   significance   and   enticing   possibilities.   Drawing   on   work   by  
Thomas   Fuchs   (2013a)   and   Matthew   Ratcliffe   (2012a),   I   suggested   that   the  
depressed  person   experiences   a   loss   of   conation.  This   helps  us   to  understand  
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the  commonly  reported  experiences  of  depression  seeming  to  be  eternal  as  well  
as   the   development   of   excessive   guilt.   I   demonstrated   how   protention   is  
impoverished   in   depressed   states   and   argued   that   an   impoverishment   of  
protention  necessitates  an   impoverishment  of   retention.     A   recognition  of   this  
alteration  to  temporal  structure  in  depression  casts  light  on  the  descriptions  of  
mild  fragmentation  that  we  find  in  first  person  accounts.    
An  appreciation  of  temporal  experience  in  mania  and  depression  can  enrich  our  
understanding   of   bodily   experience   in   these   states.   I   have   argued   that   in   the  
case  of  mania  the  weakening  of  retention  prevents  the  engagement  that  would  
allow   the   body   to   fade   out   of   conscious   awareness.   It   therefore   remains  
conspicuous.  However,   it  also  remains  active  due  to  the  experienced  excess  of  
possibilities.   In   cases   of   depression   the   body   is   also   conspicuous,   albeit   in   a  
markedly  different  way.  Following  Fuchs  (2003;  2005a),  I  have  argued  that  the  
depressed  body  is  ‘corporealized’.    
These   accounts   of   bodily   and   temporal   experience   also   help   us   to   better  
understand  depressed  and  manic  experiences  of  the  world  and  other  people.  A  
corporealized  body,  we  have   seen,  both   stands   in   the  way  of   interaction  with  
the   world   and   contributes   to   a   felt   loss   of   possibilities.   The   weakening   of  
retention   in   mania   leads   to   an   excess   of   enticing   possibilities   –   the   world  
drawing   the   person   in   to   action.   Desynchronization   of   interpersonal   time   in  
both  mania  and  depression  can  undermine  interpersonal  relations.  The  accounts  
of  mania  and  depression  that  I  have  developed  therefore  address  each  of  these  
central  features  of  time,  the  body,  the  world,  and  other  people.  
I  have  also  shown  how  my  account  allows  us  to  go  beyond  the  ‘pure’  states  of  
mania  and  depression,  helping  us  to  develop  an  understanding  of  how  features  
of  both   states  may  co-­‐‑occur.   I  demonstrated   this   through   two   forms  of  mixed  
episode:   ‘Dysphoric   mania’   and   ‘agitated   depression’.   However,   once   we  
appreciate   that  mania   and   depression   do   not   stand   in   opposition,   but   rather  
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exist  as   two  manifestations  of  similar  alterations   to  experiential  structures,  we  
may  allow  for  the  possibility  of  the  development  of  accounts  for  the  full  variety  
of  different  states  experienced  in  bipolar  disorder.    
Philosophical  Implications  
Although   my   primary   aim   was   to   develop   a   phenomenological   account   of  
mania   and   depression,   I   have   also   endeavoured   to   do   phenomenology.   As   I  
argued   in   chapter   one,   the   relationship   between   phenomenology   and  
psychiatry   is   mutually   informative   and   we   can   use   the   study   of   psychiatric  
disorders   to   inform   our   phenomenology.   This   thesis   contains   significant  
implications  for  our  phenomenological  understanding  of  bodily  experience  and  
temporal  experience.      
We  can  see  that  recognising  that  the  manic  body  is  both  conspicuous  and  active  
provides  a  direct  challenge  to  an  implicit  distinction  found  in  the  work  of  Fuchs  
(e.g.  2003)  between  the  body  as  conspicuous  and  inactive  and  the  body  as  invisible  
and  active.  This   recognition  emphasises   the  variety  of  ways   in  which   the  body  
may   be   or   become   conspicuous.   Furthermore,   I   have   shown   how   temporal  
experience  can  impact  on  bodily  experience,  thus  helping  us  to  understand  this  
variety.    This  further  demonstrates  the  intimate  links  between  these  experiential  
structures,   highlighting   the   difficulties   that   result   from   considering   them   in  
isolation.   A   full   understanding   of   bodily   experience   requires   an  
acknowledgment  of  the  associated  temporal  experience.    
Throughout  my  study  on  the  experiences  of  mania  and  depression  I  have  also  
drawn   out   the   complexities   of   temporal   experience.   I   have   refined   the  
Husserlian   account   of   temporal   synthesis,   highlighting   the   relationship  
between   protention   and   retention.   Further   to   this,   I   have   demonstrated   the  
relationship   between   shorter   and   longer-­‐‑term   temporal   structures:   Firstly,   I  
have  revealed  and  examined  links  between  projects  and  possibilities.  Secondly,  
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I  have  demonstrated  how  conation   is  stabilised  by  projects  and  commitments.  
Thirdly,   I   have   highlighted   the   relationship   between   conation   and   temporal  
synthesis.  Finally,   I  have  shown   the  necessity  of  an   intact   retentional   capacity  
for   the  development  and  maintenance  of  projects.   In  doing  this   I  have   further  
demonstrated   the   critical   role   that   experiences  of   time  play   in   structuring  our  
everyday  experiences.    
One   further   welcome   outcome   of   this   thesis   is   that   it   provides   a   means   of  
developing   a   phenomenological   distinction   between   bipolar   disorder   and  
schizophrenia.  Debates  regarding  whether  and  how  schizophrenia  and  affective  
disorders  can  be  distinguished  have  existed  for  at  least  the  last  hundred  years.1  
Differentiating   bipolar   disorder   from   schizophrenia   remains   a   diagnostic  
challenge   in   contemporary   clinical   settings.   As   Goodwin   and   Jamison   note,  
“presenting  symptoms  can  be  similar  in  mania  and  schizophrenia”  (2007,  p103).  
Phenomenological   accounts  move   beyond   these   superficial   presentations   and  
thus  allow  for  the  possibility  of  unearthing  structural  differences.  
Experiences  of  time  have  been  an  important  feature  of  recent  phenomenological  
accounts  of  schizophrenia  (e.g.  Fuchs,  2013a;  Gallagher,  2006).  Shaun  Gallagher  
(2006)   argues   that   temporal   synthesis   is   disrupted   in   cases   of   schizophrenia.  
Specifically,  he  suggests  that  there  is  a  loss  of  what  Husserl  calls  protention,  the  
anticipation  of   the   immediate   future.  This   is   a  view   that   is   also  developed  by  
Thomas  Fuchs   (e.g.   2013a).  Fuchs  argues   that   there   is  a  “fragmentation  of   the  
intentional   arc”   (2013a,  p85),  due   to  an   impairment  of  protention.  The  person  
with   schizophrenia   thus   experiences   a   fragmentation  of   experience,   alongside  
difficulties   anticipating   the   future.2   Gallagher   further   suggests   that   “the  
                                                                                                 
1  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  for  an  overview  of  the  historical  debate  (2007,  pp100-­‐‑102).    
2  Fuchs  (2013a)  notes  that  this  account  is  compatible  with  accounts  that  suggest  there  is  a  
disturbance  to  “ipseity”  or  a  minimal  sense  of  self.  See  Sass  and  Parnas  (2007)  for  one  account  of  
this  type.  The  link  between  these  two  accounts  is  also  acknowledged  by  Sass  and  Pienkos  
(2013b).    
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protentional  mechanism  underlies  the  sense  of  agency  for  thought”  (2006,  p193).  
Thus,  with  the  loss  of  protention  the  person  with  schizophrenia  also  loses  this  
agency  of  thought.  He  therefore  may  not  experience  his  thoughts  as  originating  
from   himself.   In   this  way,   Gallagher   suggests   that   the   loss   of   protention   can  
account   for   the   experience   of   “thought   insertion”,   in  which   a  person  believes  
that  an  outsider  has  inserted  thoughts  into  his  head.3  
If   these   accounts   are   correct,   we   can   provide   a   principled   phenomenological  
distinction   between   temporal   experience   in   mania   and   schizophrenia,   thus  
helping  us  to  move  beyond  the  similar  presenting  symptoms.  In  schizophrenia,  
we  have  seen,  protention  may  be  lost.  In  contrast,  I  have  proposed  that  in  cases  
of   mania   it   is   retention   that   is   damaged.   Although   both   mania   and  
schizophrenia   may   therefore   be   seen   to   involve   disruption   to   temporal  
synthesis,  it  is  different  aspects  of  temporal  synthesis  that  are  damaged.    Whilst  
we  see  similarities  between  the  presenting  symptoms  of  the  two  cases  (after  all,  
both   involve  significant  disruptions   to   temporal   synthesis),  we  can  still   find  a  
principled  way  of  distinguishing  between  the  two.    
Clinical  Implications  
Although  the  focus  in  this  thesis  has  been  on  developing  an  account  of  mania  
and  depression,  rather  than  on  exploring  how  best   to  treat  mania,  depression,  
or   bipolar   disorder,   we   may   still   consider   some   initial   implications   for  
treatment.   The   account   that   I   have   put   forward   highlights   how   the   loss   of  
projects   and   commitments   may   contribute   to   distressing   experiences   in   both  
mania  and  depression.  Considering  how  projects  may  be  maintained  or  rebuilt  
therefore   appears   to   be   a   potentially   beneficial   focus   for   the   development   of  
treatments.   In   some   cases   the   maintenance   of   projects   or   commitments   may  
help  to  guard  against  the  development  of  depression.  Learning  how  to  rebuild  
                                                                                                 
3  See  Gallagher  (2006,  pp194-­‐‑7)  for  a  full  discussion  of  thought  insertion.    
   215  
projects   may,   in   cases   where   the   possibility   of   practical   significance   has   not  
been   entirely   eroded,   help   the  person   to   restore   his   usual   experience   of   time,  
thus  preventing  the  depression  from  becoming  more  severe.    
In   some   cases   of   depression,   and  during  most  manic   states,   the   possibility   of  
developing   new   projects   is   lost.   In   these   cases   we   can   focus   on   preventative  
regimens.  We  have  seen  that  although  projects  and  commitments  are  frequently  
lost   in  manic  and  depressed  states,  habits  are  often  maintained.  It   is   the  novel  
tasks  and  structures  that  are  most  vulnerable  to  erosion  in  these  states.  As  such,  
the  prior  development  of  robust  habitual  structures  may  help  to  minimise   the  
distressing   effects   of   the   loss   of   projects.   The   maintenance   of   these   habitual  
tasks   may   help   to   contextualise   and   highlight   relevant   possibilities,   thus  
helping   to   stabilise   conation.  A  possible   focus  of   treatment,   therefore,  may  be  
the   development   of   habitual   tasks   and   structures.   Indeed,   the   importance   of  
maintaining  daily  routines  is  highlighted  in  literature  on  bipolar  treatment  (e.g.  
Frank  et  al.  2000).  
I  have  also  highlighted  the  distressing  experience  of  alienation  or  distance  from  
others,   common   in   both   mania   and   depression   (albeit   in   notably   different  
forms,   as   frustration   in   mania   and   isolation   in   depression).   I   particularly  
stressed   the   role   that   intersubjective   time   plays   in   this   experience,   where   a  
person  in  a  manic  or  depressed  state  finds  himself  out  of  synch  with  the  time  of  
others.  A  possible  focus  for  treatment  may,  therefore,  be  on  the  development  of  
a  sense  of  intersubjective  time.  Engagement  in  projects  with  others  that  focus  on  
shared   attention   and   the   acknowledgement   of   objective   temporal   markers   –  
calendar  based  celebrations  or  occasions,  or  certain  tasks  occurring  at  the  same  
time  each  day  –  may  plausibly  help   to  minimise   the  distressing  experience  of  
desynchronization.    
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There   are   a   number   of   different   forms   these   projects   might   take.4   One  
interesting   possibility   is   the   use   of   ‘Arts   in   Health’.   These   services   aim   to  
provide   opportunities   for   those   with   health   difficulties   to   engage   in   artistic  
projects,   often   group   based   and   community   rooted.   Such   projects   may   be  
thought   to   provide   distraction   and   give   “participants   a   sense   of   individual  
achievement   at   having   made   something   which   has   some   value   within   their  
community”   (Macnaughton   et   al.,   2005,   p335).   However,   we  might   plausibly  
suggest   that   arts   in   health   offers   one  means   of   both   developing   projects   and  
re-­‐‑synchronizing  intersubjective  temporal  experiences.  Encouraging  this  kind  of  
engagement  in  projects  may  be  beneficial  for  those  with  bipolar  disorder.  Forms  
of   ‘Interpersonal  and  Social  Rhythm  Therapy’  may  similarly  prove  beneficial.5  
The   focus   in   this   form   of   therapy   is   on   stabilising   daily   routines   and   “social  
rhythms”,   as   well   as   helping   the   person   to   manage   interpersonal   problems  
(Frank  et  al.  1999;  Frank  et  al.  2000).6  Re-­‐‑establishing  these  habits  and  routines,  
along   with   the   focus   on   maintaining   interpersonal   routines   and   relationships,  
may  plausibly  help  to  stabilise  the  person’s  experience  of  time.    
These   suggestions,   it   must   be   stressed,   are   made   only   tentatively.  What   this  
thesis   provides   is   a   sense   of   the   possible   direction   of   research   into   potential  
treatments,  rather  than  an  account  of  the  exact  form  that  such  treatments  would  
take.   What   is   revealed   here   are   the   points   at   which   experience   is   altered,  
suggesting  potential  targets  for  effective  treatment.  It  may  be,  however,  that  it  is  
not   possible   to   artificially   develop   effective   responses   to   these   structural  
changes.  Extensive  empirical  research  would  be  needed  in  order  to  discover  the  
                                                                                                 
4  See  Fuchs  (2001)  for  a  list  of  guidelines  for  a  possible  resynchronization  therapy.  
5  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp900-­‐‑2)  for  an  overview  of  Interpersonal  and  Social  Rhythm  
Therapy.  
6  Frank  et  al.  (2000)  discuss  an  interesting  link  between  these  daily  routines  and  social  rhythms  
and  circadian  rhythms,  which  are  often  disrupted  in  cases  of  bipolar  disorder.  See  Goodwin  
and  Jamison,  (2007,  pp659-­‐‑688)  for  a  full  discussion  of  bipolar  disorder  and  circadian  rhythms.    
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form  of  effective  treatments  and  the  extent  to  which  they  may  be  beneficial  for  
individuals.  
Further  Research  
The   focus   in   this   thesis   has   been   on   experiences   of  mania   and   depression   in  
English-­‐‑speaking  western  countries.  An  obvious  direction  for  the  development  
of   this  account  would  be   to  perform  a  cross-­‐‑cultural  phenomenological  study,  
exploring  the  extent  to  which  similar  structures  underlie  experiences  of  mania  
and   depression   in   a   variety   of   different   countries.   Colleagues   of  mine   at   the  
University  of  Osnabrück  have  already  begun   research   in   this  area,   translating  
the   Durham  Depression  Questionnaire   into   Spanish,   German,   and   Bulgarian.  
They  have  placed  a  translated  version  of  the  questionnaire  on  the  website  of  a  
Bulgarian  mental  health  organisation  and  have  received  sixty-­‐‑six  responses  so  
far.7  Further  studies  may  focus  on  obtaining  results  from  Spanish  and  German  
speaking  countries  in  the  hope  that  similarly  rich  descriptions  can  be  gathered.  
Comparison  of   the   responses   to   these  questionnaires,   along  with   the   study  of  
relevant   first  person  narratives,  may  yield  valuable   results.   Further   studies   in  
this  area  could  explore  whether  differences  seen  in  the  experience  of  depression  
in   different   countries   are   a   result   of   structural   differences,   or   whether  
differences  at  a  superficial  level  belie  structural  similarities.  The  extent  to  which  
the  experience  of  mania  or  depression  is  consistent  across  different  cultures  has  
clear  relevance  for  the  diagnosis  and  treatment  of  bipolar  disorder.    
A   second   area   of   potential   further   study  would   be   to   explore   the   distinction  
between  unipolar  and  bipolar  depression.  It  has  been  claimed  that  depression  as  
experienced   by   a   person   with   bipolar   disorder   is   markedly   different   from  
depression   as   experienced   by   someone   with   a   purely   unipolar   depression.  
Goodwin  and  Jamison,  for  example,  write:  
                                                                                                 
7  http://psihichnozdrave.com/links/на-­‐‑български/.  Accessed:  18th  September  2013.  
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Compared  with  unipolar  patients,  depressed  bipolar  patients…appear  
clinically   to   be   less   physically   active   and   more   likely   to   sleep  
excessively.   Other   reported   differences   include   lower   ratings   of  
anxiety,   anger,   and   physical   complaints,   more   psychomotor  
retardation,   and   a   greater   likelihood   of   experiencing   depressive  
delusions  or  hallucinations.  
(1990,  p43)  
Phenomenological   analysis   of   the   bipolar   and   unipolar   experiences   of  
depression  may  prove  enlightening,  helping  to  clarify  whether  and  the  extent  to  
which  there  are  meaningful  differences  between  the  states.  There  are,  however,  
significant   concerns   about   misdiagnosis   that   may   present   difficulties   for   any  
such   analysis.8   A   person   who   currently   appears   to   have   only   a   unipolar  
depression  may  in  the  future  experience  a  manic  episode.  The  question  of  how  
to   determine   what   is   a   case   of   unipolar   depression   without   making  
pre-­‐‑judgements  or  assumptions  about   the  differences  between  the  experiences  
may,  therefore,  prove  to  be  extremely  difficult.  However,  determining  potential  
differences   between   cases   of   unipolar   and   bipolar   depression   would   be  
extremely  valuable.  Not  only  might  this  help  us  to  predict  whether  a  person  is  
likely  to  experience  a  manic  episode  in  the  future,  there  may  also  be  differences  
in  appropriate  treatment  for  these  potentially  different  types  of  depression.9  
I  noted  in  chapter  two  the  difficulty  of  distinguishing  depression  from  grief,  a  
topic   that   has   received   considerable   attention   following   the   publication   of  
DSM-­‐‑5   (APA,   2013).   Having   developed   a   phenomenological   account   of  
depression,  a  valuable  further  study  would  be  to  develop  a  phenomenological  
account   of   grief   and   to   explore   the   similarities   and  differences   between   these  
two   experiences.      For   example,   the   account   of   temporal   experience   in  
                                                                                                 
8  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp104-­‐‑106)  for  a  discussion  of  the  misdiagnosis  of  bipolar  
disorder  as  unipolar  depression.  
9  See  Goodwin  and  Jamison  (2007,  pp771-­‐‑778)  for  discussion  of  the  topic  of  those  with  bipolar  
disorder  ‘switching’  from  states  of  depression  to  states  of  mania  following  the  use  of  
antidepressants.  
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depression   that   I   have   developed   in   this   thesis   may   be   contrasted   with   the  
temporal   experience   in   cases  of  grief   in  order   to  determine  whether   and  how  
the  states  differ  in  this  regard.  A  phenomenologically  informed  discussion  that  
compares   depression   and   grief   would,   therefore,   be   an   interesting   and  
informative  development  and  application  of  this  thesis.    
As  diagnosis  of  bipolar  disorder  in  children  has  dramatically  increased  in  recent  
years,10  it  would  be  valuable  to  extend  this  study  to  include  the  experiences  of  
mania   and   depression   in   children,   allowing   us   to   explore   whether   their  
experience   of   these   states   is   different   from   those   of   adults.   We   might,   for  
example,   investigate  whether   temporal   structures   and   bodily   experiences   are  
comparable  in  adults  and  children  with  bipolar  disorder.  However,  there  is  an  
additional   difficulty   in   researching   cases   of   childhood   bipolar   disorder.   We  
should  not  assume  that  typical  structures  of  experience  in  adults  are  the  same  
as   the   typical   structures   found   in   children’s   experiences   –   what   may   be   an  
alteration  from  the  everyday  in  the  case  of  the  adult  may  not  be  an  alteration  in  
the  case  of  the  child.  It  would  first  be  necessary,  for  example,  to  determine  what  
an   everyday   experience   of   time   is   for   a   child,   before   we   could   investigate  
whether  and  to  what  extent  such  an  experience  is  altered  in  childhood  bipolar  
disorder.  This   is   not   to   say   that   such   a   research  project  would  be   impossible.  
However,  we  must  acknowledge  the  additional  difficulties  that  come  with  any  
phenomenological   discussion   of   childhood   experience   –   a   straightforward  
comparative  study  of  typical  experiences  of  mania  and  depression  in  adults  and  
in  children  would  not  be  sufficient.  
A  final  development  that  may  prove  to  be  informative  would  be  to  examine  the  
links  between  mania,  depression  and  other  psychiatric  disorders.  For  example,  
we  have  seen  that  experiences  of   the  body  are  significantly  altered   in  cases  of  
                                                                                                 
10  Moreno  et  al.  (2007)  found  a  forty-­‐‑fold  increase  in  youth  diagnosis  of  bipolar  disorder  
between  1994-­‐‑5  and  2002-­‐‑3.  
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depression.   Given   this,   it   would   be   interesting   to   explore   whether   we   can  
uncover  any  plausible   links  between   these  experiences  and  experiences  of   the  
body   in  eating  disorders,  such  as  anorexia  nervosa  and  bulimia  nervosa.11  We  
might   additionally   explore   whether   the   presence   of   depression   significantly  
alters   the   bodily   experiences   of   eating   disorders,   or   if   the   bodily   experience  
remains   the   same   regardless   of  whether   or   not   the   person   is   depressed.   This  
direction   of   research   may   also   be   valuable   in   the   exploration   of   other  
psychiatric   disorders   that   are   commonly   comorbid   with   depression,   such   as  
Body   Dysmorphic   Disorder   (APA,   2000,   p509)   or   Obsessive   Compulsive  
Disorder  (APA,  2000,  p458).  In  this  way,  the  accounts  of  mania  and  depression  I  
have  put  forward  can  be  developed  in  order  to  contribute  to  our  understanding  
of   a   number   of   psychiatric   disorders.   More   broadly,   these   suggestions   for  
further   research   highlight   some   of   the   ways   in   which   this   thesis   may   be  
developed,  forming  a  foundation  for  further  philosophical  and  clinical  work.  
                                                                                                 
11  It  is  notable  that  depressive  symptoms  and  mood  disorders  more  generally  are  common  in  
those  that  have  eating  disorders  (APA,  2000,  p585;  p591).  
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Appendix  
Durham  Depression  Questionnaire    
Section  A:  Background  information  
Age    
Gender    
Country  of  residence    
Medical  diagnosis  of  depression    
Year  of  diagnosis    
Specifics  of  diagnosis    
Forms  of  treatment    
Other  psychiatric  diagnoses    
Specifics  of  other  diagnoses    
Currently  depressed?    
Section  B:  Your  Experience  of  Depression  
1. Describe  your  emotions  and  moods  during  those  periods  when  you  are  
depressed.   In   what   ways   are   they   different   from   when   you   are   not  
depressed?  
2. Does  the  world  look  different  when  you’re  depressed?  If  so,  how?  
3. Do   other   people,   including   family   and   friends,   seem   different   when  
you’re  depressed?  If  so,  how?  
4. How  does  your  body  feel  when  you’re  depressed?  
5. How   does   depression   affect   your   ability   to   perform   routine   tasks   and  
other  everyday  activities?  
6. When  you  are  depressed,  does  time  seem  different  to  you?  If  so,  how?  
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7. How,  if  at  all,  does  depression  affect  your  ability  to  think?  
8. In  what  ways,  if  any,  does  depression  make  you  think  differently  about  
life  compared  to  when  you  are  not  depressed?  
9. If  you  have  taken  medication  for  depression,  what  effect  did  it  have?  
10. Are   there   aspects   of   depression   that   you   find   particularly   difficult   to  
convey   to  others?   If   so,   could  you   try  as  best  you  can   to   indicate  what  
they  are  and  why  they  are  so  hard  to  express.  
11. What  do  you   think  depression   is   and  what,   in  your  view,   caused  your  
depression?  
12. Who  and/or  what  have  you  consulted  in  order  to  try  to  understand  your  
depression?  (E.g.,  medical  practitioners,  friends,  books,  internet  sources,  
etc.).  
13. If   there   are   important   aspects   of   your   experience   of   depression   not  
covered  by  this  questionnaire  please  describe  them  here.  
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